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Abstract
Adopting the Euro in Central Europe: Cross-national variations in the strategies 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia
This thesis argues that the prospect of joining the euro-zone plays a predominant role 
in designing monetary and fiscal policies in the so-called Visegrad countries: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Despite generally agreeing with the objective 
of European Monetary Union (EMU) membership and being shaped by common 
features, cross-national variations persist in the Visegrad countries’ strategies for the 
adoption of the euro. The puzzle solved here is why the new EU members respond in 
country-specific ways to the objective of joining the euro-zone. The analytical 
framework applied focuses on domestic-level accounts of interests, ideas and 
institutions.
The argument is that countries are not materially-driven generic units or unitary actors 
within the international system. Cross-national variations in approaching the euro-zone 
entry have to be understood by reference to a domestic-level analysis of interests, 
ideas and institutions. Evidence of this argument is provided by analysing the 
preferences of political parties and individuals on European integration and the euro. 
Opportunistic and economic interests help to understand the turns the Visegrad 
countries have made in their approach to adopting the euro, but interests do not 
explain why EMU accession acquired different meanings in the countries under review. 
Interests do not account for actor’s ideas and therefore cannot motivate policy-makers’ 
actions. This is not to claim that interests do not matter, but rather that ideas provide 
road maps for the euro-adoption strategies that fit different interests. Moreover this 
thesis argues that interests are constantly expressed through and mediated by 
institutions and demonstrates how institutional constraints arising from the electoral 
system, the degree of central bank independence and industrial relations affect the 
euro-adoption strategy. This thesis analyses the interplay of interests, ideas and 
institutions for each Visegrad country examined, and demonstrates their relative 
significance in understanding cross-national variations in their euro-adoption strategies.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This thesis analyses why the new EU member states have chosen different strategies 
for adopting the euro in the course of the transition process. The requirements for join­
ing the euro-zone as such promote fiscal and monetary policies convergence amongst 
the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). However, despite generally 
agreeing with the objective of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership and 
being shaped by common features, the CEECs display a cross-national variation in the 
strategies pursued for the adoption of the euro. This thesis seeks to solve the puzzle of 
why the new EU members respond in country-specific ways to the objective of euro­
zone membership by applying an analytical framework of discussion that focuses on 
domestic-level accounts of interests, ideas, and institutions. It is argued that the rela­
tionship between interests, ideas, institutions and policy outcomes gives valuable in­
sights into the national strategy chosen for advancing towards euro-zone entry.
This thesis concentrates on the so-called Visegrad countries: the Czech Repub­
lic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland. The Visegrad countries joined the EU on 1 May 
2004 as “Member States with a derogation” (Art. 122 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, TEC) and have to introduce the euro as soon as they meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Adoption of the Economic and Monetary Union is part of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire requirement for EU accession.1 In fact, participation in the euro­
zone is mandatory, for the clauses that permitted the United Kingdom and Denmark not 
to adopt the euro were provided under specific circumstances and were not applicable 
to the new member states.
1 The acquis communautaire is the body of common rights and obligations deriving from EU treaties, 
laws, and regulations and binds all EU member states together. It consists of more than 80,000  
pages and comprises the content, principles, and political objectives of the treaties, the legislation 
adopted in application of the treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice, the declarations and 
resolutions adopted by the EU, measures relating to the common foreign and security policy, meas­
ures relating to justice and home affairs, and international agreements concluded by the Community 
or by the Member States among themselves in the field of the Union's activities (European Commis­
sion 2000a).
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The Visegrad countries form a relatively homogenous group in a very distinctive 
political and economic landscape in Central and Eastern Europe: first, the then 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were the frontrunners of the political debate on 
the integration into the European Community, having begun discussions on a common 
approach to their ‘return to Europe’ as early as April 1990.2 Second, following the close 
cooperation on this debate, the countries formed the so-called Visegrad Group at a 
meeting in Visgerad, Hungary in February 1991 in order to encourage economic and 
political cooperation especially with regards to issues on joining the European integra­
tion process. Third, the Visegrad countries were among the first states with which the 
European Community started to negotiate the Europe agreements. They have been 
able to establish strong political links and the closest economic ties with the EU since 
the collapse of the communist regimes. Fourth, they have the largest economies of the 
region in US dollar terms and very open economies, attracting between 70 percent and 
90 percent of all the foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
Czech Republic is the regional leader in terms of aggregate FDI per head, followed by 
Hungary. Poland is the leader in attracting FDI in absolute terms (EBRD 2004: 45). 
Fifth, the Visegrad countries are the region’s main trading partners for the EU and es­
pecially for the EU’s largest economy, Germany. Yet, the Visegrad countries experi­
ence greater difficulties to adhere to the Maastricht criteria than smaller CEECs like 
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia that first joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism II and 
are expected to join the euro-zone well before the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland or 
Slovakia.
Despite occupying similar systemic positions and being exposed to the same ex­
ternal constraints, the Visegrad countries display a cross-national variation in their 
strategies pursued for the adoption of the euro, that is, their preferences deviate from 
what systemic theories would predict. This thesis rejects systemic approaches that
2 While Slovakia provides a special case because it separated from the Czech Republic in 1992 and ex­
perienced different democratisation and market reforms, the Visegrad countries still share crucial similari­
ties (see above and cf Vachudova 2005: 8-9). In addition, although the new independent Slovakia was 
created on 1 January 1993, it might still be argued that all Visegrad countries “undertook a democratic 
revolution in 1989 in conditions of establishing state sovereignty. Even in Slovakia [...] Bratislava was the 
centre of Slovak politics in 1989” (Vachudova 2005: 9).
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focus on the political and economic structure of the international system to explain 
monetary cooperation and integration. Instead of arguing that the systemic-level is the 
exogenous source of state preferences, this thesis takes preferences on the adoption 
of the euro as endogenously given (cf Sandholtz 1993). Thus, the argument is that the 
euro-adoption strategies depend on domestic politics and actors’ perceptions; they 
depend on conditions and circumstances.
This thesis focuses on a period between the beginning of the transition process 
in 1989/90 and February 2005, when the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav 
Klaus, appointed three new members to the Czech central bank board all of whom are 
well known for their sceptical views on the adoption of the euro. Certainly, euro-zone 
membership was far from being on the political agenda at the outset of the transition 
process and therefore the empirical chapters of this thesis focus for the most part on 
developments since the late 1990s. Nevertheless, it is necessary to refer to the period 
of the early 1990s in order to make sense of the developments that eventually led to 
the respective euro-adoption strategies. In addition, the complex and dynamic process 
of enlargement started well before the opening of accession negotiations, as the 
Visegrad countries’ political and economic cooperation began with the EU’s first 
Europe Agreements on 16 December 1991. This chapter therefore starts with a de­
scription of pre-accession relations, the EU accession process and the implications of 
EMU membership for the Visegrad countries. It then discusses economic and Interna­
tional Relations approaches to monetary cooperation and points to the main shortcom­
ings of the discussed systemic approaches for understanding cross-national variations 
in the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad countries. Subsequently, the chapter 
introduces the analytical framework adopted in this thesis as further developed in the 
following chapter and finally lays out the thesis structure.
Pre-accession relations, EU accession and implications of EMU
The Europe Agreements (EAs) of 1991 were an important step toward economic and 
political cooperation and integration between the CEECs and the EU. The EAs called
13
for the EU to increase its economic and financial assistance to CEECs in an attempt to 
promote economic and political convergence. The EAs did not commit the CEECs to 
monetary integration: they merely required a successive liberalisation of financial mar­
kets and capital mobility, while not interfering in the monetary sovereignty of the asso­
ciated countries. The EAs covered trade liberalisation, political dialogue, various forms 
of economic, financial, and technical cooperation, and the approximation of CEECs 
laws to EU law, most especially in the fields of competition law, state subsidies, cus­
toms, product standards and intellectual property rights (see Temprano-Arroyo and 
Feldman 1999: 744). The most notable step toward an enlarged Europe was then 
made at the Copenhagen Summit held in June 1993. The European Council laid down 
how accession would be granted once each applicant fulfilled the relevant economic 
and political criteria. These preconditions -  the so-called Copenhagen criteria -  in­
cluded:
1. The achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
respect for human rights and the protection of minorities.
2. The existence of a functioning market economy.
3. The capacity to cope with the pressure and market forces likely to be faced within 
the Union.
4. Full acceptance of the acquis communautaire, i.e., the ability to take on the obliga­
tions of EU membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union (cf Conclusions of the Presidency SN 180/1/93).
Accession negotiations then began in March 1998 with the following “first wave” coun­
tries: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus. At the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999, the EU decided that six more states would be officially reg­
istered as candidates for EU membership; these included Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Malta. Not until October 2002 did the European Commission 
reveal a possible accession date, stating that 10 applicant countries (all but Bulgaria 
and Romania) would be ready to join the EU by May 2004.
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As the Copenhagen criteria included the ability of the Visegrad countries to ad­
here to the aims of EMU, the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of 
the European Commission launched its pre-accession fiscal surveillance mechanism 
for the accession countries in 2001. This mechanism comprised screening in the area 
of fiscal and monetary policy with respect to EU and EMU accession requirements and 
was divided into an annual debt and deficit notification and a pre-accession economic 
programme (PEP) (European Commission 2000b: 5).
In addition to the Copenhagen criteria and in an effort to facilitate the integration 
of the accession countries into the single European market (cf Smith 2004: 122) and to 
develop the financial sector and ensure monetary and fiscal discipline, the Visegrad 
countries had to fulfil the following EMU-related conditions during the pre-accession 
phase:
- Establishment of independent central banks and monetary authorities (Art. 108 
TEC).3
- Prohibition of direct public-sector financing by the central bank (Art. 104a TEC) and 
of privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions (Council Regulation 
TEC No. 3604/93 specifying definitions for Art. 104a TEC).
- Liberalisation of capital movements (Art. 56 TEC).
Upon accession, the CEECs went straight into stage three of EMU.4 However, as mem­
ber states with a derogation, the new member states remain outside the euro-zone until 
they meet the convergence criteria. From the day of their accession the new member 
states had to adopt the following policies (see European Commission 2000a: 37):
- Treatment of exchange rate policy as a matter of common interest and in light of 
the expected participation in the exchange rate mechanism (Art. 124 TEC).
3 All articles refer to the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by the Treaty on Euro­
pean Union signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, the Treaty of Amsterdam signed on 2 October 1997 
and the Treaty of Nice, signed on 26 February 2001.
4 Stage one started for the then member states in 1990 with the complete abolition of capital controls as 
under Article 56 of the TEC. In stage two (1 January 1994 - 31 December 1998) member states had to 
implement measures to achieve compliance with the EMU requirements to be able to enter EMU on 1 
January 1999. Stage three of EMU began on 1 January 1999 with the introduction of the euro on financial 
markets.
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- Avoidance of excessive government deficits and adherence to the relevant provi­
sions of the stability and growth pact (Art. 104 TEC).
- Participation in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) from the date of 
accession (Art. 109 TEC).5
- Progress toward a high degree of sustainable convergence (Art. 121 TEC) and the 
Maastricht convergence criteria.
- Treatment of economic policies as a matter of common concern and coordination of 
economic policies among member states through participation in Community proce­
dures (Art. 98 and 99 TEC).
The latter point of participation in the EU’s economic policy coordination contains the 
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) (Art. 99 (2) TEC) and the multilateral sur­
veillance (Art. 99 (3)). The BEPG is the central reference document for the annual as­
sessment of economic policies in the EU. If the Guidelines are not followed the Council 
can issue recommendations to the country concerned (Art. 99 (4) TEC). Multilateral 
surveillance is the procedure that allows the EU to monitor and assess national eco­
nomic developments and policies. The multilateral surveillance of economic policy also 
comprises the two regulations (Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 and No 1467/97) 
that form the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). While member states with a derogation 
are not bound by the full provisions of the SGP, they have to submit annual medium- 
term convergence programmes in preparation for EMU in accordance with the proce­
dures of the SGP (see European Commission 2001a: 25). These annual programmes 
are monitored by the European Commission and peer-reviewed in the Council of Minis­
ters of Economics and Finance (ECOFIN); they are subject to the excessive deficit pro­
cedure but not submitted to procedure according to which the Council may apply sanc­
tions.
5 Art. 7 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB requires full political and functional independence of member 
banks and prohibits direct fiscal financing (see also Art. 104a and 108 TEC). Political independence 
means that the central bank “has freedom to decide how to pursue its goals and [...] that its decisions are 
very hard for any other branch of government to reverse” (Blinder 1998: 54). Functional independence 
means that the central bank can freely use instruments and techniques to influence monetary and ex­
change rate policies (Masciandaro and Spinelli 1994, Blinder 1998).
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Their status as member states with a derogation gives the Visegrad countries some 
leeway in setting the target date since there is no fixed timetable for the adoption of the 
euro. Of particular importance for setting the target date is the requirement for partici­
pation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM) for at least two years and within a 15 
percent fluctuation range against the euro before adopting the single currency. There­
fore, the earliest possible date for an enlargement of the euro-zone by the new member 
states that first joined ERM II on 28 June 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia), would 
be the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007, given that the convergence test6 can only 
take place after the two years of ERM II membership (thus after June 2006).7 The ERM 
participation requirement is one of the convergence or Maastricht criteria, as described 
in article 121 (1) TEC. The following convergence criteria need to be fulfilled in order to 
qualify for euro-zone membership:
- Price stability, for a year before assessment, the inflation rate must not exceed by 
more than 1.5 percent that of the three best-performing member states.
- Budget deficit: the budget deficit must not exceed 3 percent of GDP.
- National debt: government debt must not exceed 60 percent of GDP.
- Long-term interest rates: the long-term interest rate should not exceed by more 
than 2 percent the average of the three member states with the lowest inflation 
rates.
- Participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism: the currency must stay within the 
narrow ranges of the ERM, with no realignment for at least two years.
Whereas the Copenhagen criteria set standards related to a functioning market 
economy, the capacity to cope with market pressures within the EU and to adhere to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union, the Maastricht criteria were de­
6 Following the reports from the European Commission and the European Central Bank and after the con­
sultation of the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers of Economics and Finance (ECOFIN) will 
decide on a qualified-majority basis whether the criteria are sufficiently met and will accordingly announce 
the date for the introduction of the euro. The irrevocable conversion rate between the respective national 
currency and the euro will then be set by the Council on the basis of a decision taken unanimously by the 
current euro-zone members and the country concerned.
7 The current members of the euro-zone introduced a transition period of three years between EMU ac­
cession and the introduction of euro cash. The new member states have indicated their intention of follow­
ing a so-called “big bang” scenario in which the adoption of the euro will happen at the same time as the 
introduction of euro coins and bills (see European Commission 2004: 2-5).
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signed to achieve price stability, low long-term interest rates, low public deficits and 
exchange rate stability. Thus, whereas the Copenhagen criteria focus on real and le­
gal-institutional convergence, i.e., on convergence in the economies’ structural and 
institutional characteristics, the Maastricht criteria place emphasis on nominal conver­
gence.8 Accordingly, the Copenhagen and Maastricht criteria follow two distinctive aims 
and types of benchmarks. In addition, whereas the Copenhagen criteria are also ac­
cession criteria, meeting the Maastricht criteria is not a precondition for EU accession. 
Nevertheless, prior to their EU accession, the Maastricht criteria put pressure on the 
Visegrad countries, since they had already paid close attention to the requirements 
when designing domestic fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. This was be­
cause the Maastricht criteria had a meaning for the Visegrad countries beyond that of 
defining the overall framework for a sound monetary and fiscal policy: fulfilment dem­
onstrated readiness for EU accession and the definitive break with the communist past 
(Lavrac 1999: 116). In addition, in their efforts to fulfil the Maastricht criteria, the 
Visegrad countries are driven by the desire not to be “second-class” countries and citi­
zens after EU accession. Moreover, after EU accession, the commitment to the Maas­
tricht criteria develops a further dimension as the Council can decide not to provide 
funds for new projects to the new member states if they “have failed to take action to 
correct an excessive deficit or has not respected the Stability and Growth Pact” (Jones 
forthcoming). Certainly, EMU membership brings benefits and would enhance the 
Visegrad countries’ economic and political credibility, which are especially important for 
attracting international investors, but the adherence to the Maastricht criteria also en­
tails adjustment costs (Buiter and Grafe 2004). Here, the Visegrad countries face a 
policy dilemma arising from the intention to meet the Maastricht criteria at an early 
stage of transition, on the one hand, and the need for structural reforms, on the other. 
This is because the Visegrad countries still encounter special transition problems that 
require high levels of public spending and investment (e.g. on infrastructure), but stand
8 The real convergence parameters of the Maastricht criteria are only secondary in nature (see Back6 
1999: 121).
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in conflict with the EMU’s budget criterion.9 In addition, bringing down the inflation rate 
and meeting the Maastricht Treaty’s stable exchange rate criterion are to a certain ex­
tent incompatible.10 During the catching-up process, the Visegrad countries will either 
be under enormous inflationary pressure or have an appreciating nominal exchange 
rate, deriving from the need to reform expenditure and from faster growth than in the 
euro area.11
The technical implications of EMU accession have a considerable impact on the 
Visegrad countries’ economies and politics. However, the current literature on the im­
plications of EMU accession focuses almost exclusively on economic aspects (Begg et 
al. 1999, 2003, Boone and Maurel 1999, de Grauwe and Lavrac 1999, Krenzler and 
Senior Nello 1999, Temprano and Feldman 1999, Artis and Zhang 2002, Buiter and 
Grafe 2002, 2004, Eichengreen and Ghironi 2003, Back§ et al. 2004, Angeloni et al. 
2005). The broader context of politico-economic interdependence is rarely mentioned.12 
This is surprising, since the prospect of EMU membership is already guiding and con­
straining today's new member countries’ monetary and fiscal policy. A politico- 
economic account is needed because the real difficulty in reforming the economy is 
political, given that policy adjustment involves significant costs, especially at the outset 
of reforms. Problems are related to questions of how actors are affected by institutional 
constraints in implementing the necessary policy reforms, how to share adjustment 
burdens, that is, how to implement the reform programme without creating new social
9 Given that the Maastricht criteria were not designed for transition economies, scholars argue that the 
convergence criteria and the SGP miss “the economic realities of countries that differ from the EU average 
as regards to their expected inflation and real GDP growth rates and their inherited stocks of environ­
mental and public sector capital” (Buiter and Grafe 2004: 68).
10 This can be explained by what is called the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The Balassa-Samuelson 
effect describes the mechanism by which an increase (larger than in other countries) in productivity of 
tradable goods relative to nontradable goods causes an appreciation of the exchange rate (Balassa 1964, 
Samuelson 1964). If productivity growth in one country is higher than in another, inflation will be higher 
in the former. Thus, as the Visegrad countries catch up with higher GDP growth rates, their price level 
also catches up, so that their inflation rates are higher as well.
11 There is a growing discussion among economists about the extent to which the exchange rate apprecia­
tion and inflation in CEEC is attributable to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see Egert 2002a,b, Egert et al. 
2003, Mihaljek and Klau 2004).
12 The only exceptions so far have been Kemmerling (2003) and the Berlin Group of Ezoneplus (2004), 
focusing on socio-economic aspects of EMU Eastward enlargement. Dyson (forthcoming) analyses the 
effects of EMU on policies, politics and public institutions in CEECs.
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divisions and social unrest and without putting the government’s re-election at risk. In 
addition, the adoption of the euro touches upon issues of state sovereignty and culture 
(Jones 2002: 23), as giving up its national currency is related to the risk of losing a 
‘symbolic marker in nation-building efforts’ (Risse 2003: 487). Therefore a further ob­
stacle to joining the euro-zone might stem from the countries’ reluctance to transfer 
some of their newly regained sovereignty to the European level. This thesis starts at 
this point and argues that different institutional constraints and opportunities for the 
implementation of reforms designed to fulfil EMU accession criteria, variations in inter­
ests and preferences in joining the euro-zone, as well as divergent meanings of EMU 
membership in the Visegrad countries, are the sources of cross-country variations in 
approaching euro-zone accession. This thesis aims to understand why the Visegrad 
countries have adopted different strategies towards the adoption of the euro and why 
they have had to readjust their initial strategies in the course of the transition process.
Indeed, while all euro-adoption strategies as such aim to fulfil the Maastricht crite­
ria, the strategies of the Visegrad countries differ in terms of their target dates for the 
adoption of the euro. In fact, the target dates, on which this thesis focuses and defines 
the strategies, have not been static, but have changed on a number of occasions. Until 
the end of the 1990s the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were keen to join the 
euro-zone as soon as possible. By the late 1990s target dates for entry into the euro­
zone had been announced for 2005 and 2006. However, given that at that time acces­
sion negotiations had not been concluded and no date for EU accession had yet been 
set, the target dates for 2005 were quite optimistic and, as later became clear, unrealis­
tic. In 2002 the first Visegrad country, the Czech Republic, gave up plans for a quick 
approach to euro-zone entry and the Spidla government announced that the adoption 
of the euro would only be possible by 2010 or 2011. It should be noted that at that time 
the other Visegrad countries were still aiming to adopt the euro by 2006 or 2007, much 
earlier than the Czech Republic. Gradually, the other Visegrad countries readjusted 
their strategies too and, in August 2003, Hungary presented its official euro-adoption 
strategy, which called for euro-zone entry by 2008. In May 2004, the Hungarian gov­
20
ernment readjusted its strategy again and stated that, with the present macroeconomic 
problems encountered by the Hungarian economy, euro-zone entry would be possible 
only by 2010. Slovakia published its accession strategy in Summer 2003 and an­
nounced that it wanted to join the euro-zone as soon as possible and no later than the 
other Visegrad countries. While in the 1990s under the Meciar governments, the EMU 
was a far distant project, Slovakia now advocates an early entry to the euro-zone that 
could happen around 2008. Poland, in contrast, has not set a target date for the adop­
tion of the euro nor has it presented a draft strategy for adopting the euro. Official an­
nouncements concerning euro-zone entry are not consistent, and target dates vary 
from 2007 to 2011.
This thesis argues that a political-economy approach that focuses on interests, 
ideas and institutions can demonstrate why the Visegrad countries’ euro-adoption 
strategies are idiosyncratic, i.e. why they vary across time and space. The approach 
applied in this thesis does not aim to predict policy outcomes, but to provide a frame­
work for discussion of cross-national differences in approaching the adoption of the 
euro in the Visegrad countries. The thesis approaches this issue through a politico- 
economic analysis based on the following research question: Why -  despite generally 
agreeing with the objective of EMU membership and being shaped by common fea­
tures -  do the Visegrad countries display a cross-national variation in their strategies 
pursued for the adoption of the euro?
Economic and International Relations approaches to monetary cooperation
To start with, it is necessary to consider the existing literature on monetary cooperation 
and integration. Economic approaches and research fields in International Relations 
(IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) have traditionally concentrated on the 
political and economic structure of the international system in approaching questions of 
international economic cooperation and integration, thereby stressing the prevailing 
significance of the systemic-level to explain foreign economic policies. This is most
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prominently represented in the work on the theory of optimum currency areas and the 
theory of hegemonic stability.
In the IR literature, what is called hegemonic stability theory (HST) has attracted
much attention for the study of international monetary relations. In fact,
much of the international relations literature concerned with prospects for 
international monetary reform can be read as a search for an alternative to 
hegemony as a basis for international monetary stability (Eichengreen 
1989: 286).
HST offers ‘the most parsimonious and widely employed explanation of (regime) dy­
namics” (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 500). The theory focuses on the distribution of 
power among states (Lake 1993, Gilpin 1981, 1987, Kindleberger 1973). The interna­
tional system is an anarchic system in which states try to maximise their power relative 
to each other. Cooperation occurs only if the system is dominated by a hegemonic 
state able and -  more importantly -  willing to wield its power to ensure political and 
economic stability, i.e., to provide public goods (Kindleberger 1973). In view of this, the 
hegemon functions as the “stabiliser” of international cooperation; a benign provider of 
public goods. In turn, the absence of a hegemon or a decline in hegemonic power cor­
relates with a collapse in cooperation. In addition to the economic power of the he­
gemon, Gilpin (1981) and Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) identify the military and ideo­
logical factors of hegemony and thus malign aspects of cooperation. Correspondingly, 
with respect to EMU, Cohen (2001) stresses that an analysis of European monetary 
cooperation concentrating on economic variables (such as the optimum currency area 
criteria) is doomed to failure. He argues that these criteria are by nature only secon­
dary. What really matters is “whether a local hegemon or a fabric of related ties exists 
to neutralise the risks of free-riding or exit” (Cohen 2001: 196).13 Thus, to bind govern­
ments to durable arrangements, a single powerful state (hegemon) or a fabric of re­
lated ties is required that can provide “incentives”, like side payments or sanctions. 
Cohen is rather optimistic about the sustainability of the EMU, because the euro-zone
13 The “fabric” refers to institutional linkages reflecting the sense of solidarity within the community and in 
which the individual units are defined in relation to each other (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991 use the term 
“network” instead of referring to institutional linkages).
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includes a ‘monetarily’ dominant state, in this case Germany, which is willing to use its 
power to promote the euro and because its member states have the “political willing­
ness” to commit to the EU (Cohen 2001: 196, see also Walsh 2000). Consistent with 
the HST therefore -  but including, as Cohen does, international institutional opportuni­
ties and constraints -  is the interstate bargaining model (Garrett 1992, Krasner 1991), 
showing that a policy outcome depends on the preferences of the most powerful states. 
Among the latter, the state with the fewest expected benefits from the new institution 
has the most power to decide on the institution’s rules (e.g. see the European Central 
Bank (ECB) design and German preferences). The principle source of power provided 
by the most powerful state is, in turn, the credible threat of preferring the status quo to 
participation in the new institution (Schelling 1960). Other countries come to accept 
some rules because the rules may distribute costs away from themselves (Cohen 
1977, Gilpin 1987). The underlying assumption of studies using an interstate bargain­
ing approach is that governments trade-off objectives. Given that issue linkages are of 
specific importance within the EU bargaining structures, interstate bargaining models 
interpret the creation of EMU as the result of cross-issue deals while other scholars 
additionally point to the importance of issue linkages as an engine for further European 
integration (Martin 2001).
However, the interstate bargaining model and especially the HST have been 
widely criticised on both empirical and theoretical grounds. First, regarding the inter­
state bargaining approach, it is hard to specify explicit links between issue areas. More­
over, the success of issue linkages requires different values on different issues be­
cause similar preferences leaves “little room for trading-off concessions” (Eichengreen 
and Frieden 2001: 19). In addition, issue linkages as such make credible threats and 
promises difficult “for not only must commitments on each dimension be credible, but 
the commitment to link dimensions must be credible as well” (Eichengreen and Frieden 
2001: 19). For the HST, as the different variants of the theory show, the definition of the 
relevant structure (military, ideological, economic) of cooperation dynamics is prone to 
be arbitrary. Empirically, the theory neglects monetary aspects and fails to explain why
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a country like Germany without military dominance and with no overwhelming eco­
nomic control over the EU (in 1990, Germany’s GDP was 25 percent of the total in the 
EU, whereas France’s share was 20 percent) but with the strongest currency in 
Europe, should be able to ensure cooperation stability (McNamara 1998: 26-27). Sec­
ond, since the structure alone is a ‘poor predictor’ of national policies and cooperation 
stability, “structural theories must continually revert in an ad hoc way to domestic politi­
cal variables” (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 501). Thus, in the context of the research 
of this thesis, hegemonic stability theory might explain why CEECs are willing to join 
the EMU, e.g. since the EMU provides public goods such as price stability, but hege­
monic stability theory does not sufficiently explain why the Visegrad countries have 
chosen divergent paths on their road to euro-zone accession.
Systemic scholarship neglects how domestic forces shape policy preferences 
on international cooperation and likewise how international cooperation impact on do­
mestic structures and policy preferences. Beginning in the mid-1980s, in an effort to 
integrate systemic opportunities/constraints and foreign economic policy with domestic 
structures (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 668), scholars shifted to a more comparative ap­
proach that focused on economic cooperation by arguing that there is a second game 
in progress, namely on the domestic level (Putnam 1988, Dyson 1994, Moravcsik 
1993). According to Moravcsik (1993, 1997), governments use the interplay between 
the inside (domestic politics) and the outside (international politics) as a “two-level” 
game played on two different playgrounds (see Putnam 1988) in international monetary 
integration to gain more power vis-a-vis their domestic politico-economic actors (see 
also Dyson 1994). This is because the two-level game enhances the autonomy of po­
litical leaders, since the decision-making process in an international monetary regime is 
more insulated from domestic pressures than the decisions on national monetary poli­
cies are. However, missing from this literature is a classification of domestic structures 
(Katzenstein et al. 1998: 669) and like other system-centred scholarship on interna­
tional monetary cooperation (Moravcsik 1998, Henning 1998) these approaches help to 
clarify the EMU process and to understand why countries are willing to agree to mone­
24
tary integration (Verdun 2000: 9), but fail to explain why the countries pursue different 
policies of macroeconomic convergence.
Equally, economic approaches to international monetary cooperation and inte­
gration fall short of explaining cross-national variations in approaching the adoption of 
the euro. However, like the interstate bargaining approach and the HST, they do pro­
vide explanations of why countries are willing to join a monetary union. They also help 
to explain where adjustment costs of prospective monetary union membership are 
likely to reside. In this respect, they point to potential conflicts as well as to advantages 
and benefits that can be generated from macroeconomic considerations. To under­
stand respective strategies for the adoption of the euro merely on the basis of weighing 
the economic costs and benefits of EMU membership would be desirable but is a reck­
less undertaking, as the real costs and benefits are political in nature and therefore a 
purely economic analysis would overlook the political reality. But although economic 
approaches might not be useful in explaining cross-national variations in approaching 
EMU accession criteria, they nevertheless provide important insights into the nature of 
monetary unions and therefore cannot be neglected in a thesis dealing with EMU.
Among economic approaches, the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) and 
the related capital mobility hypothesis have led the debate on monetary integration. 
Economic accounts of monetary integration usually start with a cost/benefit analysis, 
which is discussed at great length in the literature on the theory of OCA. It is from this 
literature that much of the debate, e.g. the arguments against and in favour of mone­
tary unions, has developed. OCA theory as such implies a critical approach to the con­
stitution of a monetary union. This is because OCA theory formulates a large set of 
preconditions for the constitution of a monetary union and thus establishes a frame­
work of prerequisites that have to be met in order to establish a successful monetary 
union. The OCA theory was developed in the 1960s, most prominently by Mundell, 
McKinnon and Kenen, who defined an OCA as “an economic unit composed of regions 
affected symmetrically by disturbances and between which labour and other factors of 
production flow freely” (Eichengreen 1997: 51). Mundell (1961) focuses on factor mobil­
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ity, McKinnon (1963) on trade integration and economic openness, and Kenen (1969) 
on the diversification of industrial production.14 Mundell assumes that the higher the 
mobility, the lower the costs of a monetary union. Referring to a study on the USA and 
Canada, Mundell proves that a fixed exchange rate system (e.g. a currency union) 
would have substantial problems if labour were immobile, wages inflexible and labour 
markets rigid. McKinnon (1963) considers another source of tension in a monetary un­
ion, which he attributes to the extent to which the participating economies are open. 
According to McKinnon, small and open economies will benefit from a monetary union, 
since greater openness means that most domestic prices are linked to prices on mar­
kets and to the exchange rate which makes it difficult to tackle real exchange rate de­
preciation by means of nominal devaluation. A further condition for an optimum cur­
rency area was developed by Kenen (1969), who underlines the notion of the pattern of 
production in the participating economies. He argues that external shocks have a 
smaller effect on countries with a high degree of product diversification and an exten­
sive export profile, because particular demand shocks on export goods can be com­
pensated and counterbalanced by adjustments elsewhere in the economy. Conse­
quently, similar patterns of production and diversification should lead to the reduction of 
costs in a monetary union.
Economists and political scientists widely criticise OCA theory. For example, the 
theory emphasises external shocks and downplays shocks caused by the union itself, 
or, conversely, as argued by Frankel and Rose (1998), neglects the fact that OCA crite­
ria are likely to be satisfied ex post as a monetary union stimulates growing trade links 
that reduce asymmetries (also referred to as the endogeneity of the OCA). Likewise, 
OCA theory neglects differences in social standards and living conditions; however, 
differences in levels of GDP per head certainly have implications for the functioning 
and stability of a monetary union (Lythe 1995). But the central weakness of OCA theory
14 Other approaches to the constitution of an OCA do exist and are also important. For further details, see 
Ishiyama (1975), who has reviewed Kenen’s (1969) approach, and the following authors who have reas­
sessed and backed up the work on the theory of OCA: Corden (1972), Ingram (1973), Canzoneri and 
Roger (1990), M6litz (1995), Tavlas (1993), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), Bofinger (1994), Eichen­
green (1997), de Grauwe (1997). For a survey of the literature on currency unions, see Masson and Taylor 
(1992).
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remains its inability to deal with political factors in understanding the stability of a 
monetary union and the rationales for its creation. Obviously, EMU came into being 
because of political rather than economic considerations (Risse et al. 1999). As Risse 
et al. conclude (1999: 150), “to accept 11 EU countries into 'Euroland' was mainly a 
political decision and did not have much to do with economic criteria for optimum cur­
rency areas" because, following the reasoning of OCA theory, the EU is clearly not an 
optimum currency area. Instead, Risse et al. (1999: 148) argue that EMU is about po­
litical ideas and interstate bargaining, rather than merely lowering transaction costs or 
providing for a stable exchange rate. Nevertheless, it is in this regard that the theory 
offers some important insights on how to approach the inclusion of CEECs in the EMU. 
It becomes obvious that appropriate adjustment instruments for CEECs rely not on 
traditional monetary and exchange rate policy, nor -  for political reasons -  on labour 
mobility or fiscal transfers, but on the flexibility of labour markets. Thus, while the OCA 
theory points to the benefits of a single currency for small and open economies such as 
the CEECs, it also gives important clues as to where the costs of adjustments in a 
monetary union are likely to reside and consequently points to potential sources of con­
flicts.
Other economic approaches to analysing the costs and benefits of monetary un­
ions also fail to explain cross-national differences in reforms that are related to EMU 
accession criteria. However, they explain why the Visegrad countries have no other 
choice but to join the EMU and point to potential costs and benefits of non-participation. 
Here, research on business cycle correlation has attracted the most attention in recent 
years. With regard to special transition problems encountered by the Visegrad coun­
tries, business cycle analysis may be more valuable in assessing the costs and bene­
fits of inclusion in the EMU. Boone and Maurel (1999) assess the cost of pegging cur­
rencies to the euro by analysing the degree of (a)symmetry of business cycle fluctua­
tion between CEECs and EU member states. They state that similarities in business 
cycles are more crucial than the Maastricht criteria for a successful EMU, since
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during a transition process there are specific sources of inflation, interest, 
and exchange rate instability which are less related to the costs of adopting 
a common monetary policy and may explain the current failure to fully sat­
isfy the Maastricht criteria (Boone and Maurel 1999: 3).
Boone and Maurel’s results show the extent to which a common shock, i.e., an EU- 
wide shock, explains unemployment (see also de Grauwe and Aksoy 1999, Artis et al. 
1999, 2004, Artis and Zhang 1998, Fidrmuc and Korhonen 2001, and Backe et al. 
2003).15 Boone and Maurel (1999) conclude that CEECs’ business cycles correlate 
with European business cycles and especially with German business cycles. Hence, 
the likelihood of external asymmetrical shocks will diminish over time for CEECs, since 
trade structures between CEECs and the EU are becoming more integrated and con­
vergent. However, while this study might also say a lot about the sustainability of EMU 
and the costs and benefits of membership, it does not explain cross-national variation 
in approaching EMU accession.
Related to OCA theory and the literature on business cycle correlation is the 
capital mobility hypothesis or Mundell-Fleming model. Monetary cooperation and inte­
gration are a result of the structural power of economic interdependence and financial 
markets (Dyson 1994). As Dedek (1999:168) states:
if the country has submitted voluntarily to the pressure of the external disci­
pline, it is mainly the fagade of autonomy that will be lost at the time of en­
tering a monetary union.
Economic interdependencies increase the costs of macroeconomic conflicts; since in­
terdependence has become a constant of the international system, governments place 
more and more emphasis on avoiding macroeconomic conflicts (de Macedo 2000). 
Economic interdependencies call for policy convergence, since a beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy, e.g. seeking an exchange rate that puts the country at an advantage over 
neighbouring countries, would cause excessively costly macroeconomic conflicts. This 
is because interdependence and capital mobility preclude misalignments directed 
against neighbouring states; this fact is explained by the Mundell-Fleming model, which 
describes fiscal and monetary policy in a flexible or fixed exchange rate regime. The
15 For a literature review on business cycle correlation between the new member states and the euro-zone 
see Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2004).
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model is also known as Mundell’s “assignment problem”, the “impossible trilogy”, or the 
“unholy trinity”, which implies that policy-makers can obtain only two of three policy 
options at any time: free capital flows (i.e., full financial integration), a fixed exchange 
rate, and full monetary policy autonomy. This is because a country that wants to main­
tain full capital mobility and to fix its exchange rate has to adjust its domestic interest 
rate to the rate of the anchor currency. Consequently, monetary policy is decided not at 
home, but abroad. This makes monetary policy less and less effective; monetary policy 
becomes merely a tool for maintaining the exchange rate. Given that European coun­
tries have agreed to abolish capital controls, the choice was between freely floating 
exchange rate regimes and monetary union. The alternative option
of letting exchange rates float was never acceptable to Europeans. The 
perception is that markets are too integrated to allow for sizable relative 
price changes. The exchange rate and trade wars from before World War II 
are still remembered as an example of a Jack that must absolutely be kept 
in the box. [...] The choice is not between EMU and heaven. It is between 
EMU and freely-floating exchange rates, with possibly poorly coordinated 
monetary polices, within an area gradually becoming as tightly integrated 
as the US (Wyplosz 1997: 4-10).
Thus, economic interdependencies and political reasons explain why the alternative of 
floating exchange rates was not an option for European states that vividly remember 
the fatal consequences of the beggar-thy-neighbour policy of the inter-war period. It is 
in this regard that EMU has to be seen as “the outcome of constrained optimisation. 
The constraint is the impossible trilogy” (Wyplosz 1997: 8). Thus, the capital mobility 
hypothesis explains why EMU was an unavoidable and logical step following the Euro­
pean Monetary System (EMS). It explains why the EU member states were willing to 
agree to the EMU, even though from an economic point of view monetary union was 
not a good idea, since the EU does not comprise an OCA (Eichengreen 1997, de 
Grauwe 2000). The Visegrad countries face the same policy impasses, given their 
economic interdependence and taking into account that from the day of their EU ac­
cession they have been obliged to accept free capital flows. However, whereas the 
Mundell-Fleming model justifies EMU accession, it does not explain why the Visegrad 
countries approach euro-zone entry in country-specific ways. The objective -  euro­
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zone membership -  may be common to all Visegrad countries, but their paths to realise 
this are significantly different.
In conclusion, systemic approaches to monetary cooperation might explain why 
the Visegrad countries have no other choice but to join the EMU. They also point to 
potential benefits, costs and sources of conflict in a monetary union. But they fail to 
explain why the Visegrad countries have chosen different paths to euro-zone member­
ship. The main shortcoming of these systemic theories is that they focus on the political 
and economic structure of the international system -  e.g. the degree of state interde­
pendence on international trade and on multipolarity, bipolarity or hegemony (see also 
Waltz 1979, Keohane and Nye 1977, Baldwin 1980) -  but they neglect dynamics deriv­
ing from the impact that domestic interests, ideas and institutions have on political de­
cision-making. Thus, these “systemic arguments were at best incomplete” (Katzenstein 
et al. 1998: 648) as they neglect how “variations in domestic structures [...] would lead 
to different national and corporate responses to the same external pressure and oppor­
tunities” (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 648). The theories described do not explain why 
countries in similar economic and political situations and with similar structural features 
(thus countries that occupy similar systemic positions) do not react identically, but 
rather very differently. As Haggard and Simmons (1987: 513) explain, domestic political 
processes have been ignored, “in part because of the lure of parsimonious systemic 
theory”. Not only from the methodological but also from the theoretical point of view, 
there are several “reasons to open the black box of domestic politics” (Haggard and 
Simmons 1987: 513). As Gourevitch (1986) states, systemic reductionism -  parsimony 
-  ignores the fact that states do have choices:
unless the international situation is completely coercive, as may be the 
case with foreign occupation, countries do have choices. The selection they 
make from among those choices depends on domestic politics, on the dis­
tribution of power within countries and various factors that influence it -  so­
cietal forces, intermediate institutions, state structure, ideology. The inter­
national economy affects national policies by acting upon domestic actors 
(Gourevitch 1986: 65).
Thus, in contrast to the statist literature of the state-as-a-unitary-actor, domestic ap­
proaches account for the state-society relationships to define the content of policy (see
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Zysman 1983 and Katzenstein et al. 1998: 667). Scholars have increasingly turned to 
the relevance of domestic sources in international cooperation and monetary integra­
tion16 and extensive work has been conducted on the underlying reasons for the crea­
tion of EMU ranging from country-specific case studies (Kaltenthaler 1998, Jones et al. 
1998, Walsh 2000, Verdun 2000) to more theoretical arguments (Sandholtz 1993, 
Frieden 1994, 2002, Frieden and Jones 1998, McNamara 1998, Dyson and Feather- 
stone 1999, Verdun 2000, Frieden and Eichengreen 2001). Common to all these ap­
proaches is that while taking into account systemic constraints, they focus on the dy­
namics within the political economy; however, they attribute different degrees of influ­
ence to economic actions, domestic factors of interests, ideas and institutions to ex­
plain policy outcome. Having rejected systemic scholarship, the conceptual framework 
applied in this thesis takes the same approach but integrates the different perspectives 
on domestic interests, ideas and institutions into one analysis as it is argued that one 
factor alone is not sufficient to elucidate why the Visegrad countries pursue different 
strategies for the adoption of the euro.
Interests, Ideas and Institutions
This thesis follows a domestic-level approach to political economy in order to under­
stand the persistence of cross-national differences with regard to the euro-adoption 
strategies of the Visegrad countries. In doing so, this thesis incorporates insights of 
interest-, idea-, and institution-oriented approaches. Policy outcomes are inherently 
linked to the complementary and competing effects of interests, ideas and institutions. 
The argument is that interests, ideas and institutions are intrinsically mutual and there­
fore one factor alone is not able to address questions of policy variation with regards to 
euro-zone entry. An analysis integrating these three approaches does not separate the 
facts from meaning and processes, but integrates them in one analytical framework. 
This approach is problematic, because the analysis might end up with “an almost end-
16 Certainly this shift has to be understood in the context of the end of the Cold War and the decreasing 
ability of the nation-state to shield its domestic side from international developments. For a review how 
EMU and the end of the Cold War challenge the neo-realist research programme as well as for an 
amended neo-realist argument to explain the creation of EMU see Grieco (1995).
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less list of domestic conditions, institutions, bargaining tactics, personalities, and fac­
tors that might ‘matter’” (Simmons 1994: 283) resulting in a separate model for each 
country, which would hinder a comparative analysis. While Hall (1997: 198) argues that 
following this approach “at times [...] can be frustrating”, this thesis makes the case 
that an integrated analysis is best able to provide a framework for the discussion of 
cross-national variations in approaching euro-zone accession. In this respect, this the­
sis contributes to research that endeavours to determine the value of such approaches. 
It also contributes to the current debate about the relative importance of interests, ideas 
and institutions, as it seeks to demonstrate the interactive effects of these factors and 
highlights their impact on the Visegrad countries’ euro-adoption strategy.
This thesis adopts a qualitative methodology based on a comparative case 
study of the Visegrad Four. Some of the data used in this thesis may be quantified, but 
the analysis itself is based on a qualitative research method (Corbin and Strauss 1990). 
Just as a qualitative method allows for an adequate analysis of complex politico- 
economic processes, a comparative case study allows for an in-depth study that re­
veals insights into underlying causal forces of the euro-adoption strategies (cf Vachu- 
dova 2005: 8). The first priority is to design a framework of reference that allows further 
application to similar case studies. Although the differences between the case studies 
might outweigh the similarities, the first aim of the analysis is to show how politico- 
economic processes are conducted and to understand policy outcomes. This analytical 
framework pays tribute to the complexity and sophistication of politico-economic proc­
esses, since understanding cross-national differences in approaches to EMU is not a 
one-dimensional undertaking (cf Levi 2004). The complexity of the goals of politics 
makes politics inherently ambiguous (Pierson 2000). However, complexity does not 
mean that politico-economic processes resulting in policy divergence/convergence do 
not follow specific patterns. Policy variation has its own logic which is apparent in the 
deeply embedded domestic differences that produce different national responses to the 
same external opportunities and constraints (Katzenstein et al. 1998: 648, Jones 2003: 
141, Lenschow et al. 2005: 797). It is the purpose of this thesis to reflect systematically
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the complex nature of politico-economic processes and to demonstrate the resulting 
inner logic (e.g. critical junctures/moments) that is behind policy variation, i.e. to show 
why and how domestic factors intersect and/or come to prevail over others and under 
which conditions (thus when) they impede or generate policy changes that affect the 
euro-adoption strategies. This thesis shifts away from overly parsimonious theoretical 
assumptions (see Pierson 2000 and Hay 2002) and general theories toward a more 
“Weberian” approach that examines the Visegrad countries’ diverse strategies for 
achieving the same objective, or as Weber would say, the same phenomena: why do 
cross-national differences persist even though all these countries share the objective of 
EMU accession and are all confronted with similar difficulties in policy reforms? Accord­
ing to the Weberian definition, the state is not a unified actor, as assumed by the HST 
and systemic-centred economic approaches, but a collection of rules and institutions. 
This definition of the state focuses on institutions, actors’ preferences and perceptions 
and therefore provides insights into the institutional, rational and ideological roots of 
actors’ behaviour in order to analyse why countries choose different paths to euro-zone 
entry. Applying this definition to the research question of this thesis, it follows that the 
same pressure and objective to qualify for the euro-zone may result in different acces­
sion strategies because (1) actors differ in their interests and positions towards the 
objective of EMU (interest approach), (2) the ideas actors hold about European integra­
tion and macroeconomic policy may vary (ideas approach), and (3) the existing organ­
isational framework differs (institutional approach).
Focusing on interests, this thesis analyses whether the euro-adoption strategy 
depends on the balance of power between the winners and losers in the reform proc­
ess (Haggard and Webb 1994: 8). This balance of power is expressed in the prefer­
ences of the actors involved. In addition, the analysis of positions toward EMU has to 
take into account the distributional consequences of reforms related to the adoption of 
the euro. Domestic distributional issues are crucial in understanding whom the EMU 
affects and might therefore indicate why the Visegrad countries approach the EMU in 
country-specific ways (cf Jones 2002: 11). However, a “purely” distributional approach,
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i.e., the attempt to explain the euro-adoption strategies by referring to distributional 
issues and the interests of the actors involves several problems and limitations (cf 
Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Nelson 1992). The first limitation has to do with the prob­
lem of collective action itself. The amount of political influence that an individual or a 
group of individuals gains depends on their capacity to organise, “but organisation does 
not follow from shared economic interest alone” (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 28). 
Diffuse interests, for instance, create difficulties in channelling interests and organising 
collective action. Second, it is difficult to generate interests solely on the basis of an 
individual’s or a group of individuals’ position in the economy, because their positions 
have multiple causes. For instance, an individual can occupy several positions within 
the economy at the same time, and may have different religious and ethnic identifica­
tions that may affect his/her economic interests. Finally, while interest-based ap­
proaches account for positions and preferences, they neglect the effects of how inter­
est is translated into policy outcomes (Gourevitch 1986: 113-119). Even if distinct inter­
ests are identified as important for the making of the euro-adoption strategy, they do 
not necessarily explain policy outcomes because interests cannot only be understood 
as the result of aggregate material preferences of individuals, or groups of individuals 
but also as the result of ideas and institutionalised norms.
Therefore, the analytical framework applied in this thesis integrates idea-oriented 
approaches because a purely interest- or institution-based study misses most of the 
turns the Visegrad countries have made in their strategies during the transition proc­
ess; it would fall short in explaining why EMU accession took on different meanings in 
the countries under review. Such approaches do not grasp people’s beliefs and there­
fore cannot explain how individual actions are motivated. There is much in the making 
of the euro-adoption strategy that cannot be explained by power, interests and institu­
tional constraints alone. Interests are not formed in a vacuum, but are the product of 
discursive formations, of a belief system and of material forces. Ideas help to solve 
problems of collective co-ordination; they serve as focal points for political action 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12; see also Schelling 1960, McNamara 1998). By in­
troducing ideas into the analysis of cross-national variations in approaching EMU ac­
cession, this thesis accepts ideas as a mediating variable between interests, institu­
tions and policy outcomes.
By the same token, interests and ideas are expressed through institutions and 
can thus be “mediated” by them. As Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 18) put it: “political 
institutions, like markets, structure the incentives to political action and can have a pro­
found impact on the relative standing and power of different groups.” In the same tenor, 
Eichengreen and Frieden (2001:11) state:
since institutions can magnify the political influence of some groups while 
diminishing that of others, similar interest may be expressed differently 
when, for example, parliaments are chosen by proportional representation 
than when members come from single districts in a first-past-the post sys­
tem (see also Rogowski 1987 and Farrell 2001).
Institutional constraints are ubiquitous in the policy-making process. Therefore, an 
analysis of the euro-adoption strategies has to take into account the fact that institu­
tions endogenously and exogenously affect actors’ preferences and therefore impact 
on policy outcomes. Thus, it has to explore whether different domestic structures and 
institutions produce distinctive patterns of policy outcomes and therefore whether insti­
tutional constraints and opportunities are able to highlight cross-national variations in 
the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad countries. Yet, as argued above, this 
analysis of institutions has to be complemented and combined with one of interests and 
ideas in order to be sufficient to explicate variations in the euro-adoption strategies 
across time and space.
In short, perceptions of and incentives/constraints faced by political actors in dif­
ferent national contexts are the key this thesis uses to address the research question. 
Different preferences, institutional capacities and willingnesses to implement EMU- 
related policies are the origins of the persistence of cross-national differences. This 
thesis highlights the variations through the use of an analytical framework that inte­
grates interest-, idea- and institution-oriented approaches.
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Thesis Structure
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews interest-, idea- and institution- 
oriented approaches and relates them to the research question in order to frame the 
conceptual starting point of this thesis. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the development 
of fiscal and monetary policy in the Visegrad countries from 1990-2004. In doing so, 
Chapter 3 provides the necessary background on fiscal and monetary policy that is 
relevant to the discussion of cross-national variations with regard to the euro-adoption 
strategies. Having framed the analytical backdrop for the analysis of cross-national 
variations in approaching EMU accession, Chapter 4 applies interest-based ap­
proaches to the case studies. The following interests and preferences are analysed: 
the interests of and positions taken by political parties on EMU (part A), and public 
support for and opposition to the euro (part B). Chapter 5 then analyses the following 
ideas: (1) ideas that actors hold on European integration, i.e. do they support further 
and deeper EU integration or do they oppose it?; (2) Ideas that actors hold on macro- 
economic policy, i.e. do they support the idea of a fixed exchange rate regime for a 
transition economy (and therefore implicitly of fixing the exchange rate irrevocably 
through EMU membership) and do they perceive euro-zone membership as a means 
of achieving real convergence, or should accession follow at the end of the transition 
process? Chapter 6 provides the institution level of analysis and concentrates on the 
following institutions in the Visegrad countries, which are regarded in the literature as 
the key factors in instituting policy reforms designed to meet EMU criteria: electoral 
systems, central banks and industrial relations. The final chapter, 7, summarises the 
main arguments and findings, points to the challenges an integrated analysis has to 
face and makes recommendations for further research.
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Chapter 2 
Interests, Ideas and Institutions:
The Political Economy of the Euro-adoption Strategies
in Central Europe
Having outlined systemic approaches to monetary integration, it is now clear that do­
mestic factors must be taken into account when trying to understand cross-national 
differences concerning euro-adoption strategies. Political economy defines three major 
areas of domestic constraints and opportunities: interests, ideas and institutions. 
Scholars of domestic approaches to political economy all highlight domestic forces as 
sources for variations in national responses to common challenges; however, they at­
tribute different degrees of influence on economic actions to domestic factors of inter­
ests, ideas and institutions. Consequently, at the centre of the debate lies the disagree­
ment about the relative “weights assigned to these factors and the linkages that are 
said to exist between them” (Schonhardt-Bailey 2001:198).
Therefore, whilst bearing these concerns in mind, the following chapter pre­
sents an analytical framework for discussing how the interactions of interests, ideas 
and institutions could affect the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad countries. In 
doing so, this chapter first outlines the three approaches; then it identifies which inter­
ests, ideas or institutions matter for the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad coun­
tries; and finally it relates them to the research question of this thesis. The empirical 
chapters on interests, ideas and institutions then show why, how, and when these fac­
tors influence these countries’ euro-adoption strategies and highlight the interactions 
and dynamics that exist between them.
Interest-based approaches
According to interest-based approaches to political economy, policy outcomes reflect 
the interests of competing actors or groups of actors. In other words, economic policy 
outcomes are the product of individual and collective interests’ influence. A politico- 
economic perspective should therefore start with the questions of “whose voices are
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heard in the political process” (Hall 1997: 196) and why they are heard. Interests are 
crucial to the research question of this thesis because they show how individuals are 
affected by EMU in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits and how politicians 
may react to the strategic environment of party competition to gain or maintain office 
and votes. Interests provide a crucial link between attitudes and politics and may there­
fore manifest themselves in different levels of support for, and opposition to, the EMU.
Interests are either political or economic. Political interests are defined as op­
portunist interests to gain or maintain office and votes (see p. 40). Economic interests 
are defined as the real material interests of individual actors or groups of actors to 
maximise their income and wealth. According to interest-based approaches focusing 
on economic interests, interests are important because a policy can be sustained only 
if it serves the interests of a significant segment of society (Haggard and Kaufman 
1992). Such approaches show that economic policy affects the interests of individuals 
or groups of individuals differently, depending on the position they hold within the econ­
omy. Interest-based approaches therefore not only demonstrate how some individuals 
or groups benefit from, while others lose out to the same economic policy, but they also 
explain political struggles for economic policy designs. Since interests directly relate to 
the distributional consequences of political decisions, they are strongly affected by 
changes in the economic environment. Therefore, interests account for how key groups 
can shift their support for certain policies due to changes in the international economic 
environment (Milner 1988, Gourevitch 1986). However, many of these interest-based 
analyses tend to focus on the international economy when explaining changes at the 
domestic level, neglecting other domestic factors as sources of adjustment, such as 
domestic institutional frameworks for interest intermediation or cultural and historical 
legacies (see Hall 1997: 178). In addition, interest-based approaches pose several 
empirical problems since it is not entirely evident that the distributional consequences 
of economic policies can be traced to the interests of specific individuals or groups (see 
chapter 1). Interests are especially difficult to determine with respect to monetary policy 
since changes in exchange rate policy, for instance, have an impact on various other
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policies, such as social, wage, and fiscal policy, with consequences at the international 
and domestic levels (see McNamara 1998: 35-6, see also Jones 2002: 21-22). Also in 
regard to monetary policy, a weakness of interest-based approaches is that they ignore 
how monetary integration policy, at both the national and European levels, is made with 
a high degree of insulation from the influence of pressure groups. Instead, they are 
formulated exclusively at the elite level of government where, according to McNamara
(1998), ideas exert a strong influence. For example, McNamara asserts that the EMU 
came into being because of policy shifts that mainly followed new ideas arising in the 
economic profession, making epistemic communities the main driving force in transmit­
ting new ideas to a transnational level (see also Haas 1992 and Goldstein 1993). By 
the same token, the complexity of monetary integration and cooperation makes it im­
possible to see the country’s euro-adoption strategy as being only related to the inter­
ests of the actors involved. Interest-based approaches also fall short of explaining other 
factors, such as collective action problems due to coalition formation (Hall 1997: 178), 
and why and how political conflict can result in new coalitions and new interests that 
influence the policy outcome. This “heuristic limitation of considerable significance” 
(Hall 1997: 196) exists because the analysis neglects the endogenous impact that the 
process of political conflicts itself may have on the creation of interests. It neglects the 
fact that interests are “not generated entirely by the antecedents to that conflict” (Hall 
1997: 197; see also Gourevitch 1986 and chapter 1).
For the reason that historical compromises among interest groups are virtually 
nonexistent in CEECs and that interest groups in the Visegrad countries experience 
substantial problems in formulating common interests (see chapter 6), this thesis does 
not apply to the strand of interest-based approaches that focus on producer groups as 
their units of analysis (Rogowski 1989, Frieden 1991, 1994; for a critique see Kalthen- 
thaler 1997, McNamara 1998, Walsh 2000). Rather, this thesis concentrates on in­
terest-based approaches that focus on the electoral and individual levels as their unit of 
analysis, thus it concentrates on the interests of political parties/politicians and at the 
individual level on public opinion. In particular, the findings of political business-cycle
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scholars (Nordhaus 1975, Hibbs 1977, Alesina 1994), public opinion scholars (Gabel 
2001) and class politics and cleavage scholars (Evans 1999, Mateju et al. 1999) yield 
important insights into the research question of this thesis.
Political business cycle and Party strategy
One school of interest-based scholars takes an electoral approach, which focuses on 
the electoral arena and thus on political actor and party strategies to gain/maintain of­
fice and votes (see Hall 1997). With regards to the quest for office and votes of govern­
ing parties, it stresses politicians’ opportunistic interests in being re-elected. Political 
business cycles (PBCs) are of central importance to this approach, the literature con­
cerning which has developed since the 1970s. Whereas William Nordhaus’ (1975) work 
is devoted to the development of opportunistic cycles, Douglas Hibbs’ (1977) work em­
phasises partisan cycles. Two critical driving forces are considered: a) politicians’ in­
centives to be re-elected (opportunistic model) and b) the degree of societal polarisa­
tion and social conflict that puts pressure on politicians’ decisions (partisan model).
According to Nordhaus, governments’ macroeconomic policies depend not only 
on the party in office, but also on the date of elections. Politicians tend to conduct ex­
pansive economic policies before an election to “massage” the economy and to in­
crease their prospects of re-election. Once in office, politicians then introduce restric­
tive policies to reduce the inflation rate and the budget deficit caused by expansionary 
policies because voters, at this time, are not able to punish them (Nordhaus 1975). 
However, for the Nordhaus model, evidence unexpectedly showed that parties whose 
policies resulted in high unemployment rates -  which would have rendered them non 
re-electable in the 1950s and 1960s -  were confirmed in office (Alesina 1987). Taking 
these shortcomings into account, Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff and Sibert (1988) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1990) developed rational opportunistic models based on 
the assumption that voters are well aware of politicians’ opportunistic ambitions and will 
therefore punish opportunistic politicians. Consequently, rational opportunistic models
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are better at explaining short-lived political and irregular business cycles than the Nord­
haus model.
Building on the seminal work done by Kirschen (1964), Hibbs (1977) analysed 
class-based organisations of economic preferences and showed that there is a left- 
right split over inflation and unemployment policies. Hibbs’ model is based on the fol­
lowing assumption: since parties have different distributional preferences, they also 
have divergent views on how macroeconomic policies should best be conducted. It 
follows that the more these distributional preferences diverge, the more volatile the 
macroeconomic policy becomes (Hibbs 1987). While the left traditionally favours an 
economic policy devoted to solving problems of unemployment, right-wing parties are 
more concerned about inflation and are more willing to implement anti-inflation policies 
at the cost of higher unemployment rates. Left-wing politics are often characterised by 
higher government spending, higher rates of economic growth, and lower rates of un­
employment (Garrett 1998: 25). However, these policies are implemented at the cost of 
higher inflation rates, higher budget deficits and higher interest rates. Right-wing poli­
tics are often characterised by weak labour unions, small deficits, lower interest rates, 
lower growth rates, lower inflation rates and higher unemployment rates (Garrett 1998: 
25). However, as was the case for the Nordhaus model, Hibbs’ results were not replic­
able in later studies (Hood 1994, see also Jones 2002). Evidently, the weak point of the 
Hibbs model is that it does not take into account governments’ economic interdepend­
ence. Consequently, Alesina (1987, 1994) developed the rational partisan model. The 
rational partisan theory explains why differences in growth rates and unemployment 
are only temporary. This is because, once in office, left-wing parties will devote their 
attention to reducing unemployment and will find themselves trapped in a high-inflation 
equilibrium with no benefits on the unemployment side but higher costs. Differences in 
growth and unemployment between left-wing and right-wing governments will therefore 
disappear in the second half of the legislative period after a change of government 
(Alesina 1994: 45).
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Insights from the PBC models are relevant to this thesis because they address 
the question of whether policy reforms, specifically reforms related to the EMU acces­
sion project, are subject to the timing of elections or the type of party in power. EMU 
accession criteria place a heavy burden on politicians to implement strict fiscal consoli­
dation programmes and on the central bank to follow a restrictive monetary policy. The 
question is whether the Visegrad countries’ governments tend to loosen their insistence 
on fiscal consolidation in the run-up to general elections or whether the countries ex­
perience fiscal cycles under left-wing governments in the short-run after the elections 
(Alesina 1994). PBCs would therefore help to understand possible sources for fiscal 
cycles that may influence or jeopardise the country’s approach to adopting the euro.
As mentioned above, the PBC literature analyses opportunistic interests of poli­
ticians in office and therefore explicitly refers to governing political parties’ strategies to 
maintain office and gain votes. However, as figure 1 shows, apart from the quest for 
office and votes, a party’s strategy -  whether in office or in opposition -  is influenced by 
the party’s identity/ideology and its policy goals. These four strategic objectives form 
the framework in which parties come to ‘politicised’ issues of European integration.
Figure 1 Party Strategy
Policy Goals
I
Party identity PARTY STRATEGY < - Quest for office
t
Quest for votes
Source: Batory and Sitter (2004: 525)
To approach the question of the relative importance of interests in understanding gov­
erning and opposition parties’ preferences on EMU that may affect the countries’ ap­
proach to adopting the euro, this thesis analyses the extent to which the political party’s
42
position on the euro and European integration is driven by the party’s partisan interests 
(i.e. the responsiveness to its electorate), and its relationship to other parties or elec­
toral strategies/coalition politics (cf Batory and Sitter 2004: 543). Interests in this con­
text are defined firstly by strategic electoral interests in gaining office and votes and 
secondly, by the need to address partisan interests of the party’s voter base (see Table 
1, p. 49). The argument is that the motivation behind the political party’s position on the 
euro provides information on possible sources for variations in the Visegrad countries’ 
strategies to adopting the euro.
Public opinion and distributional issues
Given that organised interests still have substantial problems pressing for their de­
mands in the Visegrad countries, Matthew Gabel’s study (2001) on public opinion is of 
particular importance in understanding cross-national differences in euro-adoption 
strategies. This approach points to the relevance of distributional consequences of in­
ternational economic policies for individual voters -  rather than organised interests -  as 
the central domestic factors.
Gabel (2001) analyses the relationship between public opinion and public sup­
port for the EMU and individual economic interests, and shows that public opinion 
about the EMU is consistent with economic interests. According to Gabel, economic 
interests are closely related to issues such as exchange rate stability, low inflation and 
capital mobility. Agreeing with Baldwin (1989), Gabel refers to the economic self-inter­
est approach and, using Eurobarometer surveys, shows that the distributional conse­
quences of the EMU account for a specific pattern of political conflict over the EMU 
(Gabel 2001: 49). The following policies were expected to result in support for, or op­
position to, the EMU: (1) trade-related distributional consequences of exchange rate 
stability, where it is assumed that the public sector and the domestically oriented ser­
vice sector are less supportive of the EMU than the (export-oriented) industrial sector 
(see Frieden 1994, 1996); (2) distributional consequences of inflation policy (such as 
higher inflation policy versus flexible labour markets and restrictive monetary policy)
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where manual workers and left-wing party supporters are less likely to support the euro 
than managers and right-wing party supporters (Oatley 1997); (3) distributional conse­
quences of cross-border shopping where residents of border regions are more suppor­
tive of the EMU; (4) distributional consequences of capital market liberalisation, with 
more support for the EMU from those citizens whose income, amount of capital assets 
and level of occupational skills are high relative to the national average; and (5) distri­
butional consequences of the Maastricht criteria, where it is assumed that public em­
ployees, national industry and the poor will lose from convergence criteria, whereas the 
rich will gain.
Gabel has not found empirical evidence of the Maastricht criteria’s distributional 
consequences and their effect on voters’ behaviour. However, empirical data confirmed 
all his other assumptions. Thus, the overall result of the study is that EU citizens vary in 
their support for EMU in accordance with their economic interests and the distributional 
consequences of EMU. These findings not only confirm the economic self-interest hy­
pothesis formulated by Baldwin but they also explain variations in voters’ support for 
EMU, providing further insight into euro-related cleavages, changes in public attitude 
and potential political difficulties.
While Gabel’s study was applied to the old EU member states, Rodrik (1995) 
provides a model of transition economies to explain the dynamics of public support for 
reform policy in CEECs. The overall re-emergence of the popularity of post-communist 
parties is often associated with, and explained by, growing unemployment rates in 
CEECs (Aghion and Blanchard 1993, Sachs 1993). As unemployment rose, the popu­
larity of reformers declined. Rodrik (1995), however, states that the relationship be­
tween the level of unemployment and the level of support for economic reforms is not 
evident at all. This is because the unemployed group is much too small to contribute 
decisively to the huge success of post-communist parties. Moreover, there is no clear 
evidence that unemployed workers would best benefit from less reform. In fact, as 
Rodrik (1995: 22) points out, “[t]he unemployed workers themselves are a force for 
reform, not a source of opposition”. Policies that increase subsidies in the public sector
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at the cost of reducing the rate of job creation in the emergent private economy would 
harm unemployed workers. To approach the question of how political support for re­
forms changes during the various stages of transition, Rodrik designed a model of an 
economy in transition. He arrived at the conclusion that the dynamics result from the 
preferences of state-sector workers. According to Rodrik, workers employed in the pub­
lic sector are confronted with a trade-off connected to an increase in subsidies, which 
would be beneficial to them but would result in two distinct losses. First, subsidies 
would reduce the creation of new jobs in the private sector and therefore reduce state- 
sector workers' chances of finding a job in the much better paid private sector. Second, 
subsidies would reduce after-tax income in the private sector and therefore also reduce 
the income of the state-sector worker if s/he moves toward employment in the private 
sector. Consequently, at the outset of the transition process, public sector employees 
are more supportive of economic reforms because the likelihood that they will lose their 
jobs is particularly high at the beginning of the transition process. However, the likeli­
hood of being laid off diminishes in later stages of the transition process. Therefore, the 
dynamic of political support for reform in economies in transition is mainly driven by 
state-sector workers.
To summarise, individuals support or oppose the EMU according to their per­
ceptions of how it might affect their individual welfare rather than how it might affect the 
welfare of the nation or the entire EU. Domestic distributional issues are therefore cru­
cial in understanding how EMU affects groups or individuals. The applicability of 
Gabel’s study and Rodrik’s findings to the research question needs to be investigated 
in order to identify the factors responsible for strong opposition to, or support for, the 
euro.
Since Gabel’s and Rodrik’s approaches focus on individual -  rather than organ­
ised -  interests as the central domestic factor, individual interests are perceived as 
having far-reaching consequences for decision-makers because voters will punish or 
reward incumbents for economic performance (see Fiorina 1981; for opposing views 
see Magee et al. 1989). This leads to the question of how public opinion influences
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voting behaviour In exploring this question, scholars have pointed to the relevance of 
political cleavages.
Cleavages and the strategic environment for political parties
Related to public opinion and distributional issues is an interest-based approach that 
focuses on voting behaviour in terms of cleavages, classes and party identification. 
Cleavages may indicate societal divisions over policy reforms. Cleavages also reveal 
the strategic environment in which political parties compete for votes and political legiti­
macy (see Hix 1999). To study party responses and voter alignments is therefore par­
ticularly helpful in understanding cross-national variations in approaching EMU acces­
sion. This is even more important as the relationship between political parties and their 
electorates is still in a state of flux (as highlighted, for instance, in the high volatility lev­
els of voters’ support and party formation/disintegration), thereby creating considerable 
opportunities and incentives for the actors involved to shape actively the strategic envi­
ronment of party competition.1
The structure of individual political preferences that creates competition among 
political parties can be explained by a cleavage-model in which political cleavages are 
defined as “a fault line through a political community which affects how citizens vote” 
(Henderson and Robinson 1997: 285). Some scholars have argued that the most sig­
nificant bases for political cleavages are classes (Rose and Urwin 1970, Rose 1974). 
Related to the analysis of cleavages is therefore the issue of class politics and class- 
based voting, i.e. the relationship between voting behaviour and social position.
In contemporary Western European politics, the importance of social classes, 
as a basis for political partisanship and an indicator of voting behaviour, is largely con­
tested. Political scientists are divided over the degree to which class politics has de­
1 It should be noted that definitions of cleavages vary and are often blurred since scholars are unable to 
agree on a coherent characterisation of what cleavages actually are (see Rommele 1999:4). The literature 
distinguishes between political and social cleavages. Broadly speaking, social cleavages are “defined in 
terms of social attitudes and behaviours [...]; political cleavages are [...] defined in terms of political atti­
tudes and behaviours” (Rommele 1999: 4; see also Upset and Rokkan 1967, Gallagher et al. 1992, Barto- 
lini and Mair 1990, Rose and Urwin 1970). According to Arendt Lijphart (1984), the following cleavages are 
crucial to politics in democratic countries: socio-economic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime 
support, foreign policy and post-materialism (see also Inglehart 1977). Cleavages can be mutually reinforc­
ing when a variety of features determine voting behaviour, such as the fact that rural areas are often tradi­
tion-oriented and religious.
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dined. Clark and Lipset (1991: 397), state that “class analysis has grown increasingly 
inadequate in recent decades as traditional hierarchies have declined and new social 
differences have emerged”, concluding that today’s politics are more organised by 
"other loyalties" than by class. In contrast, Geoffrey Evans (1999) points out that cur­
rent developments do not equal the end of class politics, even though societies are in 
transformation -  or, as Inglehart (1977) says, are experiencing a ‘Salient Revolution’ -  
due to new post-industrial societal cleavages, values, life changes, and so on. Evans 
(1999) states that the only evidence of dramatically declining class-voting relations 
comes from Scandinavia. Other studies, such as the work carried out by Mateju et al. 
(1999), confirm that class politics plays a crucial role in post-communist societies as 
classes' economic stances polarise along the classic left-right axis, and parties distin­
guish themselves as representing different class interests. Mateju et al. show that, be­
tween 1992 and 1996, the societal cleavage orientations in the Czech Republic were 
transformed. This was especially true for the relationship between social classes and 
political partisanship, and a new perception of the relationship between state and mar­
ket:
[vjoters on the left have thus become more egalitarian in their views of dis­
tributive justice while those on the right of the political spectrum display 
more anti-egalitarian attitudes (Mateju et al. 1999: 231).
This might explain why the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) succeeded in build­
ing a strong left-wing opposition. It received 26 percent of the vote during the 1996 
election -  four times as much as they received in the 1992 election. Mateju et al.
(1999) provide an explanation of the relationship between voting behaviour and social 
position in terms of a distinction between winners and losers of the transition process. 
They conclude that:
post-communist countries experiencing the early stage of capitalism are 
likely to be characterised by class polarisation between disadvantaged 
classes -  the working class and peasants -  and those who benefit more 
obviously and immediately from marketisation -  the professional and entre­
preneurial classes (Mateju et al 1999: 233).
Szelenyi et al. (1996, 1997) argue similarly, stating that post-communist countries have 
experienced social divisions along two cleavages (also referred to as the theory of the
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two axes). According to this view, post-communist societies are generally split along a 
liberal-conservative cleavage and a left-right cleavage. Whereas the liberal-conserva­
tive cleavage provides the basis for political struggles over norms, orientations, and so 
on (the politics of symbols), the left-right cleavage provides the basis for political strug­
gles over economic preferences and interests (the politics of interests). But post­
communist countries are currently undergoing a shift from the liberal-conservative axis 
to the left-right axis (Szelenyi et al. 1996, 1997). That is to say, the politics of identity, 
liberty, and community, which were not dominated by class politics, are shifting to a 
politics of economic interests, in which class attitudes prevail. As Szelenyi et al. ex­
plain:
[...] the closer the former state socialist countries move to the model of de­
mocratic market societies, the more meaningful the notion of Left and Right 
becomes and the greater the role economic interests and class cleavages 
play in electoral politics (Szelenyi et al. 1997: 212).
According to Mateju et al. (1999), it is precisely this change from symbolic to interest- 
driven voting behaviour that leads to an increased alignment in class voting. In this 
sense, the ongoing debate on class politics in post-communist states is not primarily 
occupied with the decline of class divisions during the transition from industrialism to 
post-industrialism, but with an increase in class divisions as the former classless com­
munist countries undergo a transition process from command economies to market 
economies. This thesis sees and uses the study of Mateju et al. as a useful starting 
point to explain different levels of public support for the euro in the Visegrad countries. 
The relationship between voting behaviour and social position has to be related to atti­
tudes toward the adoption of the euro. Since voters’ attitudes are directly linked to po­
litical parties’ positions on the EMU, a further polarisation between socio-economic 
classes and class politics would certainly influence EMU-related policies as parties 
come under pressure to fulfil partisan expectations and the Maastricht criteria at the 
same time (Mateju et al. 1999, Evans 1999). Left-wing parties in particular are trapped 
by their commitments to fiscal consolidation programmes and low inflation rates, as
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well as pre-election promises to reduce unemployment rates by introducing expansion­
ary fiscal policies.
For the research of this thesis, it is therefore necessary to analyse whether this 
polarisation is common to all of the case studies or whether there are factors that are 
country-specific. As this illustrates, an analysis of cleavages needs to be accompanied 
by one of class politics in order to demonstrate the relationship between attitudes to­
ward euro-zone accession and classes, cleavages, and party identification; or, to put it 
differently, between voting behaviour and social position. Identified cleavages in the 
Visegrad countries might explain different levels of support for, and opposition to, the 
euro and therefore must be included in the framework of analysis.
Table 1 Interests
Position on the adoption of the euro driven by
Political parties Strategic electoral interests to gain/maintain office and votes 
Partisan interests
Assumed implications of the cleavage structure: Polarisation between socio-economic classes 
puts pressure on left-wing parties committed to adhering to the Maastricht criteria
Public Opinion Economic self-interest
However, as pointed out in chapter 1, interests are not formed in a vacuum but 
are intimately related to a belief system, to actors’ ideas. This thesis reasons that it is 
impossible to conceptualise interests without analysing the ideas an actor holds, argu­
ing that ideas help to explain the decisions made by the Visegrad countries in their 
euro-adoption strategies. Ideas provide a powerful tool to understand cross-national 
approaches to adopting the euro when they become persuasive, i.e. when they are 
seen to solve problems that fit different interests.
Idea-oriented approaches
Interest- and institution-oriented approaches address questions of cross-national differ­
ences in strategies towards the adoption of the euro. They focus either on the interests 
of actors or on the organisational frameworks of a country’s political economy. How-
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ever, both approaches neglect the way ideas shape policy-makers' values and cogni­
tive templates. Policy outcomes are also subject to policy-makers' ideas about eco­
nomic policies. Political leaders are often divided over the way macroeconomic policy 
should be carried out because they subscribe to different ideas and ideologies on eco­
nomic policy. Any approach that seeks to explain cross-national differences in the euro- 
adoption strategies pursued in terms of economic interests and conditions or institu­
tional capacities must, to some extent, rely on the way ideas shape actors' cognitions 
and values (Haggard and Kaufman 1992: 22, Evans 1992, Waterbury 1992, Williamson 
1994; see also Hood 1994).
Although idea-oriented approaches have gained attention, no single definition 
has been developed and so scholars are deeply divided over the extent of the role 
played by ideas in the process of policy reforms. At the heart of the disagreement lies 
the concern regarding the causal effects of ideas. The question of how important ideas 
are in understanding policy outcomes touches upon the classic debate over ideas ver­
sus interests. On the one hand, there are ‘materialist’ scholars who suggest that ideas 
do not have causal effects on policies at all (see Odell 1982 for a comprehensive re­
view of this 'materialist' school; see also Hollis and Smith 1991). They argue that ideas 
are merely a means to legitimise actions that are taken in the individual’s or group’s 
self interests. On the other hand, at the opposing end of the spectrum, there are those 
scholars who hold that ideas have an autonomous impact on political outcomes (Sik- 
kink 1991, Ziegler 1997, Blyth 1997, 2002, Hay 2002). In contrast to the materialist 
researchers who treat ideas as unimportant or epiphenomenal, they claim that ideas 
are of causal primacy because they are "constitutive of the most basic meaning sys­
tems that make individual or collective action possible” (Hall 1997:184-185). Therefore, 
without having a cognitive template of ideas, interaction simply could not take place. As 
Sikkink (1991: 243) puts it: “ideas are the lens, without which no understanding of in­
terests is possible”. Haas continues: “interests cannot be articulated without values. Far 
from (ideal) values being pitted against (material) interest, interests are unintelligible
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without a sense of values-to-be-realised” (Haas 1990: 2).2 However, traditional IR
scholars usually start with an analysis of the material forces, i.e. of power and interest,
and “bring ideas only to mop up residual unexplained variances” (Wendt 1999: 371).
Ideas are seen “as a mere rhetoric, a cover or justification for other things” (Barker
2000: 223). “Ideas are just hooks” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 4) that are merely
used to legitimise actors’ interests and do not drive political action. The great influence
of interest-oriented approaches encouraged:
a kind of ‘hyper-determinism’ in which political action is understood as an 
expression of the dynamic of interests narrowly conceived and redefined 
with no significant intervening process of intellectual or communicative de­
liberation; interests just manifest themselves as unmediated action-in-the- 
world (Finlayson 2004: 532; see also Hindess 1988 and Hay 2002).
Yet, there is much about the euro-zone accession strategy that cannot be explained by 
power and interests alone. Rather “power and interest have the effects they do in virtue 
of the ideas that make them up” (Wendt 1999: 135). Sikkink (1993) and Katzenstein 
(1993) go a step further and argue that normative beliefs are the reason why states 
react to similar material circumstances in country-specific ways. Hence the decision to 
treat ideas in their own right as an aspect of political action that has a dynamic force to 
transform social action (Finlayson 2004: 531). But while this thesis shows that ideas 
might become causally consequential for the making of the euro-zone accession strat­
egy, it also argues that the impact of ideas varies in all four countries. Ideas ‘do not 
float freely’ (Risse-Kappen 1994) and the impact of ideas depends on whether the idea 
fits domestic coalitions supporting or opposing EMU accession.
Thus, this thesis treats ideas not as an exclusive explanation about individual 
behaviour; rather it takes Goldstein and Keohane’s (1993) approach and suggests “that 
ideas as well as interests have a causal weight in explanations of human action” (Gold­
stein and Keohane 1993: 3-4; see also Weber 1968).3 Goldstein and Keohane’s ap­
proach recognises that it is “futile to try to distinguish interests and ideas analytically”
2 Haas defines values as a function to identify ideally desired interests: "one’s interests are shaped by 
one’s experiences. But one’s satisfaction with an experience is a function of what is ideally desired, a func­
tion of one’s values” (Haas 1990: 2). Values are thus not given but acquired through the process of learn­
ing from past experiences.
3 For a review and critique of Goldstein and Keohane’s approach see Blyth (1997).
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(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 26) as “people need to attach meaning to their behav­
iour, even if that behaviour is motivated by self-interest” (Kingdon quoted in Marks 
1997: 30). This approach allows a focus on the interrelationship between interests and 
ideas. Interests are not formed in a vacuum but are the product of discursive forma­
tions, a belief system and material forces. Ideas help to solve problems of collective co­
ordination; they serve as focal points for political action. By introducing ideas into the 
analysis of cross-national variations in approaching EMU accession, this thesis accepts 
ideas as a mediating variable between interests and policy outcomes.
As stated above, definitions of ideas vary and ideational approaches use a 
broad range of terms to “substitute for, or to be synonymous with ‘idea’: norms, belief, 
paradigm, value, habit, tradition, narrative and even culture” (Finlayson 2004: 530). A 
more narrow definition is given by Risse-Kappen (1994: 186), who defines ideas as 
knowledge, values and strategic concepts. Similarly to Risse-Kappen, this thesis ap­
plies the Goldstein and Keohane (1993) definition of ideas as beliefs that can range 
from general moral principles to more specific applications of (scientific) knowledge 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 7). Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 8) distinguish three 
different types of beliefs: 1) worldviews, 2) principled beliefs and 3) causal beliefs.
Worldviews are defined as the beliefs an actor holds about his or her identity 
and culture. Worldviews deeply affect the “modes of thoughts and discourse” (Gold­
stein and Keohane 1993: 8) because they manifest themselves in cultural symbolism. 
Religion, for example, belongs to worldviews. Principled beliefs are defined as norma­
tive ideas -  ideas about what is right or wrong. Therefore, principled beliefs “translate 
fundamental doctrines into guidance for contemporary action" (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993: 9). Principled beliefs and worldviews have the deepest impact on political actions. 
A change in these two sets of beliefs has profound implications for human action 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 9). Causal beliefs consist of strategies that emerge from 
beliefs about the cause-and-effect relationship, providing guidance for actors on the 
means to achieve their objectives (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 10). In contrast to 
worldviews and principled beliefs, causal beliefs can change more frequently. This is
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because “specific policy shifts can often be traced to such [causal belief] changes par­
ticularly when technical knowledge is expanding” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 10). 
However, it should be noted that the three sets of beliefs are tightly interrelated since 
causal beliefs “are themselves valued because of shared principled beliefs and [they 
are] understandable only within the context of broader worldviews” (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 10).
Goldstein and Keohane describe three ways through which ideas exert their 
power. Ideas affect policy when they become institutionalised, by providing causal road 
maps and by affecting strategies where there is no unique equilibrium (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 8). Ideas influence policy when they become legally embedded within 
institutions prescribing organisational rules, laws and procedures (see also Yee 1996: 
88 and Sikkink 1993). Institutionalised ideas influence the operation of the institution 
and also describe the incentives of the actors within the institution and of those whose 
interests are served by the institution (see Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20). But in 
doing so, institutionalised ideas constrain and therefore limit the choice of the actor’s 
behaviour (Garrett and Weingast 1993; see also Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13).
Second, ideas exert their power through providing causal road maps. Since 
ideas provide an understanding of cause-and-effect relationships, ideas help actors to 
choose among political strategies to attain their goals. Road maps were especially im­
portant at the outset of the transition process because the collapse of the communist 
regimes destroyed the political discourse of the nations or the ‘prevailing set of political 
ideas’ (Hall 1989). New ideas and conceptions of economic, political and security inter­
ests had to fill a political space that had been occupied by a dismissed ideology. Ideas 
served as road maps that guided actors’ behaviour and coalesced expectations when 
the Visegrad countries experienced a unique period of convergence and consensus. It 
was a period of geo-political uncertainty that bound various groups to a common goal, 
namely the transformation of the command economy into a market economy. During 
this period of ‘extraordinary politics’ (Balcerowicz 1994, Rose 1999), differences be­
tween politically-divided groups were overlooked because shared beliefs prevailed
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about the way the economy should be managed. Ideas here were essentially causal 
because they stipulated not only how to conduct transition policies but they also pre­
scribed how to reform the economy in an ideologically correct way.
Third, and related to the aspect of uncertainty, ideas affect strategies in the ab­
sence of a unique equilibrium. Ideas serve as focal points that provide guidance to find 
cooperative solutions “or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular 
groups” (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12; see also Schelling 1960, McNamara 1998). 
Focal points play an important role for actors’ behaviour in the resolution of multiple 
equilibrium problems in which the actors involved have no preferences among the po­
tential outcomes (see Garrett and Weingast 1993: 185). Thus, ideas help to overcome 
problems associated with incomplete information and “when there are no objective cri­
teria on which to base choice, ideas focus expectations and strategies” (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993:18).
The factor of uncertainty cannot be overestimated when studying the foreign 
policy of new democracies. According to Marks, “under these conditions of uncertainty, 
the idea of Europe exerts a strong influence in one way or another in all the CEECs” 
(1997: 135). In turn, some scholars argue that the idea of Europe or the ‘return to 
Europe’ is embodied in the wish to become a member of the EU (see Brada 1991, van 
Brabant 1994).4 Becoming a member of the EU implies that the Visegrad countries 
have to join the single currency as soon as they fulfil the EMU requirements (see chap­
ter 1). But although the countries share the same objectives and similar conditions, 
their euro-adoption strategies differ. This thesis argues that euro-adoption strategies 
are influenced by country-specific historical and politico-economic experiences that 
produced distinctive meanings of, and thus ideas on, the EMU. To explain why the 
Visegrad countries approach EMU accession differently touches not only upon the
4 In contrast, Judy Batt states that there is not a clear definition of a ‘return to Europe’ (Batt 1991). The 
'return to Europe’ might imply more than the mere adaptation of Western principles (Ners et al. 1992: 32, 
see also Marks 1997: 136). Feffer (1992) argues that the notion of the return to Europe was more an ab­
straction for many citizens of the CEEC (see also Marks 1997: 138 and Garcia 1993). In this sense, it is 
not the prospect of EU membership that drove the Visegrad countries to adopt Western norms, but rather 
the wish to break with the past fifty years of communist rule. According to Batt (1991), this was an impor­
tant aspect especially at the outset of the transition process, when the political elite and the public were 
more influenced by emotional appeals than by interest-based arguments (Batt 1991: 50, Marks 1997:136).
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question of how ideas exert their power but also on the question of why the actors 
come to adopt new ideas or readjust old ones. Here, the concepts of policy failure and 
learning as well as persuasiveness are helpful when attempting to understand why the 
Visegrad countries hold different ideas about how to approach EMU accession.
Odell (1982) and Hirschman (1982) argue that the critical moment for an indi­
vidual to change his cognitive template is found in dramatic policy failure or disillusion­
ment.5 Cognitive change is triggered by “a major failure of past policy, or rather ex­
treme or accumulated evidence that can be readily interpreted as a consequence of 
past policy” (Odell 1982: 371). Like Hirschman (1982: 10) and Odell (1982), Goldstein 
and Keohane (1993) argue that policy failure is one of the main reasons why a pre­
existing consensus can be destabilised and replaced by another. Accordingly, new 
ideas can change the constitution of interests and:
this change can come about when an existing set of ideas is discredited by 
events or when a new idea is simply so compelling that it captures the at­
tention of a wide array of actors (Goldstein and Keohane 1993:16).
Related to policy failure as an important aspect of the impetus of cognitive change is 
the critical moment of learning from success and past experience. As Wendt (1999) 
argues, actors’ preferences for a policy option are not given but acquired (see also 
Haas 1990: 2-7, Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13). Learning from others’ success 
leads to a redefinition of ideas and to a preference for certain policy options.6 As Gold­
stein puts it: “nothing establishes the legitimacy of a policy like success” (Goldstein 
1989: 71). When communist principles collapsed, the Visegrad countries were keen to 
adopt and eventually institutionalise Western policy practice because they believed 
they ‘work’ and are successful (Goldstein 1989: 71, Johnson and Kowalska 1994).
Related to policy failure and learning, Hall (1989) identifies persuasiveness as 
another factor to explain changes in ideas. Ideas become persuasive if they provide a 
tool to solve today’s economic and political problems (Hall 1989: 369-70, Hall 1993). As
5 See also Hirschman (1982) for an analysis of the aspect of “disappointment” as one of the main factors 
that drives social action.
6 It should be noted that policy learning and failure do not automatically result in the adoption of new ideas. 
As Risse-Kappen (1994: 191) stated: “even large-scale failure does not necessarily result in the adoption 
of the competitor’s approach to the problem”.
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Sikkink puts it: “success and failure are interpreted in terms of what are perceived as 
the most pressing problems facing a country at a particular time” (Sikkink 1991: 247). 
Sikkink continues that persuasiveness depends on the degree to which the idea “fits 
with existing ideologies” (Sikkink 1991: 2). However, as this thesis shows, political 
leaders are able to shape the ‘interpreted persuasiveness’ (Yee 1996: 91) because 
they can frame their ideas within the context of existing ideologies and use symbols to 
appeal to commonly held beliefs (Yee 1996: 139 and Sikkink 1991: 20-21)7 For exam­
ple, politicians may use existing myths and historical memories to make EMU acces­
sion unattractive to people.8 Hence, because the fit with existing ideologies may rein­
force the persuasiveness of an idea, political leaders may “garner political support” 
(Yee 1996: 91) by framing their ideas in accordance to commonly held beliefs and 
myths. Politicians are able to do so because conventional wisdom and ideas about the 
international order are embedded in myths of national history and identity.9 Thus, the 
“persuasiveness [of ideas] is neither coincidental nor covert” (Finlayson 2004: 536).
This thesis argues that ideas may become causally consequential when they 
match with existing beliefs and when they are powerful enough to create winning coali­
tions. Consistencies between ideas and political action suggest that ideas may have 
played a causal role in actors’ behaviour (George 1979). The analysis therefore has to 
start with the identification of the ideas being described by the policy-makers and the 
respective policy outcomes. It is necessary to analyse variations in beliefs and how 
these variations account for different political actions under conditions that are other­
7 This means that the persuasiveness of an idea does not necessarily have to match its scientific veracity 
(Finlayson 2004: 536, Hay 2002: 202).
8 According to Norman Davies (1997:141) “myths are the sets of simplified beliefs, which may or may not 
be approximate to reality, but which give the sense of our origins, our identity, and our purposes. They are 
patently subjective, but are often more powerful than the objective truth -  for the truth can be painful".
9 As Wallace (2001:9) argued: “states in their foreign policy rest upon national identity and its components: 
myths and memories, traditions and national purpose, of national friends and enemies”. For example, 
historical memories have shaped to a great extent the mistrust of a purely European influence and explain 
why the Visegrad countries “have developed almost an obsession with the idea of joining the NATO. Their 
interest in NATO membership, however, is not based on a thoughtful consideration of whether the alliance 
can in fact counter the threats facing central Europe, but rather on an emotional urge to ensure American 
presence in the region [...] The east Europeans have become prisoners of their historical memory. Looking 
to the past for insights into their traumatised present, they tended to draw wholesale and inappropriate 
historical parallels. They fear that Europe without America might become what it had been before the US 
anchored itself there -  a scene of bickering and bloodshed” (Lunak 1994:128, see also Marks 1997:137).
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wise similar (see Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 26). Ideas are always interpreted within 
the political and economic context they have been inserted in; it is a political and eco­
nomic context at a particular time.10
The Visegrad countries were also constrained in their choice of economic mod­
els by their position in the international economic order, the size of their domestic mar­
kets and the pressure of international organisations. For example, the countries under 
review have had to adopt a range of economic policies that were not automatically in­
ternally persuasive but were dictated by international organisations, such as the IMF or 
the EU. Likewise, the approach to adopting the euro was constructed within a matrix of 
international and domestic constraints and opportunities. The constraints are part of the 
policy-makers cognitive template, i.e. the constraints are perceived by policy-makers in 
accordance with their conceptual framework (Sikkink 1991: 19). For example, it de­
pends on the policy-makers’ ideas on macroeconomic policy if they believe that EMU 
has to be introduced at the end of, or to be seen as a means to achieve, real conver­
gence. It becomes clear that the question of how and why ideas have an effect on the 
policy outcome is not an abstract one but:
must be understood as practical in nature: it can be asked and answered 
only in relation to specific ideas as it concerns how such come to have ef- 
fectivity through being persuasive to particular people at particular times 
(Finlayson 2004: 531-532, italics in original).
This thesis therefore concentrates on the specific ideas of particular policy-makers who
express the dominant political discourse on EMU accession. Specifically, this thesis
concentrates on former and current leading members of the Visegrad governments and
central banks, and analyses the conceptual language used when making the case for
or against euro-zone membership.
The following ideas are discussed in this thesis: the idea of a national currency 
touches upon national sovereign identity (Risse 2003) and is thus embedded within
10 The economic context also includes putative macroeconomic constraints arising from the need to fulfil 
the Maastricht criteria.
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ideas on European integration per se.11 This thesis therefore analyses the ideas held 
by key actors about European integration, i.e. do they support further and deeper EU 
integration or do they oppose it? Indeed, ideas on European integration are especially 
revealing because there is a positive correlation between opposing/supporting EU inte­
gration and opposing/supporting EMU membership (see chapter 4). The argument is 
that ideas on European integration influence the position of key actors on euro-zone 
membership that may affect the country’s approach for the adoption of the euro. Sec­
ond, the actors’ ideas on macroeconomic policy are analysed. For example, what ideas 
do they have about an explicit fixed exchange rate regime for a transition economy and 
therefore implicitly about fixing the exchange rate irrevocably through euro-zone mem­
bership? Do they perceive euro-zone membership as a means to achieve real conver­
gence or should accession follow at the end of the transition process? The argument is 
that if actors perceive a fixed exchange rate regime as an inferior solution for an econ­
omy in transition and/or perceive euro-zone membership as a hurdle in the catching up 
process, they are more likely to favour staying outside the euro-zone for as long as 
possible (see Table 2b).
As Table 2a shows, this set of ideas involves all three types of beliefs. In the 
first instance, they consist of worldviews because the idea about European integration 
is embedded in a larger conception of the role and function of the Nation State, i.e. the 
idea of a (supranational) political state or a looser entity whose main preoccupation is 
trade and economic integration. Ideas on European integration are related to the funda­
mental debate over the nature of sovereignty and do not change frequently; they are 
more stable over time. However, most of the ideas analysed in this thesis are catego­
rised as principled and causal beliefs, as values and knowledge. They are principled 
beliefs because they translate ideas on European integration (illustrated in the debate 
about whether the EMU is a legitimate aim of state interests) into guidance for political
11 According to Risse (2003: 488): “money is among the most important identity markers in people’s daily 
lives” (see also Jones 2002: 170). Jurgen Habermas, for instance, speaks of a DM-Nationalism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. According to Habermas, a strong DM substituted for state attributes such as 
security and trust. This “currency-Nationalism” replaced the obsolete German national pride after World 
War II with a strong DM (Jurgen Habermas, DIE ZEIT 30/03/1990).
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action. They are causal beliefs because macroeconomic ideas about how to stabilise 
the economy and how to achieve real convergence and growth are essentially based 
on cause-and-effect relationships within a given macroeconomic policy. For example, it 
depends on actors’ ideas on macroeconomic policy if they perceive shock therapy 
measures as a means to achieve real convergence or as a means to create greater 
and explosive socio-economic discrepancy. Because ideas on macroeconomic policies 
are essentially based on cause-effect relationship, they alter more frequently than 
ideas on European integration.
As Table 2a shows, ideas exert their power through the three ways mentioned 
above. In particular, road maps are important as they provide actors with the necessary 
means-goal strategy for euro-zone entry, especially in times of uncertainty and in the 
absence of a unique equilibrium. Although the chapter on ideas does not explicitly refer 
to the role of institutions, it is important to bear in mind that the ideas of central bankers 
are essentially influenced by the design and function of an independent central bank.
Table 2a Ideas
Worldviews Principled beliefs Causal beliefs
Changes are induced by policy failure/learning and persuasiveness
Road maps
Ideas on macro- 
economic policyAbsence of unique 
equilibrium
Ideas on European integration
Institutions
Table 2b Ideas
Actors’ attitudes on euro-zone membership related to 
their
European integration principled beliefs on European integration (correla­
tion between positive/negative ideas on European inte­
gration and positive/negative ideas on euro-zone mem­
bership )
Macroeconomic policy
causal beliefs on EMU as a means or obstacle to 
achieve real convergence and causal beliefs on flexi­
ble or fixed exchange rates
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However, it should be noted that there are several difficulties when attempting 
to measure something as normative and abstract as an idea. It is extremely difficult to 
trace the processes of learning and socialisation that determine actors’ ideas and ide­
ologies that then shape policy contexts. The approaches have to “engage in attempts 
at VERSTEHEN, the interpretation of meaning through empathetic understanding and 
pattern recognition, made possible by shared language and shared tradition” (Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993: 27, emphasis in original). This of course is methodologically very 
difficult. Any idea-approach has to deal with problems relating to the interpretation of 
the actors’ beliefs. In particular, it is difficult to distinguish between random behaviour 
and specific action, and between behaviour that reflects genuine belief and pretend 
behaviour. Similarly, it is difficult to distinguish between actual beliefs and tactical 
comments which are purely self-interested and short-term goal related. For example, 
choices of ideas by policy-makers may simply reflect the interests of the actors (see 
Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 11). Moreover, idea-oriented approaches are often very 
restricted since they point to a particular individual point of view within a particular 
structural setting without taking into account how the importance of the same individual 
position might strongly vary in different situations. For example, during a crisis the indi­
vidual standpoint is more influential since the mechanism of political control is weak­
ened (Larsen 1993: 11). Problems of idea-approaches are also related to the imprecise 
specification of ideas. Ideas and beliefs can be both general and specific. For instance, 
they can be embodied in specific programmes, issue-areas and doctrines, as well as 
policy paradigms, ideologies and cultures. Ideas are also held by different social enti­
ties, such as policy-makers, organisations, professional (epistemic) communities, social 
groups and societies (cf Yee 1996: 70 and Hall 1992: 91-2), to which scholars attribute 
varying degrees of importance for policy outcomes. In addition to these problems that 
arise from the different units of analysis, it is difficult to distinguish the factors that de­
termine why some ideas come to prevail over others (Hall 1997: 198). Related to this is 
the reproach that “ideas are a dime a dozen” (Garrett and Weingast 1993: 203) be­
cause there are so many ideas in actors’ minds but only one may play a role at any
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particular time. As Yee puts it: “since causes are usually multiple and indeterminate in 
the social world, [ideas are] generally only one of many probable partial causes of poli­
cies” (Yee 1996: 70). It is often impossible to explain the outcome by way of political 
discourse or other structural elements alone. This is because the “level of abstraction is 
simply too high” (Larsen 1993: 44). The value of ideational approaches therefore lies in 
their ability to create a “structure or a frame which can link up [the] different free- 
floating elements” (Larsen 1993: 44) of interest- and institution-based approaches. 
Again, this stresses the need for this thesis to undertake an integrated analysis.
Institution-oriented approaches
Interest and idea-based approaches are valuable when attempting to understand the 
different preferences and concepts of the actors involved in the process of policy for­
mulation. Interest and idea-based approaches are useful tools to identify those prefer­
ences and meanings of the euro that are central to the policy-making process of the 
Visegrad countries’ euro-adoption strategies. However, while idea-approaches point to 
the significance of institutionalised ideas for policy outcomes (see Goldstein and Keo­
hane 1993: 20), interest-based approaches have neglected institutions in their analysis 
-  yet interests are constantly mediated by, and expressed through, institutions. Un­
questionably, interests are therefore influenced by the institutional structure through 
which they are articulated. As Martin states:
[policy] outcomes cannot be explained solely in terms of efficiency or 
through the interest of the most powerful states [or actors]; they are in large 
part shaped by the opportunities and constraints created by institutional ar­
rangements (Martin 2001: 132; see also Katzenstein 1976).
Even if distinct interests are identified as important for the making of an euro-adoption 
strategy, they do not necessarily explain policy outcome. Interests are not only the re­
sult of aggregate material preferences of actors but also the result of institutionalised 
norms (see chapter 1). Therefore, the analysis has to account for the impact of institu­
tions on cross-national variations in policy (Hall 1986). Institutional approaches to politi­
cal economy focus on rules, procedures and the formal organisation of institutions.
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Different national structures and institutions may produce distinctive patterns of policy 
outcomes. Accordingly, institution-oriented approaches aim to analyse how institutions 
affect economic policies and performances (Katzenstein 1976, Hall 1986, Zysman 
1983, Henning 1994, Walsh 2000).
Building on insights from earlier work on how institutions affect economic policy 
and performance, neo- (or new) institutionalism developed during the 1980s (for classic 
institutionalism, see Finer 1954, Johnson 1975; for new institutionalism, see March and 
Olsen 1984). In contrast to traditional institutionalism that defines political institutions as 
organisations, new institutionalism understands institutions more broadly to “refer to a 
stable recurring pattern of behaviour” analysing “the way in which institutions embody 
values and power relationships”, while not only concentrating on the impact of institu­
tions but focusing on “the interaction between institutions and individuals” (Lowndes 
2002: 91). In other words, new institutionalism takes into account a potential interde­
pendency between actors and institutions and in doing so, it points to the potential of 
integrating actors’ interests and ideas with institutions to explain policy outcomes (see 
Hall and Taylor 1996: 938).12
Institution-based approaches have pointed to a range of institutionalised struc­
tures that matter for economic policy outcomes: structures of industrial relations, elec­
toral systems, central banks or vocational training and systems of education and the 
structure of inter- and intra-firm relations (Cox 1996, Hall 1986, Scharpf 1991, and 
Zysman 1983). As Hall concludes:
12 This is especially true for historical institutionalism which adopts insights of the different schools of new 
institutionalism. Apart from historical institutionalism, Hall and Taylor (1996) distinguish between rational 
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (see also Immergut 1998). All of these approaches 
agree that institutions reduce uncertainty by providing actors with efficient frameworks. Rational choice 
institutionalism points to the role institutions play in solving collective action dilemmas since institutions 
provide actors with information on other actors and how they are likely to behave. Historical and sociologi­
cal institutionalism claim that institutions determine an actor’s action, i.e. his/her very identity, because 
social choices (the actor’s preferences) are shaped, mediated and channelled endogenously through insti­
tutions. Rational choice institutionalism sees institutional developments as the result of “an effort to reduce 
the transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an institution” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
943; see also North 1981, Keohane 1984, Axelrod 1984 and Oye 1986). In contrast, historical institutional­
ism understands institutional developments in the context of historical forces, path dependency and unin­
tended consequences (see also Hall 1997: 191 and Steinmo 1989). In contrast, sociological institutional­
ism focuses on culturally-specific practices in order to explain the development of institutions: “even the 
most seemingly bureaucratic of practices have to be explained in cultural terms" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
947). Peters (1999: 97) describes seven separate varieties of new-institutionalism (normative, rational 
choice, historical, empirical, international, sociological and network institutionalism).
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[t]hese features interact and present a national matrix of sanctions and in­
centives resulting in a distinctive pattern of strategies that lead to particular 
patterns of aggregate economic performances and policy (Hall 1997: 181; 
see also Hall and Franzese 1998, Soskice 1990).
A comparative case study of institutional features in the Visegrad countries provides
relevant answers to the research question of why the CEECs respond to euro-zone
accession requirements in different, country-specific ways. Adopting an integrated
analysis, this thesis concentrates on institutional features of the Visegrad countries
associated with reforms designed to fulfil EMU accession criteria. In the first instance,
these are the operating electoral systems, central banks and tripartite institutions.
Electoral systems
First, the electoral system is of great importance when analysing different patterns of 
euro-adoption strategies and policies. This is because fiscal policy outcomes are influ­
enced by the institutional design of electoral systems that determine the number of 
parties in parliament, the degree of social representation (such as the number of 
women and ethnic minorities who are members of parliament), the likelihood of coali­
tion governments, the style of party campaigning, as well as organisation and electoral 
choices that are open to voters (Farrell 2001: 192, Roubini and Sachs 1989, Alesina 
1994). Scholars of institutionalism and electoral systems have also demonstrated that 
electoral systems shape party structures, candidate behaviour and voter behaviour 
(Duverger 1954, Taagepera 1997, 1998, Rae 1967, Lijphart 1977, 1985, 1999, Hag­
gard and Mccubbins 2002). In recent years, the seminal work by Douglas Rae (1967) 
on the consequences of electoral systems has been developed further, most notably by 
Richard Katz (1980, 1997), Arend Lijphart (1990, 1994, 1999), Michael Gallagher et al. 
(2001), and Rein Taagepera (1998). These authors argue that, broadly speaking, elec­
toral systems can be divided into proportional and non-proportional systems. Whereas 
proportional systems try to translate as closely as possible the votes received by par­
ties into the number of seats in parliament, non-proportional systems aim to give one 
party a clear majority of seats over its competitors. The Visegrad countries all opted for 
a proportional or a mixed system with a strong PR element (Hungary). Continental
63
Western European democratic forms of government were taken as a blueprint to estab­
lish a parliamentary system in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, as well as a 
semi-presidential system in Poland.13 Indeed, in all Visegrad countries, PR systems 
were seen as the most democratic electoral system, closely reflecting variety within 
societies, and best suited to the dissidents’ “long-standing normative commitment to 
pluralism” (Birch et al. 2002: 69). Surprisingly, none of the newly founded democracies 
(including those in Latin America and Africa) adopted a system of single member plu­
rality (SMP) as it exists, such as in the UK (see Farrell 2001: 2).
SMP is often associated with simplicity (the system is easy to understand), sta­
bility (coalitions are nearly unheard of) and constituency representation. In comparison, 
it is often said that having a representative assembly -  elected through a proportional 
system -  comes at the cost of instability and a low degree of efficiency in government. 
This is because proportional electoral systems are more likely to produce coalition 
governments, which require consensus among coalition parties, each having a veto 
(see Alesina 1994: 51). Farrell (2001), however, provides counterexamples. Austria, 
Sweden, and Norway, for instance, have proportional electoral systems yet they have 
also experienced high degrees of government stability. In contrast, countries that have 
non-proportional electoral systems, such as Japan and India, have experienced gov­
ernment instability. In a recent study, Lijphart (1999) comes to a very similar conclusion, 
stating that proportional electoral systems can provide the same degree of government 
stability as a non-proportional system can (see also Gallagher et. al 2001). For the pur­
poses of this thesis, it is of interest to analyse whether proportional electoral systems in 
the Visegrad countries provide stability or instability and whether these electoral sys­
tems hinder or support policy reforms. Given that the Visegrad countries have experi­
enced broad coalition governments and following the reasoning that in this case “only 
inter-party collaboration can overcome legislative stalemate and executive inertia” 
(Kitschelt et al. 1999: 346), this thesis analyses whether these coalition governments
13 However, given that the Polish Presidency lost much of its political power to the Prime Minister under 
the 1997 constitution “Poland can be seen as moving away from the semi-presidential model” (Gallagher 
et al. 2006: 39).
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tend to hinder rather than stimulate policy reforms. Since durable majorities are rare, 
governments might tend to have a shorter time horizon and might be likely to postpone 
adjustment measures related to EMU accession (see also Garrett and Lange 1991, 
Simmons 1994).
Since non-proportional electoral systems support two-party systems, it might be 
expected that proportional representation leads to fragmented party systems. In fact, 
Maurice Duverger (1954) proved that proportional electoral systems coincide with 
multi-party systems (also known as ‘Duverger’s Law’). Multi-party systems are more 
likely to emerge in divided societies (e.g. ethnically or religiously divided). This is con­
firmed by the case studies: all Visegrad countries possess a multi-party system al­
though with varying degree of party fragmentation. The number and composition of 
coalition parties -  both important indicators of a stable government -  also differ from 
country to country. Whereas there is a trend towards a domination of socio-economic 
cleavages in the Czech Republic and the Czech party system (Evans and Whitefield 
1998, Mateju et al. 1999, Kitschelt et al. 1999, see also Lewis 2004: 135-6), in Hungary, 
the cleavage structure is not so much determined by issues of distribution as by ethnic 
rights, the protection of Hungarian minorities abroad and attitudes toward the Roma 
(Evans and Whitefield 1998: 134; cf Evans and Whitefield 1995). In Poland, a society 
divided in multiple crosscutting cleavages along not only socio-economic lines, but also 
authoritarian religious lines (especially concerning attitudes toward Catholicism and 
issues of religious education and abortion), as well as attitudes toward the former com­
munist regime (cf the battles between Solidarity and communists during the 1980s) is 
shaped by a strong fragmented party system (cf the 1991 parliamentary election when 
no less than 27 parties received a place in the Sejm (parliament)). Slovakia’s multi­
party system is heavily polarised with a main cleavage along issues of Slovak nation­
hood (such as insecure and contested national identity) and along ethnic lines (vis-a- 
vis the Hungarian and Roma communities). In particular, there is a strong polarisation 
between an anti- and pro-Meciar camp- between “what might be called Westernisers 
and Slavophiles” (Wightman 2001: 136; see also Meseznikov 1997). In both Poland
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and Slovakia, the high number of parliamentary parties increased the need for multi­
party coalitions. Scholars have argued that in societies with fragmented and polarised 
partisan alignments, politicians are more likely to try to make a case for distributional 
issues and/or broader populist stances because they have to respond to their respec­
tive constituencies (see Haggard and Kaufman 1992). For this reason, it is of particular 
importance for this thesis to analyse political alignments and the structure of party sys­
tems as studied by cleavage and class politics scholars (see p. 46). Indeed, the obliga­
tion to conduct restrictive monetary policy and fiscal policy in line with the EMU has led 
to societal tensions over the ways in which reforms should be carried out. This has 
opened the door to populism, making life difficult for the Visegrad governments commit­
ted to adhering to the Maastricht criteria.
Taking this into account and relating the shape of the party system to reforms 
associated with EMU accession, the studies by Alesina and Perotti (1994), Grilli et al. 
(1991) and Roubini and Sachs (1989) are of particular importance. These studies point 
out that fragmented party systems have more difficulties in attaining low budget deficits 
and that these party systems also have a deep impact on the nation’s level of debt and 
deficits. Therefore, multi-party systems and coalition governments might have difficul­
ties in designing fiscal consolidation programs and, as Alesina concludes, “the institu­
tion of proportionality may not be conducive to swift fiscal reforms when they are 
needed” (Alesina 1994: 53; for empirical results, see Roubini and Sachs 1989 and Grilli 
et al. 1991).14 In contrast, stable governments, defined by a one party government or a 
low number of coalition parties and a cohesive cabinet, succeed much better in imple­
menting fiscal consolidation programmes. Given that all Visegrad countries have coali­
tion governments, looking at the number and coherence of the coalition parties is a 
valuable starting point in understanding the differences in euro adoption strategies. It is 
therefore argued that the electoral system is an effective variable when not only trying 
to understand the degree of policy reform related to early euro-zone entry but also
14 For a critical review of Sachs and Roubini’s results see Edin and Ohlsson (1991).
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when trying to trace sources of difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms by means of 
an analysis of governments’ stability and time horizons in the Visegrad countries.
Central bank independence
Central bank independence (CBI) is both a dependent and independent variable in the 
analysis of cross-national variations in the Visegrad countries’ euro adoption strategies. 
On the one hand, CBI is a dependent variable because it is a prerequisite for EMU ac­
cession, whilst, on the other hand, it is an independent variable because a low inflation 
rate (which is a central convergence criterion for euro-zone entry) is influenced 
endogenously, namely through the degree of independence of the central bank (Cuk- 
ierman et al. 1994, Grilli et al. 1991). The degree to which the central bank has an in­
dependent status is highly important when analysing institutional constraints on country 
specific monetary and fiscal policy. This is because the status of the central bank has 
several consequences for governments' economic policy choices.
Rogoff (1985), building on the work of Barro and Gordon (1983), demonstrates 
that governments committed to independent monetary institutions enjoy higher credibil­
ity than states without independent monetary institutions. An obvious advantage of in­
dependent central banks is that they are able to guarantee monetary stability and so 
reduce the problem of time-inconsistency usually associated with monetary policy.15 A 
country suffering from a lack of credibility is likely to experience problems when it 
needs to borrow money from the market (see also Simmons 1994). In these regards, 
requirements concerning the independence of central banks ensure international credi­
bility for the Visegrad countries by demonstrating that they have fully adapted to the
15 The time-inconsistency problem derives from the fact that economic actors’ behaviour today depends on 
their expectations of the central bank’s decision over time. It is thus related to the uncertainty about the 
future development of monetary policy and in particular about the rate of inflation. Because of the time- 
inconsistency problem, economic actors are inclined to agree on higher nominal wages since a potential 
higher inflation will lower real wages and therefore returns (see Barro and Gordon 1983). An independent 
central bank committed to particular policy rules will enhance the credibility and therefore economic actors 
(i.e. wage-price bargainers) will lower their anticipation of price-level changes so that they are also more 
inclined to agree on moderate wage increases. Other scholars have pointed out that in particular discre­
tionary monetary policy faces the key problem of inflation bias. This relates to the idea that policy-makers 
(central bankers) can take advantage of existing expectations to create “inflation surprises’’ that increases 
short-term output. However, agents can adapt to theses policies and revise their expectations of prices 
(Barro and Gordon 1983, Kydland and Prescott 1977).
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process of liberalising their economies.16 Furthermore, following Simmons’ reasoning 
(see footnote 16), this would suggest that the overall success of policy reforms in 
CEECs depends primarily on the credibility of their governments.
According to Cukierman et al. (1994) and Grilli et al. (1991), there is an obvious 
correlation between central bank independence and low inflation.17 Their studies con­
firm that the lower the inflation rate, the greater the central bank's independence (see 
also Scharpf 1991, Eijffinger and de Haan 1996). This is because, under CBI, central 
bankers can follow their monetary policy aims without being disrupted by political influ­
ence or decisions (Alesina and Summers 1993, Cukierman 1992, Rogoff 1985). An 
independent central bank places far-reaching constraints on the government's eco­
nomic policy decisions. The greater the central bank's political independence and 
commitment to low inflation, the more the government comes under pressure to choose 
options of financing other than the monetarisation of the budget deficit, such as cutting 
public spending or increasing taxes (see Alesina 1994: 54). Certainly, this would again 
increase pressure on affected socio-economic groups (such as the business commu­
nity with tax increases; or the public sector with cuts in public spending).18 Govern­
ments come under pressure to find other ways to counteract economic downturns 
rather than, for instance, through cutting interest rates. Accordingly, the position of the 
respective central bank is fragile, illustrated by some Visegrad governments' constant 
efforts to undermine the independence of their central banks and to force them to cut 
interest rates (see chapter 5 and 6). The debate is directly related to issues relevant to 
euro-zone accession. Since the Visegrad countries already pay great attention to the
16 Simmons (1994) states that a government’s ability to make credible commitments depends on the de­
gree of political stability, the degree of social and labour unrest, the political orientation of the government, 
and the dependent or independent status of the central bank. According to Simmons, it was the lack of 
credibility of some states in the interwar period that led to the respective countries' difficulties in tying 
themselves to norms set by the gold standard.
17 See also Persson and Tabellini (1994) for a collection of the theoretical literature on central bank inde­
pendence.
18 Consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model (see chapter 1) and following the reasoning that an inde­
pendent central bank constrains the government in its scope to reflate the economy, Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000) and Hallerberg et al. (2002a,b) found empirical evidence that two factors determine whether transi­
tion countries experience a fiscal or monetary cycle prior to elections: first, the relative independence of 
the central bank and, second, the country’s exchange rate regime. The study reveals that independent 
central banks can eliminate monetary cycles under flexible exchange regimes; however, this is done at the 
expense of fiscal expansion.
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Maastricht criteria and consequently to attaining low inflation rates (see chapter 1), 
central banks are even more reluctant to cut interest rates because this creates infla­
tionary pressure. Controversies about CBI are therefore of significance to this thesis, 
both at an abstract level, concerning the relationship between central banks and gov­
ernments, and at the CEECs-specific level where governments lack respect for CBI. It 
should be stressed that governments’ efforts to undermine CBI -  whether successful or 
not -  do not strengthen the credibility of the central bank and its ability to deliver low 
inflation. This is an important aspect to keep in mind given that sole inflation expecta­
tion can create inflation inertia (cf Moghadam 1998, Dvorsky 2000). It should also be 
kept in mind that the disinflation process in a transition country might go beyond the 
direct control of the central bank as “inflation data are likely to reflect very specific, 
temporary developments related to that particular year in the transition process” (Dvor­
sky 2000: 27). Therefore, this thesis does not correlate the CBI to the disinflation proc­
ess per se (see also Dvorsky 2000: 25) but it explores whether the central bank pur­
sues a restrictive monetary policy and whether the resulting constraints for the gov­
ernment to conduct economic policies have consequences for the euro-adoption 
strategies of the countries concerned. To look at the monetary policy in practice is even 
more important given that while the countries may score well in CBI indices, the actual 
behaviour of central banks may deviate from the law (Cukierman et al. 1994: 3). Thus 
indices of legal CBI might rather describe what is desirable and they therefore “may at 
times be misleading or insufficient to fully explain the real institutional status or the ac­
tual independence of central banks” (Angeloni et al. 2005: 35).
Besides the problems associated with CBI indices as a reliable measure of the 
disinflation process, political economists disagree on whether low inflation is due more 
to actual CBI or to other economic institutions responsible for the organisation of wage 
bargaining; thus to industrial relations (Hall and Franzese 1998, Posen 1998).
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Tripartite institutions and wage bargaining levels
Institution-oriented scholars claim that tripartite institutions are central in explaining 
institutional constraints that affect economic performance. It might therefore be argued 
that tripartite institutions also affect the euro-adoption strategy of the Visegrad coun­
tries. After the breakdown of the communist regimes, the Visegrad governments were 
keen to apply Western practices of industrial relations and tripartite meetings were es­
tablished in all Visegrad countries. Hence, corporatist models of interest representation 
were supported by the governments.
Since the adoption of the euro requires profound macroeconomic adjustments it 
is important to examine the social partners’ capacity to support compliance with the 
Maastricht criteria and hence to influence the respective euro-adoption strategy. This is 
all the more important as the Maastricht criteria place limits on wage developments and 
therefore influence the agenda of the national-level tripartite social dialogue. Indeed, as 
recently happened in Hungary and Slovakia, the prospect of EMU membership was 
used by the governments to warn the social partners against an escalation of wages:
the need to comply with the Maastricht criteria is put forward whenever es­
calation of wages brings threat of macroeconomic imbalances and the gov­
ernment seeks to curb inflation and the state budget deficit through wage 
restraints (Toth and Neumann 2004b: 7).
An analysis of the social partners’ role in the economic policy-making process shows 
whether they are able to influence the pace and content of the euro-adoption strategy 
concerned and therefore whether the strategies vary in accordance to different institu­
tional tripartite settings. Related to this last point is also the role of the wage-bargaining 
level in attaining wage restraints.
The literature on corporatism, in particular, has discussed at great length the 
different structures of wage bargaining (decentralised or centralised) and their impact 
on economic performances (see Schmidt 1987, Goldthorpe 1984, Katzenstein 1985, 
Schmitter 1974, Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Scholars have argued that central­
ised wage bargaining does a better job of resisting inflationary pressures and of deliv­
ering strong economic performances. Hood (1994: 70) summarises that corporatism is
70
more likely to succeed in delivering effective wage restraint policies, thereby creating 
favourable conditions for capital accumulation, as well as affecting policy through the 
demand side. In other words, unemployment becomes more sensitive as a political 
issue in corporatist states than in liberal ones (see also Katzenstein 1985, Wilensky 
and Turner 1987).
Geoffrey Garrett (1998) states that macroeconomic performance is as good or 
often better in countries with strong centralised labour movements and powerful left- 
wing parties.19 Opponents of centralised bargaining say that centralised bargaining is 
too rigid and therefore unable to respond quickly to changes in production processes 
and technology. On the other hand, economists claim there is a reversed U-shaped 
curve (the so-called hump-shaped hypothesis) for wage inflation resulting from the de­
gree of centralised wage bargaining (Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Barro 1988, Flanagan 
et al. 1983, Layard et al. 1994, Jackman 1995). That is to say, both fully centralised 
and fully decentralised wage bargaining structures are able to deliver wage restraint 
and thus to reduce inflationary pressures. In a centralised bargaining system, real 
wage restraint occurs because “union leaders will internalise the externalities of wage 
increases” (Garrett 1998: 33). Union leaders “understand that economywide wage re­
straint today will improve the material well-being of all workers in the longer run” 
(Garrett 1998: 32).18 This is because trade union leaders are aware of the wage-price 
spirals that result in higher inflation which in turn negatively affects the “employment 
prospect of all workers” via economic growth constraints (Garrett 1998: 32). Thus, so­
cial partners develop a consensus “about the appropriate ‘going rate’ for nominal 
wages which is then implemented without requiring unemployment to eliminate the 
wage-price [...] spirals” (Layard et al. 1994: 98). However, in a decentralised bargain­
ing system, market forces impose wage restraint too (see Calmfors 1993: 8). This is 
because in decentralised bargaining systems “isolated groups of workers do not have 
the organisational clout to bid up wages above market-clearing levels” (Garrett 1998:
19 For a critique of Garrett’s arguments see Hay (2000).
18 For a discussion of various wage externalities see Calmfors (1993: 6-8).
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33); or, to put it differently, “in the absence of trade unions there would be no external­
ities to internalise” (Garrett 1998: 32). By contrast, mixed systems of wage bargaining 
are likely to increase wages and therefore inflationary pressure. This is because trade 
unions in mixed intermediate systems are strong enough to push for higher wages but 
are “not sufficiently centralised across regions and industries to internalise general 
macroeconomic consequences” (Bell and Mickiewicz 1999: 132; see also Calmfors and 
Driffill 1988, Garrett and Lange 1996: 52).20
When compared with their Western European counterparts, wage bargaining in 
the Visegrad countries is rather decentralised. For example, most of the wage bargain­
ing in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland takes places at the company level 
whereas in Slovakia this occurs at the sectoral level. Similarly, collective wage bargain­
ing coverage is highest in Slovakia and lowest in the Czech Republic. Furthermore, 
union density is highest in Slovakia and lowest in Poland and Hungary. It is therefore of 
interest to analyse whether the variation in the wage bargaining levels and trade union 
densities account for variations in the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad coun­
tries. Together with insights from research focusing on institutional constraints arising 
from tripartite institutions and their consequence on wage setting structures, the dy­
namics of political support from the social partners are therefore added to the analytical 
framework for analysing and explaining different approaches to reforms related to EMU 
membership in the Visegrad countries.
20 The hump-shaped hypothesis has been criticised for its rigid focus on the wage bargaining level without 
paying attention to the actual strength and internal structure of trade unions (Golden 1993). For example, 
lower wage bargaining levels have to adhere to the agreements, however, poor coordination within the 
trade union would open the door for free riders to agree on higher local wage payments (e.g. overtime 
payments and bonuses). A higher union authority, thus high union density, for example, is able to mitigate 
these so-called wage drifts (see Garrett 1998: 33).
72
Table 3 Institutions
Assumed implications for fiscal and monetary policy 
reforms
Electoral system Stable and coherent coalition governments perform 
better in implementing fiscal policy reforms
Central Bank independ­
ence
High CBI contributes to lower inflation and inflation ex­
pectations
Industrial Relations Tripartite institutions important for compliance with 
Maastricht criteria (social pacts). Decentralised and 
centralised wage bargaining level contributes to wage 
restraint
Having outlined the main advantages and disadvantages of the three ap­
proaches to political economy, it becomes clear that a study of the research question -  
why the Visegrad countries respond in country-specific ways to the challenge of EMU 
membership -  cannot be based on one approach alone. Instead, an integrated ap­
proach that takes into account the strengths and weaknesses of each of the three ap­
proaches oriented toward interests, institutions, and ideas must be adopted. The next 
chapter reviews the development of fiscal and monetary policies in the Visegrad coun­
tries that is relevant to the analytical framework for discussing policy variations in ap­
proaching the adoption of the euro.
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Chapter 3
Fiscal and monetary policy in the Visegrad countries, 1990-2004
Having outlined the analytical framework applied in this thesis, the following chapter 
explores the development of fiscal and monetary policy in the Visegrad countries from 
1990 to 2004. It provides the necessary background on fiscal and monetary policy re­
forms that is relevant to the discussion of cross-national variations in regard to euro­
zone accession.
This chapter shows the different starting conditions for the Visegrad countries and 
the details of the reform programmes adopted. The Visegrad countries’ approaches to 
macroeconomic stabilisation share important similarities but differ in their ways of im­
plementation and in the problems encountered. The overall aims of the reforms are to 
achieve price stability, low public deficits, and exchange rate stability, thus to comply 
with the Maastricht criteria. Indeed, these objectives gained a predominant role in de­
signing monetary and fiscal policies as EU accession rose on the political agenda. But 
while the objective of EMU membership is common to all Visegrad countries, their 
strategies for the adoption of the euro differ. This chapter discusses the development of 
fiscal and monetary policy that led to the adoption of the respective euro-adoption 
strategy. Chapters 4-6 then apply the analytical framework described in chapter 2 to 
highlight the rationale behind these variations. This chapter is structured in five parts 
including the four case studies and a conclusion. Each study is divided into a monetary 
and fiscal policy section. The conclusion summarises the analysis and relates the find­
ings to the subsequent chapters.
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The Czech Republic
Fiscal policy
Unlike Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia1 did not experience a period of pere- 
stroika-type reforms. No systemic changes took place before 1989 and the private sec­
tor was virtually nonexistent.2 However, among the Visegrad countries, Czechoslovakia 
emerged from the communist regime with its macroeconomic fundamentals under con­
trol (Dlouhy 2001: 175). In 1989, Czechoslovakia and especially the later Czech Re­
public had economic advantages over other CEECs because the country could look 
back on a long industrial history. Indeed, on the eve of the transition process, the coun­
try was in a good macroeconomic position with low foreign debt, a relatively strong bal­
ance of payments performance, minimal inflation, and a relatively well-developed con­
sumer goods market (Prust 1993: 56). In addition, since the country -  unlike Poland 
and Hungary -  had not experienced market-oriented reforms during the communist 
period, no quasi-property rights, such as leaseholds, hindered or complicated the trans­
fer of ownership (see EIU 2005a: 33).
In 1990, Czechoslovakia launched an economic reform programme, which con­
sisted of price and trade liberalisation, tax reform, anti-inflationary policies, a new ex­
change rate regime, and privatisation. Consumer prices were liberalised and rose 
quickly by 47.6 percent in 1991 (Dlouhy 2001: 177). In 1990, the government planned 
for a small budget surplus, which was mainly achieved “because virtually all categories 
of expenditure were restrained” (Prust 1993: 56). In 1991, the government cut both 
revenues and expenditures, resulting in a loss of the share of general government 
revenues in GDP by almost 10 percent to 52.9 percent. On the revenue side, profits tax 
and some turnover taxes were reduced, while foreign trade levies were abolished 
(Prust 1993: 56). Government expenditure was cut by 8 percent to just under 55 per­
cent of the share of general government expenditure in GDP. This was mainly due to
1 The pre-1993 period refers to fiscal and monetary policy implemented in Czechoslovakia.
2 The private sector contribution to GDP was 2 percent in 1989 (Rapacki 2001).
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cuts in budgetary subsidies, which were reduced from 13 percent to 7 percent of GDP. 
In 1989, budgetary subsidies still accounted for 16 percent of GDP. Sixty percent of the 
subsidies were used for agricultural producers and retail subsidies on foodstuff (Prust 
1993: 60). Housing and construction also received important subsidies. Retail subsi­
dies were abolished in 1991 and agriculture subsidies were cut by one-third (Prust 
1993: 57). However, despite the vast subsidy cuts, the deficit rose to 2.8 percent for 
1991 because the GDP continued to fall due to output decline (see Table 4, p. 101). 
GDP dropped by 25 percent between 1989 and 1993.
In addition, the Czech economy suffered from several external shocks like the 
collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) market and the divi­
sion of Czechoslovakia into two independent countries. The domestic market shrank by 
one-third and Slovakia’s protectionism seriously hurt new exports (Dlouhy 2001: 177). 
In 1994, the Czech economy reached a turning point. After 3 years of negative output, 
growth rates increased to 2.2 percent and 5.9 percent in 1994 and 1995 respectively 
(see Table 4). At the same time, inflation rates decreased from 20.8 percent in 1993 to 
9.1 percent in 1995. Imports remained low because of low aggregate demand, and the 
trade balance was positive between 1989 and 1994 (Dlouhy 2001: 179). The budget 
continued to show a slight deficit and unemployment remained low at around 4 percent 
(see Table 4). Some analysts have linked the low unemployment rates to the country’s 
slow microeconomic restructuring and the small number of bankruptcies (cf Sojka 
1994: 40, Dlouhy 2001:181).
One of the main reasons for the rapid economic recovery was the exceptionally 
high increase of foreign direct investment (FDI). Net capital inflows accounted for 8.5 
percent and 16.6 percent of GDP in 1994 and 1995 respectively (Tullio 1999: 68). 
Two years later, however, the Czech Republic experienced its worst economic crisis, 
triggered by speculative attacks on the Czech crown. The main destabilising effects 
were caused precisely by the strong capital inflows, which suddenly and violently re­
versed (see p. 79). Many economists blamed the slow microeconomic restructuring for 
the deep crisis (see Jurajda 2001, Dlouhy 2001). The currency crisis resulted in a GDP
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fall of -1 percent in 1998. At the same time, the unemployment rate rose from 3.9 per­
cent in 1996 to almost 9 percent in 1999 (see Table 4). Only in 2000 did the Czech 
economy slowly start to recover and economic output expanded for the first time since
1996. Growth rates increased to 3.3 percent in 2000, and FDI rose again as a result of 
a reinvigorated privatisation agenda and the privatisation of formerly state-owned 
banks (World Bank 2001: 14). However, since the currency crisis, the unemployment 
rate has remained high and stood at 8.3 percent in 2004 (see Table 4). As discussed in 
the following chapters, both the currency crisis and the rising unemployment rates in 
the aftermath of the economic recession influence distinctively the Czech approach to 
the adoption of the euro.
In addition, the fiscal deficit has increased continuously since 1999. From a sur­
plus in 1993, it dropped to 4 percent of the GDP deficit in 2000, partly because of the 
financial crisis in 1997 and partly for structural reasons. As the economy picked up 
again, it became apparent that the fiscal deficit is not “merely cyclical but to a large 
extent [...] structural in nature” (World Bank 2001: 1). Between 2000-2002, the fiscal 
deficit rose to a 6.8 percent of GDP because of high expenditures in military procure­
ment, flood-related spending3, and unemployment and social payments (European 
Commission 2003b: 15). For example, there has been a gradual increase of subsidies 
to households throughout the 1990s that is explained by an increase in social security 
and welfare payments since 1994 (World Bank 2001: 17). Welfare payments went up 
partly due to an increase in the number of early retirements. Mandatory and quasi­
mandatory expenditure, such as pension, health care schemes and employment policy, 
have increased by 10 percent since 1995 and account for about 80 percent of state 
budget spending (Zombrit 2003: 68). In 2003, the fiscal deficit rose to a record high of 
12.3 percent of GDP because of modifications in reporting state guarantees. This was 
due to the changeover to the accruals-based and EU-compliant European System of 
Accounts (ESA 95) methodology which caused a one-off increase of 7.3 percent in the 
general budget deficit (EIU 2005a: 36). In addition, the budget deficit remained high
3 In August 2002, the Czech Republic was hit by a catastrophic flood.
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because economic growth was supported by fiscal expansion and by a lack of compre­
hensive reform of entitlement programmes, especially in the field of pension and social 
security systems (Zogala 2003: 6, EIU 2005a: 35). The record high deficit of 12.3 per­
cent in 2003 was also caused by losses at Ceska konsolidacni agentura (CKA), the 
state bailout agency that is responsible for the debts accumulated by companies during 
the communist regime. These ‘hidden debts’ in the form of “bad loans taken over from 
the commercial banking sector reached a peak exceeding US$ 14bn in 2003” (EIU 
2005a: 36).
In December 2003, the CSSD-led government approved a reform package of 
11 fiscal measures to bring down the fiscal deficit to around 4 percent of GDP by 2006. 
As further discussed in the following chapters, fiscal reforms were justified and de­
fended by Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla explicitly with reference to the need to comply 
with the Maastricht criteria. The reform package included cuts in the salaries of state- 
employees and a tax increase. Due to strong investment (but weak domestic con­
sumption) and a high growth rate of 3.8 percent, the fiscal deficit decreased to 4.8 per­
cent, however, this was still well above the initial target. In summer 2004 the Czech 
Parliament accepted a bill on new budgetary rules. It included a fiscal target based on 
medium-term expenditure ceilings, needed in order to meet the convergence criteria by 
2008 and to adopt the euro by the end of the decade (see Ministry of Finance of the 
Czech Republic 2004: 29).
Monetary policy
To reduce inflationary pressures resulting from the price liberalisation, monetary policy 
was restrictive between 1990 and 1992 and a fixed exchange rate system with narrow 
bands was introduced. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the Czechoslovak 
crown was devalued several times in 1991 and 1992 before it was pegged to a five- 
currency basket. The basket was then changed in May 1993 to a basket consisting of 
65 percent Deutsch Mark (DM) and 35 percent US dollar, with narrow fluctuation bands 
of only 0.5 percent on either side. Due to macroeconomic stabilisation, trade liberalisa­
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tion and an improved investment rating, FDI increased substantially after 1993, putting 
more and more pressure on the money supply. The Czech National Bank (CNB) re­
acted with costly but ineffective sterilisation operations. Inflationary pressure increased 
and real currency depreciation occurred, leading the central bank to widen the fluctua­
tion bands to ± 7.5 percent in February 1996. The Czech crown depreciated within the 
widened band, but capital inflows decreased only temporarily. In early 1997, the current 
account deficit rose sharply and inflation rates increased to much higher levels than 
those of the Czech Republic’s main trading partners. To reduce inflationary pressure, 
the central bank raised interest rates in February 1997, resulting in a renewal of capital 
inflows. In March 1997, the market decided that the Czech current account deficit was 
unsustainable and large speculative attacks on the Czech crown began. The govern­
ment and the central bank reacted by introducing a managed floating system in order 
to depreciate the currency by almost 20 percent. Budget cuts of 15 percent and wage 
restraint in the public sector were initiated between May and July and monetary policy 
remained neutral. To counterbalance the economic downturn, the central bank cut the 
interest rate from 15 to 5 percent between the summer of 1998 and the end of 1999 
(World Bank 2001: 14). Interest rates have been gradually reduced since. The short­
term interest rate, for instance, was cut from around 14.3 percent in 1998 to 2.1 per­
cent in 2004 (see Table 4; Zombrit 2003: 68). This was possible because, by the end of 
1999, macroeconomic conditions had changed; the currency account deficit improved 
and inflation began to decrease. The inflation rate was brought down from 9.7 percent 
in 1998 to 1.4 percent in 2002 (see Table 4). However, at the same time there has 
been a continuous trend for the Czech crown to appreciate against the euro. The sig­
nificant cuts in interest rates are therefore the response to a low inflationary environ­
ment and a strong currency appreciation (see Table 4; Zombrit 2003: 68). While the 
Czech economy continued to grow in 2003 and 2004 due to high investment, domestic 
consumption remained weak (see Table 4 and European Commission 2005b). This 
contributed to a deflationary situation in 2003 when the inflation rate stood at -0.1 per­
cent. However, inflation rose again to 2.8 percent in 2004 because of an increase in the
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value-added tax (VAT), regulated food prices, as well as higher economic activity 
ahead of EU accession on the 1st of May (see Table 4 and EIU 2005a: 39). Neverthe­
less, the Czech Republic is in a favourable position to comply with the Maastricht crite­
rion of low inflation. As discussed in the following chapter, the continual low inflation 
environment, low interest rates and a low debt level distinctively influence domestic 
preferences on the adoption of the euro in the Czech Republic.
Slovakia 
Fiscal policy
Slovakia differs greatly from the Czech Republic in terms of economic structures and 
performance. The Slovak economy relied heavily on the coal and steel industry, in­
cluding arms and weapons industries that depended on the CMEA market. Slovakia 
therefore suffered more from the collapse of the CMEA than the Czech Republic did. 
This also explains why the economic reforms of the 1990s have had a more negative 
impact on output and unemployment rates than in the Czech Republic (see Prust 1993: 
49-50 and Table 5, p. 102).
As described above, the first priority of fiscal policy in Czechoslovakia during 
the pre-1993 period was to implement a modern taxation system and to reduce public 
expenditure. On the revenue side, the government considerably reduced profit, turn­
over, and foreign trade taxes. On the public expenditure side, subsidies were cut dras­
tically and real government consumption was reduced by 18 percent in 1991 (Toth 
2000: 73). In 1992-1993, budget deficit was caused by the costs of creating a new in­
dependent Slovakia and the economic recession reinforced by the decay of the tradi­
tional markets (see Table 5). The period between 1993-1995 was then characterised 
by a steady reduction of expenditures and by a high ratio between taxes and revenues 
to GDP. Basically, this was attributed to a comprehensive tax reform on income and 
VAT. In addition, although the government of independent Slovakia at first employed 
the rhetoric of fiscal expansion, it nevertheless followed the restrictive path of fiscal and
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monetary policy from the Czechoslovak period. In 1994 and 1995, Slovakia’s economy 
started to recover and experienced successful macroeconomic development with low 
budget deficits and inflation rates and high growth rates. This was mainly achieved 
through the growth of exports. Slovakia succeeded in turning the fiscal deficit from 6.7 
percent of GDP in 1993 into a surplus of 0.2 percent in 1995 (Table 5). However, the 
deficit rose again quickly between 1996 and 1998, due to a rapid deterioration of tax 
discipline, which translated into external imbalances. Accordingly, Slovakia experi­
enced a current account deficit of around 9 percent of GDP in 1996-1998 (see Table
5). Together with a reduction of FDI, “the country set out on an unsustainable borrow­
ing spree” (Toth 2000: 61). In 1996, the government started to implement expansionary 
macroeconomic plans consisting mainly of government guarantees and resulting in a 
high level of budget deficit. Between 1996-1998, the government increased spending 
on health, public administration, and major infrastructure projects, such as railways, 
motorways, and power plants, while the revenue side was characterised by a deterio­
ration of tax revenue allocation due to huge losses in corporate enterprise productivity. 
This all translated into a high fiscal deficit, which increased from 2.1 in 1996 to 5.7 in
1997. In 1997, the Meciar government also introduced an administrative reform with 
new regional districts to act between the state and the local government (see chapter
6). Costly new offices had to be opened, and before the 1998 elections the government 
increased the nominal wages of state bureaucrats substantially. Indeed, Slovakia is a 
case in point for a strong fiscal cycle before the 1998 elections; an aspect which is fur­
ther elaborated and related to the euro-adoption strategy in the following chapter.
In 1999, an austerity package, launched by the newly elected liberal-conserva­
tive and socialist coalition government, failed to reduce the budget deficit. On the reve­
nue side, the Slovak government cut the corporate income tax in 1999.4 At the same 
time, public expenditure rose by 2 percent of GDP between 1999 and 2001, in particu­
lar due to high expenditure needs for the reconstruction of the banking sector which
4 During the 1990s, Slovakia had the highest corporate profit tax among the Visegrad countries. VAT was 
also very high at 23 percent, although with a reduced VAT of 10 percent for specific products such as food, 
medications, fuel, and many services. Only Hungary with a VAT of 25 percent has a higher indirect tax, 
however, on the other hand, corporate profit tax in Hungary is very low (only 18 percent).
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was neglected under the Meciar government (World Bank 2003: 3). In 2000, the fiscal 
deficit reached a record high of 10.3 percent. The fiscal deterioration was also caused 
by policy-driven revenue losses, for example by the tariff reduction and the elimination 
of the import surcharges required by EU accession and the WTO. However, in general, 
Slovakia’s macroeconomic performance has been improving significantly since 2000. 
Output grew by 4.6 percent in 2002, the fiscal deficit declined to 5.7 percent and FDI 
surged from about 1 percent of GDP annually in the 1990s to around 17 percent, re­
sulting in a capital account surplus in 2002 (see Table 5). With a capital account sur­
plus of almost 20 percent in 2002, Slovakia is in a favourable position to finance its 
fiscal deficit (World Bank 2003). Indeed, in 2002 the Slovak economy experienced its 
best growth performance since it was hurt by the financial crisis in 1998. This is re­
markable given that most of the Central and Eastern European countries have been 
struggling with very low growth performance since 2000.
Compared to the rest of the Visegrad countries, the Slovak government spends 
higher levels on subsidies to agriculture, transport, and hospitals (see also Toth 2000: 
84). Around 34 percent of all subsidies go to the agricultural sector, which produces 
only 4.5 percent of GDP. In addition, public sector wages account for 8.6 percent of 
GDP, reflecting the large workforce in health and education (World Bank 2003: 16). In 
1998, social security expenses mounted to 21.5 percent of GDP in Slovakia compared 
with 9.2 percent in Hungary (Toth 2000: 86). This is mainly due to an inherited and very 
costly pay-as-you-go pension system. A new pension system with a funded second 
pillar to replace the pay-as-you-go pension system was prepared by the government in 
2004 (see European Commission 2005b: 227). In addition, the parliament approved the 
last tranches of the government’s reform package in the realm of health care with a 
reconfiguration of the insurance system (European Commission 2005b: 227). In Janu­
ary 2004, Slovakia also introduced a far-reaching tax reform with a flat personal and 
corporate income tax rate and a unified added tax rate, all at 19 percent.
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The second Dzurinda government has been successful in launching structural 
reforms.5 It also approved a new 2004 budget bill that successfully reduced the fiscal 
deficit to 3.9 percent in 2004 (see Table 5) and that aims to reduce the deficit to slightly 
below 3 percent by 2006 (European Commission 2003a: 49) so that the adoption of the 
euro could happen at the ‘earliest realistic target’ date in 2008 (National Bank of Slova­
kia and Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic 2003: 17). However, despite these 
economic improvements, Slovakia’s major economic problem has not been resolved; 
the unemployment rate still remains fairly high at 18.4 percent in 2004 (see Table 5).
Monetary policy
The price liberalisation in 1991 ended in historically high levels of inflation. The tax re­
forms implemented in Slovakia in January 1993 and the currency devaluation in July 
1993 also contributed to high inflation rates (see Table 5; Morvay 2000: 26). To keep 
inflationary pressures under control, the central bank set high real domestic interest 
rates, which limited the profitability of Slovak corporate firms. After the split of Czecho­
slovakia on 1 January 1993, Slovakia initially kept the fixed exchange rate regime with 
narrow bands. The Slovak crown was first pegged to a currency basket of five curren­
cies and later modified to a currency basket of the US dollar and DM. At the beginning 
of 1993, the currency came under pressure, due to high expectations of devaluations 
and low foreign exchange rate reserves. The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) re­
sponded to the pressure by devaluing the crown by 10 percent, broadening progres­
sively the fluctuation bands first to ± 3 percent, later to ± 9 percent and implementing a 
series of administrative measures, like limiting access to foreign currency funds and 
delaying payments for imports (Beblavy 2000: 113). Inflation rates were brought down 
to low levels between 1993-1998 by executing a restrictive monetary policy and post­
poning the deregulation of capped prices, such as electricity prices, and by the privati­
sation of natural monopolies. This “inflation debt”, accumulated under the Meciar re­
5 In 2004, Slovakia was awarded the title of “top reformer” from the World Bank.
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gime had consequences for the development of inflationary pressures after 2000 (see 
below).
Between 1996 and 1998, the government policy was oriented toward expan­
sion, especially through the launching of large highway projects (see above). This led 
to a high fiscal and current account deficit and to a typical crowding-out effect on pri­
vate sector investment (Kominkova 2000: 3). During the same period, monetary policy 
became restrictive in an effort to resolve the imbalances. The inconsistency between 
fiscal and monetary policies led to a rapid increase in inflation and interest rates. As 
Beblavy (2000: 115) says, “the years 1996 to 1998 in Slovakia saw a textbook example 
of a conflict or lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy.” The expan­
sionary fiscal policy under the fixed exchange rate regime forced the central bank to 
increase domestic interest rates. However, the high interest rates resulted in an even 
higher debt level. In 1997, external and internal imbalances continued and, together 
with the high interest rates, this resulted in an attack on the Slovak crown in May 1997. 
The NBS could not use an even more restrictive monetary policy, because interest 
rates were already exceptionally high. In April 1997, real interest rates were at 13.1 
percent, compared with 9.6 percent in Poland6, 5.3 percent in the Czech Republic and 
1.5 percent in Hungary (see Beblavy 2000: 116). Early in 1998, expectations of de­
valuation -  created by the financial crisis in Russia in August-September and a refusal 
of the Meciar government to tighten fiscal policy -  put pressure on the currency. In ad­
dition, parliamentary elections were due in September 1998 and put further pressure 
on the currency, due to uncertainties about future developments after the elections. 
Rating institutions downgraded Slovakia as a consequence of the Meciar government’s 
lack of fiscal discipline, the halt in the restructuring of the banking sector, and the large 
current account deficit. The downgrading led domestic and foreign banks to make large 
foreign exchange purchases. This in turn resulted in a depreciation of the currency. 
The NBS intervened several times by adopting a sterilisation policy. However, pressure 
remained on the Slovak crown. After a series of further speculative attacks in 1998, the
6 The rate for Poland is the average real interest rate for 1997 (see Schweickert 2001: 82).
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peg was eventually abandoned. On 1 October 1998, the NBS switched from a fixed to 
a floating exchange rate system and introduced inflation targeting. In 1999, the central 
bank started to reduce the interest rates to sustainable levels. Interest rates declined 
throughout 1999-2003 and long-term interest rates were set at 5 percent in 2003 and 
2004 (see Table 5 and Word Bank 2003: 3). In 2002, Slovakia reached a record low 
inflation of 3.5 percent, but in 2003 consumer prices increased to 8.5 percent (an ‘infla­
tion debt’ in the form of delayed price liberalisation that was built up by the Meciar gov­
ernments) as a consequence of adjustments to administered prices and a higher VAT 
(European Commission 2003a: 48, EIU 2005h: 38, see above). This period of adjust­
ments was completed in 2004 and the inflation rate started to decrease again (Euro­
pean Commission 2005b: 224). Although the inflation rate significantly exceeded the 
reference value of the Maastricht criterion, Slovakia is optimistic it will meet the Maas­
tricht requirements by 2007 (National Bank of Slovakia and Ministry of Finance of the 
Slovak Republic 2005: 2). This is because core inflation remains low and it is expected 
that the inflation rate will decrease sharply in the coming years.
Hungary 
Fiscal policy
After the break-up of the communist regime, economic output declined by a cumulative 
17 percent of GDP between 1990-1992 (see Table 6, p. 103). Economic shocks oc­
curred due to a fall in external demand (collapse of the CMEA market), a decline in 
output and price liberalisation (see Dethier and Orlowski 1998: 48)7 However, com­
pared with the other Visegrad countries, Hungary was in a better position to accommo­
date these shocks. This was because Hungary had already started to implement some 
market economic reforms from the late 1960s onwards when the rest of the region still 
remained under communist control. The Hungarian “third way” of economic organisa­
7 Product-specific subsidies were included in the retail prices of basic foodstuff, energy and fuel for home 
use, pharmaceuticals, children’s clothing, and basic services like public heating, electricity, and water 
(Kopits 1993: 76). In addition to consumer price subsidies, households received housing subsidies through 
rents and long-term mortgages (Kopits 1993: 76).
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tion became known as the “goulash” reforms. They consisted of some competition, 
some private entrepreneurship, and some foreign trade with the West (Hungary be­
came a member of the IMF and World Bank in 1982), while the soft-budget constraint -  
i.e., the financial support to bail out state-owned firms in financial trouble -  was re­
tained (Kornai 1996; Blazyca 2003). Already in 1987, Hungary introduced a two-tier 
banking system. FDI in Hungary and trade with Western Europe were higher than in 
other post-communist countries, and the decline of public-owned enterprises was partly 
compensated by the private economic sector, which had been developing since the 
1980s (see Dethier and Orlowski 1998: 48).8 However, this was overshadowed by an 
alarmingly high level of foreign debt, composed mostly of short-maturity loans. The 
accumulation of high foreign debt was built up during the 1970s and 1980s as a result 
of the early reforms. Hungary’s high level of foreign debt was unusual among post­
communist countries (see Table 6) and still constrains the conduct of fiscal and mone­
tary policy therefore influencing -  as discussed further in the following chapters -  the 
country’s path to adopting the euro.
In 1989, the government implemented a stabilisation programme consisting of 
tax increases and expenditure cuts. Public expenditure was cut by 5 percent within one 
year, largely through a reduction in subsidies to enterprises, investment, and in-kind 
transfers (Dethier and Orlowski 1998: 50). Hungary attained a current account surplus 
and a balanced budget in 1990. However, the budget deficit rose sharply between 
1992 and 1994, largely as a result of politically motivated higher public transfers to 
households. At the same time, revenues declined sharply due to the economic reces­
sion and, in 1993, the budget deficit was at 7.8 percent of GDP (see Table 6). Due to 
high public borrowing requirements, domestic banks were lending extensively to the 
public sector in 1993-1994. Together with the large foreign debt, this worsened the 
economic situation drastically. At the end of 1994, Hungary experienced alarming mac­
roeconomic conditions: the current account deficit rose to 9.7 percent, gross foreign
8 At the outset of the transition process, the private sector already contributed 33 percent of GDP to the 
Hungarian economy (see Table 6).
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debt increased to almost 70 percent of GDP, the budget deficit went above 9.2 percent 
of GDP, and the public debt accounted for 85 percent of GDP (see Table 6). As Cot- 
tarelli (1998: 6) puts it, “the dramatic worsening of the current account highlighted a 
long-standing weakness of the Hungarian economy: its high external debt ratio.” To 
tackle the twin deficit, i.e., high public and current account deficits, the newly elected 
Socialist/Free-Democrat coalition government launched an austerity programme (the 
so-called Bokros plan, named after the Finance Minister Lajos Bokros) in late 1994. 
Implemented in 1995, the programme comprised of a cut in social welfare measures 
and transfers to households, the introduction of university tuition fees, a ceiling on 
wage increases for public sector workers (resulting in real wage losses of 19 percent), 
further privatisations of state-owned firms, the introduction of a crawling peg exchange 
rate regime, several small and major devaluations between January and March 1995, 
export subsidies and import tariffs on agricultural products, and a restriction on car im­
ports (see Holscher and Stephan 1999: 162; Cottarelli 1998: 7). As a result of the com­
bination of revenue-enhancing and expenditure-cutting measures, the budget deficit 
started to decline again in 1996 by almost 3 percent (Dethier and Orlowski 1998: 55, 
see Table 6). As Cottarelli (1998: 15) puts it, “the adjustment was painful: net real 
wages dropped by a cumulative 16.5 percent in 1995-1996, and private consumption 
dropped by 10 percent” (see also Dethier and Orlowski 1998: 55). However, declining 
wages, especially in the public sector, helped stimulate exports and reduced inflation­
ary pressures and unemployment rates (see Table 6).
Supported by favourable external conditions and government policies, the cur­
rent account deficit declined from 9.2 percent in 1994 to 2.7 percent of GDP in 1997, 
due to an increase in exports and high FDI. The external debt declined to 52.9 percent 
of GDP, its lowest level in the 1990s (see Table 6).9 External debt dropped mainly be­
cause of the reduction of the current account deficit, increased privatisation receipts,
9 However, it should be noted that the foreign debt level is still highest in Hungary. Hungary has also the 
highest euro-denominated foreign debt level among the other Visegrad countries; an important aspect to 
explain Hungary's initial euro-adoption strategy as highlighted in chapter 5. For example, the euro- 
denominated external debt was at 30.8 percent of GOP in 2002 almost three times higher than in the 
Czech Republic (see Berger 2004:17).
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and FDI (Cottarelli 1998: 14). Thus, the economic growth was led by high export dy­
namics and a strong investment boom (Halpern and Nemenyi 2001: 154). However, 
these developments also contributed to high inflationary pressures throughout the sec­
ond half of the 1990s. In 1996 and 1997, the budget deficit was further reduced by ad­
ditional sizeable declines in public revenues and expenditure ratios, stimulating private 
sector growth (Cottarelli 1998: 9).10 Under the FIDESZ government (1998-2002) fiscal 
policy loosened again and during the hard-fought general election year of 2002, Hun­
gary experienced a significant rise in the budget deficit to 9.2 percent of GDP (see Ta­
ble 6). The national development programme of infrastructure projects, the so-called 
Szechenyi plan and Szechenyi Plus, as well as increases in wages and payments for 
public-sector workers and pensioners contributed significantly to a strong increase in 
the fiscal deficit in 2002. Indeed, Hungary shows a strong fiscal cycle before the 2002 
elections; an aspect which is related further to the country’s euro-adoption strategy in 
the following chapters. The high fiscal deficit was further a result of external account 
deterioration and unstable exchange and interest rate stability (see below). The export 
industry suffered from declining external demand and a strong currency appreciation. 
The current account deficit rose to 7.1 percent of GDP and FDI dramatically dropped to 
1.8 percent of GDP in 2002 (European Commission 2003a: 23). The new Social-led 
government, elected in 2002, continued the expenditure-oriented fiscal policy of the 
FIDESZ government and launched a ‘fiscally generous 100 day programme’ (EIU 
2005f: 32). The minimum wage was doubled and public sector wages increased by 50 
percent (European Commission 2005b: 182). The increase in wage-levels beyond the 
level of productivity growth and the crisis of the forint in 2003 (see below) added to a 
loss in competitiveness. To counterbalance economic imbalances and to comply with 
the Maastricht criteria, the government approved an austerity plan that aimed to bring 
down the fiscal deficit to 3.8 percent in 2004 (OECD 2004: 5). The austerity plan con­
sisted of limited wage increases in the public sector and delays to public investments,
10 Hungary was not seriously hit by the Russian currency crisis in 1997-1998. As Halpern and Nemenyi 
(2001: 168) argue, “the collapse of the Russian market and the Yugoslav war have had some impact on 
the external demand, but the Hungarian business cycle is now more driven by demand from EU countries.”
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for example in infrastructure reconstruction. The plan succeeded in decelerating the 
high real wage growth to a moderate level below productivity growth, however, the 
budget deficit remained high with 5.5 percent of GDP in 2004 and thus was well above 
the envisaged target by the government (see Table 6 and European Commission 
2005b: 179). The official general target for 2004 had to be revised upwards because of 
higher public expenditure and over-optimistic revenue forecasts (see European Com­
mission 2005b: 180). Because of the poor fiscal performance, Hungary readjusted its 
initial euro-adoption strategy in May 2004 and postponed the target date from the very 
ambitious 2007/08 to 2010 (see chapter 1).
While the current account deficit remained high in 2004, real GDP growth in­
creased again. As in the Czech Republic, economic growth was driven by strong in­
vestments and export while domestic consumption remained weak. Among the 
Visegrad countries, Hungary has been most successful in reducing the unemployment 
rate. In 2004, the unemployment was at 5.8 percent which is one of the lowest rates 
among the new EU member states. However, it should be noted that the employment 
rate, at 56 percent in 2004, is fairly low (see European Commission 2005b: 180).
Monetary policy
Due to price liberalisation, which began in Hungary in the late 1960s, only 20 percent 
of prices were still being regulated by 1989. Hungary therefore did not experience an 
inflationary burst like other transition economies (Cottarelli 1998, Moghadam 1998). 
However, as Moghadam (1998: 56) puts it, “despite this favourable position, inflation 
in Hungary has been very sticky” (see also Suranyi and Vincze 1998). Many econo­
mists blame the inconsistencies of the early efforts of the market economic reforms for 
the “creeping” inflation after the break-up of the communist regime. Inflation rates re­
mained high throughout the 1990s largely as a result of trade and price liberalisation 
and frequent currency devaluations between 1991-1994 (Moghadam 1998: 56). After 
steady moderate inflation, sticky inflation expectations consolidated. The large degree 
of inflation inertia has itself affected inflationary expectations and prevented the infla­
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tion rate from declining (Moghadam 1998: 61). In addition, the limited credibility of the 
national central bank and its anti-inflationary programme continued to put pressure on 
prices (Cottarelli 1998: 16). During 1992-1994, the inflation rate remained at about 20 
percent. Monetary policy was loose during 1992 and was only tightened by raising 
interest rates in late 1993 when the financing crisis became apparent (Barabas et al. 
1998: 86). However, this proved to be ineffective, largely since it was accompanied by 
higher public expenditure and increased borrowing required to reduce foreign debt. 
Fiscal and monetary policy were not coordinated and led to an explosive twin deficit, 
i.e., high budget and current account deficits (see above). At the same time, domestic 
demand increased mainly due to government consumption, a rise in nominal wages, 
and a real investment boom (Holscher and Stephan 1999: 157). All this resulted in an 
increased inflation rate after it had fallen from its peak of about 35 percent in 1990 to 
slightly below 19 percent in 1994 (see Table 6). The occurrence of the twin deficit af­
fected the credibility of the government and people’s trust in their currency and re­
sulted in a capital flight from monetary assets in forint to other means of more stable 
value, e.g. foreign exchange as a form of savings (Holscher and Stephan 1999: 158). 
In an effort to support competitiveness, the forint was devalued by 8 percent in August 
1994 and again in October and November 1994, “raising total market devaluation in 
1994 to 15.6 percent” (Holscher and Stephan 1999: 161). However, since this was not 
coupled with appropriate fiscal adjustment measures, the devaluation failed to slow 
down imports or to support exports. Due to the frequent devaluations, the fixed ex­
change rate regime lost its credibility. The evolution of the exchange rate became un­
predictable, and the frequent devaluations resulted in disruptive speculation. The shift 
from an almost balanced foreign position in 1992 to a severe current account deficit in 
1994 resulted in further capital imports, which in turn caused a rise in foreign debt and 
destabilised the exchange rate. On 13 March 1995, the forint was devalued by 9 per­
cent; simultaneously, the narrowly pegged exchange rate regime based on 2.25 per­
cent fluctuation bands was replaced by a crawling peg. As a consequence of the mac­
roeconomic adjustment measures and the crawling peg regime that was intended to
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create a gradual deflation, the inflation rate declined from 28.2 percent in 1995 to 14.2 
percent in 1998 (see Table 6, see also Halpern and Nemenyi 2001: 164). For the first 
time since 1987, the inflation rate fell to a single digit in the first quarter of 1999 
(Halpern and Nemenyi 2001: 160). This was mainly due to a decrease in nominal 
wages in 1998. In 2000, the inflation rate was 10 percent and started to decline to 5.2 
percent in 2002 after the successful introduction of inflation targeting and wider trading 
bands of ± 15 in May 2001. Certainly, fluctuation bands of ±15 percent can be charac­
terised as a “quasi-floating exchange rate mechanism” (Lavrac 1999: 110). The infla­
tion targeting mainly succeeded in reducing the excessive inflationary expectations. 
However, following the changes in the exchange rate regime, the forint appreciated 
substantially. A strong currency and high interest created a low-risk environment and 
eventually generated speculative attacks on the forint at the upper end of its trading 
band. In January 2003, the central bank acted against a further strengthening of the 
forint by purchasing around 100 billion forint worth of euros (450 billion US dollars) 
and cutting the interest rate by 200 basis points to 6.5 percent. In June 2003, the cur­
rency was devalued against the euro by 2.26 percent. Following the speculative at­
tacks against the forint and the currency depreciation in June 2003, the inflation rate 
rose. Shortly after,
the central bank raised interest rates again by a total of 3 percentage points 
in an attempt to re-strengthen the currency’s exchange rate which had 
started to depreciate sharply as a reaction to a deteriorating overall market 
sentiment, reflecting a considerable degree of uncertainty about monetary 
and exchange rate strategies, as well as the overall economic policy mix in 
Hungary (European Commission 2003c: 24).
The result was that, in July 2003, interest rates stood at the same nominal level as be­
fore the speculative attacks. The turbulence surrounding the forint led to greater volatil­
ity and risk premiums. According to the European Commission (2003c: 27), the “incon­
sistent monetary and exchange rate policies added to the strain in the policy mix” and 
eventually supported the increase in the fiscal deficit in 2002 and 2003 which led to the 
government’s decision to postpone the target date for the euro-adoption. This decision 
was further supported by persistent high inflation expectations. High inflationary pres­
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sure generated from high oil prices, tax increases in the context of the country’s EU 
accession in May 2004 and accelerated economic growth resulted in the inflation rate 
rising to almost 7 percent in 2004 (see Table 6 and Government of the Republic of 
Hungary 2004: 4).
Poland 
Fiscal Policy
In 1989, Poland had to cope with hyperinflation as a result of growth stagnation and 
growing external and internal imbalances. In October 1989, the inflation rate was esti­
mated to be 3200 percent (see Rapacki 2001: 107). The disastrous state of the econ­
omy at the end of the 1980s promoted the Mazowiecki-Balcerowicz government’s deci­
sion to adopt shock therapy. The stabilisation programme of shock therapy, known as 
the Balcerowicz plan (named after the former Finance Minister and current President of 
the Polish National Bank, Leszek Balcerowicz), was launched on 1 January 1990 and 
consisted of price liberalisation but wage control, currency convertibility with strong 
currency devaluation, tax reform, privatisation, and a tight fiscal policy. Poland experi­
enced a “transformational recession” (Kornai 1993), with an immediate sharp decline in 
GDP of 17.8 percent between 1990-1991 (Blazyca 2003: 225).11 Indeed, Poland ex­
perienced the highest output decline among the Visegrad countries, and the subse­
quent economic downturn was more drastic than many economists and politicians had 
predicted.
The budget consolidation was achieved through cuts in subsidies for food, raw 
materials, production inputs, and energy carriers (Dabrowski 2001: 127). Public subsi­
dies accounted for 16 percent of GDP in 1988 and were reduced to 7 percent of GDP 
in 1990 and to less than 5 percent of GDP in 1991 (Gandhi 1993: 104). This mainly
11 The collapse of former state-owned enterprises could not be compensated by the relatively large private 
sector which contributed to 19 percent of the GDP (Rapacki 2001: 129). The private sector in Poland al­
ready developed in agriculture, trade, services, construction, handicrafts and small-scale manufacturing 
under the communist regime (Dabrowksi 2001: 138). Poland retained through the communist period a 
commercial code and bankruptcy law from 1934, a land and real estate register, and some protection of 
private property rights in the civil code (Dabrowski 2001:138). In 1989, for instance, 80 percent of the land 
was in private hands; a unique case in communist Central Europe (Rapacki 2001:129).
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reflects price liberalisation. In early 1992, subsidies for agricultural inputs, food, and 
coal prices were eliminated. Household rents were further deregulated in 1994; gaso­
line prices were liberalised only in 1997. By the end of the 1990s, about 90 percent of 
the prices had been liberalised (Dabrowski 2001: 127). Despite these cuts in subsidies, 
the government budget balance has remained negative since 1991. In 1993, the 
budget deficit began to decrease as a result of output recovery, the completion of the 
tax reform, and expenditure adjustments. The economy started to recover, and a high 
growth rate could be sustained through the 1990s (see Table 7, p. 104). Growth rates 
reached their peak levels in 1995 and 1997 -  7 percent and 6.8 percent respectively -  
mainly due to high growth rates in the service sector (Rapacki 2001: 115). Despite 
strong growth rate records, adjustment measures came to a halt between 1995-1996 
as “political will and energy declined” (Dabrowski 2001: 121) after years of ‘extraordi­
nary politics’ (Balcerowicz 1994) during which the implementation of fast and harsh 
economic reforms was supported by the public. Only in 1998, after a new government 
took office, did fiscal adjustment resume and the fiscal deficit decreased from 2.3 in 
1998 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 1999 (see Table 7). In 1998, the Russian currency crisis 
hurt the Polish economy; it is estimated that the “Russian factor”, i.e., losses in export 
and their effects on the domestic output, accounted for 1-1.5 percent of growth rate 
decline in 1998 (Rapacki 2001: 114). From 2000 on, the economic situation deterio­
rated drastically due to a further fall in external (as a result of the European-wide re­
cession) and domestic demand, and the fiscal deficit continued to rise to 3.6 percent 
and 3.9 percent in 2002 and 2003 respectively (see Table 7). In 2003, Poland experi­
enced a modest recovery and the growth rate grew by 3.3 percent after being just 1.0 
percent in 2001. Again, growth was driven by increased private consumption and net 
exports, whereas fixed investment has contracted sharply (European Commission 
2003a: 42, see Table 7). Economic growth then gained strength and real GDP was 
close to 6 percent in 2004 (see Table 7). In January 2004 the government approved a 
revised version of the so-called Hausner plan (named after Deputy Prime Minister and 
Economy Minister Jerzy Hausner) or ‘programme of rationalisation and reduction of
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public spending’ which foresaw to comply with the Maastricht criteria and reduce the 
fiscal deficit to around 3 percent by 2006 (European Commission 2005b: 206). The 
revised Hausner plan includes tax and benefit reforms whereas the initial proposals for 
the reform of the disability pension system and reforms in the early retirement pension 
scheme have been either watered down or abandoned (see European Commission 
2005b: 205). It should be noted that while the initial Hausner plan was designed to 
meet the Maastricht criteria by 2006 the Polish government refrained from announcing 
an official target date for the adoption of the euro.
It is worth mentioning that Poland was the first post-communist country to re­
gain its pre-transformation development level in 1996 (Blazyca 2003: 218). Among the 
Visegrad countries, only Slovakia was able to achieve and succeed in maintaining its 
pre-transformation level of GDP in 1999. Hungary and the Czech Republic still per­
formed badly in these terms at the beginning of 2001 (Rapacki 2001: 108). However, 
despite very high growth rates, Poland still has the highest unemployment rate among 
the Visegrad countries. In 2002, unemployment reached a new record high of 19.8 per- 
cent.12
Monetary policy
At the beginning of the transition process, Poland depreciated the zloty sharply before 
pegging the currency to a currency basket consisting of five different currencies. With 
the sharp devaluations and a restrictive monetary policy, including high interest rates of 
about 36 percent, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) tried to gain control of the hyper­
inflation. Nevertheless, Poland had substantial difficulties in lowering inflation. Due to 
high inflation rates, the fixed exchange rate regime was not sustainable because the 
currency soon became overvalued. To protect the country from further losses in com­
petitiveness, a crawling peg with pre-announced devaluation was introduced in October
12 Rapacki names three factors, among others, responsible for the high unemployment rates in Poland: 1) 
demographic pressure, e.g. the rising number of school leavers; 2) the restructuring of the coal-mining and 
metallurgy sector, resulting in a huge number of layoffs; and 3) reforms in the health and education sector. 
In 1999, the health care law was changed so that only people who are registered as employed or unem­
ployed are eligible for medical coverage. This resulted in a higher registration of those who were living in 
the large shadow economy and who became registered unemployed for the first time (Rapacki 2001:119).
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1991. In May 1995, the NBP widened the fluctuation bands of the exchange rate re­
gime from ± 2 to ± 7 percent. Expectations of currency appreciation were therefore 
relieved and FDI inflows reduced (see Table 7). These measures helped to reduce the 
inflation rate from almost 30 percent in 1995 to less than 20 percent in 1996 (Hutersik 
et al. 1999: 138). Nevertheless, compared with the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Po­
land’s inflation rates were exceptionally high throughout the 1990s.
Until 1998, the government had substantial influence on the NBP, because the 
parliament had to approve the yearly monetary programmes. The NBP’s credibility suf­
fered enormously from regular failures in inflation forecasting and from open conflicts 
between the NBP and the Ministry of Finance, especially between 1994-1996. Mone­
tary policy only started to change in 1998, when the NBP became officially independent 
through the implementation of the new constitution (see chapter 6 for a detailed dis­
cussion of central bank independence in Poland).
Between 1997 and 1998, capital inflows increased rapidly and put pressure on 
the currency. The NBP tried to absorb and sterilise the capital inflows because it 
wanted to avoid an appreciation of the zloty and to stick to the crawling peg. However, 
the impact of large-scale sterilisation on controlling the money supply was limited. The 
sterilisation led to high fiscal costs and to a structural surplus in the banking system. 
Dabrowski (2001: 134) argues that the maintenance of the crawling peg regime led to a 
strong inflationary inertia, because the crawling peg devaluations did not aim at disin­
flation but at balance of payments or export promotion and growth targets. In 1998, the 
NBP started to move toward a floating exchange rate regime, progressively widening 
the band from ± 10 percent (February 1998) over ± 12.5 percent (October 1998) to ± 
15 percent (March 1999). Due to persistent large capital inflows -  as stated in chapter 
1, Poland is the regional leader in attracting FDI in absolute terms -  and in an effort to 
avoid losses in competitiveness and to reduce the inflation rate, the central bank even­
tually announced an inflation-targeting strategy in September 1998 and finally intro­
duced a freely floating exchange rate in April 2000, replacing the previous implicit ex­
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port promotion and balance-of-payment target and the crawling peg devaluations (Dab­
rowski 2001:136, see also Bofinger and Wollmershauser 2002:173).
Due to a very good harvest, food prices declined and the inflation rate decreased 
sharply to 1.9 percent in 2002 from 10.1 percent in 2000. In addition, the disinflation 
was supported by a weak domestic demand and restrictive monetary policy. In 2002, 
economic growth was still very low and the unemployment rate rose sharply. At the 
same time, the inflation rate was well below 2 percent; however, the interest rate was 
still fairly high at 8.5 percent fuelling criticism that the central bank was pursuing an 
overly restrictive monetary policy. As further discussed in chapter 6, the dispute be­
tween the hawkish central bank and the government influenced Poland's path to euro­
zone entry. Despite the low inflation rate, the central bank only slowly started to de­
crease the interest rate from 19 percent in February 2001 to 5.25 percent in June 2003 
(European Commission 2003a: 42, see also EIU 2005d: 26). As Zombrit (2003: 73) 
puts it,
there has been an increasing divergence of views between the monetary 
authorities and the government that has led to a sub-optimal macroeco­
nomic mix and a further breakdown in co-operation (see also Rozkrut and 
Chmielewski 2003).
Reflecting the economic recovery with a strong increase in real GDP and in 
domestic demand, inflation rose again in 2004 to 3.5 percent. As in the other Visegrad 
countries, an increase in inflation rates can also be attributed to the country’s EU ac­
cession and the subsequent increase in indirect taxes as well as the introduction of the 
CAP mechanism (see Republic of Poland 2004: 20). However, despite this increase in 
inflation, the central bank has been remarkably successful in reducing the inflation rate 
ever since it became independent in 1998 (see Table 7). This so-called ‘Balcerowicz- 
effect’ (The Economist 31/01/2004) is further discussed in relation to Poland’s ap­
proach to adopting the euro in the following chapters.
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Conclusion
Although the Visegrad countries differed in their starting conditions, they share impor­
tant similarities in their approach to macroeconomic stabilisation. All the reform pack­
ages were designed to curb inflation, restore the fiscal balance, and improve the exter­
nal balance (Lavigne 1999: 121). The result of the reform programmes was an initial 
burst of inflation and a dramatic output decline. Inflation was curbed and brought down 
to moderate levels. Fiscal imbalances increased mainly because of an enormous out­
put decline that reduced budget revenues while increasing the need for public expen­
diture. Reducing and maintaining the budget deficit at an acceptable level as defined 
by the IMF and the Maastricht criteria have been difficult in all Visegrad countries.
Among the Visegrad countries, Hungary and Slovakia experienced the highest 
budget deficits in the 1990s. Hungary had to cope with a high foreign debt burden in­
herited from the communist regime and a twin-deficit crisis in the mid-1990s. Indeed, 
Hungary’s legacy of the goulash reforms continues to constrain the conduct of fiscal 
and monetary policy today and influence the country’s euro-adoption strategy. In addi­
tion, the significant increase in the real wage level between 2000 and 2003 beyond 
productivity growth contributed to the budget deficit and reduced Hungary’s economic 
competitiveness. The reasons for the rapid wage increase are discussed further with 
regards to Hungary’s euro-adoption strategy in the following chapter, but have to be 
seen in the light of the tight election contest between the major parties. Slovakia, on the 
other hand, had a policy of strong fiscal expansion and suffered a currency crisis under 
the last Meciar government. It has been indicated that the fiscal expansion path was 
caused by Meciar’s efforts to get re-elected. Slovakia’s fiscal policy therefore shows 
some signs of a political business cycle, which is discussed further in the following 
chapters. The Czech Republic went through a period of successful macroeconomic 
development before it was hit by a deep economic recession triggered by the currency 
crisis in 1997. The subsequent economic recession revealed many of the flaws in the 
structural reform programme of the first half of the 1990s. Since the currency crisis and 
the economic recession in the late 1990s, the Czech Republic has experienced a
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steady increase in its budget deficit and successive governments have conducted an 
expenditure-oriented fiscal policy. Both the consequences of the currency crisis and the 
fiscal policy of the Social Democratic-led coalition government are highly relevant to 
explain the country’s euro-adoption strategy and discussed further in the subsequent 
chapters. Poland has been successful in consolidating its public budget, but since the 
beginning of the economic recession in 2000, the budget has come under growing 
constraint. In 2004, Poland experienced its highest budget deficit since 1991. In gen­
eral, since 2000, the fiscal deficit has increased remarkably in all Visegrad countries, 
however, with varying intensity. Understanding the sources behind the different levels 
of success in achieving fiscal consolidation and relating them to consequences for the 
countries’ approach to adoption of the euro are the aims of the following chapters.
The initial conditions inherited from the communist past play a dominant role in 
explaining the inflation rate in the Visegrad countries in the 1990s. Poland had to cope 
with hyperinflation as a result of the disastrous economic conditions in the 1980s. 
Throughout the 1990s, Poland had substantial difficulties bringing down inflation. Infla­
tionary pressure especially increased due to the high and sustainable growth rates ex­
perienced between 1993 and 2000. Hungary experienced sticky moderate inflation that 
stands in relation to the high debt burden inherited from the early reform efforts in the 
1970s and 1980s and the high inflationary expectations generated by uncertainty about 
monetary and exchange rate strategies. In the Czech Republic, the rapid success in 
achieving low inflation rates and budget deficits is also a consequence of the Czech 
Republic’s initial macroeconomic conditions, which were much better than in other 
post-communist countries. In contrast, Slovakia had to cope with higher inflationary 
pressures than the Czech Republic. Inflation rates were particularly high between 1993 
and 1994, mainly because of fiscal expansion involved in creating a new state. In the 
mid 1990s, the inflation rate was brought down to moderate levels before the Meciar 
government embarked on a fiscal borrowing spree in 1998 that caused higher inflation 
rates. Since the late 1990s, the inflation rate has remained higher than in the other 
Visegrad countries because the newly elected government further liberalised prices
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that were neglected under the Meciar governments. The inflation debt, inherited from 
the Meciar government, is thus an important aspect to keep in mind when analysing the 
disinflation process in Slovakia. With the introduction of central bank independence, 
Poland’s inflation rate decreased substantially, reaching a record low of 0.7 percent in 
2003. However, in general, there has been a trend toward achieving low inflation rates 
in all the countries under review since the beginning of 2000, although not always with 
the same success. The factors which contributed to the disinflation process are dis­
cussed and related to their impact on the countries’ approach to euro-zone accession 
in the following chapters.
Foreign trade and the current account balances are still deteriorating in all 
Visegrad countries. Also, all Visegrad countries have had to deal with problems arising 
from short-term capital inflows. Capital flows were especially harmful in the Czech Re­
public. Speculative attacks on the crown resulted in a deep economic recession, from 
which the country is still recovering. Speculative attacks on the Hungarian forint also 
occurred in 2003, resulting in high inflationary pressure and a rise in the budget deficit. 
Due to the problems arising from strong capital inflows, all Visegrad countries moved 
progressively from fixed to flexible exchange rate regimes. At the outset of the transi­
tion process, the Visegrad countries opted for peg strategies. However, with growing 
external imbalances, these exchange rate regimes were later abandoned or radically 
adjusted (Hallerberg et al. 2002b: 345). Indeed, exchange rate regimes in the Visegrad 
Four have not been static, but are “moving towards the more extreme ends of the spec­
trum [in keeping with observed trends more generally among transition economies and 
countries world-wide]” (Corker et al. 2000: 3).
All Visegrad countries are currently negotiating or implementing fiscal reform 
programmes that aim to meet the EMU accession criteria. Indeed, all Visegrad coun­
tries regard the EMU as the main argument for pushing forward fiscal reforms (see 
chapter 5). Slovakia has been successful in implementing structural reforms since the 
new government took office in 1998 and has announced it intends to join the euro area 
as soon as possible and in any case no case later than the other Visegrad countries. In
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Poland, the “Hausner” austerity plan for 2004-2007 was explicitly designed to bring 
down the deficit to the Maastricht-compatible 3 percent by 2007. In 2003, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary approved austerity plans to bring the fiscal deficit down to a 
level in line with the Maastricht criteria and both countries have announced that they 
will not adopt the euro before the end of the decade. It has been indicated that the re­
form packages had to be modified and were watered down in some Visegrad countries. 
The following chapters further discuss the obstacles for implementing economic policy 
reforms and relate them to the euro-adoption strategies concerned. This thesis aims to 
explore the underlying rationales for cross-national variations in the strategies pursued 
for the adoption of the euro by using an integrated approach that analyses the impact 
of interests, ideas and institutions. The next chapter puts policy reforms into a politico- 
economic perspective by analysing political parties’ and individual preferences on 
EMU.
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Table 4 MAIN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1990- 2004
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
REAL ECONOMY
Real GDP growth rates, %a -2.5b - 14.6b -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1.0 0.5 3.3 2.6 d 1.5d 3.1d 3.8 d
Unemployment rate (Eurostat definition), %a 0.7 4.6 2.7 4.3 4.3 4.0 3.9 4.8 6.4 8.6 8.7 8.0 7.3 7.8 8.3d
Private sector share in GDP %c 12.3 17.3 27.3 45.1 56.3 66.3 75.4 75 75 80 80f 80f 80f 80 f 80 f
FISCAL AND INFLATION POSITION
Fiscal balance, GDP, %a -0.6b l ro 00 O
'
-1.0C 0.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.8 -2.7 -4.5 -3.7 -4.0 -5.9d -6.8d -12.3d -4.8d
General government debt, GDP, %a 12.8 13.7 14.3 18.2 25.3d 28.8 d 37.8 d 37.8d
Gross foreign debt, GDP, %a 22.8 25.6 22.4 24.5 21.3 22.0 28.8 26.6 27.0 34.9 37.0
Inflation rate; %a 9.6C 57.0° 11.0C 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.6 9.7 1.8 3.9 4.5 d 1.4d -0.1 d 2.8 d
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current account balance, GDP, % 1.7 0.7 -2.5 -4.2 -6.8 -6.5 -2.2 -2.7 -5.3 -5.4d -5.6 d -6.2 d -6.1d
FDI (net), GDP, %a 8.5° 16.6C 2.5C 2.5° 4.8 4.9 5.5 8.6 13.4 3.5 4.6
MONETARY CONDITIONS
Long-term interest rates3 6.9 6.3 4.9 4.1 6
©00
Short-term interest rates3 13.1 9.1 11.0 12.0 16.0 14.3 6.9 5.4 5.2 3.5 2.3 e 2.1 e
aEuropean Commission (1997b); (1998d); (2001a), (2002a); (2003a); (2003b); DOECD (1999) The Data are for Czechoslovakia before 1992;
°World Bank (2001); (2003); dEuropean Commission 2005b; eEuropean Commission 2005a; EBRD (2004).
Table 5 MAIN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN SLOVAKIA
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
REAL ECONOMY
Real GDP growth rates, %a -2.5b -14.6b -6.5b -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 5.6 4.0 1.3 2.2 3.8 d 4.6 d 4.0 d 4.9 d
Unemployment rate (Eurostat definition), %a 1.6b 11.8b 10.4b 14.4 13.7 13.2 11.3 11.9 12.9 16.7 18.7 19.4d 18.7d 17.5d 18.4d
Private sector share in GDP %c 10 15 22 25 44 66 72 75 75 75 75 80 80f 80f 80f
FISCAL AND INFLATION POSITION
Fiscal balance, GDP, %a -0.6b -2.8b -11.9b -6.7b -1.3 0.2 -2.1 -5.7 -4.7 -6.4 -10.3 -6.0 d -5.7 d -3.7 d -3.9 d
General government debt, GDP, %a 28.6 28.6 43.8 49.9 48.7 d 43.3 d 42.6 d 44.2 d
Gross foreign debt, GDP, %a 11.3 19.6 21.6 28.6 33.0 42.1 37.3 33.1
Inflation rate; %a 10.4 61.2 10.2 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.0 6.7 10.4 12.2 7.2 d 3.5 d 8.5 d 7.7 d
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current account balance, GDP, %a -4.1 5.3 3.0 -9.0 -8.7 -9.0 -3.5 -2.5 -7.4 d -8.2 d -1.1 d -2.9 d
FDI (net), GDP, %c 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 1.8 0.8 1.9 7.7a 17.0a
MONETARY CONDITIONS
Long-term interest ratesb 10.4 9.7 9.4 21.7 15.9 8.3a 8.0e 6.9® 5.0® 5.0®
Short-term interest rates3 8.4 11.9 21.8 21.1 15.7 8.6 7.8 7.8 6.2® 4.7®
aEuropean Commission (1997a); (1998a); (2001 d), (2002d); (2003a); (2003e); OECD (1999); (2003). The data are for Czechoslovakia before 1992,
°World Bank (2003); dEuropean Commission 2005b; ®European Commission 2005; fEBRD (2004).
Table 6 MAIN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN HUNGARY
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
REAL ECONOMY
Real GDP growth rates, %a -3.5b -11. ob -2.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 d 3.5 d 3.0 d 3.9 d
Unemployment rate (Eurostat definition), %a 1.9b 7.5b 9.8 11.8 10.5 10.0 9.6 9.0 8.4 6.9 6.3 5.6 d 5.6 d cn co a
.
5.8 d
Private sector share in GDP %b 25 33 44 52 55 60 70 75 85 80 80 80f 80f 80f 80f
FISCAL AND INFLATION POSITION
Fiscal balance, GDP, %a 1.1 b -3.3 b -7.2 b -7.8 b -9.2 -6.6 -3.2 -6.8 -8.0 -5.6 -3.0 -4.4 d -9.2d -6.2d -5.5d
General government debt, GDP, %a 66.3 b 73.4b 77.6 b 87.9 b 85.2 b 84.3 b 72.1 b 64.2 62.1 60.5 55.7 53.5 d 57.2 d 59.1 d 59.7 d
Gross foreign debt, GDP, %a 64.3b 67.1b 57.0b 67.2 69.0 65.5 60.3 52.9 53.9 56.1 51.6 38.3
Inflation rate; %a 34.6b 31.0b 24.7b 22.5 18.8 28.2 23.5 18.5 14.2 10.0 10.0 9.1 d 5.2 d 4.7 d 6.9 d
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current account balance, GDP, %a 0.4b 1.2b o CO c
r
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Table 7 MAIN ECONOMIC TRENDS IN POLAND
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
REAL ECONOMY
Real GDP growth rates, %a -11.6 -7.0 2.5 3.7 5.3 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0d 1.4d 3.8 d 5.8 d
Unemployment rate (Eurostat definition), %a 6.5 12.7 13.7 14.5 14.6 13.4 12.2 10.9 10.2 13.4 16.4 18.5d 19.8d 19.2d 19.0d
Private sector share in GDP b 30 45.3 48.2 53.8 56 60 60 65 65 65 72 75 9 75 9 75 s 75 9
FISCAL AND INFLATION POSITION
Fiscal balance, GDP, %a’ 3.7b -6.7b -4.9b -3.4b -2.4 -2.1 -2.5 -2.4 -2.3 -1.5 -1.8 -3.1d -3.6 d -3.9 d -5.6 d
General government debt, GDP, %a 44.0 39.1 40.3 36.6 36.7 d 41.1 d 45.4 d 47.7d
Gross foreign debt, GDP, %a 77.9 62.2 53.2 54.5 37.7 27.7 24.4 24.8 23.3 25.3 24.0 22.1
Inflation rate; %a 70.3f 43.0' 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 15.0 11.6 7.2 10.1 5.3 d 1.9d 0.7 d 3.5 d
EXTERNAL SECTOR
Current account balance, GDP, %a 9.7 0.2 2.4 1.5 -1.1 -3.7 -4.2 -5.5 -6.1 -2.9 d -2.6d -2.2 d -2.6 d
FDI (net), GDP, %a 0.2b 0.3b 0.7b 0.6b 1.0b 2.0b 2.3b 4.0 4.7 5.7 3.1 2.2 4.3 11.8
MONETARY CONDITIONS
Long-term interest rates3 9.5 11.8 10.7® 7.4 e 5.8e 6.9e
Short-term interest rates3 34.9C 31.8° 27.6 21.4 23.7 20.4 14.7 18.8 16.1 9.0 5 .7 ° 6.2 e
European Commission (1997d); (1998b); (2001b); (2002c); (2003a); (2003d); “World Bank (1998); (2003); cOECD (2003);
dEuropean Commission 2005b; eEuropean Commission 2005°; fEBRD (1997); 9EBRD (2004).
Chapter 4
The interest level of analysis: positions and preferences on the EMU
Having discussed the development of fiscal and monetary policy in the Visegrad coun­
tries since the collapse of the communist regime, this chapter provides the interest 
level of analysis, examining the positions and preferences of political parties and public 
opinion on the euro and European integration. The aim of this chapter is twofold. 
Firstly, the chapter demonstrates to what extent the positions of the actors are driven 
by their strategic electoral and partisan interests (political parties) and by their eco­
nomic self-interest (public opinion, see chapter 2, p. 43). Secondly, the chapter seeks 
to show whether political parties are powerful enough to translate their positions into 
policies and thus influence the country’s strategy to adopting the euro. The latter point 
also touches upon the question of whether the countries experienced political business 
cycles, that is, whether parties in government have used expansionary fiscal policies to 
enhance their chances of re-election (opportunistic model) and/or whether fiscal policy 
varies according to the kind of party in office (partisan model).
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part deals with political parties’ 
positions on European integration and euro-zone entry. The argument is that the de­
gree of politicians’ opportunistic interests varies in accordance to different strategic 
environments of party competition. Strong opportunistic and partisan interests produce 
fiscal cycles at odds with the Maastricht criteria and therefore may explain cross­
national variations in approaching euro-zone accession. The second part of this chap­
ter discusses why attitudes towards EMU vary at an individual (public opinion) interest 
level. The argument here is that the degree to which economic self-interests explain 
individual preferences on the adoption of the euro is related to class-based responses 
to the reform process (cf Haggard and Webb 1994: 8, see chapter 1 and 2).
105
A. Political parties
Political parties play a key role in shaping policy outcomes and conflicts over reforms. 
They serve as a platform for political debate on European integration and influence 
voters’ preferences on public policy issues (Gabel and Hix 2005, Lewis 2003: 153). At 
the same time, public opinion exerts a strong influence on policies developed by politi­
cal parties. This interdependence reflects the tension between representation -  i.e. the 
representation of the population by the political elite -  and mobilisation -  i.e. the ‘edu­
cation’ or mobilisation of the population towards policies which the political parties wish 
to pursue (Blondel 1995: 206). Related to this is the question of whether public support 
for, or opposition to, EMU is translated into party politics. As Downs once famously 
said: “parties formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in 
order to formulate policies” (Downs 1957: 28). However, it is not evident where to draw 
the line between purely vote-seeking and policy-seeking behaviour, i.e. to differentiate 
between actions to win votes and actions to maximise the party’s impact on public pol­
icy (Strom and Muller 1999). Since both are tightly interrelated, it is inevitable that the 
euro-adoption strategy of the Visegrad countries is subject to the dynamics of this rela­
tionship.
Following the question of party responsiveness to public opinion, what matters 
for parties’ positions on EU issues is extensively contested in the literature. Broadly 
speaking, the camps are split between those who argue that a party’s position on EU 
issues is a product of domestic party system structures (e.g. the intra-party arenas 
such as proximity to power, government-opposition relationship and coalition-politics1) 
and therefore heavily depends on the party’s strategies to gain votes and to guarantee 
its own survival (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2001, Batory 2001, Sitter 2001, Batory and 
Sitter 2004), and those who argue that the party’s position on European integration is a
1 See chapter 6 for an analysis of the electoral systems that produce distinctive electoral incentives and 
options for coalition-building.
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product of the party’s ideology, its cleavage-based identity and responsiveness to its 
electorate (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Beichelt 2004).2
The framework in which parties arrive at ‘politicised’ issues of European integra­
tion (see also Figure 1, p. 42) is discussed in the following section. The aim is to show 
when and how the party’s partisan interests (i.e. the responsiveness to its electorate), 
and its relationship to other parties or electoral strategies/coalition politics influence the 
party’s position on European integration and EMU (cf Batory and Sitter 2004: 543). As 
discussed in chapter 2, interests in this context are thus defined firstly by the need to 
address the partisan interests of the party’s voter base and, secondly, by strategic elec­
toral interests to gain office and votes.
Secondly, the analysis considers to what extent the parties are able to trans­
form their positions on EMU into policies, i.e. to what extent they are able to influence 
the country’s strategies towards the adoption of the euro. Certainly, because of their 
proximity to power, government parties have a direct impact on the country’s euro- 
adoption strategies, especially when their fiscal policy is subject to opportunistic inter­
ests, thereby making a fast-track approach to joining the euro-zone problematic. How­
ever, it should be noted that an absence of parties “from government is not equivalent 
with lack of influence” (Beichelt 2004: 41). According to Sartori, the party’s relevance 
depends on its coalition and ‘blackmail’ (or veto power) potential (Sartori 1976: 123- 
124). A party’s policy agenda on the periphery of the party system with no coalition but 
‘blackmail’ potential may well affect the policy agenda of the other parties and the way 
they compete for votes (see also Ware 1996). Certainly, the potential to influence gov­
ernment policy also depends on the opposition parties’ percentage of parliamentary 
seats (see Beichelt 2004: 41). For example, it can be argued that the emergence of the 
League of the Polish Families and Samoobrona as strong forces in the Polish Sejm, led 
other parties to reconsider their policy agenda in relation to EU policies (see p. 132).
2 In this regard, the discussion reflects the different approaches to parties and party systems such as the 
factor of cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Almond 1956), institutions (Mair 1984, Duverger 1959) and 
competition (Sartori 1976, Duverger 1959, Epstein 1967) as well as the “responsiveness of parties and 
party systems to changes in [these] factors that created them” (Ware 1996: 8).
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The next four sections discuss the positions of particular parties in each country 
in relation to their potential impact on the country’s euro-adoption strategy and demon­
strate the influence of their interests on the party’s position regarding European integra­
tion and euro-zone accession.
The Czech Republic
In the last parliamentary election in June 2002, the Czech Communist Party of Bohe­
mia and Moravia (KSCM), formerly led by the Eurosceptic Miroslav Grebenicek, won 
18.5 percent of the vote, its highest share since the first free election in 1990. But as an 
unreformed communist party, the KSCM’s coalition potential remains (so far) low. The 
party’s position on European integration is consistent with the party’s communist iden­
tity; the EU is regarded as too capitalist a system and membership is therefore inadvis­
able due to meagre benefits for the Czech people and potentially high economic costs 
for the party’s constituency (Hanley 2002: 9, see chapter 5). Most of the KSCM’s voters 
belong to the so-called “transition losers” (see part B of this chapter) since support is 
mainly in industrialised regions with high unemployment rates (Western Bohemia and 
Southern Moravia) and high among the older and retired people (see also Hanley 
2002). Consequently, the KSCM’s anti-EU rhetoric is also very much a response to the 
socio-economic interests of its constituency, since the party’s stance is consistent with 
the strong Eurosceptical positions of its loyal and stable electorate (cf Hanley 2003 and 
part B of this chapter).3
Since the 2002 general election campaign, the KSCM’s rhetoric on European inte­
gration has become softer, yet more ambivalent. While the EU system was rejected, 
the party pledged more Czech influence within the EU. The ambivalent position on 
European integration was best shown when the party recommended a ‘moderate No 
vote’ (Hanley 2003: 8) for the EU accession referendum (see Table 8). As Hanley 
(2003) explains, it was a “No, but...” recommendation expressing the KSCM’s opposi­
tion to the EU in its present form, but its support for the idea of membership if the trea­
3 The KSCM’s loyal electoral base and therefore “supporters discipline in a low turnout election" (EIU 
2005a: 14) played a crucial role in explaining the KSCM’s best election result ever in 2002.
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ties of the EU would allow a direct form of democracy and a new left ideological 
agenda (see Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 169). In this regard the KSCM is also very criti­
cal towards EMU and favours postponing the adoption of the euro (Hanley 2002: 9). In 
particular, the party voted against the fiscal consolidation programme of the Spidla 
government in 2003 that aimed to adopt the euro by 2010 (see chapters 3 and 5). Be­
ing the third largest party in parliament since 2002, “with KSCM members for the first 
time assuming leadership positions in the Chamber of Deputies and its committees” 
(EIU 2005a: 14), the KSCM has considerable political leverage (see also Petrovic and 
Solingen 2005). This is reinforced by the fact that the CSSD-led government held the 
slimmest possible majority with 101 government and 99 opposition deputies.
The liberal conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) -  a mainstream party led by 
Mirek Topolanek and formerly by the current President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav 
Klaus, -  was founded in 1991 and has its roots in the Civic Forum movement of the 
1989 Velvet Revolution.4 The core electorate of the ODS represents the middle and 
upper class; the party draws considerable support from employers, the young and ur­
ban areas such as Prague and Brno (see EIU 2005a: 14). The ODS was the ruling 
party from 1990 to 1997 and developed “a high profile Thatcherite Eurosceptic position” 
(Hanley 2002: 5). While the ODS’ critical position on European integration stands para­
doxically in contrast to its largely pro-European voter base (see part B of this chapter), 
its stance is consistent with the party’s Anglo-Saxon liberal conservative ideology that 
the EU should solely be an instrument to create a free trade area, to enlarge markets 
and to guarantee peaceful cooperation in Europe (see Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 167, 
Hanley 2004a; 2004c) but should not be a means to create political integration (see 
chapter 5).
The ODS lost office in 1997 and since then the leadership -  although challenged 
from within the party (cf Petrovic and Solingen 2005) -  has adopted a more detailed 
and harsher position on EU issues in defence of Czech ‘national interests’ (Hanley
4 Vaclav Klaus was elected as President of the Czech Republic by the Czech Parliament in February 2003 
but he remains the ODS’ honorary chairman. Klaus has been the dominant political figure of the ODS 
since its foundation in April 1991. For a discussion on Klaus’ role within the ODS see Saxonberg (1999: 
71-97).
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2004c: 48, see also Hanley 2004b), an assertion which is confirmed by the ODS’s 2001 
Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism (see chapter 5).5 Fearing that the Czech Republic will 
once again lose sovereignty through EU membership and be overruled by larger na­
tions, the manifesto suggests alternatives to full EU accession such as membership of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It is in this context that the Maastricht 
Treaty is harshly criticised as an attempt to undermine state sovereignty and a forced 
imposition of a new European identity -  an important aspect in the ODS’s rhetoric on 
European integration which is further elaborated in chapter 5 (cf Klaus as quoted in 
Bugge 2000: 213). Since the EU does not form an optimum currency area and lacks a 
strong common European identity, the Manifesto is very sceptical about the euro and 
adds that “if the circumstances require, [we may] keep the tools of monetary policy in 
our own hands” (Manifesto of the Czech Eurorealism quoted in Hanley 2002: 6).
Given that the ODS is a mainstream party with an electorate mostly favouring EU 
accession (see Hanley 2003: 11 and part B of this chapter), the party found itself in a 
dilemma during the campaign for the EU accession referendum. Being Eurosceptic, the 
party refrained initially from issuing a formal appeal to the party supporters to vote 
‘yes’, arguing that the ODS supporters would vote for EU accession anyway (see Table 
8). It was not until two hours before the polls opened that the ODS leadership recom­
mended a yes-vote. But Klaus did not change his view on the referendum. Unlike the 
presidents of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, Vaclav Klaus refused to back and lead 
the country’s “yes” vote campaign for the EU accession referendum held in June 2003 
(see chapter 5). The ODS’ indecisiveness during the referendum campaign suggests 
that the party’s ideological orientation towards a ‘Thatherite’ position on EU issues was 
a greater influence on their EU stance than their responsiveness to the electorate (see 
chapter 5, cf also Hanley 2004a: 541). Being the second largest party in parliament and 
the only opposition alternative for the majority of the Czech citizens who reject the
5 The Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism was published in 2001 and is the most Eurosceptical manifesto 
produced by any mainstream political party in Central and Eastern Europe. The Manifesto was written by 
the current ODS member to the European Parliament and former First Vice Chairman and Foreign Affairs 
spokesman of the ODS, Jan Zahradil, and three politically engaged intellectuals, ODS members, Petr 
Plecity, Petr Adrian and Miroslav Bednar.
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KSCM, it has considerable potential to mobilise public opinion and to influence the po­
litical agenda, given that the coalition government only held a small majority. In addi­
tion, with its former party leader being the President of the Czech Republic, the party’s 
position on the euro is reflected in Klaus’ appointment of three new members (Pavel 
Rezabek, Robert Holman and Miroslav Singer) to the central bank board in February 
2005, all of whom are well known for their sceptical views of adopting the euro by 2010 
(see chapter 5 and 6, see also EIU 2005b: 11).
The Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) is the only social democratic party 
among the Visegrad countries that is not the successor of the communist party.6 While 
the party was a rather marginal force in the early 1990s, it made an astonishing break­
through in 1996 under the leadership of Milos Zeman, gaining more than 26 percent of 
the vote (see also chapter 2). Since 1998 it has been the leading government party. 
The CSSD firmly and consistently supported EU membership, seeing accession as a 
“modern social democratic project” (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 306) to “which there is 
no meaningful alternative” (Hanley 2002: 7). In contrast to the ODS, the CSSD sup­
ports a deepening (further integration of policy issues) of the EU. It is in this regard, 
that the CSSD fully supports the Maastricht Treaty and therefore the adoption of the 
euro (Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 169, Hanley 2002: 7). In fact, the CSSD was the only 
Czech party that unconditionally supported the Maastricht treaty and European integra­
tion efforts at all levels as early as 1996 (see election manifesto for 1998 as cited in 
Bugge 2000: 208, cf The Prague Post, 17/07/1996, see chapter 5). It should be noted 
that the CSSD’s pro-European position is an essential tool used to distinguish itself 
from the Eurosceptic ODS and KSCM and has therefore to be put into the context of 
the Czech intra-party arena. But whereas the intra-party arena seems to exert a strong 
influence on the CSSD’s position on European integration, the pressure to fulfil partisan 
expectations helps to explain why the party has become increasingly reluctant to take a 
fast-track approach to adopting the euro in recent years. For example, while standing 
at odds with the Maastricht criterion of fiscal consolidation, expenditure oriented poli­
6 The CSSD was founded in the 19th century and forcibly merged with the Communist Party in 1948.
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cies such as wage increases for public sector workers in 2002 and 2004 “reflect the 
CSSD’s electoral interest in retaining the support of a key constituency” (EIU 2005a: 
35). Partisan interests were certainly a positive influence on the CSSD’s policy of wel­
fare social-democracy given that the party lost much of its traditional core constituency 
to the KSCM (see EIU 2005a). In turn, the growing partisan pressure -  reinforced by 
rising unemployment rates in the aftermath of the currency crisis (see chapters 3 and 
5) -  has to be put into the context of a cleavage structure in which issues of distribution 
determine political partisanship, thus socio-economic cleavages dominate (see part B 
of this chapter). Given that the CSSD’s general election campaign promised to expand 
the welfare state, the Spidla government initially set a mediocre fiscal target and did not 
present a more ambitious reform package until the external pressure became too high 
(see chapter 5). This points to the value of a rational partisan model in highlighting fis­
cal cycles under left-wing governments in the short-run after the elections (see chapter 
2, Alesina 1994). With higher public spending, the CSSD evidently had to give up plans 
for a fast-track approach to euro-zone accession and postponed the adoption of the 
euro to 2010/2011. The postponement of the target date also reflects the ambivalence 
of the party’s voter base towards the euro (see part B of this chapter). Traditionally, 
support for the CSSD comes from the working class and is therefore high in industrial­
ised regions. The party also finds considerable support among public sector workers 
and trade unionists. The public’s growing scepticism toward European integration, es­
pecially from the party’s potential voter base, and the Eurosceptic position of the two 
opposition parties, has certainly affected the CSSD’s rhetoric and stance on European 
integration. Indeed, the party has gradually realigned its position, stressing now more 
than before, the negative social and economic consequences of EU accession likely to 
arise from, among other things, price rises and intensified economic competition. In 
order to avoid “undesirable tensions and problems in Czech society" (Euromanifest 
CSSD 2001 as cited in Hanley 2002: 7) says the CSSD, the Czech Republic needs 
transitional arrangements. Thus, while fully supporting the Maastricht treaty, a post­
ponement of euro-zone entry is in line with the CSSD’s concerns regarding growing
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socio-economic tension in the light of high unemployment rates and the sceptical public 
attitude to the euro, especially among its potential electorate. It is therefore argued that 
the CSSD’s position on the euro is driven by electoral interests and a partisan related 
fiscal expenditure oriented policy help to explain the CSSD-led government’s decision 
to postpone the adoption of the euro to the next decade.
Like the CSSD, its junior coalition partners since the 2002 general elections, the 
centre-right Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party (KDU-CSL) and the 
Freedom Union (US-DEU) are pro-European integration.7 Indeed, the coalition gov­
ernment united a “common commitment to rapid Czech accession to the EU and a re­
jection of the Civic Democrats’ ‘Eurorealism’” (Hanley 2004b: 693), thereby demon­
strating the significance of European issues for the overall stability of the coalition (see 
chapter 6). The KDU-CSL has its roots in the Christian social movement of the 19th 
century and is especially well established in the Czech lands and in small cities. Its 
core electorate represents catholic and conservative voters with particularly high sup­
port in rural parts of Moravia. The KDU-CSL was the junior coalition party in the Klaus’ 
government between 1992-1997 and formed a coalition election action with the US- 
DEU for the 2002 general election. In their joint party manifesto the KDU-CSL and US- 
DEU stress the rule of law as well as the fight against corruption. The US-DEU was 
only established in 1998 by former ODS members as a reaction to the ODS party fi­
nance scandal in 1997 (see chapter 6). Support for the US-DEU is mainly in larger cit­
ies as well as among the younger generation and voters with higher education. In con­
trast to the ODS, the other centre-right parties in the Czech Republic firmly support EU 
accession seeing membership as “vital to Czech national interests” (Hanley 2002: 8). 
EU membership, the KDU-CSL and US-DEU argue, will reinforce economic reforms. In 
the same vein, the parties support a rapid adoption of the euro. In their joint coalition
7 That does not mean that these parties never criticise any aspect of EU at all. The debates on the Benes 
decrees legitimising the expropriation from the Czech lands and segregation of more than 2 million ethnic 
Germans after the end of the Second World War in particular, have inflamed the atmosphere between the 
EU and all Czech parties (Hanley 2004a: 532, see chapter 5). Indeed, the Benes decrees play an impor­
tant role in mobilising anti-EU sentiments (see Hanley 2004b: 696). At a German-Czech discussion forum 
in Berlin in March 2002, for instance, Miroslav Bednar, one of the co-authors of the Manifesto of Czech 
Realism and member of the ODS (see footnote 6), went so far as to describe Germany, Austria and Hun­
gary as the “Axis of Evil” for their stance on the Benes decrees (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) 
09/03/02 and Hanley 2004a).
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manifesto for the 2002 general elections, the KDU-CSL and US-DEU advocated a 
macroeconomic policy that would make adoption of the euro possible in 2007 (KDU- 
CSL and US-DEU Coalition Manifesto 2002). It should be noted, however, that the par­
ties’ position on European integration is driven to a large extent by their relationship 
with the ODS. Especially in the case of the US-DEU, the strong Europhile position is “a 
necessary break with the Euroscepticism of ODS” (Hanley 2002: 8) and
it is hard to avoid the feeling that the KDU-CSL and US developed their po­
sition on EU primarily as an opposition to the sometimes sharp tongue of 
the ODS, rather than from some form of party-wide or ideological issue 
(Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 168).
Thus, the KDU-CSL and US-DEU’s pro-European stance is largely shaped by their 
antagonistic relationship with the ODS. This is particularly important since the coalition 
parties compete for votes with the ODS and can thus benefit from the fact that the anti- 
European discourse of the ODS does not match the pro-European attitude of its con­
stituency (see above and part B of this chapter).
Table 8 Czech political parties’ position in the EU-accession referendum
i
P osition  on the E U -accession  referendum
..I
KSCM ‘M o d era te ’ No cam paign  
(qualified  rejection o f EU accession)
R epublicans o f M iroslav S lad ek8 No cam paign
ODS No active Yes cam paign , no form al appeal 
to vo te  Yes until 2 hours before polls w ere opened.
CSSD Yes cam paign
KDU -CSL Yes cam paign
US-DEU Yes cam paign
8 The Republicans of Miroslav Sladek (RMS), formerly run under the Association for the Republic- 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSC), came in fourth place with 8 percent of the vote in 1992 
and won a share of 6.5 percent in 1996. The nationalist RMS manifests its anti-EU position in hostility 
toward Germany and the Roma minority and “dreams of an ethnically pure greater Czechoslovakia” (Bei­
chelt 2004: 38). It criticises the EU as being dominated by German interests and focuses on fears of the 
sell-out of Czech industry and property to foreign companies. It also led the no-campaign for the EU ac­
cession referendum. During the last parliamentary election in June 2002, the RMS received only a devas­
tating 1 percent of the vote, mostly because all major parties conducted populist electoral campaigns.
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In summary, in the case of the junior coalition parties KDU-CSL and US-DEU, 
strategic interests generated from the intra-party arena exert a strong influence on their 
positions on European integration. On the other hand, the KSCM’s rejection of the EU 
as too capitalist a system is clearly motivated by both the party’s communist identity 
and the party’s interest in fulfilling partisan expectations, given that its electorate is 
highly anti-EU. Eurosceptic positions are further expressed by the ODS, thus Euro- 
sceptic parties are well represented in the parliament and have considerable political 
leverage. Instead of deeper European integration, the ODS favours a free-trade area 
without transferring national loyalties to a supranational entity. While the ODS’ position 
on European integration is consistent with its Anglo-Saxon liberal-conservative ideol­
ogy, it does not represent the interests of its electoral base which is strongly pro- 
European integration. In fact, the ODS’s position on the euro deviates from what ra­
tional electoral strategies would predict. Thus, other factors than partisan pressure play 
a dominant role in understanding the ODS’ stance on European integration; an impor­
tant finding further highlighted in chapter 5. In contrast, partisan pressure strongly af­
fects the CSSD preferences on EMU. Its voter base is less inclined towards European 
integration and while the party initially unconditionally supported the Maastricht Treaty, 
it followed expenditure oriented fiscal policies that were at odds with the Maastricht 
criteria. It is argued that fiscal expansion under the CSSD governments (especially in 
the first half of its time in office) has to be seen in light of growing partisan pressure, 
given that the party lost many of its supporters to the KSCM, a party which seeks to 
become a legitimate alternative to the Social Democratic Party. The CSSD’s fiscal ex­
penditure-oriented policy also explains why the CSSD-government readjusted its euro- 
adoption strategy in 2002 and postponed the target date (see chapter 3 and 5). It can 
therefore be argued that a partisan related political business cycle positively influenced 
the postponement of the euro-adoption. However, as further argued in chapter 5 and 6, 
partisan pressure does not explain why the CSSD changed its view on the euro after 
the currency crisis and not before, nor can partisan and strategic electoral interests
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account for the overall reluctance towards the adoption of the euro among the political 
elites, especially among high-ranked ODS politicians and central bankers.
Slovakia
Two parties on the far-left, the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) and the Commu­
nist Party of Slovakia (KSS), have adopted anti-European stances (see chapter 5). 
However, neither of these parties commands very many votes, and they do not play a 
major role in the political system. The KSS entered the parliament for the first time in 
2002, receiving 6.3 percent of the vote whereas the ZRS lost its parliamentary repre­
sentation in 1998 (votes dropped from 7.4 percent in 1994 to a disappointing 1.3 per­
cent) and has not been able to recover since.9 Although the KSS recommended a yes- 
vote in the EU accession referendum (see Table 9) its “distaste for both post­
communist economic reform and the EU was frequently manifested” (Henderson 2003: 
3). Consistent with its communist ideology, the KSS rejects the EU system as it is 
“based on the neoliberal dogmas about the needs of the free market” in which “the in­
terests of capital are set over the interests of the citizens” (KSS 2004). In the same 
vein, the KSS condemns the Maastricht Treaty as too capitalist. The anti-EU rhetoric of 
the KSS falls on fertile grounds since the supporters of the communist party “have 
been more willing to convert their resistance to the hardship of post-communist transi­
tion into a vote against the EU [in the accession referendum]” (Henderson 2003: 9). 
The core electorate of the KSS consists of protest voters and voters “alienated by the 
transition” (Fitzmaurice 2004: 163), especially retired people and people who lost out 
from the transition process and/or have a certain nostalgia for the communist system 
(Fitzmaurice 2004: 165). The KSS’ anti-system/anti-EU position fits therefore with the 
socio-economic interests of its electoral base and is clearly driven by the party’s com­
9 Unlike in the Czech Republic, the unreformed communist parties play a marginal role in the struggle over 
power in Slovakia. The different levels of success reflect the societal differences between the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. The core constituency of the communist party, industrial workers, is less represented in 
Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. In addition, unlike in the Czech Republic, religion plays an important 
role and Slovaks are very sensitive to the anti-communist rhetoric of the Slovak Catholic Church. More­
over, as further discussed in chapter 5, the need for nation building after the split of Czechoslovakia gave 
rise to nationalist parties; a need for self-determination, which is diametrically opposed to the communist 
ideology.
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munist identity, rather than by short-term goals such as office-related payoffs. Cer­
tainly, as an unreformed communist party, the KSS has no coalition potential and its 
anti-EU rhetoric therefore correlates with its outsider status. However, since the con­
solidation of the KSS as a permanent representative in the parliament is far from cer­
tain, its veto potential remains fairly low.10
On the extreme-right, the Slovak National Party (SNS) expresses anti-EU views 
that stem from a rejection of Western values and fears of losing state sovereignty (see 
chapter 5; Szczerbiak and Taggart 2001: 19; Beichelt 2004: 40). The SNS rejection of 
EU membership and membership in any international organisations is consistent with 
its nationalist/patriotic and protectionist values -  thus with the party’s identity -  and fits 
with its Eurosceptic voter base. Support is mainly in rural areas and is high among the 
unemployed, male voters (especially young men) and skilled workers (see Krause
2000). Together with the ZRS, the SNS was the junior coalition partner in the Meciar 
government from 1994 to 1998 under which Slovakia became internationally isolated 
and EU accession a far distant project; a foreign policy which has to be seen in light of 
shared principled beliefs about Slovakia’s place in Europe as discussed in chapter 5. 
But the party lost its political influence and parliamentary representation in 2002, as 
support for the SNS dropped from 9.1 percent of the vote in 1998 to only 3 percent in 
the last parliamentary election in 2002.11
The largest party with Eurosceptical views is the Movement for a Democratic 
Slovakia (HZDS) -  renamed the People’s Party-Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(LS-HZDS) in 2002 -  the ruling party from the country’s independence until 1998, 
headed by the former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar. The LS-HZDS is an authoritarian 
nationalist/populist party (its main ally has been the SNS) with its core electorate 
mainly in rural and -  with the exception of Bratislava -  Western Slovakia, as well as 
among older and less educated people (Fitzmaurice 2004: 162). During Meciar’s time
10 In the 2004 election to the European Parliament, for instance, the KSS was not able to exceed the 5 
percent threshold.
11 Before the general election in 2002 the former party leader, Jan Slota, left the SNS and founded the 
Real Slovak National Party (PSNS). Following the split, the SNS and the PSNS were not able to exceed 
the 5 percent electoral threshold in the 2002 general elections.
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in office, Slovakia became internationally isolated and excluded from NATO and EU 
accession negotiations (see chapters 5 and 6). The Eurosceptic stance of the LS- 
HZDS fits well with the interests of its supporters who are traditionally “politically re­
served about the EU” (Henderson 2001: 11) fearing both economic disadvantages from 
EU membership and the loss of the just-gained national sovereignty (chapter 5).
As stated in chapter 3, opportunistic interests of the Meciar government resulted 
in a political business cycle, i.e. in a drastic increase of the budget deficit, prior to the 
1998 general elections. Indeed, Slovakia’s fiscal policy is still constrained by a budget 
deficit that goes back to the economic policy of the Meciar governments, under which 
economic reconstruction was neglected, privatisation turned into cronyism and expen­
diture-oriented fiscal policy implemented (see chapter 3). However, despite the fact that 
the party’s efforts in attracting votes proved to be successful as the LS-HZDS again 
became the largest single party in parliament, it found itself unable to form a govern­
ment after the 1998 elections. In reaction to this, the LS-HZDS has realigned its posi­
tion on EU and NATO membership since 2002 and now takes a rather moderate 
stance toward European integration. Indeed, during the campaign for the EU accession 
referendum, the LS-HZDS recommended a yes-vote (see Table 9). The overwhelming 
consensus on “the return to Europe” led even nationalists like Meciar to try to broaden 
their rhetoric into a pro-European political discourse. Thus, the LS-HZDS position on 
European integration has to be understood as a means to appeal to a broader elector­
ate and to become internationally rehabilitated (Henderson 2002: 6). The LS-HZDS’s 
adjusted stance on EU issues is therefore motivated by its office-seeking behaviour 
rather than by a change in the party’s fundamental values or ideas on European inte­
gration.12 More important for the Slovak euro-adoption strategy, in an effort “to end its 
long-standing pariah status” (EIU profile 2005h: 15) the LS-HZDS supported key gov­
ernment bills for policy reforms designed to meet the Maastricht criteria by 2007. As the
12 For example, Meciar’s moderate stance towards European integration is often contradictory and not 
consistent in its arguments. While Meciar now officially declares himself “not to be a supporter of the 
Europe of regions nor the Europe of the nations but of the United States of Europe” (Meciar quoted in 
Kopecky and Ucen 2003:172), he states at the same time that the adoption of the acquis communautaire - 
and thus EMU - comes with the ‘extinction of Slovak statehood’ and is a ‘nightmare’ (ibid).
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largest party in Slovakia and with a party leader that strongly polarises Slovak society 
on political issues (see chapter 6), the LS-HZDS has considerable political leverage on 
the political discourse of EU issues but also on the country's strategy for adopting the 
euro, especially since the government has relied on LS-HZDS support for key govern­
ment bills promoting early EMU accession.
During the last parliamentary election in 2002, the newly-founded populist cen­
tre-left party SMER (“Direction”) received 13.5 percent of the vote. Its charismatic 
leader, Robert Fico, was a former MP for the Party of the Democratic Left.13 The elec­
tion campaign, run on a populist platform, emphasised law and order and the fight 
against corruption, capitalising on the people’s frustration with inter-party conflicts, cor­
rupt politicians and painful EU-mandated reforms. The party thus appeals to former 
supporters of the ruling parties who have become disillusioned with the Dzurinda gov­
ernments as much as to “those voters -  mainly elderly, less educated and rural -  who 
have been most threatened by the government’s liberal economic reforms and have 
benefited the least” (EIU 2005g: 15). The party supports EU accession and an adoption 
of the euro within a “reasonable and for Slovakia advantageous time" (SMER 2004) 
but, at the same time, it is against further political integration on the EU level, saying 
such integration runs counter to the party’s desire for national sovereignty. SMER’s 
populist stance, assigning Fico the reputation of being “Meciar-light”, has to be put in 
the context of the Slovak party arena and competition, given SMER’s interest in ap­
pealing to supporters of the government parties. SMER’s position on EU issues is pri­
marily based on the instrumental populism it uses to attract voters. This is further re­
flected in the party’s lack of a coherent political agenda. SMER’s potential impact on 
the policy agenda of the other parties is not negligible given the fact that in 2004 it “has 
taken over HZDS’s mantle as the most popular opposition party in Slovakia” (Bakke 
and Sitter 2005: 249, see also chapter 6).
13 Robert Fico was a popular politician in the SDL and left the party in October 1999 after the former SDL 
party leader Jozef Migas prevented the appointment of Fico to the post of Justice Minister (Fitzmaurice 
2004:163).
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The current government coalition, consisting of several liberal-conservative and 
previously also socialist parties -  the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU)14, 
the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), the Christian Democratic Movement 
(KDH), the liberal Alliance of New Citizen (ANO) and also between 1998-2002 the 
Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)15 and the party of Civic Understanding (SOP)16 -  
was built to exclude the party that received the most votes, the Movement for a Democ­
ratic Slovakia. The general “anti-Meciarism” which united the coalition parties was 
strengthened by the threat that Meciar could return to office. This was especially true of 
the first Dzurinda government (1998-2002) and its major coalition partner the SDL (see 
chapter 6). Being a moderate socialist party with its core electorate coming mainly from 
the left and the ex-communist wing, the SDL found itself in a difficult situation in the so- 
called “anti-Meciar rainbow-coalition” which was in essence a centre-right coalition (see 
Fitzmaurice 2004: 162). Indeed, as Bakke and Sitter (2005: 249) state: “apart from be­
ing against Meciar, the members of this civic-democratic coalition had little in common”. 
As discussed further in chapter 6, the left-right tensions of the first Dzurinda govern­
ment caused a division between the leadership and the party’s rank-and-file members, 
particularly for the left SDL who “felt like hostages on issues such as fiscal policy and 
privatisation” (Fitzmaurice 2004: 162). This clearly demonstrates the importance of 
coalition politics and office-seeking behaviour when other interests or even the party’s 
identity may have to be sacrificed, as happened to prevent Meciar’s return to office 
(see chapter 6).
14 The leading party in the first Dzurinda government (1998-2002) was the Slovak Democratic Coalition 
(SDK) that consisted of the KDU, the Democratic Union (DU), the Democratic Party (DS), the Social De­
mocratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Party of the Greens (SZS). During the first Dzurinda govern­
ment the SDKU split off from the Christian Democrats (the latter became the Christian Democratic Move­
ment) and joined the Democratic Union.
15 Unlike in Poland and Hungary, the successor of the communist party was not able to establish itself as a 
ruling party in Slovakia. After gaining only a disappointing share of votes during the 2002 general elec­
tions, the Party of the Democratic Left merged with SMER in December 2004. For a detailed analysis of 
the failure of the SDL see Haughton (2004) and Fitzmaurice (2004).
16 The centre-right party SOP was formed shortly before the general election in 1998. The SOP was pub­
licity supported by the independent Markiza TV station (the director of Markiza, Pavol Rusko formed later 
the liberal Alliance of the new Citizens, ANO). The party chair was the former President of Slovakia Rudolf 
Schuster. SOP stood with the SDL in the 2002 elections but failed to pass the 5 percent threshold.
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Apart from the Christian Democratic Movement, the coalition parties strongly 
support EU membership. As argued in chapter 5, the coalition’s stance on foreign pol­
icy and European integration is a vital element in contrasting itself from Meciar’ politics 
and has to be seen in the context of the Slovak experience of international isolationism, 
the polarisation of the Slovak society between pro- and anti- Meciar camps and public 
support for EU membership (see part B of this chapter and chapter 5). The coalition’s 
foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis the EU, is for that reason very much a “source of 
legitimacy and proof of successful rule” (Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 172). Certainly, le­
gitimacy is a very hard currency in politics and stresses the value of the pro-European 
stance for the coalition’s own survival (see chapter 6). By referring to Meciar's ne­
glected reforms and the country’s need to catch up with the other new member states, 
the SDKU party manifesto for the 2002 general elections defines EU membership as 
“the opportunity to speed up the modernisation of the country” while the adoption of the 
euro would “complete the integration of Slovakia into the group of developed world 
countries” (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 2002). Thus, EMU membership is 
seen as necessary in order to achieve parity with other European states and as a 
means to overcome Slovakia’s previous ‘outsider’ status (see chapter 5). The govern­
ment’s enthusiasm to push forward reforms aimed at joining the euro-zone as quickly 
as possible must be viewed in this context. This matches the pro-European attitude of 
the SDKU’s voter base. Support is particularly high among entrepreneurs, people with 
higher education and those living in urban areas. As stated in the second part of this 
chapter, these voters benefit from EU membership and are more likely to support the 
country’s adoption of the euro. Being pro-European integration is integral to the 
SDKU’s identity in as much as this is a source of its legitimacy, illustrating the overall 
importance of the SDKU’s foreign policy for its own stability and survival. The SDKU’s 
EU policy is therefore pursued in its own-interest and -  as further demonstrated in 
chapter 5 -  is interwoven in the principled (normative) and causal beliefs that EU 
membership and the adoption of the euro are fundamental principles for guiding Slova­
kia’s path in Europe and to ‘speed up the country’s modernisation’.
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The centre-right Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), one of the coalition 
parties, represents Catholic fundamentalism and some Eurosceptical stances. The 
KDH’s enjoys stable and loyal support from a rural and catholic electorate. It shares 
with the nationalist parties its older, less educated electorate (Henderson 2002, 2003). 
While the KDH was firmly pro-EU accession during its years as an opposition party, the 
party has shifted toward a Eurosceptical position. The founder and former leader of the 
KDH, Jan Carnogursky, expressed the fear that the “western values and way of life are 
not particularly suitable for the Slovak people” (Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 173). Con­
cerns about cultural and ethical sovereignty are at the heart of the KDH’s sceptical po­
sition on the EU, resulting in a declaration put forward by the party and approved by the 
parliament in 2002 that calls for the exclusive jurisdiction of the new member states on 
culture, ethical questions (e.g. against euthanasia, abortion), family protection (e.g. 
against legalisation of gay marriages) and anti-discrimination laws (e.g. discrimination 
based on sexual orientation) (see Rybar 2002: 26, Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 315 and 
EIU 2005h: 17).17 Nevertheless, the KDH supported the Yes-campaign for the country’s 
accession referendum in 2003 (see Table 9) but has recently expressed some con­
cerns about a common currency, as it would undermine state sovereignty (see Ucen 
2004: 1124). The KDH’s sceptical position on European integration is thus rooted in its 
cultural and religious identity.
Table 9 Slovak political parties’ position in the EU-accession referendum
P arty P osition  in  the E U -accession  referendum
HZDS (renam ed LS-H ZD S) C alled fo r a Yes vote
SNS No cam paign
KDH Called fo r a Yes vote
SDKU Yes cam paign
SM ER Yes cam paign
KSS Low -key ‘Yes recom m endation ’
17 A similar proposal was put forward by the KDH during the campaign on the country’s EU referendum 
(see Bilcik 2003: 97).
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In summary, under the Eurosceptic Meciar governments (1993-1998), Slovakia 
experienced a period of international isolation during which EU membership became a 
far distant project. Prior to the election in 1998, the Meciar government pursued strong 
fiscal expansion in an effort to get re-elected. Expansionist and interventionist policies, 
neglected structural reforms and inflation debts in the years of the Meciar governments 
(see chapter 3) certainly put a heavy burden on successive governments aiming for a 
fast-track approach to adopting the euro. Despite being the largest single party in par­
liament, the LS-HZDS found itself unable to form a government after the 1998 elec­
tions. In reaction to this, the party has moderated its tone on European issues. Indeed, 
strategic electoral interests led Meciar to soften his stance in an effort to become inter­
nationally rehabilitated and to increase the party’s coalition potential. On the other 
hand, the Eurosceptic communist party, KSS, possesses a very low veto potential 
while, the KDH’s Eurosceptical position is mainly related to concerns about appropriate 
cultural and religious values and the party has only recently expressed some hesitancy 
about EMU. Thus, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the political conditions for a quick 
adoption of the euro are rather positive; a fact that corresponds with low public Euro- 
scepticism (see p. 143). Indeed, ever since the HZDS lost office in 1998, the reform 
oriented Dzurinda governments have successfully embarked on a pro-European inte­
gration foreign policy, are highly committed to joining the euro-zone as quickly as pos­
sible and certainly no later than the other Visegrad countries. The stance on European 
integration of the governing SDKU is a source of its legitimacy in a highly polarised 
party system and is consistent with the interests of its pro-EU oriented electorate (see 
part B of this chapter). Interests certainly play a crucial role in understanding the 
SDKU’s stance on European integration, however, as stated above and elaborated in 
chapter 5, these interests have to be put into the context of the dramatic experience of 
foreign policy failure under the Meciar governments that made the idea of a pro- 
European integration policy so persuasive. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 6, the 
SDKU’s ability to implement reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria is also a conse­
quence of favourable institutional opportunities.
123
Hungary
In contrast to the other Visegrad countries, Hungary displays a low level of party-based 
Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2001: 24). The only exceptions to this are the 
parties representing strong anti-EU resentments, such as the far-right Hungarian Jus­
tice and Life Party (MIEP) and the far-left Hungarian Workers’ Party (Munkaspart). 
However, Munkaspart plays only a marginal role in the struggle over power and has 
been unable to win any parliamentary representation since its foundation in 1989. 
Likewise, while the MIEP won 5.5 percent of votes in the 1998 parliamentary election, it 
was not able to pass the 5 percent threshold in the 2002 elections, losing many of its 
voters to FIDESZ. Given that FIDESZ was able to attract votes from the MIEP, it is 
worth looking at the latter’s position on the EU.
The MIEP broke away from the governing Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF18) in 1993 to become a national populist party that opposes any form of foreign 
influence (see Beichelt 2004: 38). The MIEP’s rejection of EU accession is based on 
nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. The essential issue for the MIEP is Hungarian na­
tionhood linked with the post-World War One peace settlements and their conse­
quences for Hungarian borders.19 The question of nationhood has always been crucial 
to political debates in Hungary (Markowski 1997, Kitschelt et al. 1999, Schopflin 2000). 
Hungarian politics -  and especially the political discourse of MIEP and FIDESZ -  are 
heavily dominated by socio-cultural issues related to the large Roma community and 
the 3 million Hungarians living in the neighbouring states of Romania, Slovakia, Yugo­
slavia, and the Ukraine (these countries or territories within them were parts of the me­
dieval Kingdom of Hungary and later of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy). Social- 
cultural issues divide the Hungarian society into a nationalist-right and a liberal-left 
cleavage. It is a historical and ideological rural-urban cleavage regarding moral issues
18 The MDF was once the leading political party in Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s but gradually lost 
power and is now a junior partner of FIDESZ. In fact, only the alliance with FIDESZ guaranteed the MDF 
representation in parliament after 1998 since the party was not able to pass the 5 percent threshold in the 
last two general elections.
19 The Justice and Life Party does not recognise the existing borders between Hungary and the Ukraine 
(see Kbrosenyi 1999).
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which has far reaching consequences for voting behaviour and for the way the two 
mainstream parties, FIDESZ and MSZP, compete for votes as well as for their stance 
on European integration.
Victor Orban’s FIDESZ Party and the Smallholder Party (the former junior part­
ner of the FIDESZ Party when it was in government20) have taken some sceptical 
views on European integration. FIDESZ -  an acronym for Alliance of Young Democrats 
-  started as a radical youth movement against Communism. Not until 1995 was the
party renamed the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, symbolising the party’s new empha-
\ !
sis on conservative nationalism (Fowler 2004: 104, cf Kiss 2002). In the late 1990s the 
party was then gradually “transformed into a centre-right “catch-all” party espousing 
conservative and nationalist values at least as much as liberal ones” (Batory 2002: 4, 
Lomax 1999: 114). In 2003, FIDESZ changed its name again to “’FIDESZ-Hungarian 
Civic Union’, in a move to signal a shift from a strictly political organisation to a grass­
roots movement uniting people with conservative and nationalist values” (EIU 2005f: 
11). This shift is particularly important and has consequences for FIDESZ’s fiscal policy 
agenda. Support for FIDESZ is particularly high in rural areas, smaller towns and 
among the poor and less educated people with strong national preferences. Agh (2002: 
284) therefore argues that FIDESZ’s voter base “went against the logic” of class-based 
voting behaviour, given that the liberal-conservative FIDESZ attracts votes from those 
who benefit from the social and economic policy of the Socialist-led government. Agh 
(2002: 284) explains the
reasons [for the status inconsistency of the Hungarian voters] may be found 
at the level of political discourse, since FIDESZ has used a traditionalist-
20 Until its defeat in the general election in 2002 and its subsequent demise, the Independent Smallholder 
Party (FKGP) was the largest national farmer organisation, receiving a share of votes between 9 and 13 
percent. Being a farmer party, the FKGP draws most of its support from a clearly defined socio-economic 
segment, namely from people working in the agrarian sector and living in the countryside. The FKGP 
characterises itself as a national Christian peasant party. Under the slogan uGod, Fatherland, Family”, it 
defends national interests and accuses other liberal parties of “shameless supranationalism” (Batory 2001: 
15). The FKGP was not against EU accession per se, but called for a critical approach to accession nego­
tiations. Under the slogan ‘the Motherland is not for sale’ (see Batory 2002: 5), the party says, Hungary 
should insist on prohibiting the sale of real property to foreign investors, because such sales runs counter 
to the interests of its constituency, the rural population. However, since the 2000 resignation of its leader 
and former agricultural minister Jozsef Torgyan in the wake of allegations of corruption and embezzle­
ment, the FKGP has been split into factions and was crushingly defeated in the 2002 parliamentary elec­
tions, in which it received only 0.8 percent of the vote. Following the party’s quasi-collapse after the corrup­
tion affair, many of its leading members joined the FIDESZ; supporting and strengthening the nationalist 
wing of the party.
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nationalist discourse, combined with a modernist one for other strata, that 
has been attractive for the less educated people in smaller settlements.
j
FIDESZ’s traditionalist-nationalist discourse is dominated by the issue of Hun­
garians living outside Hungary; a distinguishing cleavage of Hungarian society which 
explains much of the peculiar nature of Hungarian party competition. Also in response 
to the ‘status inconsistency’ (Agh 2002) of the Hungarian voters, the FIDESZ govern­
ment significantly loosened fiscal policy in the run up to the 2002 general election and 
^  increased spending on infrastructure projects and public sector wages (see chapter 3, 
5 and 6). Indeed, given that the ideological cleavage regarding moral issues is so deep 
between FIDESZ and MSZP, the only electoral strategy that can be used to attract vot­
ers from the concurrent camp is populist spending. In such a rigid framework, fiscal 
policy is the only ‘neutral’ policy that can be used to attract voters. All other issues are 
much too attached to one party. Thus, the Hungarian experience of a political business 
cycle prior to the 2002 election that resulted in a ballooning of the budget deficit with 
consequences for the country’s euro-adoption strategy (see chapter 1 and 3) has to be 
seen in the context of the cleavage structure in Hungary.
Relevant to FIDESZ’s traditionalist-nationalist discourse is the party’s position on 
the EU. While FIDESZ sees EU accession as a necessity promising material gains and 
the opportunity for “the ‘spiritual association’ of all Hungarians inside and beyond the
91country’s physical borders” (Hegedus 2003: 48) , it called for a tough approach to ne­
gotiations (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, Batory 2002). Indeed, a tough bargaining ap-
\/
proach with Brussels became a repeated claim leading Victor Orban to state that “there 
is life outside the European Union” (Orban in 2000 quoted in Batory 2002: 5, see also 
Hegedus 2003). Since the last general election in 2002, the party’s national rhetoric 
against the EU has systematically become “an important part of the political-building
21 In 2001, the FIDESZ-led government passed the controversial Status Law that gives special rights (e.g. 
employment, health care and welfare rights) to ethnic Hungarians living abroad. The status law was 
harshly criticised by Slovakia and Romania (both countries have Hungarian minorities) arguing that the law 
discriminates against their citizens and that Hungary tries to broaden its sphere of influence through grant­
ing quasi-citizenship to the Hungarian minorities, an act seen as the first step towards territorial claim in 
the future. Orban also called for the repeal of the Benes Decrees under which ethnic Germans and Hun­
garians were expelled from Czechoslovakia and lost their property.
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manoeuvres of FIDESZ” and has therefore to be seen as an electoral strategy to gain 
votes (Hegedus 2003: 47, see also Fowler 2003). According to Batory (2002), its 
harsher rhetoric against the EU is a result of the tight contest in the 2002 elections. By 
radicalising its stance on EU integration, FIDESZ hoped to appeal to voters of the radi­
cal right (MIEP) (Batory 2002: 5). However, despite its critical stance on the EU, 
FIDESZ firmly supports the adoption of the euro, seeing it as the ‘greatest advantage 
offered by the EU’ as the euro is a critical means to achieve economic stability and low 
inflation:
[f]or Hungary being a country with a small and open economy, perhaps this 
[the single currency] is the greatest advantage offered by the Union. Pre­
dictability and low inflation that is guaranteed are the best protection 
against speculation and the reducible reserves of foreign exchange repre­
sent major opportunities for us. For these reasons, we have to do every­
thing possible for the introduction of the Euro in 2008 (FIDESZ 2004 The 
Europe Programme).
As discussed in chapter 3, Hungary has had to cope with high inflationary pressures, 
inconsistent fiscal and monetary policies and unpredictable exchange rate develop­
ment throughout the transition process, resulting in a loss of economic and political 
credibility. The adoption of the euro is therefore ‘the greatest advantage offered by the 
Union’ because the euro is considered as a ‘credibility anchor’ for the Hungarian econ­
omy in as much as the single currency would bring advantages such as lower interest 
rates (see chapter 5). It should be noted that FIDESZ submitted its Europe programme 
in May 2004 after the MSZP-led government readjusted the country’s EMU accession 
strategy and postponed the adoption of the euro to 2010. Thus, although FIDESZ ex­
presses some Eurosceptical views -  defended on the basis of national interests but 
certainly to be seen as an effort to broaden out its electoral base -  the party is very 
positive towards EMU and favours a much earlier target date for the adoption of the 
euro than the government.
The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) is the successor to the communist Hun­
garian Socialist Workers’ party (MSZMP). In 1994, the MSZP returned to power and 
formed a coalition with the Free Democrats, lost the election to FIDESZ in 1998 and 
won the election again in 2002. The MSZP is described as a universal, pragmatic and
\ f
technocratic party that sees EU accession as its top foreign policy priority (see Batory 
2001: 19). According to the MSZP, “[...] there is no other way for modernisation for 
Hungary [...] than joining the process of European integration as soon as possible [...].” 
(MSZP, quoted in Batory 2001: 19). In the same vein, the MSZP firmly supports euro­
zone membership. The party’s positive stance on European integration is also a logical 
consequence of the MSZP’s transformation process from an unreformed communist 
party to a Social Democratic one and may therefore have been “largely pragmatic” as 
the “MSZP’s self-constructed party identity was built on the rejection of the ‘ideologisa- 
tion’ of politics in general” (Batory 2001: 19). Thus, the party’s desire to leave behind its 
communist legacy -  rather than the party’s identity as a Socialist party -  exerts a 
strong influence on the MSZP’s stance on European integration. But the pro-European 
stance of the MSZP also reflects the interests of its pro-EU electorate. Support for the 
Socialist Party is high among university graduates and in large cities, especially in Bu­
dapest, leading Agh to speak of an “anomaly or perversity” (Agh 2002: 285) underlying 
the social structure of political support for the two mainstream parties FIDESZ and 
MSZP. As stated above, the “status inconsistency” of the Hungarian voters has to be 
seen in the context of the nationalist discourse of FIDESZ which attracted many of the 
votes from less educated and rural citizens. It is also a consequence of the fact that the 
MSZP was perceived to
a great extent as a pragmatic-technocratic party that performed a role in 
socio-economic transformations usually played by the parties on the Right 
and it has only recently made a major correction towards ‘social systemic 
change’ (Agh 2002: 285, see also chapter 3 for a discussion of the austerity 
measures implemented by the Socialist party in the mid-1990s).
However, the MSZP’s efforts to “shake off its post-Bokros image as a party of “auster­
ity” (EIU 2005 2005f: 32) led the party to run its electoral campaign on economic poli-
\J
cies to expand the welfare state, thus creating for the MSZP a dilemma of fulfilling elec­
tion promises that contravened the Maastricht criteria (see chapter 5). Indeed, while the 
MSZP firmly supports a quick adoption of the euro, it has followed a policy of welfare 
social-democracy that stands at odds with the Maastricht criterion of fiscal consolida­
tion (see chapter 3). The expenditure oriented fiscal policy is also a consequence of the
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tight and emotional electoral contest with FIDESZ that fuelled the populist positions of 
the two mainstream parties and put even more pressure on the MSZP to fulfil voters’ 
expectations (see also EIU profile 2004: 6). The strong increase in public expenditure 
prior to and after the 2002 elections can therefore be attributed to the process of oppor­
tunistic and partisan political business cycles and clearly stands in the context of the 
FIDESZ-led government’s interest to get re-elected and the MSZP’s interest in fulfilling 
election pledges. But with an increase in the budget deficit and growing macroeco­
nomic imbalances, the MSZP-led government eventually had to readjust its euro- 
adoption strategy in May 2004 and postponed the adoption of the euro to 2010.
The Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), a liberal democrat party and coalition 
partner of the MSZP, is most strongly in favour of EU and EMU membership. The pro- 
European stance corresponds with the economic interests of its electorate, which be­
longs to the ‘transition winners’ and beneficiaries of EU membership. The party’s voter 
base is concentrated in Budapest (the SZDSZ politician Gabor Demszky has held the 
city’s mayoralty since 1990) and larger cities and its popularity is high among the well- 
off and well-educated voters (EIU 2005f: 11).22 The party manifesto of the SZDSZ for 
the 1998 parliamentary election was titled “For a modern, European Hungary”. Simi­
larly, during the election campaign in 2002, the party presented itself to the voters as 
‘the party of European Hungary’ (see Batory 2002: 6). EU membership is perceived as 
a guarantee of modernisation, prosperity, market economy, democracy, and the rule of 
law (see the 1998 party manifesto quoted in Batory 2001). Rather than focusing on 
issues of national identity, the SZDSZ stresses shared values as the basis of political 
community. Indeed, it is the party’s identification with European values and its liberal 
economic interests that drive its positive view on further European integration, and 
thus, on a fast-track approach to adopting the euro.
22 However, support for the SZDSZ has been decreasing since 1990 underpinning the above described 
trend towards bipolarity of the left and right, i.e. of the MSZP and FIDESZ (see also chapter 6).
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Hungarian political parties’ position
M IEP No cam paign
Table 10 in the EU-accession referendum
M unkaspart Yes cam paign
(“w ish  fo r a d ifferen t EU can best 
be realised from  inside”)
FID ESZ C alled fo r a Yes vote
FKGP C alled fo r a Yes vote
M SZP Yes cam paign
SZD SZ Yes cam paign
In conclusion, strong Eurosceptic parties are not represented in the Hungarian 
parliament. The low level of party-based Euroscepticism accounts for the high approval 
of the EU by the Hungarian people (see section on public opinion). Even the parties 
that express some sceptical views on European integration, like FIDESZ, are strongly 
in favour of adopting the euro as quickly as possible. This is because FIDESZ’s scepti­
cal stance on the EU is related to its efforts to attract votes from the far-right, rather 
than to real concerns about the possibility of European economic integration undermin­
ing state sovereignty. Likewise, the MSZP’s pro-European stance has been largely 
pragmatic, given the party’s efforts and needs to distance itself from its communist leg­
acy. Thus, interests rather than the party’s ideas drive the MSZP’s aspiration to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible. Indeed, the euro-zone entry is generally seen as a 
means to obtain not only a stable currency but also economic stability and much 
needed credibility. This is in line with Hungary’s initial euro-adoption strategy, which 
aimed to adopt the euro at the earliest possible time. However, actions did not match 
words and both the FIDESZ- and MSZP-led governments embarked on an expendi­
ture-oriented policy; a result of politicians’ interest in getting re-elected (FIDESZ) and in
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fulfilling election promises (MSZP). MSZP’s ‘fiscally generous 100 day programme’ 
(chapter 3, see also EIU 2005f: 32), standing at odds with a fast-track approach to 
adopting the euro, certainly has a partisan connotation and has to be seen in the con­
text of the party’s efforts to ‘shake off its image as a party that follows orthodox fiscal 
policies. The emotional electoral contest that fuelled populist economic policies is gen­
erated by the parties’ interests to broaden out their electoral bases rather than from the 
parties’ genuine ideology. The cleavages structure of the Hungarian society does not 
explain the expenditure-oriented policies per se, but it explains the parties’ electoral 
strategies that resulted in spending. Hence, political business cycles, and therefore 
opportunistic interests, contributed significantly to the postponement of the target date 
for euro-zone accession to 2010. Under the above-described conditions of a rigid envi­
ronment for party competition, opportunistic interests exert a distinct influence on the 
country’s euro-adoption strategy, as they are strong enough to outweigh pressure aris­
ing from the legal obligation to meet the Maastricht criteria.
Poland
Poland has only recently experienced an increase in Eurosceptic positions in its politi­
cal parties. Until the late 1990s, the major political parties and actors shared an over­
whelming consensus for EU membership. However, as EU accession approached, 
public debates about the costs and benefits of EU membership increased (see section 
on public opinion) and the EU is now a “focus for both conflict and hostility” (Szczerbiak 
2001b: 6).
Indeed, there is now a significant manifestation of Eurosceptic views in Poland. 
The Polish Agreement (PP), founded in 1999 and led by Jan Lopuszanski, was the first 
party to openly oppose Polish EU membership.23 For the 2001 general election, the PP 
joined the anti-EU party League of the Polish Families (LPR) which was founded just
23 The PP was part of the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and associated itself with the Catholic national­
ist right but played only a marginal role in the Polish Sejm.
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before the parliamentary election in 2001 and immediately received 8 percent of the 
vote.24 The LPR is a new party of the extreme right and some of their leaders came 
from the AWS.25 Most of the LPR’s support comes from orthodox Catholics (Szczerbiak 
2003b: 737). Its electorate, the ‘religious right’, represents “nationalist and anti­
cosmopolitan worldviews” (Szczerbiak 2003b: 737), rejects the legalisation of abortion, 
supports an active role of the Church in public affairs and is highly anti-EU with only 36 
percent of LPR supporters voting in favour of the country’s EU accession in the 2003 
referendum on EU membership (Markowski and Tucker 2005: 411). Consistent with its 
identity as a pro-clerical, anti-reform and anti-integration party, the LPR firmly rejects 
any kind of European integration and run a No-campaign for the EU accession referen­
dum (see Table 11, see also Szczcerbiak 2003a: 6 and chapter 5). Thus ideological 
and moral-cultural issues, rather than strategic electoral interests per se, drive the 
LPR’s position on European integration (see Szczerbiak 2003a, see chapter 5). Given 
that the LPR is not the only party in the Sejm that represents anti-EU stances, its veto 
potential is considerable. Its anti-EU position especially influences the policy agenda of 
the former AWS centre-right parties against which the LPR competes for votes (see 
below).
The Self-Defence Party (Samoobrona), founded originally as a trade union in 
1992 and led by the populist Andrzej Lepper, received more than 10 percent of the vote 
in the general elections in 2001. The Self-Defence Party is clearly a radical farmers’ 
party with anti-EU stances not only in its rhetoric but also in its action. Andrzej Lepper 
organised violent radical demonstrations and road blockades in 1999 to defend farm­
ers’ interests and to put pressure on the government to protect Polish farmers from
24 During its electoral campaign, the LPR received crucial support from the fundamentalist Catholic radio 
station, Radio Maryja. It is said that the strongly anti-European Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, director of the 
Radio station, was able to mobilise listeners to vote for the LPR (Szczerbiak 2002: 9). Radio Maryja has 
got approximately four million listeners, accounting for 5-10 per cent of the total electorate. During the 
1997 electoral campaign, Radio Maryja supported the AWS.
25 The AWS was founded in 1996 as an attempt to reunite Poland’s right-wing parties and won the parlia­
mentary election in 1997 (see chapter 6). The AWS “wanted Europe to be a community of free nations that 
remember their identity” (Krzaklewski, AWS candidate for the 2000 presidential election, quoted in Szczer­
biak 2001b: 10) and adopted a Euro-realist discourse: while generally agreeing with the necessity of EU 
accession, the AWS stipulates conditions and qualifications on how EU accession should be achieved. But 
before the 2001 elections, a number of parties broke away and the AWS failed to enter the parliament. 
Since its catastrophic election defeat in 2001, the AWS went on to disintegrate. In fact, as Szczerbiak 
(2004: 76) argues, it “appears to have passed into history”.
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European competition (Batory and Sitter 2004: 533). Lepper sees EU membership as a 
threat to national identity and economic interests. He expresses anti-German and anti- 
EU sentiments, criticising the EU as a "new kolkhoz” (Lepper, quoted in Strobel 2001: 
278). According to his rhetoric, the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF will make Poland 
“the absorber of the West’s product surpluses" (Lepper, quoted in Szczerbiak 2001 b: 
15). Further, Lepper states: “we say no to today’s Union because we do not see a ba­
sis for partnership. What we see is kneeling down and toadying” (Lepper as cited in 
Beichelt 2004: 39). In the same way, the party supporters represent anti-European po­
sitions and were less likely to support EU membership in the 2003 referendum 
(Markowski and Tucker 2005: 411). The voter base of Samoobrona is mostly left-wing 
and opposes further privatisation while supporting the redistribution of wealth and na­
tional protectionist measures on economic issues (see Szczerbiak 2003b: 740). Most of 
its support is in rural and provincial areas and among the unskilled workers, former 
state-employed farmers and the unemployed. Samoobrona attracted votes from disillu­
sioned SLD-voters and was “able to reach out beyond its rural-agrarian core” to receive 
“above average support among groups of urban 'transition losers’ such as workers and 
the unemployed” (Szczerbiak 2003b: 740, see also EIU 2005d: 10). The socio­
economic interests of its electorate are reflected in Samoobrona's protectionist stance 
on economic policy. Given its taste for state intervention, the party criticises the inde­
pendence of the central bank, a prerequisite for EU and EMU accession. The National 
Bank of Poland (NBP) is the major target of criticism in Samoobrona's party pro­
gramme (also because Leszek Balcerowicz, the President of the NBP, is the symbol of 
the much hated pro-market reforms which Lepper occasionally labels as 'economic 
genocide’ see FAZ, 28/01/2002), stating that “democratic [i.e. parliamentary] control 
over the NBP” should be restored while the central bank’s primary objective should be 
“fighting unemployment” and not price stability (Samoobrona 2004). In the 2001 gen­
eral elections, Self-Defence became the third largest force in the parliament; together 
with the LPR both parties gained about 18 percent of votes, thus anti-EU parties were 
well represented in the Polish parliament (Beichelt 2004: 39). While the success of
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Samoobrona and the LPR illustrates key divisions within Polish politics reflected in the 
rural-urban and the survival of the church-state cleavage, it also shows a “new divide 
between westernisation and nationalism, a divide that finds expression in the opposi­
tion between various pro- and anti-EU forces” (Gallagher et al. 2006: 271). Both par­
ties, Samoobrona and LPR, have low coalition potential but their policy agenda has 
influenced how the other parties compete on EU related issues. In particular Samoo­
brona influences the policy agenda of the Polish Peasant Party, which contributed to 
the failure of the PSL coalition with the SLD. The LPR, whose members mainly came 
from the AWS, also had an impact on the PO’s and PiS’ EU-rhetoric and put pressure 
on the government to adopt a tough stance during EU negotiations (e.g. see Poland’s 
initial position on the European Constitution, which eventually led to the collapse of the 
European Council talks in December 2003). Indeed, whenever the SLD-led govern­
ment had to make unpopular decisions, Samoobrona and the LPR were in a ‘favour­
able position to take advantage’ of people’s dissatisfaction (see EIU 2005d: 14).
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) was founded in the 1990s as the successor 
party to the communist satellite, the United Peasant Party (ZSL) (Szczerbiak 2002: 8) 
and went on to form a coalition with the post-communist party in 1993 and 2001 (see 
chapter 6). As Szczerbiak (1999: 1416) points out, the PSL is the “party with the clear­
est concentration of support in a particular socio-economic segment, in the countryside 
and particularly among those employed in the agricultural sector”. The party leader 
Jaroslaw Kalinowski, who was Agricultural Minister until the coalition with the post­
communist party broke up in March 2003, adopted a “‘twin-track’ approach to EU 
membership” (Szczerbiak 2001b: 12). While generally agreeing with EU accession, 
Kalinowski tried to position the PSL “as the most effective defender of Polish national 
interests” (Szczerbiak 2001b: 12). Although 50 percent of all PSL supporters oppose 
EU membership, the PSL did not adopt a decidedly Eurosceptical approach in its 2001 
general election campaign. This was because the PSL was already counting on a pos­
sible coalition with the pro-EU party, the SLD (see Szczerbiak 2001b). Thus the party’s 
office seeking strategy helps to explain the PSL’s position on the EU in 2001 (Batory
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and Sitter 2004: 543). Szczerbiak (2001b: 14) elaborates further that the party’s stance
on the EU during the 2001 election campaign was also related to the fact that “the PSL
was deliberately trying to broaden out its base of support beyond its agricultural and
rural core”, i.e., to be more than a rural or peasant party. However, in contrast to
Samoobrona, the PSL was not able to attract votes from a broader segment of society,
leading some commentators to doubt
the PSL’s ability to radically transform itself, arguing that it will ‘always re­
main a party of a clearly defined section of the electorate and will never do 
anything against its iron rural electorate, because this is its parliamentary 
bread and butter (Janicki quoted in Szczerbiak 2003b: 740-741).
Indeed, the pressure to fulfil partisan expectations eventually led to the collapse of the 
coalition. Prime Minister Miller ended the coalition with the PSL in March 2003 after the 
PSL refused to support a reform plan aimed at consolidating public finances and show­
ing financial fitness for EU and EMU accession (see chapter 6). It can thus be argued 
that while the PSL pro-European rhetoric prior to the 2001 general elections was re­
lated to its office-seeking behaviour, the socio-economic interests of its constituency -  
as well as the stronger competition with Samoobrona (cf Epstein 2005: 192) -  forced 
the PSL to vote against the government’s economic policy plans and to leave the coali­
tion. After the failure of the coalition with the PSL, the SLD went on to form a minority 
government which proved to be fairly unstable. This had consequences for both the 
government’s ability to push forward reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria (see 
chapter 3) and therefore for Poland’s approach to EMU accession (see chapter 6).
The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was founded by the twin brothers and right-wing 
former Solidarity politicians Jaroslaw and Lech Kaczynski shortly before the parliamen­
tary election in 2001 and received 9.5 percent of the vote when it first ran. As an oppo­
sition party to both the SLD and the former AWS parties, it positioned itself as an au­
thoritarian and populist party, calling for tough law-and-order measures (Kopecky and 
Mudde 2002: 312) while repeatedly comparing itself with the German Christian Democ­
ratic party (CDU), emphasising their Christian-Democratic roots. Party supporters are
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less clearly defined because the PiS’ electorate displays a ‘broad social heterogeneity’
(Szczerbiak 2003b: 738) and
the best way to characterise these voters was as ‘Christian democratic: 
moderately liberal in terms of economic policy, moderately conservative in 
terms of moral-cultural issues and the role of the Church in state affairs and 
moderately internationalist in terms of their attitude towards foreign co­
operation (Szczerbiak 2003b: 738).
In the same vein, the party itself is not against European integration per se, but pre­
sents Polish EU membership as the only realistic foreign policy alternative. However, 
the PiS conducted a reserved, low-key Yes-campaign during the country’s EU acces­
sion referendum, affirming the party’s ambiguous position on EU issues (see Table 11). 
During its time as an opposition party the PiS was moderately in favour of EU member­
ship but criticised the EU for being a ‘socialist utopia’ (thus the PiS rhetoric on Euro­
pean issues came close to the LPR critique). Sceptical European positions are espe­
cially represented by a group of defectors from the ZChN (see footnote 29) who 
merged with the PiS in 2002 and who, “if not actual opponents of EU membership, 
were among the party’s most vocal critics of the EU” (Szczerbiak 2002: 8). During its 
time as an opposition party, its position on the euro was also ambiguous. While in 2004 
the PiS was not against euro-zone membership per se, it wanted to postpone the adop­
tion of the euro to the distant future (British Polish Chamber of Commerce November 
2004). Given its indistinct position and taste for economic ‘dirigisme’ (see EIU 2005d: 
14), it is arguable that instrumental populism -  and therefore the party’s quest for votes 
-  strongly affected the PiS’ stance on European integration. Certainly, in addition to the 
anti-EU position of the LPR and Samoobrona, as well as the resistance of the PSL to 
fiscal consolidation, the PiS’ reluctant attitude towards the adoption of the euro added 
to further pressure on the government and the centre-right party, the Civic Platform, to 
refrain from announcing a target date for euro-zone accession and advocating a fast- 
track approach to adopting the euro.
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The Civic Platform (PO) was founded in January 2001 as a liberal-conservative 
party by the so-called three tenors Maciej Plazynski26 (former leading member of the 
AWS), Donald Tusk (former leading member of the pro-European Freedom Union, 
UW27) and the former Foreign and Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski. The party 
receives much of its support from private entrepreneurs and the business community, 
which strongly benefits from EU membership and further integration. Support is also 
high in urban areas and among the young and better-educated. Its electorate repre­
sents liberal views and is most supportive of privatisation and least supportive of eco­
nomic redistribution (see Szczerbiak 2003b: 739). Thus, in contrast to the PiS and the 
SLD, the PO has “more clearly defined bases of support” (Szczerbiak 2003b: 739). Yet, 
although the PO started as a strong pro-EU party, it has not been specific about Euro­
pean integration issues (Szczerbiak 2002: 7). Instead, the party leader and ‘sceptically 
pro-European’, Jan Rokita, is associated with the slogan ‘Nice or Death’ symbolising 
the Polish hard stance on changing the voting rules of the Nice Treaty to a principle of 
double majority voting in the European Constitution.28 As stated above, the growing 
support for anti-EU parties such as the LPR and Samoobrona certainly influences the 
rhetoric on European issues of the PO. Therefore, the PO’s stance on European inte­
gration has to be seen in the light of its party competition strategy and is thus strongly 
related to its vote-seeking behaviour. As a pro-reform oriented party it supports the 
adoption of the euro, yet, it adds that early accession is unrealistic and therefore fa­
vours a postponement of the accession date (British Polish Chamber of Commerce 
November 2004).
26 Maciej Plazynski left the PO in May 2003.
27 The liberal UW is the party of the current President of the Polish National Bank, Leszek Balcerowicz. 
The UW was the junior coalition partner of the AWS government (1997-2001). In 2000, several high 
ranked politicians left the Freedom Union and joined the PO. In the 2001 election the party failed to pass 
the 5 percent threshold, however, the party received 7 percent of votes in the European election in 2004. 
The UW firmly supported the Yes-campaign in the country’s EU accession referendum (see Table 11, p. 
139). This reflects the interests of its voter base that is said to benefit from EU membership, as the party 
appeals mainly to younger voters, urban citizens, better educated people, students and businessmen 
(Szczerbiak 1999:1418).
28 Jan (Maria) Rokita owes his high popularity to his function as the chair of the special inquiry committee 
for the Lew Rywin affair. The Rywin affair -  also called the Rywingate affair -  is one of the biggest corrup­
tion scandals in modem Polish history involving the film producer Rywin -  who claimed to speak on behalf 
of the SLD - bribing Adam Michnik, the editor of the largest daily newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza.
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The Alliance of the Left (SLD) was formed in 1991 by a conglomerate of twenty 
previously communist political and social organisations. The ‘hegemonic role’ (Szczer­
biak 2002: 6), however, was played by the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland 
(SdRP), the successor to the communist party (PZPR, Polish United Workers’ Party). 
The SLD won the general election in 1993, lost in 1997 to the AWS and re-entered 
government in 2001. The SLD built a coalition with the pro-European Labour Union 
(UP) and the PSL. Szczerbiak (2003b: 734) describes the SLD-UP coalition as a “truly 
catch-all phenomenon”. The SLD “always had a fairly heterogeneous electorate" 
(Szczerbiak 2003b: 734) displaying “only minimal variations between various socio­
economic and occupation groups” (Szczerbiak 1999: 1418). Indeed, the party attracts 
as many votes from businessmen (especially from the so-called ‘new nomenclature’, 
i.e. from businessmen with strong links to the communist apparatus) as from workers 
and the unemployed (see Szczerbiak 1999: 1419). To be a catch-all party fits the 
party’s interests in leaving its communist stigmata behind. The legacy of being the suc­
cessor of the communist party also explains its strong support for EU integration. The 
position on European integration is not only a tool to
contrast itself favourably with the allegedly nationalist and inward-looking 
Polish right [but also] a vital element in projecting an image of the SLD as a 
modernised Western-style social democratic party and thereby allowing it to 
distance itself from its communist past (Szczerbiak 2002: 7).
Indeed, European integration is the SLD’s top priority and, as a consequence, the party
has always advocated a rapid adoption of the euro. In addition, as stated in chapter 5,
the SLD’s stance on EMU is also driven by its interest to belong to the ‘world’s biggest
economic area using a single currency’ in which Poland -  as the largest new country
among the new EU members -  would have a strong say. Thus, rather than the party’s
identity as a Social Democratic party or partisan pressure, the SLD’s position is driven
by the party’s interest in breaking with its communist past as well as by its desire to
broaden Poland’s influence on the European level by joining the euro-zone as quickly
as possible. Yet, despite the fact that the party favours adoption of the euro, the SLD-
led government was the only government among the Visegrad countries that did not
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officially announce a target date for joining the euro-zone in 2004. This certainly has to 
be seen in the context of the decrease in both public support for the euro (see part B of 
this chapter) and the government’s popularity leading up to the 2005 general elections. 
Thus, the issue of euro-zone membership was seen as being too risky to raise before 
the elections.
Table 11 Polish political parties’ position in the EU-accession referendum
1  |  - m Position in  the EU-acces
S am oobrona Low -profile  No cam paign
LPR No cam paign
ZC hN  (faction in the A W S )29 Called fo r a Yes vote
PSL Called fo r a Yes vote, but conducted  a 
reserved and low -key Yes cam paign
PiS Yes cam paign, but conducted  a reserved  
and low -key Yes cam paign
SLD Yes cam paign
UW Yes cam paign
PO Yes cam paign
In summary, anti-EU parties (LPR and Samoobrona) possessed considerable 
leverage against the pro-European oriented SLD-led government and mainstream par­
ties like the PO. Indeed, public pressure and the emergence of parties whose identities 
are closely tied to their anti-EU rhetoric had an impact on the pro-European parties’ 
policy agenda. The PO’s slogan ‘Nice or Death’ and the tough stance of the SLD during
29 The Catholic-nationalist Christian National Union (ZChN) was a significant party within the AWS (see 
footnote 25). It was a coalition partner and played a major role in the Olszewski (1992) and Suchocka 
(1993) governments. The ZChN supports the active involvement of Roman Catholics in Polish politics and 
links its EU-accession support to several conditions. Thus, like all soft Eurosceptical parties, the ZChN 
expresses a “yes, but" attitude. In particular, the ZChN fears that EU accession will lead to a secularisation 
and de-Christianisation of Polish society that would undermine moral values and national identity. Some 
former ZChN members are now influential politicians in the PiS, LPR, PSL and even in the PO.
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the European Constitution negotiations, for instance, are certainly a response to the 
growing party-based and public Euroscepticism and have therefore to be seen in the 
context of both the Polish intra-party arena and the interests of the PO and SLD in 
gaining votes. Likewise, instrumental populism to attract voters strongly influences the 
ambiguous EU stance of the PiS. Given that the PSL and Samoobrona have clearly 
defined constituencies with alleged socio-economic interests, the two parties are under 
strong pressure to fulfil partisan expectations. Indeed, partisan pressure explains why 
the PSL eventually left the coalition with the SLD. Given that the SLD-led government 
lost their majority after the PSL left the coalition, the SLD had to modify its fiscal con­
solidation programme, designed to meet the Maastricht criteria by 2007 on several oc­
casions. Thus, while the government did not set a precise date for the adoption of the 
euro (to be seen the context of concerns regarding the next general elections), it faced 
severe constraints to adhere to its intention to join the euro-zone as quickly as possi­
ble, generated first by its limited capacity as a fragile minority government to push for­
ward politically costly reforms (see chapter 6) and second by an increased party-based 
and -  as discussed in the following section -  public Euroscepticism.
Having discussed political parties’ positions and preferences on the adoption of 
the euro, the following section explores attitudes towards the euro on an individual level 
by means of an analysis of public opinion surveys.
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B. Public opinion
The analysis of public opinion shows variations towards the adoption of the euro at an 
individual level and provides information on possible sources of why individuals hold 
different attitudes towards the euro. For example, does the variation in support reflect 
partisanship and economic interests (Anderson and Reichert 1996, Anderson 1998 and 
Gabel 1998) or is it based on the fear of losing national sovereignty (Carey 2002, Diez 
Medrano 2003 and Luedtke 2005)?30 How citizens form opinions on the prospective 
EMU membership determines the factors that are decisive for domestic opposition to 
the euro, further elucidating the nature of cross-national variations in approaching the 
euro-zone accession. It is argued that different domestic levels of support and opposi­
tion have implications for the country’s response to EMU membership and therefore 
help to explain differences in the strategies for the adoption of the euro.
In CEECs, public opinion in the early stages of the transition process generally 
greatly favoured or was indifferent to EU integration, later growing less favourable 
(Rose and Haerpfer 1995, Grabbe and Hughes 1999, Szczerbiak and Taggart 2001). 
Until the late 1990s, debates on European integration were
conducted mainly at elite level [...], with most of the population largely unin­
formed about what joining the EU will mean, either for the economy and 
society as a whole or merely for daily lives (Grabbe and Hughes 1999:
186).
By and large, the issue of EU accession was discussed only in very abstract terms in a 
discourse that was embedded in a historical and geopolitical context. The discussion 
was repeatedly referred to as a “return to Europe” or an “end of the Cold War European 
East-West division”; both implying a total rejection of the communist legacy. The public 
and political parties only slowly began to conduct debates about the long-term concep­
tions and perspectives of EU membership (Navracsics 1997, Szczerbiak and Taggart
2001). But as EU membership rose on the political agenda, public debate on EU ac­
cession increased. Indeed, the decline in the popularity of the EU membership relates
30 For a summary of the main line of theories on public opinion on European integration see Hooghe and 
Marks (2005).
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to an increase in the quality and quantity of political debates on European issues. The 
public has begun to distinguish between support for EU membership per se and spe­
cific EU issues entailing painful economic reforms. The debate on the Common Agricul­
tural Policy (CAP), in particular, has led to growing public awareness of the costs and 
benefits of EU membership. In addition, politicians have used EU accession require­
ments to legitimise painful reforms. And because
to the extent that these reforms become inextricably linked with EU acces­
sion in the popular consciousness there is likely to be erosion of support for 
[...] membership (Szczerbiak 2001b: 6).
By the same token, as discussed in chapter 3, the Visegrad governments have de­
fended fiscal consolidation programmes by referring to the legal obligation to meet the 
Maastricht criteria.
To explore the dynamics of public support for or opposition to the adoption of 
the euro this thesis relates findings on the demographic profiles to opinion on EU and 
euro-zone membership in the Visegrad countries. In particular, Gabel’s study is of rele­
vance since it explicitly links socio-demographic profiles to citizens’ attitude towards the 
euro. According to Gabel (2001), policies and their distributional consequences explain 
variations in voter’s behaviour and thus in public opinion on EMU (see chapter 2, see 
also Bielasiak 2002). If Gabel’s findings hold true for the Visegrad Four, different con­
stellations of politico-economic conditions, e.g. the importance of the agriculture sector 
or partisanship for the respective countries, explain cross-national variations in ap­
proaching the euro-zone accession.
Public opinion on EU membership
Before analysing opinion on the adoption of the euro, this thesis briefly discusses pub­
lic opinion on EU membership. Recent Eurobarometer surveys confirm that EU- 
supporters are more likely to support the country’s accession to the EMU as well (Can­
didate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB) 2002.2). On average, 59 percent of those who 
oppose EU membership are also against joining the euro-zone. Among supporters of 
EU membership, only 20 percent oppose euro-zone membership (CCEB 2002.2: B-
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110). Therefore, a closer look at public opinion on EU membership is worthwhile be­
cause it helps to understand the overall nature of support for and opposition to euro­
zone entry.
According to Eurobarometer surveys, citizens in Slovakia and Hungary express the 
highest support for and lowest opposition to the EU among the Visegrad countries (see 
Figure 2 and Figure 3; see also CEORG 2003a).
Figure 2
Support for European Union membership 
(Slovakia)
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Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country’) s membership of the European Un­
ion would be...?
Source: CCEB 2004.1, Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 62 
Figure 3
Support for European Union membership 
(Hungary)
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As Table 12 shows, Slovakia and Hungary also produced the highest yes-vote results 
in the EU accession referendum held in April and May 2003. However, turnouts were 
low in all Visegrad countries and in particular in Hungary, at 46 percent, very low. The 
low turnouts for the accession referenda reflected indecision, indifference, and citizens’ 
belief that a Yes result was inevitable and would not make much difference -  a passive 
acceptance of the result. In all Visegrad countries, those voting in the referenda tended 
to support EU accession more than those who did not participate (for data, see 
CEORG 2003a). Additionally, as there is a minimum turnout requirement of 50 percent 
to make the referendum constitutionally valid in Slovakia and Poland, the low turnout in 
these countries also reflects the “incentives for ‘No’ voters to stay at home in an at­
tempt to invalidate the inevitable ‘Yes’ vote through low turnout” (Henderson 2003: 9). 
For this reason, the Eurobarometer surveys are more accurate in reflecting the actual 
level of support for EU membership.
Table 12 EU-ACCESSION REFERENDUM
DATE percent FOR EU ac­
cession
TURNOUT
CZECH REP 15-16 June 2003 77 percent 55 percent
SLOVAKIA 16-17 May 2003 92.5 percent 52.2 percent
HUNGARY 12 April 2003 83.8 percent 46 percent
POLAND 7-8 June 2003 77.5 percent 58.8 percent
Support for EU membership has been quite stable in Slovakia. While support 
dropped shortly before the country’s EU accession, it increased again to 57 percent in 
Autumn 2004 (see Figure 2). Among the Visegrad countries, Slovakia also has the low­
est rate of EU opponents: in 2001/02 and Autumn 2004 only 5 and 4 percent respec­
tively considered EU membership as a ‘bad thing’. In Poland, there has been a steady 
decline in public support for EU membership. According to surveys, public support in 
June 1994 was, at 77 percent, fairly high (Szczerbiak 2002), but dropped to 61 percent 
in Spring 2003 and to a record low of 42 percent in Spring 2004 (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Support for European Union membership 
(Poland)
1999/00-2004
'Good thing'
"Neither good nor bad 
thing"
"Bad thing"
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Question: Generally speaking, do you think that (Country’)s membership of the European Union 
would be...?
Source: CCEB 2004.1, Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 62
The first opinion poll after EU accession indicates that the level of support rises again. 
The same is true of Hungary, where public support for EU accession was traditionally 
high (Agh 1999: 851, Neumayer 1999) but dropped to 63 percent in Spring 2003 and to 
a record low of 45 percent in Spring 2004 but increased again by 4 percent in Autumn 
2004 (see Figure 3).
Figure 5
Support for European Union m em bership  
(Czech Republic) 
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would be...?
Source: CCEB 2004.1, Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 62
In the Czech Republic, popular support for the EU appears to be the lowest. After 
a small increase to 58 percent shortly before the EU accession referendum in June
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2003, support dropped again to a record low of 41 percent in Spring 2004 (see Figure 
5). The Czech Republic also displays the highest rate of respondents who are still un­
decided about EU membership. As Figure 5 shows, in 1999 and Autumn 2004, 42 per­
cent of Czechs considered EU membership as “neither a good nor bad thing”.
In short, in all Visegrad countries, the level of support increased in the wake of 
the countries’ completion of accession talks in December 2002 and the EU accession 
referendum in Spring 2003 but fell to historic low levels in the Spring of 2004. To a 
large extent, the low level of support shortly before EU accession reflects people’s un­
certainty about the costs and benefits of EU membership. However, this trend seems to 
be reversed again because opinion polls in Autumn 2004 indicate that the number of 
supporters has started to rise again. In addition to this trend common to all Visegrad 
countries, the Czech Republic displays the highest rate of respondents who are either 
against or undecided about EU membership.
Public opinion on the euro
The same trends can be observed in opposition to the euro (see Figures 6-8). As with 
EU support, support for the euro in 2002 was lowest in the Czech Republic (53 per­
cent) and higher in Poland (71 percent), Hungary (70 percent), and Slovakia (66 per­
cent). The Czech Republic also has the highest share of opponents (26 percent) and 
citizens who are still undecided about EMU membership (21 percent), compared with 
only 15 percent opponents in Poland, 16 percent opponents in Hungary, and 19 per­
cent in Slovakia (see Figures 6-8). In 2003, opposition to the euro increased to 33 per­
cent in the Czech Republic. Citizens who were neither for nor against the euro in 2002 
seem to have shifted towards opposition as the undecided rate decreased from 21 per­
cent to 13 percent in the wake of the countries EU accession referendum. In 2004, 
support for the euro increased slightly to 56 percent in the Czech Republic. The oppo­
site trend can be observed in Poland and Hungary: while support for the euro in­
creased in the wake of the countries’ accession referendum, it dropped remarkably in 
2004 (see Figure 7 and 8). In Poland support decreased from 72 percent in 2003 to 59
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percent in 2004. At the same time, opposition increased from 17 percent to 29 percent. 
In Hungary support for the euro increased to 73 percent in 2003 and dropped to 63 
percent in 2004. In contrast, the Slovak support for the euro remained quite stable with 
no major fluctuations. In the Czech Republic, the opposition to the euro remained sta­
ble. Figure 7 shows that with 53 percent being for and 33 percent being against EMU 
membership in 2003 -  a gap of only 20 percent -  there is a much stronger trend to­
wards polarisation on the topic of EMU membership in the Czech Republic than in the 
other Visegrad countries. However, the sharp decline in support and increase in oppo­
sition in Poland in 2004 indicates that Poles are also becoming increasingly divided 
over the issue of their country’s euro-zone membership (Figure 8).
Figure 6 Support for the Euro (in percent) Autumn 2002
□  for
■  against
□  undecided
SlovakiaCzech Rep Hungary Poland
Question: Are you for or against the EU having one common currency in all Member states, 
including (OUR COUNTRY) once we have joined? That is, replacing the (NAME OF THE 
CURRENCY) by the European currency, the euro? Are you...? (see remarks p. 172)
Source: CCEB 2002.2
Figure 7 Support for the Euro (in percent) Spring 2003
□  for
■  against
□  undecided
Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovakia
Question: Are you for or against the EU having one common currency in all member 
states? (see remarks p. 172)
Source: CCEB 2003.2
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Figure 8 Support for the Euro (in percent) Spring 2004
□  for
■  against
□  undecided
Czech Rep Hungary Poland Slovakia
Question: Please tell me, whether you are for it or against it. A European Monetary Union 
with one single currency, the euro? (see remarks p. 172)
Source: CCEB 2004.1
Demographic Profile
Henderson (2001) states that reservations about EU membership are greater in Slova­
kia in certain groups of society that include the transition “losers” -  the older population, 
the less educated, and the rural.31 Eurobarometer surveys confirm this. Whereas 77 
percent of Slovaks with higher education support EU membership, only 45 percent of 
those with only elementary education favour it (Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 
8).32 According to a survey conducted by the Slovak Institute of Public Affairs in March 
2000, 58 percent of citizens with basic education and 89 percent of those with higher 
education support EU membership (Henderson 2001: 12). Seventy-nine percent of 
citizens 18-24 years old and only 55 percent of those aged 60 and above support EU 
membership. Haerpfer (2001) comes to the same conclusion about Hungary, Poland, 
and the Czech Republic (see also Stawarska 1999: 834-5). Support for EU accession
31 In the current literature the categorisation of winners and losers of the transition process is often related 
to the demographic profile. Transition losers include the elderly, pensioners, state workers and women, 
whereas the young, the better off, well educated and private sector employees fall under the category of 
transition winners (Mackie 1995, Plasser et al. 1998). However, as Tucker et al. (2002) point out, the 
demographic status does not necessarily have to match who actually benefited from the process and 
therefore “ascribing winner status on the basis of demographic characteristics remain at best one step 
removed from individual perceptions and at worst an imprecise and inaccurate system of extrapolation” 
(Tucker et al. 2002: 559). They therefore categorise winners and losers of the transition process on the 
basis of the citizens self-assessment, i.e. whether they consider themselves better or worse off since the 
collapse of the communist regime. By applying this categorisation of winners and losers, Tucker et al. 
(2002) find empirical evidence that winners of the transition process are more likely to support the EU than 
losers.
32 However, this profile of EU supporters does not apply to minorities living in Slovakia. Hungarians living 
in Slovakia are highly in favour of EU accession “because of the expectation that it will benefit them as a 
minority, particularly given that neighbouring Hungary will also be a EU member” (Henderson 2001: 18).
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is particularly strong among the young, the better-off, the highly educated, and urban 
citizens (Haerpfer 2001: 23-30). In contrast, opposition to EU accession is strong 
among the less educated, the rural, those with lower incomes, and the old.
Gabel’s study on attitudes towards the euro in the old EU member countries ar­
gues that economic interests explain variations in support for the euro (see chapter 2). 
His study confirms that distributional consequences of the EMU account for a specific 
pattern of public support and explain differences in support for and opposition to EMU 
(Gabel 2001). As discussed in chapter 2, Gabel distinguishes between trade-related, 
liberal capital market-related and class-based distributional consequences of EMU 
membership and finds empirical evidence that those with higher income, higher educa­
tion as well as professionals and voters of right-wing parties are more supportive of 
EMU than people with low education, low income, manual workers and left-wing voters. 
Gabel further distinguishes between distributional consequences of cross-border shop­
ping, price transparency and the convergence criteria. However, this thesis does not 
rigorously test Gabel’s model, that is, it does not replicate his model. Rather the follow­
ing part is a descriptive attempt to explore whether Gabel’s major conclusions find sup­
portive evidence in the new data source. This chapter only concentrates on trade- 
related, capital-market related and class-based distributional consequences.
The CCEB 2002.2 from September 2002 and the CCEB 2003.2 from May 2003 
show that some but not all demographic profiles of EU-membership supporters and 
opponents in the Visegrad countries apply to EMU supporters and opponents as well 
(CCEB 2002.2, CCEB 2003.2).33 Likewise, there is only some supportive evidence for 
Gabel’s study on public opinion towards EMU in the Visegrad countries. Trade-related 
distributional consequences of exchange rate stability, for instance, are expressed in 
managers’ strong support for EMU membership (see Figures 11-18, p. 164-71). As 
Gabel (2001) argues, this is related to the managers’ interest in a fixed exchange rate 
regime that reduces currency uncertainty, because many large firms depend on foreign
33 Raw data for the CCEB 2004.1 survey (Figure 8), the Standard Eurobarometer 62 (Autumn 2004) and 
the Flash Eurobarometer report 165b (Autumn 2004, Figures 9 and 10) are not available yet. Therefore 
this thesis cannot breakdown these figures by socio-demographic categories.
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trade and payments (cf Frieden 1994). However, there is no supportive evidence that 
class-based distributional consequences of EMU affect the attitudes towards the euro 
because -  with the exception of the Czech Republic -  manual workers are not less 
supportive of the euro than managers and white collar workers (see Figures 11-18, p. 
164-71). Additionally, as Figures 11-18 show, again with the exception of the Czech 
Republic, supporters of EMU are not divided along left and right political party lines as 
assumed by Gabel (see chapter 2 and Oatley 1997). In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, 
voters of the Social Democratic as well as liberal/conservative parties highly favour the 
adoption of the euro. In the Czech Republic, there is a trend towards class-based vot­
ing behaviour, as voters of the communist party KSCM, at 44 (AQf4 percent, and the 
CSSD, at 27 (35) percent oppose EMU as compared to only 22 (25) percent (US-DEU) 
and 10 percent (27) (ODS) voters of liberal and conservative parties (see Figure 11 
and Figure 15, p. 164 and p. 168). The trend towards class-based voting is even more 
evident if figures for the support for the euro are considered: Only 28 percent of KSCM 
and 55 percent of CSSD voters supported the euro in 2002, but 70 percent of US-DEU 
and 80 percent of ODS voters did so. In Slovakia, opposition towards the euro is rela­
tively higher among voters of the LS-HZDS (29 and 19 percent in 2002 and 2003 re­
spectively), the communist party, at 23 and 20 percent in 2002 and 2003 respectively, 
and the populist left (SMER), at 16 and 22 percent in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
However, voters of these parties still favour the adoption of the euro at 51 percent in 
2002 and 66 percent in 2003 (LS-HZDS), 67 percent in 2002 and 69 percent in 2003 
(KSS) and 81 percent in 2002 and 71 percent in 2003 (SMER). In Hungary, the split 
between right and left parties is even less pronounced. Voters of the MSZP and 
FIDESZ favour the adoption of the euro by around 80 percent (MSZP) and over 70 
percent (FIDESZ) in 2002 and 2003 (see Figures 13 and 17, p. 166 and p. 170). How­
ever, there is a relatively higher percentage of FIDESZ voters who oppose the euro (20 
percent) as compared to around 10 percent of MSZP voters in 2002 and 2003. The 
same applies to Poland where voters of right-wing as well as left-wing parties (PO and
34 The first figure refers to the CCEB 2002.2 and the figure in brackets to the CCEB 2003.2.
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SLD) favour the euro. In contrast, opposition is relatively higher among supporters of 
farmer parties (PSL and Samoobrona) and nationalist parties (LPR and PiS), especially 
in 2003.
Concerning Gabel’s assumption about the effects of distributional conse­
quences of capital market liberalisation, Table 13 and Table 14 (p. 172) show that in 
Slovakia and Hungary citizens are indeed more supportive of the EMU when their av­
erage income is relatively high compared with national income distribution. The same 
can be said for the Czech Republic and Poland in 2002, however, there is no variation 
in support for the euro among income groups in both countries in 2003. In Poland both 
the three lowest and three highest income groups are against the euro at 19 percent 
but support is still remarkably high, measuring around 75 percent in 2003. While there 
is also no variation between the income groups in the Czech Republic in 2003 the 
overall level of opposition to the euro is considerably higher. Both the three lowest and 
highest income groups are against the euro at 36 percent and 33 percent respectively 
in 2003, mirroring the general reluctance towards the euro in the Czech Republic but 
also pointing to the fact that citizens’ higher opposition to the euro cannot solely be 
explained by different income levels (see Table 13). This contrasts Gabel’s claim that 
people’s degree of support depends on the amount of capital assets and occupational 
skills they have, because the wealthy and skilled would benefit from the distributional 
consequences of capital market liberalisation. Again, this latter point is not confirmed in 
the Czech Republic, but in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland in 2003. Highly educated and 
skilled workers are among the groups that strongly support EMU accession (see Fig­
ures 15-18, p. 168-171). But whereas in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland highly educated 
citizens support strongly the euro with approval rates between 76-86 percent, Czechs 
with the same level of education are less favourable with every fourth person disap­
proving of the euro. Again, this aptly reflects the overall higher reluctance towards the 
euro in the Czech Republic, the only country among the Visegrad Four where opposi­
tion to the euro is, at 40 percent, remarkably high among white collar workers in 2003.
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Again, with the exception of the Czech Republic, unemployed people favour the 
country’s conversion to the euro, at around 70 percent, which is rather surprising be­
cause they actually belong to the losers” of the transition process and thus one might 
expect them to be rather reluctant about EMU accession (see Figures 15-18, p. 168- 
71). However, this finding is in line with Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc (1999), who state 
that growing opposition to policy reforms (in this case reforms that are related to fulfill­
ing the Maastricht criteria) does not come from unemployed people, as is often as­
sumed. This is because unemployed people would benefit from reforms required by the 
Maastricht criteria, e.g. budget cuts that reduce public sector subsidies, because public 
sector subsidies reduce the rate of job creation in the emergent private economy (see 
chapter 2). In contrast, pensioners are rather helpless when faced with policy reforms 
related to fiscal consolidation. It has to be kept in mind that the cuts in public spending 
significantly affected the Visegrad countries’ pension system (see chapter 3). It is 
therefore no surprise that in all Visegrad countries (although in Hungary to a lesser 
extent) support for the euro is lower among retired persons (see Figures 11-18). Re­
lated to worries about the Maastricht criterion of fiscal consolidation and official institu­
tions’ repeated demand to cut subsidies to households might also be the high opposi­
tion towards the euro among house persons35 in all Visegrad countries and in 2003 in 
particular in the Czech Republic (32 percent), Hungary (30 percent) and Slovakia (25 
percent).
In Poland, in 2003 the strongest opposition is found among farmers (29 per­
cent), a fact that is mirrored in stronger opposition to the euro among those living in 
rural areas (see Figures 14 and 18, p. 167 and 171).36 In fact, the Czech Republic is 
the only country of the Visegrad Four where there is a trend towards higher opposition 
to the euro in urban areas, at 40 percent in 2003, than in rural zones (at 28 percent in
35 The Eurobarometer categorises 'house persons’ as people responsible for ordinary shopping and look­
ing after the home, or without current occupation (see p. 172).
36 Given that these are aggregate figures, it should be noted that the identified association of farmers and 
those living in rural areas are vulnerable to the ecological fallacy when conclusions are drawn for individu­
als living in rural areas or being a farmer. For example, while it may be accurate to say that on average 46 
percent of farmers oppose the adoption of the euro it is not possible to draw the same conclusion for indi­
viduals living in rural areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that the inference is flawed per se, 
but it points to the need of careful consideration for conclusions drawn from aggregate figures.
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2003). In contrast, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary follow the common pattern where 
support is much higher in cities than in rural areas. A closer look at the respondents 
voting behaviour reveals that the lower support from citizens living in rural areas might 
stem from the higher opposition to the euro among voters of farmer parties (e.g. PSL 
and Samoobrona) and parties strongly represented in rural areas (like the Slovak LS- 
HZDS and Hungary’s FIDESZ). In contrast, in the Czech Republic, the low support 
from citizens in urban areas is consistent with high opposition to the euro among white 
collar workers. This also supports the fact that opposition is highest among voters of 
the third strongest Czech party, the communist party (KSCM) that has its core constitu­
ency in the industrialised and urban area of Northern and Western Bohemia.37
In summary, the peculiarity of the Czech Republic is striking. Gabel’s assump­
tions on trade-related and class-based distributional consequences find supportive evi­
dence in the Czech Republic but not in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. In contrast, 
while Gabel’s assumption on distributional consequences related to market liberalisa­
tion finds supportive evidence in Slovakia and Hungary as citizens with higher income 
are more supportive of the euro, in the Czech Republic opposition in both lower and 
higher income groups is remarkably high. This stands at odds with the finding that 
managers who are supposed to belong to higher income groups, are among those who 
highly favour the adoption of the euro. In the case of the Czech Republic it seems 
therefore that most of the dynamics are indeed coming from the white collar workers 
who oppose the euro at 40 percent in 2003. In Poland, opposition to the euro is higher 
among self-employed persons and farmers reflecting the high percentage of self- 
employed people in small enterprises who fear the growing competition within the 
European single market. Opposition to the euro is also higher among Polish farmers 
who have traditionally adopted a rather sceptical attitude towards the EU. Thus, in the 
Polish case, most of the dynamics concerning opposition to the euro are likely to come 
from the significant variations by these two occupational groups. In both Slovakia and
37 It should also be noted that the Czech agricultural sector does not play the same role as in Poland and 
Slovakia or Hungary where farmers had until 2001 their own party (the FKGP) represented in the govern­
ment (see footnote 20, p. 125).
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Hungary, the highest opposition to the euro is found among retired and less educated 
people. The relatively high opposition among citizens of these groups may reflect the 
fact that they are more vulnerable to EMU related cuts in public expenditure.
The considerable differences in public opinion on the EMU between the Czech 
Republic and the other Visegrad countries mirrors its stronger opposition to EU integra­
tion (see Figure 5, p. 145)38 Figure 9 shows that the opposition to the euro is also 
closely related to the Czechs’ fear of losing a great deal of their identity.
Figure 9
□  Disagree 
■  Agree
□  DK/NA
You think that adopting the euro will mean that (OUR 
COUNTRY) will lose a great deal of its identity
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Czech Rep
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 165b (Autumn 2004)
Whereas 45 percent of Czech respondents agree that the country will lose its identity 
through joining the euro-zone, only 24 percent of Hungarians believe that their identity 
depends on the Hungarian Forint. Related to the fear of losing their identity is the ar­
gument made by some Czech high-ranking politicians (see p. 110) that EMU and fur­
ther European integration will mean the loss of the just-regained sovereignty to the 
bureaucratic and undemocratic Brussels. Indeed, Eurobarometer surveys confirm that 
low support for European integration is related to the Czech people’s high level of dis­
trust in the EU which is seen as highly undemocratic and bureaucratic (see CCEB 
2001, von Schnurbein 2002).
38 It has to be kept in mind that the raw data for the Flash Eurobarometer 165b (Figure 9-10) are not avail­
able yet and therefore, this thesis cannot break these figures down by the sodo-demographic categories of 
the respondents. For this reason the thesis cannot explain the significant drop in EMU support in 2004 in 
Poland and Hungary by reference to differences in socio-demographic profiles.
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The opposition to monetary union might also stem from the wish to retain mone­
tary autonomy to guarantee price stability. As Figure 10 confirms, Czechs generally do 
not believe that the euro would help to maintain price stability but rather that it in­
creases inflationary pressure. Figure 10 also gives supportive evidence that the high 
support for the euro in Hungary stems from the wish to guarantee price stability after 
years of sticky inflation and inflation expectation (see chapter 3). But Figure 10 also 
shows that Poles fear inflationary pressures, which attests to the recent increase in 
opposition towards the euro. After years of high inflationary pressures throughout the 
1990s, Poland has experienced exceptionally low inflation rates in recent years. The 
fear of growing inflationary pressures through the adoption of the euro -  as perceived 
by the current euro-zone members -  might therefore stem from the fear of losing the 
newly gained price stability again. In contrast, Hungary, a country that also suffered 
from high inflation rates throughout the transition process, was not as successful in 
achieving low inflation and exchange rate stability as Poland -  a fact which certainly 
contributes to the high approval of the euro by Hungarians as the common currency is 
not seen as a threat to price stability but actually as a means to achieve it (see chapter 
5).
Figure 10
Do you think the introduction of the euro would help to maintain 
price stability or, on the contrary, increase inflation in (our 
country)?
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
m crrmHungary
7%]""T5’B7oPoland
Slovakia
Czech Rep
□  Help maintain price stability 
■  Increase inflation
□  No impact
□  DK/NA
Source: Flash Eurobarometer 165b (Autumn 2004)
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The differences between the Czech Republic and the other Visegrad countries 
are also related to the above described trend towards polarisation in the Czech Repub­
lic. As argued in chapter 2, the Czech Republic displays the highest degree of polarisa­
tion along class cleavages in the Visegrad countries (Mateju et al. 1999, Evans and 
Whitefield 1998). The above analysis of the respondents’ socio-demographic profile 
supports the notion that issues of distribution divide Czech society into social classes 
and determine political partisanship, i.e., socio-economic cleavages dominate. Parti­
sanship in Slovakia and Hungary, by contrast, is determined less by issues of distribu­
tion than by issues regarding Hungarians’ ethnic rights, of Slovak national identity, of 
the protection of Slovak and Hungarian minorities abroad respectively, and of attitudes 
toward Gypsies (in Hungary) (Evans and Whitefield 1998, 1995). In Slovakia and Hun­
gary, “ethnic questions are most closely related to party divisions and economic issues 
have only a secondary impact” (Evans and Whitefield 1998: 134). In Poland, multiple 
crosscutting cleavages (socio-economic, religious, authoritarian vs. non-authoritarian, 
and attitudes toward the former communist regime) divide the society (Henderson and 
Robinson 1997: 286). That is to say, in the Czech Republic, economic issues play a 
dominant role in cleavage formation, whereas in the other Visegrad countries other 
factors come into play. Certainly, a polarisation of class cleavages in the Czech Repub­
lic has to be understood in a broader context of historical and economic developments 
and social conditions. Among the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic has had the 
most advanced economy and, from the beginning of the transition process, was well 
positioned for a successful transformation into a market economy (see chapter 3). 
Since the collapse of the communist regime, the Czech Republic has performed better 
in economic terms than the other three Visegrad countries. Certainly, this and the fact 
that unlike in the other Visegrad countries, socio-cultural cleavages (Hungary), issues 
of nationhood (Hungary and Slovakia) or church-state and rural-urban cleavages (Po­
land) do not play a primary role, has had a positive effect on the acceleration of class 
polarisation. This thesis argues that this polarisation of classes provides the basis for a 
stronger articulation of pro- and anti- EMU positions in the Czech Republic than in the
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other Visegrad countries, where the socio-economic dimension of political partisanship 
is less developed (cf Evans and Whitefield 1998: 118). This thesis therefore assumes 
that in addition to fears of losing national sovereignty once again, the polarisation of 
classes over socio-economic issues of distribution is responsible for the greater opposi­
tion to the euro in the Czech Republic. Consequently, class-based responses to the 
euro must be taken into account to fully explain the reluctant euro-adoption strategy of 
the Czech Republic.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the positions and preferences of political parties and indi­
viduals on the euro and EU membership in the Visegrad countries. It has demonstrated 
the extent to which positions of the actors are driven by their strategic electoral and 
partisan interests (political parties) and by their economic self-interests (public opinion). 
The following conclusion summarises the relative importance of these interests and the 
extent to which they account for why the Visegrad countries have pursued different 
strategies for the adoption of the euro.
The distinction between electoral interests in gaining votes and offices and the 
party’s need to address the partisan interests of its voter base provides a useful tool to 
highlight the relative importance of interests in shaping party positions on issues re­
garding European integration. For example, the Czech KDU-CSL and US-DEU pro- 
European attitude has to be understood within the context of their competition strate­
gies to attract votes and is essentially influenced by their relationship to the Eurosceptic 
ODS. As Kopecky and Ucen (2003: 177) state: “becoming strongly pro-EU meant to be 
strongly anti-Klaus and anti-ODS”. However, becoming strongly pro-EU meant also to 
be able to benefit from the mismatch between the Eurosceptic position of the ODS and 
its pro-European voter base. In contrast, the ODS’ position on the euro and European 
integration cannot solely be explained on the basis of partisan and electoral strategic 
interests given that the party’s Eurosceptic rhetoric deviates from what these interests
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would predict. As further highlighted in the following chapter, other factors play a domi­
nant role in understanding the ODS stance on European integration. In turn, FIDESZ’s 
EU rhetoric has to be seen in the context of its efforts to attract votes from far-right vot­
ers. While FIDESZ justifies its Euroscepticism on the basis of defending national inter­
ests, the party’s position on the EU is not (in contrast to the Czech ODS) related to 
concerns about EMU undermining state sovereignty. In fact, in contrast to the Czech 
Republic and also Poland, mainstream parties in Hungary strongly support euro-zone 
membership, seeing the euro, as FIDESZ states, as the ‘greatest advantage offered by 
the EU’. Indeed, in contrast to the Czech Republic and Poland, both political parties 
and the public generally see the euro as a means to attain price stability. Yet, despite 
this view, both the FIDESZ- and MSZP-led governments embarked on an expenditure- 
oriented fiscal policy that significantly contributed to Hungary's troublesome road to 
euro-zone accession. The tight and emotional election contest between FIDESZ and 
MSZP fuelled populist economic policies that contravened the Maastricht criteria forc­
ing the government to eventually readjust its initial euro-adoption strategy. The argu­
ment is that the ‘proliferation’ of populist economic policies is a consequence of the 
existing traditionalist-nationalist and left-liberal cleavage that divides the Hungarian 
society and that produced a trend towards a bipolarity between a populist right and a 
constrained pragmatic left party (see also chapter 6). In such a rigid framework, popu­
list economic policy is believed to be a promising way to attract voters from the oppo­
site camp. Thus an opportunistic political business cycle (FIDESZ) and the need to fulfil 
election promises (MSZP) led to the postponement of the euro-adoption target to 2010. 
Under these conditions, the pressure for policy convergence as expressed in the obli­
gation to meet the Maastricht criteria significantly loses its leverage and -  as discussed 
in the next chapters -  opportunistic interests prevail over the influence that ideas and 
institutions may have.
Similarly, a partisan-related political business cycle had a positive impact on the 
CSSD’s decision to postpone euro-adoption to the next decade. Indeed, partisan pres­
sure in light of growing unemployment rates and stronger party competition with the
KSCM, generated partisan related increases in public spending at odds with the Maas­
tricht criteria and supporting the postponement of the euro-adoption. The argument is 
that the need for left-wing parties to reflate the economy by means of expansionary 
fiscal policies is reinforced in the Czech Republic by its cleavage structure that divides 
the society along socio-economic issues. Indeed, among the Visegrad countries, the 
Czech Republic manifests the most definitive Left-Right division. Under these condi­
tions, partisan interests exert a distinct influence on the euro-adoption strategy of a 
government led by a left-wing party because the party finds itself trapped by election 
promises to reduce unemployment by means of expansionary fiscal policies and the 
requirements to meet the Maastricht criteria. However, in the Czech case, a fast track 
approach to adopting the euro does not depend on a right-wing party in office either 
given that the ODS is very sceptical about EMU. In fact, the strong political leverage of 
the opposition parties and the relatively high level of public Euroscepticism, especially 
stemming from its potential voter base, further produced an unfavourable environment 
for the CSSD, a party which had intended to join the euro-zone as soon as possible, 
until the Spidla government takeover in 2002 (cf chapter 1). Yet, as further discussed in 
chapter 5 and 6, interests are not sufficient to explain why the CSSD changed its view 
on the euro slowly after the currency crisis and not before nor can partisan and strate­
gic electoral interests account for the overall reluctance towards the adoption of the 
euro among the political elites, especially among high-ranked ODS politicians.
In Poland, the considerable leverage of anti-EU parties like the LPR and 
Samoobrona as well as by the moderate Eurospectic PiS, influences essentially how 
Polish parties compete for votes and has certainly affected the SLD and PO policy 
agenda on EU issues. The rise in party-based Euroscepticism is associated with grow­
ing public opposition to EU membership and explains why the SLD-led government did 
not define its euro-adoption strategy to set an official target date for euro-zone mem­
bership. Thus, to refrain from announcing an official target date was also a tactical step 
taken by the SLD-led government to avoid conflicts leading up to the 2005 general 
elections, especially given that approval rates of the euro were dropping and the gov­
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ernment’s popularity decreasing. In addition to growing party-based and public Euro­
scepticism, a fast-track approach to adopting the euro was further constrained by the 
limited capacity of the fragile SLD minority government to push forward politically costly 
reforms; an aspect which cannot solely be explained by interests but have to be under­
stood in the context of institutional constraints (see chapter 6).
In contrast to the other Visegrad countries, political conditions for a fast-track 
approach to euro-zone accession are rather positive in Slovakia given that anti-EU par­
ties (like the SNS and ZRS) are losing ground and have not been able to exceed the 5 
percent threshold since 2002 and 1998 respectively. On the other hand, the Euroscep­
tic KSS possesses a limited political leverage while other Eurosceptic parties do not 
formulate their Euroscepticism explicitly with regards to EMU (KDH) or, alternatively, 
have ‘softened’ their positions on the EU in an effort to get internationally rehabilitated 
and to increase the coalition potential (LS-HZDS). In fact, the LS-HZDS position on 
European integration can only be understood with reference to its office-seeking be­
haviour given that the party has to instrumentalise a pro-European attitude in order to 
become a legitimate coalition partner. To end the party’s ‘long-standing pariah status’, 
the LS-HSDZ supported key government bills and in doing so, supported the govern­
ment in its efforts to implement reforms in line with a fast-track approach to adopting 
the euro. The latter point, however, can only be understood with reference to the high 
level of party fragmentation and polarisation and their consequences for coalition build­
ing; a distinct feature of Slovak politics which is further discussed in chapter 6. In turn, 
a fast-track approach to adopting the euro by the governing party has to be seen in the 
context of its pro-European position, which is a source of legitimacy in a highly frag­
mented and -  as further discussed in chapter 6 -  also polarised party system, as much 
as it is a response to its pro-EU oriented electorate. Interests certainly play a crucial 
role in understanding the SDKU’s stance on fast-track approach to adopting the euro; 
however, as elaborated in chapter 5 and 6, these interests alone do not account for the 
success in pushing forward reforms nor can they support arguments that a fast track 
approach is inevitable. The enthusiasm for euro-zone membership has to be put into
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the context of the dramatic experience of foreign policy failure under the Meciar gov­
ernment, which made the idea of European integration so persuasive, a fact which is 
also illustrated in the relatively high levels of public support for EU and EMU member­
ship.
Indeed, support for the euro has been remarkably stable in Slovakia since the 
late 1990s. In contrast, the euro is perceived less favourably in the Czech Republic 
than in the other Visegrad countries. This is consistent with the traditional lower levels 
of support for the EU in the Czech Republic. In Hungary, approval rates have been 
high whereas in Poland, support for the euro has decreased in the wake of the coun­
try’s EU accession in May 2004. However, when compared to the Czech Republic, 
support in Poland is still relatively high. It has been argued that the higher opposition of 
the public to the euro in the Czech Republic fits well with Gabel’s assumption of class- 
based opposition to EMU. Indeed, the chapter finds supportive evidence for a class- 
based polarisation that provides the basis for a stronger articulation of anti- and pro- 
EMU positions in the Czech Republic than in the other Visegrad countries where the 
socio-economic dimension of political partisanship is less developed. Voters of the left 
(CSSD) and particularly the far left (KSCM) are among the strongest opponents to the 
euro whereas voters of liberal and conservative parties favour euro-zone membership. 
This observation, however, does not apply to the other Visegrad countries where sup­
port is remarkably high among manual workers and varies little regarding left and right- 
wing voters. In Poland, voters of nationalist and farmer parties are more inclined to 
oppose the adoption of the euro reflecting, in the latter case, the stronger opposition 
among citizens living in rural areas and farmers.
The trend towards class-based voting behaviour in the Czech Republic explains 
why the CSSD-led government found itself trapped by commitments to fiscal consolida­
tion programmes and low inflation rates as well as the pre-election promise to reduce 
unemployment rates by expansionary fiscal policies. While the problems to adhere to 
the fiscal criterion of the Maastricht requirements essentially led to the government’s 
decision to postpone the initial euro-adoption target date, this decision was further sup­
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ported by an unfavourable environment for a fast-track approach to euro-zone entry 
given the relatively high scepticism of the Czech public towards the euro -  and espe­
cially of those citizens supporting the CSSD party. In contrast, the Slovak government’s 
approach to a quick adoption of the euro is mirrored in relatively high and stable public 
support since the late 1990s; a fact that cannot be solely explained on the basis of in­
terests, as highlighted in the following chapter. On the other hand, public support for 
the euro has fluctuated considerably in Poland. It has been argued that most of the 
dynamics for the opposition to the euro are not part of a class-based response to the 
government’s economic policies generated by a more manifested Left-Right cleavage, 
but from supporters of nationalist parties (like the LPR and PiS) and Eurosceptic farmer 
parties (Samoobrona and PSL). This underlines the importance of a national­
ist/religious-rural and liberal-urban cleavage for the voting behaviour in Poland. Indeed, 
the role of the Catholic Church and the agricultural sector is a distinctive feature and 
dominates Polish politics and public debates. By extension, the case of Poland shows 
that support for the euro cannot be achieved or maintained through merely addressing 
distributive issues with regards to euro-zone membership but depends also upon cul­
tural idiosyncrasies; an aspect which is further addressed in the following chapters. It 
has been argued that the rise in opposition is reflected in the emergence of nationalist 
and populist farmer parties (LPR and Samoobrona) as strong forces in the Sejm. While 
the SLD minority government did not define its euro-adoption strategy and set an offi­
cial target date for the adoption of the euro, the decrease in government popularity and 
stability combined with an increase in public and party-based Euroscpeticism made a 
fast-track approach unlikely. It has also been argued that the downward trend in sup­
port for the euro stands in relation to the citizens’ fear of losing the just regained price 
stability after years of high inflationary pressure. This aspect should not be underesti­
mated given that the perception of inflationary pressures in some current euro-zone 
member states stokes fears of price increases. In contrast, higher support for the euro 
in Hungary reflects the respondents’ wish to attain price stability. After years of sticky 
inflation expectations and unpredictable exchange rate developments, Hungarians may
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consider the euro as the much needed ‘stability anchor’. The relatively high support 
also suggests that the fear of losing national identity is low among Hungarians. This fits 
well with Hungary’s initial euro-adoption strategy that aimed to join the euro-zone as 
quickly as possible, however, a fast-tack approach was then constrained by strong op­
portunistic interests and the government had to postpone euro-zone entry to the next 
decade.
This chapter has highlighted cross-national variations in approaching the adop­
tion of the euro through an analysis of actors’ positions and preferences on EMU and 
European integration. At the same time, this chapter has shown that the preferences 
have to be related to an analysis of institutional constraints and opportunities in order to 
understand the countries’ capacity to implement reforms in line with the Maastricht cri­
teria (chapter 6). By the same token, these preferences have to be related to an analy­
sis of actors' ideas on the euro in order to fully explain the countries’ willingness to join 
the euro-zone. It is the purpose of the following chapter to explore the impact of ideas 
on the Visegrad countries’ euro-adoption strategy.
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Figure 11 Support for the euro (CCEB 2002.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
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Figure 12 Support for the euro (CCEB 2002.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Slovakia (Autumn 2002)
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Figure 13 Support for the euro (CEEC 2002.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Hungary (Autumn 2002)
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Figure 14 Support for the euro (CEEC 2002.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Poland (Autumn 2002)
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Figure 15 Support for the euro (CEEC 2003.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Czech Republic (Spring 2003)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
GENDER
Male
Female
AGE
15-24 
25-39 
40-54
55+
EDUCATION
<15
16-19 
20 and above
OCCUPATION 
Farmers (1) 
Self-employed 
Managers 
Other white collars 
Manual workers 
House persons 
Students 
Unemployed 
Retired 
LOCALITY TYPE 
Metropolitan 
Other towns 
Rural zones 
POLITICAL SCALE 
KSCM 
CSSD 
KDU-CSL 
US-DEU 
ODS 
Other parties 
Would not vote
m
ZZ~ZZZZj4
 301=1
  M
28 ■
WMR
6 ' B*— 1
25
27"': i
35 = = ^ —I i m  mnHnnH
■ 0 3
P r-~~— zrx
S> :
— — II
3
M X
□ Against 
■ For
□ Undecided
(1) Only ten respondents
Figure 16 Support for the euro (CEEC 2003.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Slovakia (Spring 2003)
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Figure 17 Support for the euro (CEEC 2003.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Hungary (Spring 2003)
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Figure 18 Support for the euro (CEEC 2003.2)*
Breakdown by socio-demographic categories 
Poland (Spring 2003)
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*Remarks:
■ The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much against” 
and “somewhat against”
■ The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much for” and 
“somewhat for”
■ The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “neither for, nor 
against” and “no opinion”
■ Self-employed = professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, etc.), 
owner of a shop, craftsman, business proprietor, owner of a company
■ Managers = employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, ar­
chitect, etc.), general manager, director or top management (department head, 
junior manager, teacher, technician)
■ Other white collars = employed position, working mainly at a desk, salesman, 
driver
■ Manual workers = employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospi­
tal, restaurant, police, fireman etc.), supervisor, skilled manual worker, other 
(unskilled) manual worker, servant
■ House persons = responsible for ordinary shopping and looking after the home, 
or without current occupation, not working
Table 13 Support for the euro: Income groups, Autumn 2002
C zech R epublic S lovakia H ungary P o land
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest
3 3 3 3 3  3 3 3
income income income income income income income income
groups groups groups groups groups groups groups groups
Against1 47 20 24 12 16 14 16 7
For4 11 67 55 83 62 79 65 84
1 The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much against” and 
“somewhat against”
2 The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much for” and “somewhat 
for”
Table 14 Support for the euro: Income groups, Spring 2003
C zech R epublic S lovakia H ungary P o land
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest
3 3 3 3 3  3 3 3
income income income income income income income income
groups groups groups groups groups groups groups groups
Against1 36 33 23 9 18 12 19
• >» ■ ...............
19
For2 61 60 70 88 69 83 73 77
1 The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much against” and “some­
what against”
2 The original Eurobarometer survey distinguishes between “very much for” and 
“somewhat for”
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Chapter 5
The ideational level of analysis:
The impact of ideas on the euro-adoption strategies
Having investigated the core research question from an interest-oriented perspective, 
this chapter analyses cross-national responses to euro-zone accession by applying an 
idea-oriented approach. The argument is that the relationship between ideas and policy 
outcomes provides a tool for judging political action against interests and helps to ex­
plain how interests and ideas intersect and affect the country’s approach to adopting 
the euro.
Each of the interest and institution levels of analysis provides insights into the 
actions taken during the period under analysis. However, neither of them alone can 
answer the central question of this thesis: why do cross-national variations to the objec­
tive of euro-zone entry persist in the Visegrad countries? The complexities of policies 
related to euro-zone entry cannot be reduced to fit within these frameworks without a 
distortion of analysis. Purely interest- or institution-based approaches would miss many 
of the turns the Visegrad countries have made during the transition process because 
they fall short of explaining why EMU accession took on different meanings in the 
countries under review. These approaches do not account for people’s beliefs and 
therefore cannot explain how individual actions are motivated.
For example, as discussed in chapters 2 and 6, institutional constraints due to 
the degree of central bank independence, the choice of the electoral system and the 
wage bargaining level affect the outcome of fiscal and monetary policy and may there­
fore help to explain differences in approaching the EMU requirements. However, insti­
tution-oriented approaches relocate preferences from individuals to institutions and 
attribute changes in preferences to exogenous crisis: u[t]he actual ideas in question are 
left largely ignored; their power simply derivative of the power of institutions”, concludes 
Finlayson (2004: 531). Institution- and interest-based approaches fall short of explain­
ing why EMU may take on different meanings; they neglect the fact that policy out­
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comes are also subject to ideas about European integration and economic policies. For 
example, policy-makers can be divided over the way macroeconomic policy should be 
carried out because they subscribe to different ideas about economic policy. Moreover, 
as argued in chapter 2, it is impossible to conceptualise interests without analysing the 
ideas an actor holds because “interests cannot be articulated without values” (Haas 
1990: 2). However, values are not given, but acquired through the process of learning 
from past experiences (Haas 1990: 2-7, Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 13, Wendt 
1999). As pointed out in chapter 2, policy failure (thus past experience), policy learning 
and persuasiveness are most crucial in understanding the process of cognitive change, 
and therefore help to understand why the EMU took on different meanings in the 
Visegrad countries. But while different ideas on the euro might become causally con­
sequential for the making of the country’s euro-adoption strategy, it is also argued that 
the impact of ideas varies in all four countries (see chapter 2). Ideas ‘do not float freely’ 
(Risse-Kappen 1994) and the impact of ideas depends on whether the idea fits domes­
tic coalitions supporting or opposing euro-zone entry. Thus, this thesis treats ideas not 
as an exclusive explanation about individual behaviour; rather it focuses on the inter­
relationship between interests, ideas and institutions. Applying Goldstein and Keo- 
hane’s (1993: 7) definition of ideas as beliefs that can range from general moral princi­
ples (worldviews and principled beliefs) to more specific applications of (scientific) 
knowledge (causal beliefs; see chapter 2), this chapter analyses whether ideas on 
European integration and macroeconomic policies provide the policy-makers with a 
road map that helps them to choose among alternative strategies regarding ap­
proaches to adopting the euro.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to analyse how far policy-makers have re­
considered and adjusted their prevailing assumptions and ideas on euro-zone acces­
sion during the transition process. In particular, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the 
extent to which ideas on European integration and macroeconomic policy led to the 
adoption of different strategies towards the euro-zone accession in the Visegrad coun­
tries. This chapter is divided into four sections, each dealing with one case study.
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These sections are further subdivided into ideas about European integration and ideas 
about macroeconomic policy. The conclusion evaluates the ideas described by the 
policy-makers and relates them to the euro-adoption strategy of their country.
The Czech Republic
Among the Visegrad countries, the Czech Republic has been the most reluctant to join 
the euro-zone. As early as 2002 the government gave up plans for a quick adoption of 
the euro and advocated a target date of 2010/2011, while, at that time, other Visegrad 
governments were still aiming at euro-zone entry for 2006 or 2007 (see chapter 1). 
Also, out of all the Visegrad central banks, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is the most 
reluctant since its board members are the most divided about issuing an official state­
ment of when they want to join the euro-zone (see also chapter 6).
The Czech Republic’s reluctant attitude towards euro-zone entry is reflected in 
the Euroscepticism of the general public and a relatively high degree of opposition to 
EMU (see chapter 4). The Eurosceptic stance of Czech citizens is mirrored by a scepti­
cal position of the current EU members towards the Czech Republic’s accession to the 
EU. Out of the ten new EU entrants, the Czech Republic received the worst result in 
the European Parliament’s approval over its membership. The Bavarian Christian So­
cial Union (CSU) threatened to boycott the Czech accession negotiations because of 
the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War.1 The CSU’s cam­
paign to force the Czech Republic to abolish the Benes Decrees2 has definitely harmed 
the German-Czech relationship and reduced the popularity of EU integration among 
Czechs (cf Hanley 2004a). The relationship with Germany is crucial given that history 
has led both states to look upon each other with great suspicion. As discussed below, 
historical memories and especially the Czech experience with foreign intervention and 
occupation are used in the political discourse of many leading Czech policy-makers to
1 Another anti-Czech campaign was led by JOrg Haider, former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party 
(FPO), over the issue of the nuclear power plant in Temelin at the Czech-Austrian border.
2 The Benes Decrees legitimised the expropriation from the Czech lands and segregation of more than two 
million ethnic Germans after the end of the Second World War (see chapter 4).
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make their ideas on European integration persuasive and consequently to make their 
case against the euro.
The other important idea-related factors to explain the reluctant position on the 
euro-adoption are the idea that the EMU is an obstacle to achieve real convergence 
and the change of ideas about monetary policy triggered by the currency crisis in 1997. 
It is argued that the experience of economic policy failure led to a readjustment of exist­
ing ideas on how to conduct monetary policy, and therefore helps to understand why 
the CSSD-led governments and the CNB have come to change their positions on the 
timing of euro-zone membership.
Ideas on European integration
As discussed in chapter 4, Eurosceptic parties are well represented in the Czech par­
liament by the communist party (KSCM) and the liberal conservative ODS. Chapter 4 
has pointed out that, in both cases, the parties’ identity and national interests on Euro­
pean integration account for their sceptical position on EU membership. For example, 
the KSCM’s stance on European integration is clearly driven by the party’s communist 
ideology since the EU is principally rejected as too-capitalist a system that serves as a 
“tool of multinational capital in furthering exploitative policies in Europe” (Kopecky and 
Ucen 2003: 169) and favours “the interests of business and larger states (especially 
Germany)” (Hanley 2002: 9). On the other hand, the ODS leadership -  although chal­
lenged from within the party -  is sceptical about deeper European integration as the 
EU is seen as a bureaucratic and undemocratic entity that undermines state sover­
eignty (see chapter 4). Both opposition parties -  the KSCM and the ODS -  possess 
considerable leverage given their high percentage of seats in the parliament and the 
fact that the ruling coalition government only holds a small majority. In addition, both 
parties exert a strong influence on the public discourse on European integration. In the 
following part, the ideas of the largest opposition and former ruling party, ODS, are 
examined in greater detail. This is because -  similar to their lead in the domestic de­
bate on EU issues during the accession negotiations (cf Hanley 2004b: 693) -  the ODS
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and its former party leader and current President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus, 
are the most active in pursuing the political discourse on the euro (compare Larsen 
1993: 61 for a justification of this approach). It should be noted that Vaclav Klaus was 
the only President of the new member states who refused to back the “yes” vote on the 
country’s entry into the EU and, in doing so, he indirectly recommended a “no” vote 
(see chapter 4). Indeed, Klaus is the only President in the EU and the most influential 
and rigorous mainstream politician in the Visegrad countries, who openly and harshly 
criticises the EU and EMU.
Klaus translates his ideas on European integration into the language of past ex­
periences and historical memories. Certainly, it can be argued that Klaus’ references to 
historical memories are self-serving and used to legitimise his own views. But, even if 
true, it is striking how Klaus matches words with political action. This is not to argue 
that there exists a one-to-one relationship between Klaus’ ideas on European integra­
tion and the Czech strategy to euro-zone entry. Rather, the chapter argues that Klaus 
is able to frame his ideas on EMU within the context of existing ideologies (the ‘inter­
preted persuasiveness’, see Yee 1996: 91 and chapter 2). By appealing to existing 
myths and historical memories Klaus attempts to make the adoption of the euro unper­
suasive to the Czech people and to mobilise sceptical positions on the euro-zone entry 
producing an unfavourable environment for a government that intended to join the 
euro-zone as soon as possible. At a more concrete level, the ODS’ and Klaus’ ideas on 
the nature of European integration have direct implications for the country’s euro-adop­
tion strategy. This is because President Vaclav Klaus appoints the new members of the 
central bank board. In this function, Klaus was sufficiently farsighted to appoint three 
members, all of whom are well known for their sceptical views concerning adopting the 
euro by 2010 (see chapter 4 and 6, see also EIU 2005b: 11).
The ODS is against a deepening of EU policies because it fears that the Czech 
Republic will get “diluted in some sort of a super state structure” (Kopecky and Ucen 
2003: 168, see also the 1998 party manifesto) or, as the former ODS leader and cur­
rent President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus puts it, dissolved “in Europeanness
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like a lump of sugar in a cup of coffee” (Klaus quoted in Bugge 2000: 213; see also 
Klaus 2003). While Klaus clearly favours neoliberal policies and a single market with 
the removal of trade barriers and unrestricted competition, he does not believe in the 
good of further and deeper EU integration (Klaus 2004). Klaus rarely misses an oppor­
tunity to criticise the EU in general and the Brussels bureaucracy in particular. He ex­
plains his position against deeper European integration by referring to the Czech ex­
perience of permanent occupation by foreign powers (Klaus 2003). According to Klaus, 
integration is equivalent to foreign intervention and the decision to join the EU was “the 
most fateful decision in the history of the Czech Republic” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei- 
tung (FAZ), 22/06/2004). Since he equates integration with foreign intervention, Klaus 
is indirectly suggesting that European integration is as bad as communist rule. Indeed, 
he puts the left-wing parties in Europe on a par with the communist party. Because of 
its democratic deficit, the EU attracts left-wing parties that want to escape from voters’ 
control and create a ‘European socialist superstate’:
the Czech Republic has the chance -  in the historical period of which we 
are speaking -  to warn against this [the left-wing parties] danger. We have 
behind us the experience of Communism and this makes us very sensitive 
to certain things which the West does not feel so keenly (Klaus quoted in 
Williams 1997: 139).
In a similar vein, the ODS condemns the future EU and the Maastricht Treaty in par­
ticular as a product of the Brussels bureaucratic elites “with a covert left-wing agenda” 
who search for further centralisation (Hanley 2004a: 544; see also Bugge 2000). Ac­
cording to Klaus, “there are many freedom-loving people within the EU who could help 
form its future” and to “fight against Brussels bureaucracy” (Klaus 2003). Klaus also 
compared his ideas about European integration to a bureaucratised Brussels that op­
poses freedom and sovereignty. By the same token, he regrets “that the Czechs had 
not had longer to enjoy the national independence regained in 1989” (Hanley 2004b: 
703). During the days before his country’s accession to the EU Klaus insisted that:
we [the Czechs] must do everything we can so we are not lost in the EU, so 
that our unique existence over 1,000 years will not crumble and be lost 
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline 23/04/2004; see also 
RFE/RL Newsline 03/05/2004).
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By referring to the “unique existence”, Klaus touches upon the Czech’s idea of a nation 
that has a special mission: it is the idea of “the Czech distinctiveness from (even supe­
riority over) its neighbours" (Williams 1997: 135).3 According to Klaus it is the duty of 
the Czech Republic to stop further European integration and to reverse “certain trends 
and tendencies of the last decade [read the Maastricht Treaty]” (FAZ, 08/12/2001). It is 
in this regard that Klaus promotes his ideas on European cooperation as opposed to 
European integration (Klaus 2004). In fact, Klaus presents his ideas as the only alter­
native for Europe. To promote his vision of Europe, Klaus periodically reminds the 
Czechs of:
the danger that can accompany dealing with larger nations, such as the 
British, French and Germans [and how] these people have failed the 
Czechs at crucial moments in the past (Williams 1997: 140).
Klaus has cultivated the image of “the unreliability or dupability of the mightier nations 
of Western Europe” (Williams 1997: 135). In this context, Klaus repeatedly refers to the 
Munich agreement of 1938 and the British and French refraining from helping and de­
fending the Czechs from the German invasion. Fears that the Czech Republic will once 
again lose sovereignty through EU membership and be overruled by larger nations, 
find further expression in the ODS’ Manifesto of Czech Eurorealism. Here, the EU is 
represented as a German-inspired project of eurofederalism (Hanley 2004a: 513) and 
an attempt by European states to “restore lost great power status” (Manifesto of Czech 
Eurorealism quoted in Hanley 2004a: 525).
Klaus’ ideas about European integration fuel his political actions and serve as a 
road map for the expected effects of the EMU. Monetary policy touches upon the high­
est politics of a nation state since a currency is central to the state’s identity (see Risse 
2003, see also Jones 2002). It is no surprise, therefore, that Klaus has long been argu­
ing against the EMU. As early as 1992 he condemned the EMU project:
it [the Maastricht Treaty] is an artificial motor for a further integration proc­
ess in Europe. We know what that [centralised government] means. We 
understand certain phenomena better than the West Europeans. This is
3 According to Williams, (1997: 135) the Czech distinctiveness is supported by and goes as far back as 
the “myth of the special Czech mission, the great contribution to the spiritual liberation of Europe and all 
humanity, be it Charles IV’s Gothic Arcadia, a Hussite purification of Christianity, ‘socialism with a human 
face’, or Bohemia as a bridge spanning the divide between East and West”.
179
why I get frightened when I look at certain developments in Brussels (Han- 
delsblatt, 17/11/1992).
In February 2004, Klaus reiterated his aversion to joining the euro-zone (see also 
Klaus’ speech on the euro to the Swedish parliament in December 2003, Radio Pra­
gue, 02/12/2003). During a forum at Passau University in Germany, Klaus expressed 
his fear that the euro might harm EU members because it is a “purely political tool” 
(RFE/RL, Newsline, 10/02/2004). "Currency unification is a Trojan Horse for the har­
monisation of economies, politics, and legal regulations in the EU," said Klaus (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 10/02/2004). The metaphor of the Trojan Horse negatively represents the 
EMU in terms of a sneak attack that aims to defeat the nation state and its unique exis­
tence. Behind Klaus’ arguments is the causal belief that EMU will lead to a fiscal, and 
then to a political, union:
I am convinced of the inevitability of the following path: monetary union —*• 
fiscal union —► political union. One of the consequences of EMU, and I in­
clude it on the side of costs, will be therefore the emergence of a fiscal and 
political union. And the justified question is: Do we really want a political un­
ion? (Klaus 2000).
Thus, behind Klaus’ political actions lies the idea that the adoption of the euro will un­
dermine the sovereignty of the Czech Republic.
To further illustrate his position, Klaus argues that the Czech Republic will have 
to take most of the burdens of EMU: “I am afraid [...] that the costs and benefits of the 
EMU will not be equally distributed among its members” (Klaus, 12/12/2000). EMU, 
Klaus suggests, “could lock CEE into a cycle of backwardness, by preventing its coun­
tries from adjusting economic policies to suit local needs" (Hanley 2002: 5). Referring 
to Germany and France’s difficulties in achieving fiscal consolidation, Klaus states that 
the euro has encouraged countries to relax fiscal discipline. Unpunished states might 
pass the “financial burden to other members of the euro-zone” and thereby trigger "ten­
sion between states" (RFE/RL Newsline, 10/02/2004). In turn, this “could have a par­
ticularly adverse effect on the weaker economies of the post-communist countries, in­
cluding the Czech Republic,” argued Klaus (RFE/RL Newsline, 10/02/2004). Certainly 
this provokes further fears that the Czech Republic is losing out from euro-zone mem­
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bership and that it is merely a second class member, placing its fate into the hands of 
the big EU countries, such as Germany (see above). It should be noted, however, that 
Klaus’ anti-euro statements coincided with a rise in his popularity. In February 2004, 
Klaus became the most popular politician in his country, enjoying the trust of 69 per­
cent of the electorate, according to one opinion poll (RFE/RL Newsline, 10/02/2004). 
Certainly, other factors, such as the political crisis of the government (see chapter 6), 
also contributed significantly to the rise in Klaus’ popularity. Nonetheless, chapter 4 has 
provided supportive evidence that Klaus’ ideas on European integration fall on fertile 
ground, a fact that is highlighted in the relatively high public disapproval rates of the 
euro. Certainly, the process of socialisation is too complex to establish one-to-one rela­
tionships. However, it can be argued that Klaus is able to frame his ideas on EMU 
within the context of existing ideologies in an attempt to make the adoption of the euro 
unpersuasive to the people and to mobilise sceptical positions on the euro-zone entry. 
Klaus’ position on the EMU influences the Czech euro-adoption strategy precisely be­
cause his ideas are sufficiently powerful to resonate with the causal and principled be­
liefs of the Czech people and thereby build winning coalitions.
As stated in chapter 4, the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) firmly sup­
ported EU membership, seeing accession as a “modern social democratic project” 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 306). In contrast to the ODS, the CSSD sees the EU as a 
means not to undermine national interests but to endorse them as EU membership 
overcomes “the historical marginalisation of small states such as the Czech Republic 
within Europe and [protects] them against the political and economic threats of global­
isation” (Euromanifest CSSD 2001 as cited in Hanley 2002: 7). However, as stated in 
chapter 4, the CSSD’s pro-European position must also be viewed in terms of the 
Czech intra-party arena and therefore in the context of the CSSD’s electoral interest in 
distinguishing itself from the Eurosceptic ODS and KSCM.
The pro-European attitude translated initially into a positive position on EMU ac­
cession. As early as 1996, Zeman -  the then party leader of the CSSD -  announced he 
would support Czech accession to the EMU (The Prague Post, 17/07/1996). As Miro-
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Slav Had, senior researcher at the Prague-based Institute of International Relations, 
points out: “The CSSD [was] the only party in the Czech political spectrum to support 
the Maastricht Treaty for monetary union" (The Prague Post, 17/07/1996). But although 
the CSSD has always supported the Maastricht Treaty and EMU accession, it changed 
its attitude towards the timing of joining the euro-zone. Whereas in 1998 the CSSD 
minority government was still in favour of a quick adoption of the euro with a target date 
of 2006/7, the CSSD government led by Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla adjusted its 
position towards a later target date of around 2010-2011. It is the furthest target date 
advocated by any Visegrad country government. In contrast to Klaus and his ODS, the 
CSSD’s position on a postponement of EMU accession is not based on ideas relating 
to a rejection of deeper EU integration but, as discussed in the next section, on ideas 
related to the question of how to conduct macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of 
the currency crisis.
Ideas on macroeconomic policy
Monetary policy failure and the currency crisis of 1997 (triggered by speculative attacks 
on the koruna) are of central importance in explaining opposition to a quick adoption of 
the euro. Related to the currency crisis is the Czech’s brutal experience with capital 
flows under a fixed exchange rate regime. High speculative attacks on the koruna 
eventually forced policy-makers to change to a flexible exchange rate (see chapter 3). 
In the aftermath of the currency crisis the Czech Republic went through a sharp reces­
sion and unemployment rates rose to unprecedented levels. As stated in chapter 2, 
ideas on the appropriate macroeconomic policies fall mainly under the category of 
causal beliefs. With the economic recession, policy-makers started to reconsider the 
cause-and-effect relationships of specific macroeconomic policies. For instance, they 
questioned the suitability of a fixed exchange rate for a transition economy, and there­
fore the adoption of the euro, as a means to achieve real convergence. The CSSD-led 
governments, in power since 1998, and the CNB underwent this process that influ­
enced their switching of positions from one that supported a quick euro-adoption to one
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that favoured a postponement of euro-zone entry. This is not to say that macroeco­
nomic ideas exclusively explain the turn in the government’s euro-adoption strategy. 
Certainly, the postponement of the target date must equally be seen in the context of 
Czech self-interests to maintain a competitive advantage over its neighbouring coun­
tries, the CSSD’s electoral interests and need to fulfil partisan expectations as well as 
the unfavourable environment for a fast-track approach created by a relatively strong 
public opposition to the euro (see chapter 4) and the dominant anti-euro discourse led 
by prominent politicians such as the President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus. 
However, it is argued that monetary policy failure provides a compelling argument to 
highlight the changing meaning of euro-zone accession for the CNB and the CSSD -  a 
Social Democratic party that had to cope with increasing partisan pressure in light of 
rising unemployment rates in the aftermath of the currency crisis.
The definitive break with a quick euro-adoption strategy occurred when the 
Spidla government took over in June 2002. The postponement of the EMU target date 
came as no surprise; signs had been apparent since the resignation of Josef Tosovsky 
as the President of the CNB in 2000 (see also chapter 6) and deputy Prime Minister 
Vladimir Spidla’s proposal of a later target date of 2010 or 2011 (The Prague Post, 
10/01/2002). Spidla’s intention to postpone the adoption of the euro is a consequence 
of the demand-side oriented policies of his government. Facing rising unemployment 
rates, Spidla’s electoral campaign was based on economic policies to expand the wel­
fare state (see chapter 3). This implied htgher public expenditures and contravened the 
Maastricht criteria of fiscal consolidation. In December 2002, Prime Minister Spidla 
officially declared that the Czech Republic could join the euro-zone in 2009-2010 at the 
earliest (Radio Prague, 15/12/2002). This was supported by his Finance Minister, Bo- 
huslav Sobotka, whose budget plans for 2003 were not ambitious and rejected radical 
cuts in the public and social sector (see interview with Sobotka in Financial Times 
09/10/2002). After years of economic stagnation following the currency crisis in 1997, 
Sobotka’s main concern was to support economic growth and not to reduce the budget 
deficit to the Maastricht target at any price. In March 2004, Sobotka reiterated that the
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Czech Republic will join the euro-zone in 2010, only once additional labour market and 
structural reforms are implemented (Radio Prague, 29/04/2004). Thus, EMU is defi­
nitely not seen as a means to achieve real convergence, but as a stumbling block in 
the conduct of economic policies. While it can be correctly argued that the economic 
policies of the Spidla government are driven by partisan expectations (see chapter 4), it 
should be noted that it was the experience of the monetary policy failure during the 
currency crisis and the following macroeconomic consequences that set off the read­
justment process of the government’s euro-adoption strategy. And this was a govern­
ment led by the CSSD -  the only party in the political spectrum to support initially and 
unconditionally the Maastricht treaty and a quick euro-adoption strategy.
The CNB gradually changed its euro-adoption target date as well. The resigna­
tion of Tosovsky marks a turning point in the CNB’s position on euro-zone entry.4 Un­
der the presidency of Tosovsky (1993-1997; 1998-2000), the CNB aimed to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible; and under the presidency of Tuma the CNB has 
shifted gradually towards a postponement of euro-zone accession. In contrast to 
Zdenek Tuma, the current President of the CNB, Tosovsky argued that euro-zone 
membership would end the “boom and bust cycle” and would protect the country from 
capital flight. The EMU is a “safe harbour in a stormy sea [read capital flight]” said 
Tosovsky in an interview in 1999 (Handelsblatt, 24/12/1999). Tosovsky’s justification 
for a quick euro-zone entry is driven by the causal belief that fixing the exchange rate 
irrevocably will benefit a small and open economy like the Czech Republic. But it 
should be noted that while Tosovsky supported a quick approach to euro-zone acces­
sion, his central bank board members were, and are, still very much divided about the 
appropriate timing of euro-zone accession, precisely because they hold different mac­
roeconomic ideas on the exchange rate; i.e. they hold different causal beliefs on the 
means-end relationship of the appropriate exchange rate regime for a country in transi­
tion. Among the central bank board members, Pavel Stepanek and Michaela Erbenova
4 Tosovsky resigned on 31 October 2000, only four days after the government approved the controversial 
amendment to the central bank law that severely restricted the CNB’s independence (see chapter 6).
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have the most sceptical views of the EMU.5 Ideas about the cause-effect relationship 
between high capital flows under a fixed exchange rate regime and the currency crisis 
influence their political actions because, according to them, a flexible exchange rate 
regime is more successful in tackling the capital flows and inflationary pressure in­
duced by the transition process. According to Erbenova, a close ally of Vaclav Klaus 
(see footnote 5), there is no need to rush to join the EMU (Petrus 2002). The Czech 
economy is still undergoing a substantial transformation process, in which a flexible 
monetary policy is decisive. As relative prices have not yet adjusted and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) continues to be high, a flexible exchange rate system would be more 
suitable to tackling asymmetric economic shocks (FAZ, 03/12/2001). This clearly 
shows that the experience of a fixed exchange rate regime under large capital flows 
influenced Erbenova’s position on the euro. Above all, she said, the government first 
needs to regulate fiscal imbalance, which is a matter of long-term fiscal and other struc­
tural reforms (Petrus 2002). “It would be useless to fulfil the Maastricht criteria and to 
join the EMU at any price, only to have huge internal adjustment problems later,” said 
Erbenova (FAZ, 03/12/2001). Behind Erbenova’s support for a “go-slow” or coronation 
approach lies the fear of higher speculative attacks if real convergence must be sacri­
ficed for nominal convergence efforts that aim to fulfil the Maastricht criteria at any 
price.6 Therefore, the euro has to be introduced at the end of, and not be seen as a 
means to achieve, real convergence.
Similarly, Tosovsky’s successor Tuma has not voiced support for an early entry 
into the EMU either: “It is extremely difficult to specify optimal timing” said Tuma just 
days after his appointment as governor of the CNB (The Prague Post, 13/12/2000). 
Since the Czech Republic experiences constant real appreciation (see chapter 3), a 
“floating exchange rate rather than fixed or even the ERM II exchange rate mechanism”
5 Pavel Stepanek was a member of the central bank board from 1999 to 2005. Before Stepanek joined the 
CNB in February 1999 he was Deputy Finance Minister in 1998. Michaela Erbenova has been a member 
of the board since December 2000, having worked as an advisor to Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus between 
1996 and 1997.
6 The real convergence parameters of the Maastricht criteria are only secondary in nature (see Backe 
1999: 121 and chapter 1).
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would be more suitable to protect the country from speculative attacks, argued Tuma in 
an interview with Reuters (Willard 2002). This is at the core of the CNB attitude toward 
ERM II and euro-zone membership, because central bankers still vividly remember the 
1997 currency crisis stemming from intense speculative attacks against the koruna 
under a fixed exchange rate (see chapter 3). Yet, as argued above, this causal belief in 
the suitability of a flexible exchange rate for a transition economy and the reluctant atti­
tude of the CNB and the government on EMU fits well with existing interests. For ex­
ample, in contrast to Hungary and Slovakia, inflation rates are already very low in the 
Czech Republic. Since interest rates in the other Visegrad countries are much higher 
than in the Czech Republic (see chapter 3), businesses have lower costs to finance 
their investment plans.7 Thus, the Czech Republic provides much better conditions for 
investment and therefore has a competitive advantage over its neighbouring countries. 
This is reinforced by the fact that although interest rates are low, the Czech Republic 
was able to attract most of the FDI (per capita) -  often in the form of short-term portfo­
lio investment -  among the Visegrad countries (see chapter 1 and 3). This is quite re­
markable, as conventional wisdom would suggest that low interest rates would cause 
capital outflows. Certainly, the advantage of having a lower interest rate vis-^-vis its 
neighbours would come to a halt with euro-zone entry since interest rates have to be 
adjusted to the same ECB level. To put it differently, “owing to a low debt level, already 
low interest rates and mild inflation, the Czech Republic would clearly benefit least from 
early EMU entry” (Berger 2004: 12). While this illustrates how interests intersect with 
ideas about the suitability of a fixed exchange rate, it also shows that one factor alone 
is not sufficient to explain cross-national responses to euro-zone membership.
In summary, the Czech Republic is very reluctant to join the euro-zone and ad­
vocates the latest target date for accession among the Visegrad countries. Persuasive­
ness to discredit euro-zone membership fitting with existing ideologies (see chapter 2) 
and monetary policy failure are important sources for Czech opposition to the euro.
7 In March 2004, interest rates stood at 2 percent in the Czech Republic, 6 percent in Slovakia, 12.5 per­
cent in Hungary and 5.25 percent in Poland.
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Being the most dominant, popular and trusted politician in his country, President Vaclav 
Klaus, in particular, is able to mobilise sceptical positions on the euro-zone entry and to 
produce an unfavourable environment for a fast-track approach to adopting the euro. At 
a more concrete level, it can be argued that his ideas on European integration have 
been ‘materialised’ in his appointment of three central bank members, all of whom are 
well known for their sceptical positions on the euro. With the policy failure of a fixed 
exchange rate regime under large amount of capital flight, the CNB and the CSSD re­
considered their ideas on the cause-and-effect of monetary policy, fostering the view 
that a flexible exchange rate is the best way to tackle capital flight and to achieve real 
convergence. But it has also been argued that the government’s euro-adoption strategy 
is influenced by the self-interest of maintaining a competitive advantage for as long as 
possible over the other Visegrad countries that have much higher interest rates, illus­
trating that ideas alone do not account for the reluctant attitude towards the euro but 
they fit with different interests. In addition, as argued in chapter 4, interests are of fur­
ther help when trying to understand the CSSD’s position on the euro-adoption because 
the party faces growing public Euroscepticism and is under high pressure to fulfil parti­
san expectation.
Slovakia
Public and political support for euro-zone membership is remarkably high in Slovakia 
(see chapter 4). The government and central bank in particular are very keen to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible. However, this has not always been the case. Under 
the Meciar governments (1993-1998), Slovakia experienced a period of international 
isolation during which EU membership, let alone EMU accession, was a distant pros­
pect (see chapter 3 and 4).
Slovakia’s self-exclusion from the European integration process was purely a 
result of Meciar’s nationalist and inward-looking politics. The new Dzurinda govern­
ments, elected in 1998 and 2002, reversed Meciar’s economic and foreign policy and 
embarked on a close commitment towards Western integration. With the shift towards
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European integration, the Dzurinda government implemented economic policy reforms 
and started to advocate a fast-track approach towards the adoption of the euro. In par­
ticular, macroeconomic ideas about euro-zone entry as a means to achieve real con­
vergence and the experience of political isolation under the Meciar governments help 
when trying to understand why Slovakia is keen to join the euro-zone quickly. The ar­
gument is that the experience of foreign policy failure under Meciar makes the idea of a 
quick euro-adoption strategy persuasive to both Slovak citizens and policy-makers 
alike.
Ideas on European integration
The separation of Czechoslovakia into two autonomous states in 1993 revealed the 
distinctive attitudes of the two states towards the West (Marks 1997: 140). As a dissi­
dent and intellectual, Vaclav Havel maintained strong ties with the West and the orien­
tation of his Civic Forum (dissolved in 1991) was strongly towards European integra­
tion. The political leader of Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar, on the other hand, supported the 
communist party during the Prague Spring reform movement in 1968 that favoured 
“socialism with a human face” (Marks 1997: 140; see also Baer 2001 ).8 Meciar did not 
favour a liberal economy nor did he:
share the ideological or historically inspired motivation to engage in Euro­
pean unity present in the attitudinal make-up of some other political leaders 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Pridham 2002a: 211, see also Baer 2001).
Meciar’s politics were purely nationalist and inward-looking. His willingness to cooper­
ate with the far-right Slovak National Party (SNS) and far-left Association of Slovak 
Workers (ZRS), his confrontational politics towards the Hungarian minority and his 
leading role in forcing Slovak independence were part of his strong nationalist politics,
8 Certainly, starting from these distinctive views between the two states, the turn in Slovakia towards a 
strong commitment to European integration and the growing Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic are 
striking developments that underline the need for contextualisation since the positions deviate from what 
an analysis focusing on assumed stable preferences would predict.
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as were his interventionist economic and eastward-oriented foreign trade policies (see
chapter 4, Henderson 2002: 91, Senior Nello 2002: 296).9 It can be argued that:
the uncertain commitment to market reform in Slovakia, and its slower im­
plementation following independence, reflected a more deeply rooted belief 
in state planning, accompanied by a more widespread acceptance of au­
thoritarian rule (EIU 2005h: 33).
Meciar’s ideas on nationalism became so persuasive precisely because the need to 
gain national self-esteem was seen by the Slovaks as the most pressing problem. 
State building and democratic transition took place at the same time and created a 
need “to bolster the country’s self-esteem by demonstrating that it was a state as good 
as any other” (Henderson 2002: 89; see also Baer 2001: 97). Part of this demonstration 
was the distinctive “unwillingness to compromise on its [Meciar-government’s] domestic 
aims of strengthening and perpetuating its own political power” (Henderson 2002: 89). 
As Vachudova (2005: 4) explains: “for the illiberal elites in [...] Slovakia, complying with 
EU membership requirements was too costly, undermining their hold on power”. The 
regained national sovereignty and the right of self-determination reinforced nationalist 
sentiments, leaving issues of European integration as secondary.10 Meciar’s foreign 
and economic policies were clearly driven by the idea of creating a strong Slovak Re­
public while leaving Western integration aside (see Marks 1997: 140 and 151, Gold­
man 1999: 153, Senior Nello 2002: 296).
Meciar’s coalition partners, the extreme right SNS and far-left ZRS, certainly en­
couraged nationalist and inward-looking politics. Both parties firmly rejected any inte­
gration with the West on the basis that this would run counter to their values and iden­
tity. According to Jan Luptak, leader of the ZRS:
Slovakia can live without membership of the EU. The country has fertile soil 
and hard working hands. We do not want to import their surplus products.
9 The deteriorating domestic political situation was further highlighted by the limited progress in the transi­
tion process, the curb on the press freedom, the restrictions on the law on minority languages and the 
deterioration of relationships with its neighbouring states. Growing concerns with Slovak progress resulted 
in EU and US demarches from November 1994 and November 1995. Related to this are the EU presi­
dency declaration 7 March 1998 and the Resolution on the Need to Respect Human and Democratic 
Rights in the Slovak Republic, adopted by the European Parliament on 16 November 1995.
10 The regained sovereignty refers to the short period during World War II when Slovakia became a sepa­
rate (although authoritative and fascist) state. Some would argue controversially that it refers to the Mora­
vian Empire about a thousand years ago.
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We will grow our own tomatoes, peppers, and red melons (quoted in Ko- 
pecky and Ucen 2003:171).
Luptak is referring to the communist ideology that the structural process of capitalist 
surplus value as the basis for exploitation leads to economic inequalities within the 
world economy in which Slovakia would be one of the main losers. The party’s com­
munist ideology views the EU as a capitalist system that is responsible for ZRS’ rejec­
tion of European integration. SNS’ ideas on European integration are also closely re­
lated to the party’s identity as a far-right party. The leaders of the SNS openly express 
xenophobic sentiments against the Roma and Hungarians (Evans and Whitefield 1999: 
121) and assert that the Slovak national identity needs to be protected from foreigners 
and the EU. Its anti-European views “stem from a sensitivity to Russia and to a cultural 
sense that Western values are not necessarily appropriate for the Slovak Nation” 
(Szczerbiak and Taggart 2001: 19). Meciar and his coalition partners shared the princi­
pled belief that European integration would undermine Slovak state sovereignty, is not 
‘appropriate for the Slovak Nation’ and would lead to growing inequalities. Profound 
normative beliefs thus provided the road map that guided the coalition’s foreign policy 
and consequently its confrontational approach towards European integration.
The feeling of political isolation reached a high point in 1997 when the EU de­
cided to open accession negotiations with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Esto­
nia and Slovenia but not with Slovakia (Smith 2004: 142). This contributed to the mobi­
lisation of anti-Meciar support and to the election of a new government in 1998 (Prid- 
ham 2002b: 963). The growing international isolation had a considerable impact on 
Slovak society as it reinforced the feeling of policy failure and being left out of a proc­
ess that could stop the perceived relative economic decline of the country vis-a-vis its 
neighbours (see Kukan 1999: 4, see below). Indeed, the perception of dramatic foreign 
policy failure, which discredited Meciar’s inward-looking policy, made the idea of a 
close commitment to European integration persuasive. The idea of EU membership 
became so compelling precisely because it was seen to solve the country’s problems 
(see below).
190
The first Dzurinda government elected in 1998 promised to ‘bring Slovakia back
to Europe’ and to reverse Meciar’s foreign policy entirely (see chapter 4). Indeed, since
Dzurinda took over, Slovakia has moved towards a close commitment to the West and
its economy has become attractive to foreign investors. It has to be seen in this context
that the first Dzurinda government declared its intention to join the euro-zone as soon
as possible and in any case no later than the other Visegrad countries. At the heart of
the wish for a fast-track adoption of the euro stands Slovakia’s experience of being
treated as an ‘outsider’ under the Meciar governments. As the former President of the
National Bank of Slovakia (NBS), Marian Jusko11, put it:
[t]his [a quick adoption of the euro] is based on our latest experience, when 
we were treated as an outsider in the second wave of the EU, OECD and 
NATO enlargement, with a long-lasting effect on FDI inflows, costs and 
debt services and the overall macroeconomic development (Jusko 2003).
The commitment to a quick adoption of the euro is especially remarkable given that 
Slovakia was hurt by a currency crisis in 1998 and also had to change to a flexible ex­
change rate regime (see chapter 3). Though Slovakia was not as badly hurt by a cur­
rency crisis as the Czech Republic, it shares with the Czech Republic the experience of 
monetary policy failure under a fixed exchange rate. However, while the experience of 
a currency crisis under a fixed exchange rate regime supported a readjustment of the 
Czech euro-adoption strategy towards postponement of euro-zone accession, Slova­
kia’s experience with the politics of isolation outweighs any reservations about a fast- 
track approach to EMU.
From the foreign policy failure experienced under Meciar and the treatment as an 
outsider comes Slovakia’s desire not to join the EMU any later than the other Visegrad 
countries. As Papanek, Spokesman for the Finance ministry, explains:
for Slovakia it is important that the country does not enter the EMU later 
than its neighbours and those states with whom it has considerable trade 
and economic relations (The Slovak Spectator, 08/12/2003).
While it might be argued that the West-oriented foreign policy of the Dzurinda govern­
ments is a source of its legitimacy which reflected the polarisation and fragmentation of
11 Marian Jusko’s five-years term as the President of the NBS ended on 1 January 2005. He was replaced 
by Ivan Sramko.
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the party system (see chapter 4), it was the experience of foreign policy failure that 
provided the government with a road map to choose among political strategies: the 
euro-adoption strategy of the Slovak Republic is guided by the determination to join the 
euro-zone as soon as possible and in any case no later than the other Visegrad coun­
tries.
Ideas on macroeconomic policy
When Ivan Miklos, deputy chairman of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union 
(SDKU), took over as Finance Minister in 2002 he announced that his Ministry would 
continue the fiscal reforms necessary for a quick adoption of the euro: "The advan­
tages of fast [euro-zone] membership outweigh the disadvantages" said Miklos (The 
Slovak Spectator, 14/10/2002). He added:
[...] open economies like Slovakia's could be vulnerable through currency 
movements if they kept their own currency. [...] Joining the single currency 
would relieve the national bank of some very burdensome expenses (The 
Slovak Spectator, 21/10/2002).
Thus, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the EMU is seen as the solution to dealing
with large amounts of capital flows. Miklos’ macroeconomic ideas on a fixed exchange
rate regime are driven by the causal belief that an open and small economy will benefit
from a monetary union (see chapter 1 and McKinnon 1963). Behind Miklos’ argument
is also the idea that the EMU is part of the real convergence process. As the former
President of the NBS, Marian Jusko, stated:
the advantage [of EMU membership] is a more stable economic environ­
ment. It will not be necessary to face risks resulting from moving rates, and 
expenses related to the exchange of [Western] currencies will also be 
dropped (The Slovak Spectator, 16/06/2003).
According to Jusko, an early entry into the euro-zone would increase FDI and 
would give Slovakia an advantage over other countries, such as the Czech Republic, 
that plan to join the euro-zone later (The Slovak Spectator, 27/10/2003). Relative gains 
become all important as the ambition to gain advantage over other countries comes 
from the need to catch-up and has to be seen in light of Slovakia’s experiences under
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the period of political and economic isolation when the country suffered significantly 
from FDI losses (see chapter 3).
In June 2003, Miklos and the NBS formulated a euro-adoption strategy that 
would permit the introduction of the euro by late 2006 (The Slovak Spectator, 
16/06/2003). Miklos’ macroeconomic ideas provide him with an understanding of 
cause-and-effect relationships and therefore help him to choose among political strate­
gies to reach his goals. He believes in the effectiveness of neoliberal policies (privatisa­
tion, monetarism and competitive individualism) to achieve economic stabilisation and 
growth. At a party conference of the SDKU in July 2003, Miklos placed the EMU in a 
broader picture and made clear that European integration would not be accomplished 
by EU accession but by the adoption of the euro (SDKU news 12/07/2003). Thus, his 
macroeconomic ideas are tied to a strong commitment to Western integration where 
euro-zone accession is considered to be equally as important as EU membership. This 
again emphasises, in contrast to the Czech Republic, that the euro should not be intro­
duced at the end of a real convergence process but is part of the transition process. 
This, of course, excludes a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards euro-zone entry and 
stresses the significance of a fast-track approach in the wider context. Unlike his Czech 
counterpart, Miklos stated that euro-zone membership is his ‘top priority and concern’ 
(The Slovak Spectator, 01/12/2003). It is in this regard that Miklos, who is well known 
for his ambitious reform projects (see chapter 3), refers to the Maastricht criteria to jus­
tify further budget cuts and to push forward reforms in the area of social, tax and health 
care (SDKU news 12/07/2003). Hence, Miklos explains and justifies the burdens im­
posed by the Maastricht criteria by putting EMU accession on a par with EU accession. 
It can correctly be pointed out that Miklos uses ideas on European integration to legiti­
mise his own interests in pushing forward reforms and to dissociate himself from Me­
ciar’s interventionist economic policy. As stated in chapter 4, this is an important aspect 
to bear in mind as a pro-European policy is a ‘source of legitimacy’ for the governing 
SDKU, stressing the value of the overall importance of a pro-European stance for the 
coalition’s own stability and survival (see also chapter 6). However, these interests
193
have to be seen in a broader idea-based context, given that the idea of policy reforms 
became persuasive only when Meciar’s inward-looking and nationalist politics were 
discredited. Ideas on European integration are used to build public support for joining 
the single currency. Indeed, public support for the euro is remarkably stable and high in 
Slovakia (see chapter 4) and it is therefore argued that ideas have become causally 
consequential, given that they match the existing principled beliefs that Slovakia’s 
place is in Europe and that EU membership is the basis for modernisation. Conse­
quently, ideas on European integration are powerful enough to create winning coali­
tions.
However, as it became clear that Hungary and the Czech Republic would not be
able to adopt the euro in 2006 and that the Maastricht criteria would not be met before
2006, the government and the NBS slightly readjusted the euro-adoption strategy.12
The jointly prepared strategy paper presented in May 2003 postpones the target date
to 2008 (National Bank of Slovakia and Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic
2003: 17; see also RFE/RL 13/02/2004). But the strategy paper continues:
An important aspect to bear in mind, when considering the speed of acces­
sion to the euro-zone, is the progress made by other countries, especially 
our immediate neighbours (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland). It is ob­
vious that any lagging behind on our part would send a negative signal to 
financial markets and investors. [...] Any delay in the accession process 
leading to a later entry compared to neighbouring countries, would mean a 
severe handicap in terms of higher costs or in missing out on the positive 
effects of entry, as well as damaging the overall image of the country (with 
implications, for instance, for lower FDI inflow compared to the acceding 
countries) (National Bank of Slovakia and Ministry of Finance of the Slovak 
Republic 2003: 17).
In summary, by repeatedly referring to the period of isolation, members of the 
NBS board and the government stress the need to join EMU no later than Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (see also The Slovak Spectator, 17/03/2003). Again, this 
shows the significance of the experience of policy failure under Meciar, for it renders 
the idea of euro-zone accession persuasive to policymakers and the public alike. A 
fast-track approach to the introduction of the euro is seen to solve the country’s eco­
12 In addition to developments in its neighbouring countries, the latest dispute over the Stability and Growth 
Pact and the failure to impose sanctions on Germany and France for running high budget deficits have had 
a strong impact on Slovakia given that this happened at the time when the Visegrad countries negotiated 
their budget drafts for 2004 and the draft strategies for the adoption of the euro (cf Jones forthcoming).
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nomic problems, since it suffered so much from the loss of relative gains to its 
neighbouring countries. While it can be correctly argued that the fear of relative eco­
nomic decline highlights the zero-sum character of the strategy, and thus the weight of 
interest in understanding the Slovak drive for policy reforms in line with the Maastricht 
criteria, it becomes clear that these interests have to be seen in the context of the ex­
perience of foreign policy failure that made the idea of European integration so persua­
sive. Ideas on macroeconomic policies are embedded in a strong commitment to 
Western integration and in the causal belief that a small country like Slovakia will bene­
fit from EMU membership.
Hungary
Hungary readjusted its EMU accession strategy in May 2004 and officially postponed 
the adoption of the euro to 2010. However, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the Hun­
garian government and the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) hesitated to launch a pro­
gramme that would make a quick adoption of the euro impossible. Until early 2004 the 
government adhered to a much earlier target date. However, growing economic imbal­
ances eventually forced the government to give up its ambitious plan for a quick euro- 
adoption strategy. In fact, a fast-track strategy was never supported by the actual eco­
nomic performance nor by an adequate fiscal policy. There is a gap between the ideas 
being described by the policy-makers (i.e. a fast-track approach to EMU accession) 
and the actual policy developed. This might indicate that the actual beliefs of the policy­
makers do not drive their position on EMU but rather their short-term related goals (see 
chapter 2).
While it is argued that the very ambitious plans can be interpreted as purely 
self-interested means for the government to reduce interest rates and to gain much 
needed credibility (see below), enthusiastic public and party-based attitudes for the 
adoption of the euro (see chapter 4) must also be understood within the context of the 
idea about European integration as a ‘cornerstone of the Hungarian political culture’
195
(see below). The argument is that Hungary’s intention to join the euro-zone as quickly 
as possible needs to be seen in the context of interests; however, it should not be for­
gotten that these interests cannot be articulated without values. The positive public and 
party-based attitudes towards the euro are shaped by the existing ideas on European 
integration which embody principled beliefs that have their roots in the country’s histori­
cally-shaped ideologies.
Ideas on European integration
Hungary’s was among the first post-socialist governments to formulate a foreign policy 
strongly committed to leaving the East behind and joining the West as quickly as pos­
sible (Wallace 2001: 3, see also Bozoki 2002: 47). The first reform efforts had been 
undertaken well before the breakdown of the communist regime. Hungary became a 
member of the IMF and World Bank in 1982 and signed a cooperation agreement with 
the European Community in 1988 (see chapter 3). With regards to the early reform 
efforts, Bigler (1992) Gemer and Nystrom (1990) underline the important role of shared 
historical memories, as Hungary comprised half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (see 
also Stokes 1993). Bigler (1992: 438) continues: “[the] identification as a Western soci­
ety and aspiration to democratic values and standards [...] have been considered cor­
nerstones of Hungarian political culture”. What Hungary’s President Ferenc Madl de­
clared on the eve of EU accession should be seen in this context: “Hungary has cho­
sen Europe not through a referendum, but through her whole history” (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 03/05/2004). Ideas on European integration are rooted in the principled and 
normative belief that Hungary naturally belongs to Europe. This principled belief in the 
rightness of European integration provides a focal point of guidance for political actors.
As stated in chapter 4, the high public support for European integration corre­
sponds to the political commitment shared and supported by all the major political par­
ties. In the case of the ruling MSZP, the pro-European position is motivated by both the 
party’s interests to break with its communist past and the belief that EU membership is 
the only alternative for a modern Hungary (MSZP) while its junior coalition partner, the
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liberal SZDSZ stresses that the shared values of the EU form the basis of the Hungar­
ian political community (see chapter 4). Hungary’s initial announcement to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible and to peg the forint to the ERM II immediately after 
EU accession (Budapester Zeitung 20/10/2003) might be interpreted in terms of eco­
nomic interests to gain a much needed ‘credibility anchor1 (see below). However, these 
interests cannot be articulated without values and stand in the tradition of the country’s 
strong commitment to European integration. But with growing economic imbalances, 
the peg was postponed and the government had to readjust its ambitious plan for a 
fast-track approach to euro-zone entry.
Ideas on macroeconomic policy
On 13 May 2004 the government submitted its economic programme to the EU and 
announced its intention to introduce the euro in January 2010. The programme officially 
rejects the euro-adoption strategy of July 2003, which aimed to adopt the euro by 2008 
(National Bank of Hungary 2003). This adjustment of the target date for euro-adoption 
marks a turning point in the Hungarian strategy. Until the end of 2003, all previous 
Hungarian governments had wanted to introduce the euro as soon as possible, claim­
ing that the euro-zone entry is part of the transition process itself and should not come 
at the end of a real convergence process. The Orban government (1998-2002) advo­
cated a fast-track approach to the EMU around 2006 (Budapest Sun, 04/11/1999 and 
22/04/1999) and when the Social Democratic-led government took over in 2002, the 
new Finance Minister, Csaba Laszlo, declared that it is “Hungary’s vital interest” to join 
the euro-zone as soon as possible, however, no later than 2007” (Budapest Sun, 
18/04/2002, see also interview with Csaba Laszlo, Budapester Zeitung, 31/10/2002). In 
September 2003, Prime Minister Medgyessy still stated that he wanted to join the EMU 
in 2007/08, adding “until 2006 we will fulfil the Maastricht criteria without any difficulties” 
(FAZ, 20/09/2003, emphasis added). Whereas Hungary’s ‘vital interest’ in joining the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible might be interpreted as a reflection of the country’s 
ideas on European integration and identification with West European values, the incon­
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sistency between the government’s announcements and the actual policy developed 
shows that ideas might not have been a key factor in the Hungarian euro-adoption 
strategy. The strong variation between the wish to adopt the euro quickly and the policy 
of welfare-social democracy suggests that ideas did not play a causal role in the mak­
ing of the euro-adoption strategy. As argued in chapter 4, opportunistic interests -  illus­
trated in the experience of political business cycles and populist economic policies 
standing at odds with the Maastricht criteria of fiscal consolidation -  caused further 
macroeconomic imbalances and led to a postponement of the target date for the adop­
tion of the euro to 2010. Therefore, the optimistic rhetoric employed by the government 
and the very ambitious aim to join the euro-zone by 2008 were attempts by the gov­
ernment to regain credibility given that the economic imbalances reflected to a great 
extent the lack of trust in the Hungarian economy. In addition, given that Hungary still 
has relatively high interest rates because of inflationary pressure, a quick adoption of 
the euro would bring interest rates down to the euro-zone level. Moreover, as stated in 
chapter 3, given that Hungary has the highest foreign debt burden and the highest per­
centage of euro-dominated foreign debt among the Visegrad countries, an early entry 
into the euro-zone would be in the interest of the government. This is because through 
irrevocably fixing the forint to the euro, Hungary’s debt service would no longer be de­
pendent on currency fluctuations (see also Berger 2004: 15). Ironically, it is the wish to 
re-establish trust in the government’s economic policy that contributed to a postpone­
ment of the target date for the euro-adoption. A credible and clear euro-adoption strat­
egy that is not in a permanent contradiction with the actual fiscal and monetary policy in 
Hungary may well be more important for the market than the actual target date itself (cf 
FAZ 02/02/2004).
The ambitious aim of joining the euro-zone as soon as possible was initially 
supported by the NBH and its President Zsigmond Jarai. Jarai stated just weeks after 
taking over as President_in_Marclv^001 that Hungary should join the euro-zone as
quickly as possible (Jarai 2001: 3). o il a number of occasions this was also repeated
\
by his Vice President Gyorgy Szap£ry, who declared that the central bank aims to
adopt the euro in 2006 (Budapester Zeitung, 28/01/2002). Indeed, in contrast to its 
Czech counterpart, the Hungarian central bank board appears to have a unified opinion 
on EMU accession.
However, from mid-2003 Jarai started to be pessimistic about the government’s 
euro-adoption strategy because of fiscal expansion and worrisome economic perform­
ance. But, while the NBH was very sceptical about the feasibility of a quick adoption of 
the euro, it nevertheless supported the plan (Budapester, 20/10/2003). This has to be 
seen in the context of the NBH’s efforts to gain an additional instrument to defend its 
own independence from government intervention, to justify its monetary policy and to 
put pressure on the government to reduce the budget deficit.13 In this regards, the obli­
gation to join the euro-zone empowers the central bank as it enables the NHB to de­
fend its restrictive monetary policy. For instance, Jarai commented on increases in in­
terest rates in July 2002 with the remark that a low inflation rate would pave the way for 
a quick euro-adoption (Budapest Sun, 11/07/2002). In February 2003, Jarai justified the 
appreciation of the forint by saying that a strong forint is not good, but it is the best in­
strument to fight against inflation which in turn would support a quick EMU accession 
(Budapest Sun, 27/02/2003). In December 2003, in response to increased inflation 
rates, Jarai reiterated his position. According to Jarai: "[tjight fiscal and monetary poli­
cies are unavoidable if Hungary is to join the euro-zone as planned" (Budapest Sun, 
04/12/2003). Again, in March 2004 Jarai announced interest rates would be kept high 
at 12.5 percent -  a much higher level than in all other Visegrad countries -  to fight in­
flation, inflation expectations and to pave the way for EMU accession (Budapester Zei­
tung, 09/02/2004). Thus, the NBH also supported a quick EMU accession for self- 
interested reasons and as a means to re-establish the credibility of Hungarian mone­
tary policy after years of high inflation rates.
13 It should be noted that, in contrast to the Czech Republic, the Hungarian central bank is under higher 
pressure to fight inflation since Hungary has experienced high inflation rates since the collapse of the 
communist regime. Also, the NBH has had severe difficulties in defending its independence (see chapter 
6). Therefore, the use of the Maastricht criteria to justify an increase in interest rates is definitely also a 
means to defend its independence from government intervention. This is even more so as the central 
bank’s restrictive monetary policy is backed by the EU and the ‘price stability culture’ in Europe which is 
“underwritten by the belief that stable prices contribute to a macroeconomic framework which is conducive 
to growth and employment” (Jones 2002: 53).
Hungary only decided to postpone its target date for the adoption of the euro af-
y
ter the resignation of Csaba Laszlo as Finance Minister in January 2004.14 As the latest
budget deficit overshot the government’s forecast, a review of euro-zone entry was
necessary. Just hours after Laszlo's resignation the designated Finance Minister Tibor
Draskovics announced:
[i]n responding to the request of the premier, I shall review the agenda of 
our integration into the euro-zone. I think that the 'how' of our integration is 
more important than the 'when”1 (RFE/RL Newsline, 09/01/2004).
Only three months later, Draskovics then stated that an adoption of the euro in 
2008 would lead to severe budget cuts. If euro-zone entry was to wait until 2010, this 
would allow for a relaxation of fiscal policy (Budapester Zeitung, 22/03/2004). On 6 
May Draskovics then declared: "It is safer to set a target date of 2010" (Budapest Sun, 
13/05/2004). To justify the postponement, Draskovics placed euro-zone accession into 
a broader picture where the primary goal of the Hungarian government was not to intro­
duce the euro but to catch up with the overall GDP per capita level of the EU countries 
(Budapester Zeitung 17/05/2004). Relaxing fiscal policy would be the appropriate way 
to achieve economic stabilisation (Budapester Zeitung, 22/03/2004). This is an impor­
tant shift in the Hungarian position on EMU accession because the euro was initially 
seen as a means to achieve real convergence and not as the endpoint of the process. 
However, at the same time, a relaxation of fiscal discipline by means of a flexible fiscal 
policy is in line with the expenditure-oriented policy of the MSZP-led government; a 
policy that is driven by electoral interests (see chapter 4). Thus, in conclusion, the read­
justment of the Hungarian strategy for adopting the euro is not a consequence of low 
domestic support -  as seen in chapter 4 both party-based and public support for the 
euro are exceptionally high in Hungary -  nor a consequence of changing ideas on 
European integration. Instead, it must be seen in light of the government’s need to fulfil
14 Laszlo was asked to resign on 7 January 2004 because "the [actual] figures are worse than predicted by 
the Finance Ministry. The difference is so large that it must have personal consequences,” commented 
Prime Minister Medgyessy (RFE/RL Newsline, 08/01/2004). The budget deficit reached 5.6 percent in 
January 2004, much higher than the Finance Ministry’s initial (4.8 percent) and revised (5.2 percent) tar­
gets. Forecasts of the inflation rates were also wrong and had to be adjusted (inflation was high with an 
average of 7.4 percent in 2003). According to Judit Nemenyi the wrong forecast (tself caused further infla­
tion expectations (Budapester Zeitung, 01/03/2004, see also chapter 3).
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election promises and its interests to get re-elected. The initial ambitious plan to join 
the euro-zone as quickly as possible has to be seen in light of the government’s efforts 
to re-establish credibility and trust in the Hungarian economy and government policy. 
Under these conditions, the scope for ideas is limited and the pressure for policy con­
vergence as expressed in the obligation to meet the Maastricht criteria losses signifi­
cantly its leverage.
Poland
During and before the period of the last SLD-led government, Poland was keen to join 
the euro-zone as quickly as possible. However, as pointed out in chapter 4, growing 
public and party-based Euroscepticism, which has gained momentum in recent years, 
put pressure on the SLD minority government to reconsider its approach to euro-zone 
accession. But while the pressure certainly constrained the government in its effort to 
implement reforms to meet the Maastricht criteria, the government did not officially dis­
tance itself from a fast-track approach. In fact, in 2004 Poland was the only Visegrad 
country that had not announced an official target date for the adoption of the euro. As 
discussed in chapter 4, this certainly has to be put into the context of the decrease in 
both public support for the euro and the government’s popularity one year before the 
2005 general elections. Yet, despite the fact that the non-disclosure of an official euro- 
adoption strategy was influenced by electoral concerns, the SLD-government, techno­
crats and experts alike favoured the introduction of the euro. It is not a coincidence that 
the debate about a unilateral euroisation was conducted mainly by Polish academics 
and policy-makers.15 This particular group can be described as a genuine epistemic 
community that consists of “professionals who share a common causal model and a
15 The most prominent examples of Polish academics favouring euroisation are Andrzej Bratkowski and 
Jacek Rostowski (2002); the most prominent politician is the former Finance Minister Kotodko. Andrzej 
Bratkowski (1991) and Jacek Rostowski (1989-1991) were both economic advisors to the Deputy Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Andrzej Bratkowski was deputy President of the Na­
tional Bank of Poland from 2001-2004. Euroisation became the axiom for an adoption of the euro as legal 
tender without a previous convergence process and without having a common central bank. Unilateral 
euroisation can take place through the introduction of a currency board or a takeover of the euro as 
the legal tender. The main advantages of euroisation may include much lower interest rates and the elimi­
nation of currency risk (cf Meade et al. 2002).
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common set of political values” (Haas 1990: 41; see also chapter 2). It is the shared 
belief that a successful transition to a market economy has to be achieved through a 
rapid transformation process. In this regard a fast-track approach to adopting the euro 
is in the tradition of the Polish Balcerowicz-Plan of economic transition. Causal beliefs 
on macroeconomic policies act as a road map and increase policy-makers’ clarity 
about the end-means relationship of the fast-track approach towards euro-zone entry. 
Also, the support for a quick adoption of the euro reflects Poland’s principled beliefs 
embodied in a strong commitment to the West that, during the communist regime, 
found its most vocal expression in the Solidarity movement.
Ideas on European integration
Above all, Solidarity aimed to end the chapter “of a long historical process: [Poland’s] 
decade-long transition from “ideocratic” communism to an authoritarian, military regime 
and finally to democracy" (Bozoki 2002: 35). As stated in chapter 4, there was an over­
whelming political consensus among the major parties that this democratic process has 
to be embedded in a foreign policy committed to a ‘return to Europe’. Europe is more 
than a mere programme; it is a “regained status after the collapse of the communist 
regime” (Bozoki 2002: 48). Ideas on European integration were interrelated with a 
strong public and political identification with Western values (Los-Nowak 2000, Castle 
and Taras 2002). As Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Social Democratic Prime Minister from 
1996-97 and Foreign Minister since 2001, put it: “the European orientation is [...] built 
on values that are common for Poland and the European Union” (Cimoszewciz quoted 
in Stadtmuller 2000: 30). Ideas of shared cultural and political values as the strongest 
elements to maintain European integration and to underpin European order certainly 
influence political action. This is because the principled beliefs they embody provide 
road maps that clarify actors’ political action vis-a-vis European issues. Hanna 
Suchocka, former Democratic Union Prime Minister (1992-93), even goes a step fur­
ther by embodying idea of European integration into a worldview, and so into a funda­
mental doctrine, stating that the Polish civilisation wholly depends on EU membership:
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“[I]f Poland does not become a member of the EU, it will mean isolation, marginalisa­
tion and in consequence the collapse of Polish civilisation” (Suchocka quoted in 
Stadtmuller 2000: 31).
The consistency in foreign policy of all Polish governments -  be it a government 
led by the (post-) Solidarity parties or the post-communist parties -  went hand in hand 
with strong support for the Maastricht Treaty and a quick adoption of the euro. In 1992, 
the first Minister for Foreign Affairs of post-communist Poland, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 
stated that Poland supported the Maastricht Treaty because “it is in just that kind of 
structure that Poland saw its place in the future” (quoted in Stadtmuller 2000: 29-30). 
However, as demonstrated in chapter 4, the mainstream parties came under pressure 
in formulating a pro-European integration policy, given that Eurosceptic parties and 
growing public dissatisfaction with the EU had gained ground. The nationalist LPR and 
the radical farmer party Samoobrona were able to secure almost 20 percent of the 
votes during the general election in 2001 and possessed a considerable veto power in 
the Sejm. Their political leverage was further reinforced by the fact that the SLD coali­
tion government lost its majority in 2003 (see chapter 6). Both parties, the LPR and 
Samoobrona, represent strong resentments against the EU. In the case of Samoo­
brona, populism and the socio-economic interests of its constituency are crucial in un­
derstanding the party’s Euroscepticism (see chapter 4). In contrast, the LPR’s anti-EU 
rhetoric is not simply based on instrumental populism to attract voters but on a princi­
pled rejection of European integration as a fundamental threat to the Polish nation, 
culture and sovereignty (see Szczerbiak 2002: 9). The EU is described as “speculative 
foreign capital that will call down the destruction of Polish conscience and culture” (LPR 
quoted in Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 312). The LPR accused the SLD-led government 
of selling out Poland and destroying Polish culture: “They [the Polish government] will 
succeed in melting our nation in a unified cosmopolitan European Union” (LPR, quoted 
in Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 312). Ideas certainly drive the party’s rejection of any 
kind of European integration, which is consistent with the party’s identity as a ‘religious 
right’, pro-clerical, anti-reform, and anti-system party (see chapter 4). The 2001 general
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elections resulted in a significant manifestation of anti-EU (LPR and Samoobrona) and 
sceptical EU (PiS and PSL) forces in the Polish Sejm, all of whom either rejected the 
adoption of the euro or favoured postponing it to the distant future. Certainly, this 
added to further pressure on the former government and the centre-right party, the 
Civic Platform, to reconsider an early entry into the euro-zone, and might therefore 
have influenced the government’s decision not to announce an official strategy to 
adopting the euro. Regardless of this, prevailing ideas on macroeconomic policy held 
by policy-makers help to explain why Poland has been keen to join the euro-zone as 
quickly as possible (until recently). In particular, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and 
its President Leszek Balercowicz have been at the forefront of discussions about a 
fast-track approach to adopting the euro.
Ideas on macroeconomic policy
One of the main supporters of a quick euro-adoption has been the President of the
NBP, Leszek Balcerowicz. In November 2001 he declared:
my basic point is, that firstly, early entry into the Monetary Union is possible 
and secondly, that it is preferable to the delayed one. By early entry I mean 
entry close to the earliest possible date, which one can recognise to be a- 
round the year 2006 (Balcerowicz 2001a: 1).
Balcerowicz’s support for a fast-track approach to EMU accession has to be interpreted 
in light of his macroeconomic idea of shock therapy measures. Indeed, his macroeco­
nomic ideas on transition policies are essentially shaped by beliefs about cause-effect 
relationships and act as a road map that helps him to choose among strategies for 
EMU accession. As the father of the country’s shock therapy, Balcerowicz advocated a 
harsh and rapid transformation of the economy through the provocation of economic 
shocks. It has to be seen in this light that Balcerowicz uses ideas on macroeconomic 
policy to legitimise the costs imposed by reforms designed to fulfil EMU accession cri­
teria, using the latter to pressure the government into pursuing reforms:
[t]he earlier deadline of the entry to the E(M)U could act as a powerful moti­
vating device to complete those [economic] reforms. I am a great believer 
in the deadlines and I think they help to achieve success. Delaying the en­
try could do more harm than good, as it would weaken the incentives to
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complete the necessary and often politically costly reforms (Balcerowicz 
2001a: 2).
The resolute resistance against delays in approaching the adoption of the euro is con­
sistent with Balcerowicz’s support for shock therapy measures where under no circum­
stances were delays to be accepted since they would put the irreversibility of the re­
forms into question and so endanger the whole transition process. In December 2002 
Balcerowicz reiterated his position on early euro-zone entry arguing that it is in ‘Po­
land’s national interest’ since euro-zone membership reduces currency risks and sup­
ports economic growth:
it's in Poland's national interest to adopt a strategy thanks to which Poles 
would have euros in their pockets as soon as possible. If we met the Maas­
tricht criteria in 2005, then 2006 or 2007 would come into play (Balcerowicz 
quoted in The Warsaw Voice, 19/12/2002).
On the eve of Poland’s accession to the EU, Balcerowicz restated that it is better for 
the new EU entrants to join the euro-zone soon rather than stay outside of it. According 
to Balcerowicz, there are no economic obstacles to Poland joining the euro-zone, only 
political ones (The Warsaw Voice, 05/05/2004). Balcerowicz rejects the fears of some 
Western economists and institutions, such as the German Bundesbank and the Aus­
trian Central Bank, who insist that the Visegrad countries first have to achieve real con­
vergence before they can adopt the euro. According to Balcerowicz:
this is nonsense. We cannot wait until we are as rich as the old EU member 
states. We would like to join EMU precisely because we want to become 
rich given that the currency union supports trade within the EU and stimu­
lates economic growth (FAZ, 24/04/2004).
In contrast to the Czech and Hungarian Finance Ministers, Balcerowicz asserts that the 
EMU is part of the process to achieve real convergence. Once again, this reveals his 
macroeconomic ideas based on the perception that a rapid transformation of the econ­
omy must be achieved first if further progress is to be attained.
The SLD-led government was also in favour of a quick adoption of the euro. In 
July 2002, Grzegorz Kolodko replaced Marek Belka16 as Finance Minister and declared
16 Marek Belka officially resigned for personal reasons. However, unofficially, he lost his job over a dispute 
on the pace of reforms with Prime Minister Leszek Miller (Belka’s budget draft was rejected by the Sejm). 
Marek Belka replaced Miller as Prime Minister in May 2004 (see chapter 6).
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that Poland would be able to join EMU in 2006: “six years ago I presented a pro­
gramme, ‘euro 2006’. It was not an illusion but a reliable vision”, said Kolodko in July 
2002 (Financial Times Deutschland (FTD), 01/08/2002, for further details on the pro­
gramme ‘euro 2006’ see Stadtmuller 2000).17 In October 2002, a working group set up 
by the NBP and the Finance Ministry issued a joint statement declaring that:
the intention of the government and National Bank of Poland is the pursuit 
of economic policies that will ensure Poland's meeting of the nominal con­
vergence criteria of the Maastricht treaty in 2005 (Financial Times, 
09/10/2002).
Grzegorz Kolodko was replaced by Andrzej Raczko in June 2003 because of internal 
party conflicts with Prime Minister Miller and the Minister of Economy Hausner over the 
flat tax and economic policy. Kolodko's resignation goes hand in hand with a subtle 
readjustment of the SLD’s position on the timing of the euro-adoption. While Raczko 
vehemently defended a strategy of fast adoption of the euro, in July 2003 Hausner pre­
sented the first draft of his budget plans that aimed to increase the budget deficit tem­
porarily over the next two years and to reduce it to the Maastricht criterion level by 
2007:
The deficit in 2004 and 2005 should be temporarily higher due to EU ac­
cession, however, this should be a path toward narrowing the deficit in 
2006 and 2007 in order to meet the Maastricht criteria in 2007, with [public] 
debt not exceeding 55 percent of GDP (Hausner, The Warsaw Voice, 
3/07/2003).
Thus, the Hausner plan deviated from the previous target date for EMU accession in 
2007, making 2008 or 2009 more realistic targets. As stated in chapter 4 and 6, after 
the collapse of the SLD coalition with the PSL, Prime Minister Miller went on to form a 
minority government which proved to be fairly unstable and unable as to push forward 
reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria, therefore making a fast-track approach to 
adopting the euro unfeasible (see chapter 6). However, unlike the other Visegrad gov­
ernments, in 2004 the Polish government had not officially announced a target date for 
euro-zone entry and various representatives of the Finance Ministry and the NBP still 
considered 2007 as a possible date:
17 Kotodko was already Finance Minister between 1994 and 1997 and well known for populist economic 
and monetary policy measures (see chapter 6).
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looking at possibilities resulting from the Hausner plan, it seems that 2006, 
when the budget deficit is below 3 percent of the GDP, is the year of meet­
ing the criteria. So we would be able to join the euro-zone in 2007 (anony­
mous source of information from the Finance Ministry as cited by the Polish 
Embassy News Bulletin, 23/01/2004).
The ambitious target date of 2007 for euro-zone entry reflects the widespread idea that 
the EMU is crucial to achieving real convergence. Thus, the idea embodies causal be­
liefs about the end-means relationship between real convergence and euro-zone 
membership. Among the supporters of a fast-track approach to adopting the euro was 
Jozef Oleksy (SLD), Minister of Internal Affairs and former Prime Minister, who argued 
that:
[...] it [the Maastricht criteria] ensures similarity of the economic structures 
of the member states, which makes them less vulnerable to external threats.
[...] It creates the world's biggest economic area using a single currency, 
the euro, which translates into the benefits of its scale and allows for active 
operations on global markets (The Warsaw Voice, 21/04/2004).
Olesky’s idea on the EMU is driven by the causal belief in European integration as an
appropriate response to a changing economic and social environment. Accordingly, the
‘world’s biggest economic area using a single currency’ provides a common regional
framework to fight against 'external threats’.
But in this regard it is not only the prospect to be part of, but also to have a say 
in, the world biggest economic region that drives Poland’s desire to join the euro-zone 
as soon as possible. As the Ministry of Finance argued, a fast-track approach to euro­
zone entry is in “Poland's strategic interest as it will give Poland a bigger say in deci­
sion making within the EU”, (Polish Embassy News Bulletin, 05/11/04). Certainly, being 
the largest new member state in terms of population, the ‘bigger say’ should also be 
seen within the context of Poland’s strong voting power in the EU. This strategic inter­
est initially went hand in hand with the ideas on macroeconomic policy and European 
integration. Euro-zone membership was seen as a means to achieve real convergence 
and to gain political leverage on the EU level.
In conclusion, ideas on European integration were driven by the belief that the 
transition process should be embedded in a foreign policy committed to a 'return to 
Europe’. The consistency in foreign policy of all Polish governments went hand in hand
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with support for a quick adoption of the euro. A fast-track approach to euro-zone ac­
cession stands in the tradition of the Polish Balcerowicz-Plan of economic transition. 
Poland’s aspiration to become a strong economic and political partner within the EU 
initially found its expression in the wish for a fast-track approach to euro-zone acces­
sion. However, as discussed in chapter 4 and elaborated above, growing public Euro- 
scepticism and the emergence of parties whose identities are closely tied to their anti- 
EU rhetoric constrained any strategy to adopting the euro quickly, negatively affecting 
the feasibility of a fast-track approach -  a fact which was further supported by the mi­
nority government’s weakness to push forward reforms (see chapter 6).
Conclusion
The categorisation of ideas in causal and principled beliefs and worldviews made in 
chapter 2 provides a useful tool to analyse the different meanings of the EMU, and the 
turns the Visegrad countries have made in their approach to adopting the euro. Indeed, 
positions on euro-zone membership have not been static but have changed on a num­
ber of occasions. While until the end of the 1990s, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland were keen to join the euro-zone quickly, the Czech Republic announced in 
2002 that accession had to be postponed to 2010/2011. In 2004, Hungary eventually 
set a target date around 2010 as well. Slovakia experienced the opposite trend. While 
in the 1990s under the Meciar governments, the EMU was a far distant project, Slova­
kia now advocates an early entry to the euro-zone that could happen around 2008. 
Poland also wanted to join the euro-zone as early as possible but the governing SLD 
did not announce an official target date, reflecting their desire to avoid conflicts in the 
run up to the next general elections when approval rates of the euro were shrinking and 
the government’s popularity decreasing.
The chapter has argued that, in the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
variations in the euro-adoption strategies can be traced back to different reflections of 
past experiences (Czech Republic and Slovakia) and to a change of fundamental prin­
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cipled beliefs on European integration (Slovakia). In particular, the Czech Republic and 
its President Vaclav Klaus are cases in point for a position on the euro that has been 
driven by the perception of policy-makers’ past experiences, their historical memory 
and their images of national identity. Vaclav Klaus’ position on the EMU is tightly linked 
to his fears that the Czech Republic could once again lose its national sovereignty 
through euro-zone membership. Klaus also explained his opposition to the euro by 
referring to Czech experiences in dealing with great powers and foreign penetration. 
The argument is that his ideas on European integration and the EMU are so forceful 
precisely because they match the existing ideologies in particular historical settings. 
Because the fit with existing ideologies may reinforce the persuasiveness of an idea, 
Klaus is able to ‘garner support’ (see chapter 2) for being against euro-zone entry. At a 
more concrete level, President Klaus’ ideas on European integration are ‘materialised’ 
and temporarily ‘institutionalised’ in his appointment of three new central bank board 
members all of whom are said to share Klaus’ sceptical views on the adoption of the 
euro.
In addition, the experience of monetary policy failure fuels reservations against a 
quick euro-adoption strategy in the Czech Republic. The currency crisis of 1997 con­
tributed to a change of ideas about how to conduct macroeconomic policies. With the 
experience of monetary policy failure under a large amount of capital flight and mem­
bers of the CNB re-considered their ideas on the cause and effect of monetary policy. 
A flexible exchange rate was now seen as the best way to tackle capital flight and to 
achieve real convergence. But it has also been argued that the government’s euro- 
adoption strategy is influenced by the self-interest of maintaining for as long as possi­
ble a competitive advantage over the other Visegrad countries. Thus, the causal belief 
in the suitability of a flexible exchange rate for a transition economy fits well with exist­
ing interests. In addition, the CSSD’s decision to postpone the adoption of the euro to 
the next decade has also to be seen in the context of the party’s interests and need to 
fulfil partisan expectations as well as the unfavourable environment for a fast-track ap­
proach created by a relatively strong public opposition to the euro (see chapter 4) and
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the dominant anti-euro discourse led by prominent politicians such as the President of 
the Czech Republic Vaclav Klaus. However, again, President Klaus’ position can only 
be understood with reference to his principled beliefs on European integration whereas 
the growing partisan pressure on the CSSD must be seen with reference to rising un­
employment rates in the aftermath of the currency crisis that contributed to a readjust­
ment of causal beliefs on the suitability of a fixed exchange rate for a transition econ­
omy. While this illustrates how ideas intersect with interests it also shows that one fac­
tor alone is not sufficient to explain cross-national responses to the objective of euro­
zone membership. In addition, interests and ideas alone do not explain the capacity to 
push forward with reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria which was weakened by 
the coalition government’s instability caused by political crises and positively influenced 
by the institutional context of a coalition government consisting of incoherent political 
parties (see chapter 6).
Similar to the Czech Republic, Slovakia was hit by a currency crisis in 1998 and 
had to change from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime. However, the experi­
enced policy failure of a fixed exchange rate regime did not lead to an identical position 
on EMU accession because the meaning of the EMU differs fundamentally in both 
countries. The chapter explained the different meaning of the EMU through Slovakia’s 
experience of foreign policy failure under Meciar. Slovakia ‘returned to Europe’ and to a 
strategy of quick adoption of the euro only after Meciar lost the general election in 
1998. Indeed, the experience of foreign policy failure under Meciar as an impetus of 
cognitive change on ideas about European integration provides the Dzurinda govern­
ment with a road map to EMU accession that is guided by the determination to join the 
euro-zone as soon as possible and in any case, no later than the other Visegrad coun­
tries. Government members and the NBS repeatedly refer to the period of isolation 
when Slovakia was treated as an ‘outsider’ to justify their stance on a fast-track ap­
proach to the introduction of the euro. A fast-track approach is seen as the remedy for 
the country’s economic problems, since it suffered so heavily from the loss of relative 
gains to its neighbouring countries during the period of international isolation. While this
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demonstrates the weight of the interests to catch-up economically vis-a-vis its 
neighbours, it becomes clear that these interests have to be seen in the context of the 
experience of foreign policy failure that made the idea of European integration so per­
suasive. By the same token, ideas on macroeconomic policies are embedded in a 
strong commitment to Western integration and in the belief that a small country like 
Slovakia will benefit from EMU membership. Ideas on macroeconomic policy are driven 
by the causal belief that the adoption of the euro should be integrated within the transi­
tion process; in fact, euro-zone accession is seen as equally important as EU acces­
sion. Thus, in short, the governing SDKU’s intention to join the euro-zone as soon as 
possible is interwoven with the normatively principled and causal beliefs that EU mem­
bership and the adoption of the euro are fundamental principles for guiding Slovakia’s 
path in Europe and are means to 'speed up the country’s modernisation’. At the same 
time as this illustrates how ideas intersect with interests, the following chapter demon­
strates that the government’s ability and capacity to pursue a fast-track approach to 
euro-zone entry is further supported by party system fragmentation and polarisation 
between nationalist-populist and ‘anti-Meciar’ coalition parties -  a distinct institutional 
feature of Slovak politics that is highly relevant to understanding Slovakia’s path to­
wards the adoption of the euro.
While Hungary’s political culture and identification as a Western society lay the 
foundation for a positive view on European integration, the euro-adoption strategy is 
not driven mainly by the ideas that actors hold but by decision-makers’ self-interests in 
achieving short-term related goals. This is because there is a strong discrepancy be­
tween the ideas being described by the actors and the actual policy developed. The 
announcement of the government’s intention to join the euro-zone as quickly as possi­
ble was never matched by an appropriate fiscal policy. Under the chapter 4 described 
conditions of a rigid environment for party competition, Hungary’s euro-adoption strat­
egy is not mainly driven by the ideas that actors hold but by decision-makers’ opportun­
istic interests in getting re-elected and the need to broaden out the electoral base. The 
initial optimistic rhetoric regarding a fast-track approach towards the adoption of the
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euro has also to be seen in light of the government’s efforts to reduce investors’ uncer­
tainties. More specifically, as Hungary has experienced high inflation and interest rates 
throughout the transition process, euro-zone membership would be a perfect means to 
regain credibility and to reduce the high interest rates that impede the growth cycle. 
Moreover, through euro-zone entry, Hungary’s high euro-dominated foreign debt ser­
vice would no longer be dependent on currency fluctuations. As further discussed in 
the following chapters, under conditions that reinforced opportunistic interests, the 
scope for ideas and institutions are limited and the pressure for policy convergence as 
expressed in the obligation to meet the Maastricht criteria significantly loses its lever­
age.
In Poland, ideas on European integration were driven by the belief that the tran­
sition process has to be embedded in a foreign policy committed to a ‘return to Europe’. 
The consistency in foreign policy of all Polish governments went hand in hand with 
support for a quick adoption of the euro. But being the largest country among the new 
EU members and having a strong voting power in the EU, Poland’s initial intention to 
join the euro-zone as soon as possible was also driven by the desire to have a bigger 
say in the European decision-making process. It has been argued that the initial inten­
tion to join the euro-zone as soon as possible was supported by an epistemic commu­
nity of policy-makers, whose macroeconomic conceptions are based on shock therapy 
measures. In contrast to the Czech Republic, and lately also to Hungary, Poland’s 
Governor of the Central Bank, Balcerowicz, the most prominent member of this epis­
temic community, sees the adoption of the euro not as the end point of a transition 
process but as a means to achieve real convergence. Yet, Polish policy-makers have 
been less successful in making the idea of a fast-track approach persuasive. In fact, 
growing party-based and public Euroscepticism constrains any strategy for adopting 
the euro quickly making a fast-track approach unlikely. Ideas on European integration 
of the anti-EU parties LPR and Samoobrona are embedded in principled beliefs that 
further European integration undermines state sovereignty and is a threat to Polish 
culture. Indeed, as party-based and public Euroscepticism gained momentum, the
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SLD-led government came under growing pressure to pursue a fast-track approach to 
adopting the euro -  a fact which was further supported by the minority government’s 
weakness to push forward reforms (see chapter 6).
in summary, ideas shed light on the origin of support for and opposition to EMU 
accession. They provide a tool for judging political action against interests and help to 
explain cross-national variations in approaching euro-zone accession. It has been ar­
gued that on the basis of the experience of dramatic policy failure, when policies are 
discredited by events, ideas do exert a strong influence on the policy-making and 
therefore can become causally consequential. Ideas exert a distinct influence on the 
country’s euro adoption strategy when a cognitive change, triggered by policy failure, 
changes commonly held beliefs. Ideas become causally consequential when they help 
to specify the origins of the crisis. However, at the same time, it has also been argued 
that ideas suggest solutions to the crisis that suit actors’ interests. This again shows 
that it is fruitless to separate ideas from interests. In addition, any idea-oriented ap­
proach has to account for the fact that institutionalised causal beliefs (such as the insti­
tutionalised idea that an independent central bank performs better in delivering low 
inflation and high employment and the idea that proportional electoral systems reflect 
better the divisions in society) profoundly affect policy outcomes. It is therefore the pur­
pose of the following chapter to analyse the impact of institutional opportunities and 
constraints on the euro-adoption strategies under review.
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Chapter 6
The institutional level of analysis:
The impact of domestic institutions on the euro-adoption strategies
This chapter examines the implications of institutional settings for the euro-adoption 
strategies in the Visegrad countries. Institutional settings mean the context in which 
politicians prefer some options to others (Lijphart and Waisman 1996). Implications 
refer to the effects of these settings on the country’s approach to adopting the euro. 
The aim is to show whether institutional incentives and constraints faced by political 
actors in different national contexts help to explain why the Visegrad countries display 
a cross-national variation in the strategies pursued for the adoption of the euro. The 
chapter concentrates on three different institutions that play a key role in shaping fiscal 
and monetary policy reforms and therefore influence the countries’ strategies to adopt­
ing the euro: 1. the design of electoral systems; 2. the degree of central bank inde­
pendence; and 3. institutions of market economy and specifically industrial relations. 
The chapter focuses on two aspects of the aforementioned institutions: first, the institu­
tional constraints and the resulting strategies and preferences developed by the actors 
involved; second, the implications for reforms aimed at fulfilling the Maastricht criteria 
and therefore for the country’s approach to adopting the euro.
As discussed in chapter 2, the type of electoral system affects representation 
and political outcomes (Rae 1967, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Cox 1997). Du- 
verger’s (1954) seminal work on the electoral system and its political consequences 
has been extended and modified by numerous scholars. Scholars now agree that many 
other factors, for instance cultural factors, have multi-dimensional effects on the design 
of electoral systems (Grofman and Lijphart 1986, Lijphart 1984, Rae 1967, Bogdanor 
and Butler 1983, Sanford 2002, Mair 1991). As this chapter shows, cultural factors and 
legacies played a key role in the design of electoral laws. The overview of the constitu­
tional bargaining that led to the electoral law design clearly shows that politicians tried 
to anticipate the political consequences of electoral laws and were keen to choose
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among alternatives when the opportunity was given. This chapter relates the electoral 
law to the effectiveness of governments and their capacity to implement reforms that 
aim to fulfil the euro-zone accession requirements. In particular, it considers assump­
tions made by Roubini and Sachs (1989) and others on the relationship between the 
composition of governments and the state of fiscal consolidation (see chapter 2). Given 
that all Visegrad countries have coalition governments, the number and coherence of 
the coalition parties seem to be a valuable starting point for analysing whether stable 
governments, defined here by a low number of coalition parties and a cohesive cabinet, 
succeed much better in implementing fiscal consolidation programmes. The chapter 
thus investigates whether the electoral system is an effective variable when trying to 
trace sources of difficulties in implementing fiscal reforms that affect the countries’ 
euro-adoption strategies.
When analysing reforms aimed at fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, institutional 
constraints arising from central bank independence (CBI) are highly important too. This 
is because CBI has several consequences for the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy. 
Two aspects of reforms related to compliance with the Maastricht criteria are directly 
connected to CBI (see chapter 2). First, independent central banks enjoy higher credi­
bility than dependent ones (Rogoff 1985); in turn, credible central banks perform better 
in maintaining or achieving low inflation (Cukierman 1992, Alesina and Summers 1993, 
Eijffinger and de Haan 1996). Second, an independent central bank constrains the 
scope of a government’s economic policy choices (see chapter 2). For example, schol­
ars argue that the increase in fiscal deficits is a consequence of CBI given that gov­
ernments cannot use monetary policy and therefore may turn to fiscal policy to stimu­
late the economy (Hallerberg et al. 2002a,b). The high pressure on governments to 
achieve both fiscal consolidation and to reflate the economy resulted in some Visegrad 
governments' efforts to undermine the independence of their central banks and to force 
them to cut interest rates. Political debates on central bank law are directly related to 
issues relevant to euro-zone entry and are discussed in this chapter. This is all the 
more important for the reason that the countries might score well in the CBI indices, yet
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the actual practice may deviate from the law (Cukierman 1994: 3, see chapter 2). It 
should also be kept in mind that the disinflation process in a transition country might go 
beyond the direct control of the central bank as inflation might be related to specific 
transition problems (see chapter 2). Therefore, this chapter does not correlate CBI to 
the disinflation process per se (see also Dvorsky 2000: 25) but it explores whether the 
central bank pursues a restrictive monetary policy and relates the resulting constraints 
on the government in conducting economic policies to potential consequences for the 
euro-adoption strategies of the countries concerned.
This chapter analyses the institutional framework of the central banks in the 
Visegrad countries by applying one of the most widely used benchmark indices: that of 
Cukierman (1992). The other widely used index is the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini 
(GMT) index (Grilli et al. 1991). Some scholars (Mangano 1998, Forder 1996, 1998, 
Beblavy 2003) have criticised the Cukierman and GMT indices, correctly pointing out 
that the assessment of CBI depends to a large extent on subjective interpretations of 
central bank laws. Other scholars note that the Cukierman index ignores exchange rate 
policy as a variable of functional independence (Beblavy 2003, Dvorsky 2000, and 
Radzner and Riesinger 1997). Nevertheless, most scholars who conducted research in 
the field of CBI (most notably Romer and Romer 1997, Moser 1999 and Keefer and 
Stasavage 2000) have applied and further developed the Cukierman and Grilli et al. 
indices. By the same token, most studies on CBI in CEECs have used the Cukierman 
index and this thesis uses the same in order to be able to compare results of previous 
studies with own calculations of CBI after amendments in central bank laws in 2002.1
With respect to the Cukierman index, three aspects of CBI are analysed here: 
first, the legislative objective of the central banks; second, government lending regula­
tions; and third, the status of the central bank board. In addition, the accountability of 
the Visegrad countries’ central bank is discussed, since this is a central topic in today’s 
debate on CBI. The political authority sets the legislative objectives, which may include
1 For a review on studies using the Cukierman or modified Cukierman and GMT indices to measure CBI in 
CEECs see Dvorsky (2000).
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low inflation, output stability, and external balance. Government lending means regula­
tions on direct financing of the government deficit by the central bank. The term of of­
fice of the governors is also important, because it indicates whether the government 
has influence on monetary policy. If the term of the central bank governor is longer than 
the electoral cycle, the government’s influence on monetary policy is significantly re­
duced. Discussions of accountability, legitimacy, and credibility are also linked to CBI. It 
is often said that independent central banks are undemocratic because central bankers 
are unelected technocrats.2 Central banks obtain their democratic legitimacy from the 
appointment of the central bank board by the parliament and by the fact that the central 
bank’s goals are set by politicians (Blinder 1998). Central banks should be made ac­
countable for their actions through periodic reporting of their policy actions to the public, 
media, and legislature (Blinder 1998: 74).3
As argued in chapter 2, economic performance depends also on the existing la­
bour market institutions; thus, it depends on existing industrial relations (Garrett 1998, 
Hall and Franzese 1998). This is because the mode of interest representation, i.e., the 
institutional setting for industrial relations, plays a predominant role in the wage bar­
gaining process and thus influences economic performance. To demonstrate the im­
pact of industrial relations on policy outcomes that touch upon European monetary in­
tegration, the chapter analyses the tripartite institutions that were set up in all Visegrad 
countries at the beginning of the transition process.
National-level tripartite social dialogues -  with varying degrees of importance -  
are at the heart of industrial relations in the Visegrad countries. Since the adoption of 
the euro requires profound macroeconomic adjustments it is important to examine the 
social partners’ capacity to support compliance with the Maastricht criteria and hence 
to influence the respective euro-adoption strategy. This is all the more important as the
2 See Briault et al. (1996) and Levy (1995) for reviews of the democratic deficit of central banks. See 
Fischer (1994) for an analysis of the relationship between democratic accountability and the “deflationary 
bias”.
3 As Blinder (1998: 69) puts it: “public accountability is a moral corollary of central bank independence. In a 
democratic society, the central bank’s freedom to act implies an obligation to explain itself to the public.”
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Maastricht criteria place limits on wage developments and therefore influence the 
agenda of the national-level tripartite social dialogue.4 However, the question of wage 
restraints as negotiated by the social partners depends on their legal status and capac­
ity to influence economic policy-making; an important fact which is further elaborated in 
this chapter. The latter point also touches upon the role of the wage-bargaining level, 
trade union density and collectively agreed wage bargaining coverage which are there­
fore included in the analysis.
This chapter is divided into four parts, each dealing with one case study. Each 
country study is further subdivided into an analysis of the influence of electoral systems, 
central bank independence and industrial relations on the approach to adopting the 
euro. The conclusion summarises the main implications of different institutional settings 
for the euro-adoption strategies.
The Czech Republic 
Electoral system
The Czech Republic adopted a system of closed list proportional representation (PR) 
with a 5 percent threshold and a weak presidency, elected by the parliament.5 Negotia­
tions on the electoral law were led by non-communist liberal-democratic, Christian, and 
regional politicians who were against both a strong presidency and majoritarian elec­
toral law. A PR system was seen to fit best with the dissidents’ “long-standing norma­
tive commitment to pluralism” (Birch et al. 2002: 69).6 The communist party in turn was
4 For the same reasons, special social pacts over EMU convergence reforms were concluded in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium. One of the main issues of the social 
pacts was wage moderation to fulfil the Maastricht criterion of low inflation. In Ireland, Finland, the Nether­
lands and Belgium moderate wage increases were agreed on the basis of tax relief and social packages 
(see Welz and Kapuinnen 2004: 587, Kittel 2002, Schulten and Bispinck 2001).
5 In contrast to the open list, in closed list systems, voters vote for a party without knowing which candi­
dates from each party will get in.
6 As Petr Pithart, former leader of the Czechoslovak Civic Forum, further explained: “we do not want to 
replace one dominant political force with another, so we shall not tailor the system to benefit us and only 
us” (quoted in Birch et al. 2002: 69).
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too unpopular and weak to push its interests forward during the Roundtable negotia­
tions in 1990. Since the first free election in June 1990, the electoral law has been 
changed twice. In 1992, different thresholds for electoral alliances were introduced. In 
2002, the Czech Republic changed from the Hagenbach-Bischoff7 to the D’Hondt8 seat 
allocation formula and introduced a structure of 14 multi-member districts (see Table 
15). However, since both the Hagenbach-Bischoff and the D’Hondt formula favour 
large parties, the changes did not have substantial consequences for the party system. 
The ODS and the former president Vaclav Havel made efforts to change to a majori- 
tarian system in the early 1990s. However, parliament passed none of the proposals to 
change the electoral rule. One reason might have been that the strong parties favoured 
electoral systems that they believed would force them to enter into a coalition, which in 
turn would allow them to spread the blame for transition-related economic austerity 
measures (Birch et al. 2002: 185).
7 The Hagenbach-Bischoff quota is the number of valid votes divided by the number of seats plus one. 
This formula favours large parties.
8 The d’Hondt formula is the most frequently used seat allocation formula worldwide. The d’Hondt formula 
uses the divisor series (1,2,3,4, etc.) and systematically favours large parties. For detailed descriptions 
and examples, see Lijphart (1994:153-159).
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Table 15 Summary of Czech electoral laws
.. Sector.
J
y District structure TOrfnUla / nresnoia
1990 
(poll for 
CZ)
PR
8 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent
1992 PR
8 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
parties, 9 percent 
for 3; 11 percent 
for 4 or more
1996 PR
8 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
parties, 9 percent 
for 3; 11 percent 
for 4 or more
1998 PR
8 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
parties, 9 percent 
for 3; 11 percent 
for 4 or more
2002 PR
14 multi-member 
districts
D’Hondt 5 percent for 1 
party, 10 percent 
for alliance of 2 
parties, 15 per­
cent for 3; 20 
percent for 4 or 
more
Source: Birch et al. (2002: 85-6)
Table 16 Governments of the Czech Republic
Prime I ..... ...
Minister rany Leg is la tive  period |
Vaclav Klaus ODS 01/93-07/96 Coalition ODS, KDU-CSL, ODA
Vaclav Klaus ODS 07/96 -  01/98
Minority government: 
Coalition ODS, KDU-CSL, 
ODA
Josef Tosovsky No party affiliation 01/98-07/98 Interim government
Milos Zeman CSSD 07/98 -  06/02 Minority government: CSSD
Vladimir Spidla CSSD 06/02- 06/04 Coalition CSSD, KDU-CSL, Freedom Union (US)
Stanislav Gross CSSD 08/04 -  04/05 Coalition CSSD, KDU-CSL, Freedom Union (US)
Table 16 shows that under the PR system the Czech Republic has experienced 
mainly coalition governments and one minority government led by a single party, the
220
CSSD. Chapter 2 has argued that stable governments, defined by a one party govern­
ment or a low number of coalition parties and a cohesive cabinet, succeed much better 
in implementing fiscal consolidation programmes. The two governments under Premier 
Minister Vaclav Klaus were coherent coalitions of centre-right parties. But while the first 
Klaus government (1992-1996) proved to be stable and able to achieve fiscal consoli­
dation, the second Klaus government (1996-1997), a fractious minority government, 
collapsed over a party financing scandal in December 1997.® Certainly the worsening 
economic performance of the Czech economy in the aftermath of the currency crisis 
and the subsequent necessary adoption of austerity measures such as wage restraint 
in the public sector, in April and June 1997, accelerated the break up of the coalition. 
But the economic imbalances also revealed many of the flaws in the reform process as 
exemplified by the many corruption scandals, problems in social welfare programmes, 
enterprise debt and mounting bad loans in the banking sectors (see chapter 3). Thus, 
while the Klaus governments were successful in achieving fiscal consolidation in the 
first half of the 1990s, many necessary reforms, especially in the banking sector, were 
neglected and reinforced the economic imbalances of 1997. Hence, the argument that 
coherent governments are more stable and succeed much better in implementing re­
forms does not find unqualified supportive evidence in the Czech case. The subse­
quent interim government was headed by the non-partisan Prime Minister and former 
Central Bank President Josef Tosovsky, certainly also in an effort to divert attention 
from the intra-party squabbles and economic difficulties in the aftermath of the currency 
crisis (cf Millard 2004: 105).
The succeeding minority government under Zeman (1998-2002), formed under 
what is called the opposition agreement,10 proved to be weak and unable to make vari­
ous economic policy reforms. The opposition agreement was prone to create a political 
gridlock and resulted in long delays in the political decision-making process. This had
9 The re-election of the Klaus government in 1996 was one of the rare exceptions to the iron law of Central 
and East European politics that the elections are not won by the same government, i.e. that the govern­
ment generally lose elections (cf Fitzmaurice 2004:161).
10 The CSSD and the ODS signed the opposition agreement and a “toleration pact” including a fiscal con­
tract. In exchange, the ODS obtained top posts in the parliament.
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severe consequences for further fiscal consolidation. Indeed, by the end of the minority 
governments legislative period, the Czech Republic had one of the highest deficits 
among the CEECs: 6.8 percent of GDP (Dimitrov 2003:18, see chapter 3). In particular, 
the minority government was weakened by splits within the CSSD between those op­
posing and those supporting the opposition agreement with Klaus, and between those 
opposing and those supporting an expansive fiscal policy (Dimitrov 2003: 18).11 Like­
wise, the coalition government under Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla, consisting of the 
Social Democratic CSSD, the conservative KDL-CSL and the liberal US-DEU faced 
great difficulties of cohesion which were reinforced by the fact that the coalition gov­
ernment only held a majority of one seat. Certainly, this and the fact that -  for reasons 
which have been discussed in the previous chapters -  the CSSD was not willing at first 
to compromise on its expenditure oriented fiscal policy, led to a worsening of the 
budget deficit. In particular, the coalition with the liberal Freedom Union-Democratic 
Union caused several difficulties. Shortly after the Spidla-government took over, the 
former chairwoman of the US-DEU, Hana Marvanova, provoked the coalition’s first 
major crisis in September 2002 when “she used her vote to kill government-backed tax 
hikes -  boosting her right-wing credentials but highlighting the fragility of the three- 
party government” (RFE/RL News, 21/09/2003). The coalition government also had to 
survive several no-confidence votes in the parliament. The one directly related to the 
euro-adoption strategy on the reform plans for fiscal consolidation and adherence to 
the Maastricht criteria, was submitted by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and sup­
ported by the KSCM, took place in September 2003 (see chapter 5). The reform plans 
of the Spidla government nourished public disillusionment with the Social Democratic 
party and reduced the government’s popularity significantly. Under the impression of 
the painful reforms (see chapter 3 and 5), the CSSD experienced a disastrous result in 
European Parliament elections in June 2004, winning just two of the possible 24 seats
11 Stanislav Gross and Petra Buzkova were among the most prominent CSSD-politicians opposing the 
opposition agreement. Along the same line, the opposition agreement further exacerbated internal divi­
sions within the CSSD between Zeman-supporters (e.g. Zdenek Skromach) and Zeman-opponents (e.g. 
Gross and Buzkova).
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for the Czech Republic. Vladimir Spidla eventually resigned in June 2004 and Stanislav 
Gross was appointed as Prime Minister and CSSD chairman (see chapter 4).
In summary, the PR-electoral system in the Czech Republic has produced 
mainly coalition governments and one minority government led by a single party, the 
CSSD. Since the late 1990s the Czech governments have encountered problems of 
cohesion and stability which have had consequences for the implementation of policy 
reforms, especially after the economic and political crisis in 1997. The loose fiscal pol­
icy explains why the Czech Republic is not as eager to join the euro-zone as quickly as, 
for example, Slovakia. It also helps to explain why the current government is reluctant 
to adopt the euro given that the single currency entails politically costly and painful re­
forms with which an unstable government can hardly cope.
Central bank independence
The Czech Republic had particularly big problems amending its central bank law and 
bringing it in line with the acquis communitaire. After several failures in the late 1990s 
and early 2000 to approve the respective bills, the Czech Parliament eventually agreed 
on substantial amendments in March 2002. Indeed, only the pressure of the EU acces­
sion negotiations, concluded in December 2002, led the Czech Republic to increase 
central bank independence. During the economic recession between 1997 and 2001 
successive Czech governments successfully imposed their views on monetary policy. 
In particular, the former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus (1992-1997) engaged in ‘bitter 
polemics’ (Myant 2003) with the central bank, accusing the CNB of being entirely re­
sponsible for the economic downturn in 1997 due to its restrictive monetary policy 
adopted in late 1996: “the key to economic recovery is in the hands of those who cause 
the economic downturn -  the central bank” (Klaus 1999 as quoted in Myant 2003: 92). 
In turn, the then President of the Central Bank, Tosovsky, accused Klaus of being re­
sponsible for the economic recession because his government failed to implement 
structural reforms (see Tosovsky as quoted in Myant 2003: 92). The row between 
Klaus and Tosovsky also shows a personal antagonism and rivalry that goes back to
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1997 when Klaus was forced to resign and Tosovsky took over as interim Prime Minis­
ter (Myant 2003: 109, The Prague Post 08/03/2000). Starting from 2000, the CSSD 
joined the ODS in criticising the CNB’s monetary policy, stating that an overly restrictive 
monetary policy slows down economic growth (see Myant 2003: 112). In summer 2000 
the Parliament then approved an amendment to central bank law that severely re­
stricted the CNB’s independence. The public clashes between the high ranking politi­
cians and the CNB, as well as the amendment, clearly raised doubts about the CNB’s 
independence and future ability to cope with political pressure and certainly did not 
foster the “public’s awareness of the relevance of CBI in practice” (Dvorsky 2000: 20).12
Table 17 Central Bank Independence in the Visegrad countries
Czech 
Rep. Slovakia Hungary
......... ...
Poland
1992° 0.73 0.62 0.67 0.61
2000/' 0.69 0.68 0.78 0.91
2002c 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.91b
aCukierman et al. (2002)
b Dvorsky (2000) applying the Cukierman (1992) index (LVAU unweighted)
°Own calculation using the Cukierman (1992) index (LVAU unweighted), see appendix 
1. Calculations on the basis of the Act on the CNB, NBS and NBH after the amend­
ments in 2001 and 2002 respectively. The index can vary from 0 (no independence) to 1 
(complete independence).
As Table 17 shows, until the latest amendments in 2002 that revised the controversial 
amendment of 2000, the CNB scored only third among the Visegrad four on the Cuk­
ierman index. The 2000 amendment foresaw, among other things, a parliamentary ap­
proval of the central bank’s operating budget and the appointment of the central bank
12 Only four days after the government approved the controversial amendment to the central bank law, 
Tosovsky resigned on 31 October 2000. This was clearly a tactical step taken by Tosovsky seeing that the 
new law also foresaw that the CNB governor has to be appointed by the government and not - as under 
the old law - by the President of the Czech Republic. Tosovsky’s resignation in October 2000 gave Vaclav 
Havel, then President of the Czech Republic, the possibility to appoint the new CNB’s governor, Tuma, 
before the new legislation would become effect. Tuma was clearly not the first choice of the government 
and the opposition as the government accused Havel of not acting in the spirit of the new law (see The 
Prague Post 08/11/2000, Handelsblatt 23/11/2000 and 27/11/2000). However, it should be noted that 
Klaus in his function as the President of the Czech Republic made precisely use of the President’s right to 
appoint members of the central bank board to place three close allies in the CNB all of whom are well 
known for their sceptical views on the adoption of the euro (see chapter 4 and 5).
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President by the parliament (see footnote 12). In addition, the lower grade in the Cuk­
ierman index is due to direct public sector financing by the central bank and the CNB’s 
failure to make price stability its primary goal. In 2002 the CNB’s objective was 
changed from guaranteeing currency stability to price stability. The expression “cur­
rency stability” is not as restricted and unambiguous as the objective of price stability, 
i.e., currency stability might also include other objectives, of which price stability is only 
one. Currency stability is measured by a stable exchange rate and price stability by a 
low inflation rate. In contrast to Poland, where any direct fiscal financing has been pro­
hibited since 1998, until recently the Czech Republic allowed a central bank credit to 
the government of 5 percent of the previous year’s budget revenues. But since the 
2002 amendments, direct financing by the CNB has been prohibited. As for the status 
of the central bank boards, the managers of the Czech central bank have a 6-year term 
of service, which is longer than the electoral cycle. Board members cannot be dis­
missed unless they have committed a crime or do not perform their duties (e.g. due to 
extended illness). Transparency and accountability are obtained through the submis­
sion of regular reports on the central bank’s activities. The Czech central bank is 
obliged to inform the parliament about its monetary policies at least twice a year. In 
addition, the Czech central bank has to publish a quarterly report to inform the public 
about monetary developments. The 2002 European Commission report states: “with 
regard to the Central Bank's independence, [...] the Czech Republic has thus achieved 
a high degree of alignment on the acquis on EMU (European Commission 2002b: 80).
Indeed, as Table 17 shows, the CNB now has a relatively high degree of central 
bank independence. Following Cukierman’s reasoning this might have contributed to 
the success in bringing down the inflation rate from 4.5 percent in 2001 to 2.8 percent 
in 2004 (see chapter 3). However, given that the reference period is very short, the 
disinflation process has to be interpreted very cautiously. In addition “the inflation data 
are likely to reflect specific, temporary developments related to that particular year in 
the transition process” (Dvorsky 2000: 27). For example, the sharp fall in inflation rates 
from 9.7 percent in 1998 to 1.8 percent in 1999 (see chapter 3) is a consequence of the
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dramatic output decline and the negative growth rate of GDP in the aftermath of the 
currency crisis. While this shows that the interpretation of inflation rates for a country in 
transition by means of CBI alone is erratic and carries the risk of oversimplification, it 
can nevertheless be stated that the CNB has been successful in pursuing a restrictive 
monetary policy, especially after 2002. Indeed, the Czech Republic’s major obstacles 
with regard to compliance with the Maastricht criteria are the high public deficits. Yet, 
while the central bank followed a restrictive monetary policy in line with the Maastricht 
criteria, its central bank board members are the most divided about issuing a statement 
of when they want to join the euro-zone, fearing that a fix exchange rate is not able to 
protect the country from speculative attacks (see chapter 5). Certainly with the nomina­
tion of new central bank board members who share an affinity to Klaus’ views on the 
adoption of the euro, the CNB has become even more pessimistic towards the euro.
In short, despite frequent political attacks on the CNB, reaching their peak in 
2000, the central bank has been successful in pursuing restrictive monetary policy and 
inflation remains low in the Czech Republic, especially after 2002. While it has been 
argued in the previous chapter, that the government’s expenditure oriented policy 
stands in relation to growing partisan pressure, constraints arising from CBI might have 
reinforced the need for increased public spending. In turn, the need for higher public 
spending to reduce unemployment resulted in the CSSD-led government’s decision to 
postpone the adoption of the euro to the next decade.
Industrial Relations
The tripartite Council for Economic and Social Accord (RHSD) was established in Octo­
ber 1990 following a government initiative and thus created from above. What is more 
striking is that the tripartite arrangements were established at a time when their main 
actors did not yet exist. It was only after the establishment of the RHSD that independ­
ent employers’ and employees’ associations began to evolve (Cambalikova 1996). 
Moreover, the tripartite institution was established “prior to the onset of significant un­
employment, privatisation and price liberalisation” and was therefore created “in an
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economic and social vacuum of sorts” (Heinisch 1999: 62). The rapid and hasty crea­
tion of the tripartite institution has to be seen in the context of the government’s efforts 
to counteract expected social unrest and transition problems. In addition, international 
experts recommended tripartism, and the new government was keen to apply Western 
practices of industrial relations. However, since weak interest groups became “partners 
of the powerful state” (Heinisch 1999: 63), the tripartite arrangement developed into a 
secondary institution with no essential power or influence on economic and social pol­
icy.
The RHSD negotiated the annual general agreement (or general social pact) to 
set up recommendations for broad economic and social policy guidelines (Thirkell et al. 
1994). Although the government was not legally obliged to adopt the decisions made in 
the council, the recommendations were initially considered binding (Cox and Mason 
2000a: 340). However, after a number of demonstrations organised by trade unions, 
the government temporarily suspended the council in 1995. Thereafter the council was 
renamed Council for the Dialogue of the Social Partners and its role was downgraded 
to a purely consultative body. The right-wing governments under Prime Minister Klaus 
in particular sought to constrain the tripartite mechanism while the CSSD-led govern­
ments intensified communication with the social partners motivated “not just by its 
manifesto, but also by the preparation for EU entry, which requires important steps to 
be consulted with the social partners” (Hala et al. 2003: 87). However, the report on 
social dialogue and EMU in the Czech Republic written by Hala et al. for the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions still concludes that:
social dialogue in the Czech Republic [...] has not yet successfully become 
a source of law and is not fully integrated as an important factor in the la­
bour market. [...] [The national level tripartite meeting] is not taken for 
granted as a tool for mediating between various interests in society and 
there is also limited public involvement and low awareness of social dia­
logue (Hala et al. 2003: 98).
Indeed, since the mid 1990s, no general agreements to set definitions or targets 
for wage developments and employment have been signed nor any “other document 
defining [...] the framework for macroeconomic and social development in the Czech
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Republic” (Hala et al. 2003: 98). It is therefore not a surprise that a social pact to meet 
the Maastricht criteria has not been signed either. In fact, while drafting the reforms to 
meet the Maastricht criteria and to cut public expenditure in 2003 (see chapter 3 and 5), 
“the tripartite mechanism was not made sufficient use of and a confrontational attitude 
[...] prevailed” (Hala et al. 2003: 103). The ‘confrontational attitude’ reached its peak 
when the largest trade union confederation and social partner, the Czech-Moravian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (CMKOS), organised a series of strikes and demonstra­
tions against the reform plans in 2003 and 2004 (CMKOS 2003).13 On 21 April 2004, 
300.000 civil servants joined a one-hour strike organised by the trade union of public 
sector employees to protest against wage cuts “made by the government [...] within the 
framework of economic reforms, which are designed to reduce public debt and help 
qualify the country for the euro currency” (RFE/RL Newsline 23/04/04). However, it 
should be noted that industrial action regarding the Spidla government’s reform plans 
took the form of “short-term ‘warning’ strikes rather than prolonged walkouts, which 
probably reflects the weak loyalty of most union members” (EIU 2005a: 22, see also 
Carley 2005: 56). In fact, prolonged strikes to put pressure on the government have 
remained an exception in the Czech Republic.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that public dissatisfaction with the reforms, rein­
forced by a series of demonstrations in 2003 and 2004, had fatal consequences for 
Spidla who was forced to resign as Prime Minister in June 2004 after his party experi­
enced a disastrous European Parliament election. It is said that people’s disagree­
ments with the reform plans reflected the bad result in the European election for the 
CSSD. This is not to argue that trade unions are responsible for the resignation of 
Prime Minister Spidla but that their protest actions against the reform plans designed to 
meet the Maastricht criteria went hand in hand with a growing public dissatisfaction 
with the government and therefore supported the serious political crisis. To help his 
party out of the crisis, Spidla’s successor Stanislav Gross therefore announced he
13 The CMKOS is the successor organisation to the communist trade union confederation, the Revolution­
ary Trade Union Movement (ROH). The CMKOS became the largest trade union confederation in the 
Czech Republic and "initially retained, de facto, its monopoly on interest representation” (Heinisch 1999: 
62, see also appendix 3).
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would re-negotiate the reform package. As a first step Gross invited the CMKOS to 
give suggestions to the new government programme (Hala 2004). Thus, the failure to 
reach an agreement in the tripartite meeting worsened the 2003/2004 government cri­
sis, affecting both the stability of the government and its stamina to push forward re­
forms in line with the Maastricht criteria and the country’s euro-adoption strategy. Cer­
tainly, the political crisis which weakened the government’s ability to implement policy 
reform, underpinned the furthest target date for the adoption of the euro.
Wage bargaining is fairly decentralised and most of the wage bargaining takes 
place at the company level (see appendix 2). Central wage bargaining is non-existent 
and sectoral wage bargaining underdeveloped. One reason for the poor development 
of sectoral and inter-sectoral wage bargaining is the weak institutional capacity of the 
social partners -  especially on the part of employers -  and their poor representation at 
the sectoral level (Hala et al. 2003: 98).
Table 18 Collective bargaining coverage
; V V" " I.1 Collective bargaining coverage (in%)
Czech Republic 25-30
Hungary 34
Poland 40
Slovakia 48
Euro area 81
Source: Angeloni et al. (2005: 22)
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Figure 19 Trade union density in the Visegrad countries (2002)
Trade union density in the Visegrad countries (2002)
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Source: Angeloni et al. (2005: 22)
The Czech Republic also has a very low union density and collective bargaining 
coverage is, at 25-30 percent, significantly lower than in Slovakia (see Figure 19). Thus, 
given the low bargaining coverage rate and the fact that most of the bargaining takes 
place at the company level, the coverage proportion of all companies and employees is 
fairly low. Given that the workforce is rather atomised, trade unions lack legitimacy and 
power. Indeed, the case of the Czech Republic provides supportive evidence for the U- 
shape curve of wage determination where the negative wage-push inflation is mitigated 
by the absence of strong trade unions since there are “no externalities -  in the form of 
wage militancy -  to internalise” (Garrett 1998: 32, see also chapter 2). Indeed, average 
collectively agreed pay increases in 2003 and 2004 were, at 4.1 percent and 3.8 per­
cent respectively, significantly lower than in Slovakia (7.5 and 7 percent) and Hungary 
(8.2 and 9 percent) (see Carley 2005). This might have contributed positively to the low 
inflation rate in the Czech Republic.
In short, while trade unions are not strong enough to support an escalation of 
wages that would jeopardise compliance with the Maastricht criteria and the tripartite 
institution too weak to influence the content of the country’s euro-adoption strategy, 
trade unions confrontational attitude towards the Spidla government went hand in hand
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with growing public dissatisfaction and contributed to the political crisis that under­
pinned the furthest target date for the adoption of the euro.
Slovakia 
Electoral system
Slovak electoral law operates through a proportional representation system with party 
candidate list voting that is restricted by a 5 percent threshold. The first Slovak election 
in 1994 after the break-up of Czechoslovakia was conducted under the same electoral 
law as were the 1992 Czechoslovak elections (Elster et al. 1998: 117). Although the 
Slovak Parliament has extensively debated electoral rules, no major changes were 
introduced until 1998. In May 1998, the four multi-member districts were replaced by 
one single national multi-member district (see Table 19). In addition, in an effort to 
weaken small opposition parties, the Meciar government introduced a general 5 per­
cent threshold for all parties, whether standing alone or in alliance. However, the oppo­
sition parties were able to develop strong organised parties out of their election coali­
tions (Kipke 2002: 286). After the 1998 election, Meciar was not able to build a new 
coalition, and several liberal-conservative parties and the socialist SDL formed the new 
government (see chapter 4 and 5).
The Slovak party system is deeply fragmented and polarised. In the 1992 legis­
lative period, more than 18 percent of the MPs changed party factions or established 
new parties. Party fragmentation is mainly due to personal disagreements and a lack of 
party discipline. However, as Meseznikov (1997) points out
the large number of political parties in Slovakia is more a reflection of Slo­
vakia’s societal diversity than a simple mechanical result of the implemen­
tation of a proportional system (Meseznikov 1997: 38).
The polarisation of the party system mirrors polarisation in society: first, over Slovakia’s
past and future and, second, over current issues, such as Slovakia’s Hungarian and
Roma minorities. It is a polarisation between “what might be called Westernisers and
Slavophiles” (Wightman 2001: 136), that is, between those who see Slovakia’s place in
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Western Europe and those who emphasise the Slovak nation and its sovereignty (see 
chapter 5). The same applies to the division of the Slovak party system. As Meseznikov 
states:
the fundamental axis on which this division has evolved is [a party’s] rela­
tionship to the norms of modern parliamentary democracy, constitutional­
ism, the principles of a state based on the rule of law and the values of a 
democratic political culture (quoted in Wightman 2001: 130).
On the one hand there are the parties that formed the government in 1994, i.e., the 
HDSZ, the extreme right Slovak National Party, and the extreme left Workers’ Associa­
tion of Slovakia (see chapter 4 and 5). On the other hand there are the parties that 
formed the opposition after 1994 and the coalition government in 1998 (see chapter 4 
and 5). The two poles, i.e. the national-populist side and the anti-Meciar coalition side, 
have heavily dominated Slovak politics. The pattern of party competition has only 
slowly started to change and the recent dynamics are very much associated with the 
emergence and success of the SMER (see chapter 4); the party that
have taken over HZDS’s mantle as the most popular (opposition) party in 
Slovakia [as of early 2004], which may seem to suggest a stabilisation of 
two-bloc competition along a left-right dimension, gradually replacing the 
inherently unstable yet enduring ‘Meciar-and-allies versus the rest’ pattern 
(Bakke and Sitter 2005: 249).
Yet, given the short period of observation, the stabilisation of a more ‘West European
left-right pattern’ (Bakke and Sitter 2005) remains fragile.
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Table 19 Main changes in the law on election to the Slovak Parliament
Election /ea r
■
Wei District structurem tvne formula m Threshold
1990
(poll for Slovak 
Parliament)
PR
4 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hare14
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
3 percent
1992 PR
4 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
or 3 parties, 10 
percent for 4 or 
more
1994 PR
4 multi-member 
districts,
1 national district for 
unfilled seats
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
or 3 parties, 10 
percent for 4 or 
more
1998 PR 1 national multi- member district
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 
each party 
whether stand­
ing alone or in 
alliance
2002 PR 1 national multi- member district
Hagenbach-
Bischoff
5 percent for 1 
party, 7 percent 
for alliance of 2 
or 3 parties, 10 
percent for 4 or 
more
Source: Birch et al. (2002: 79)
Table 20 Governments in Slovakia
Party Legislative | Type of government j
Vladimir Meciar VPN 06 / 9 0 - 04/91 Coalition VPN/NMI. KDH. DS
Jan Carnogursky KDH 04/91 -  06/92 Coalition VPN, KDH, DS,
Vladimir Meciar HZDS 06/92 -  03/94 since 1993: HZDS, SNS
Jozef
Moravcik
DU 03/94 -  12/94 Coalition SDL, KDH, DU, and others
Vladimir
Meciar
HZDS 12/94-10/98 Coalition HZDS, SNS, ZRS
Mikulas Dzurinda SDK 10/98-09/02 Coalition SDK, SDL, SMK, SOP
Mikulas Dzurinda SDKU 09/02 - Coalition SDKU, KDH, SMK, ANO
14 Hare is the oldest “largest-remainder” system. The Hare quota is the total number of valid votes divided 
by the size of the district. The seat allocation for parties is proportionate to the quotas they obtained. Re­
maining seats are given to the party with the largest remainder of votes. For detailed descriptions and 
examples see Lijphart (1994: 153-159).
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The PR system has produced a highly divided party system and exclusively coali­
tion governments (see Table 20). But both the HZDS and the SDK managed to get re­
elected (although not with the same junior coalition partners); and since 1994 all coali­
tion governments survived their full legislative periods. The only government that col­
lapsed because of in-fighting and defections was the Meciar-government in March 
1994. The subsequent interim government was headed by Jozef Moravcsik but Meciar 
managed to re-enter office in December 1994 gaining an unexpected 35 percent in the 
general elections. As mentioned above, Slovak politics has been dominated by the 
division of parties in a pro- and anti-Meciar camp and scholars have argued that the 
coalition governments since 1998 (and particularly the first Dzurinda government) have 
worked only because of the threat that Meciar could return to office. As discussed in 
chapter 4, apart from being anti-Meciar, the so-called ‘rainbow coalition’ parties in the 
first Dzurinda government had little in common and especially “its [the coalition’s] more 
left-wing ministers, such as Finance Minister Schmognerova [Party of the Democratic 
Left, SDL], inevitably felt like hostages on issues such as fiscal policy and privatisation” 
(Fitzmaurice 2004: 16). Indeed, the SDL lost credibility among the party’s rank and file 
members because the party became associated with the austerity measures of Fi­
nance Minister Brigita Schmognerova, once nicknamed ‘Brutal Brigita’.15 But it might be 
argued that a Left (and not a centre-right) Finance Minister was instrumental in promot­
ing the necessary but painful structural reforms and stabilising the overheated econ­
omy caused by the expenditure oriented fiscal policy of the Meciar government (see 
chapter 3). Indeed, under the Dzurinda government, economic growth recovered and 
the implemented reforms led to OECD membership as well as to regaining the impor­
tant investment grade credit rating. However, despite the success in the first reform 
efforts, the rainbow coalition proved to be unstable, with a large number of ministers 
being replaced. In particular, the coalition was weakened by the ‘bitter feud’ between 
the two leading figures of the SDK, Dzurinda and Jan Carnogursky, who later estab­
15 Brigita Schmdgnerova eventually resigned as Finance Minister in January 2002. The growing tension 
within the SDL generated by the pro-market reforms of the coalition government eventually led to the disin­
tegration of the Left, which entered the 2002 election fragmented (see chapter 4, Haughton 2004, Haugh- 
ton and Rybar 2004).
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lished the KDH (see Fitzmaurice 2004: 161). At the same time disputes on economic 
issues raised tensions between Dzurinda and the SDL, as did the initial refusal of the 
SDL to cooperate with the Hungarian Coalition party (SMK), while the SMK itself “al­
most left the government over the regionalisation bill, but was just persuaded to remain 
by pressure from intellectuals and human rights and pro-EU NGO’s” (Fitzmaurice 2004: 
161 ).16 This all underlines the importance of the coalition’s anti-Meciar consensus for 
its own survival. In turn, the anti-Meciar consensus was related to a strong consensus 
on foreign policy illustrating once again the importance of the coalition’s foreign policy 
for its internal stability and overall legitimacy (see chapter 4 and 5). Yet, the difficulties 
in reaching an agreement on economic policy continued, and despite the first reform 
efforts it was only the second Dzurinda government, consisting of several, but more 
coherent, centre-right parties, that was more successful in implementing fiscal and fun­
damental reforms in the health care, tax and pension systems (see chapter 3). Indeed, 
the case of Slovakia illustrates that the successful implementation of reforms does not 
necessarily depend on the existence of a one-party government but on the cohesion of 
the coalition parties. This is not to say that the coalition was to be untroubled by dis­
putes and quarrels. In fact, especially the
KDH and the ANO have sustained a chronic and bitter rivalry, fuelled by 
deep personal animosities, as well as the inherent incompatibility of their 
stances -  Catholic-inflected and secular, respectively -  on most social is­
sues (EIU 2005h: 9).
However, these divisions along socio-cultural issues did not have a negative impact on 
economic policy reforms. Even the break-away of three ANO and seven SDKU MPs, 
through which the coalition lost its majority in December 2003, did not hinder the im­
plementation of policy reforms since these MPs continued to support the coalition gov­
ernment on key issues.17 In addition to the ideological cohesion on economic policy
16 It should be noted that support -  yet also pressure -  for and on the coalition to remain in office did not 
only come from the domestic civil society but also from the international political community (Vachudova 
2001).
17 Following a party dispute within the SDKU, Dzurinda sacked his Defence Minister and vice chairman of 
the SDKU Ivan Simko in December 2003 which led seven MPs and allies of Mr Simko to leave the party. 
Ivan Simko lost his office after he refused to support Dzurinda in his efforts to dismiss the Head of the 
National Security Office (NBU), Jan Mojzis (cf Haughton and Rybar 2004:128).
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among the coalition parties, the high fragmentation within the parliament strengthened 
the coalition’s reform efforts given that the two deeply divided opposition parties, SMER 
and LS-HZDS, were not able to present a coherent alternative to the Dzurinda govern­
ment. The deep division among the opposition parties is also the reason why SMER -  
in collaboration with the Confederation of Trade Unions (see p. 240) -  failed to mobilise 
enough citizens in the referendum held in April 2004 on an early election. SMER’s 
categorical rejection of the government’s economic reforms isolated the party while the 
LS-HZDS “has supported key government bills, in an effort to end its long-standing 
pariah status” (EIU 2005h: 15).18
In short, the electoral system has produced exclusively coalition governments, 
nevertheless, unlike the Czech Republic, Slovakia has recently been successful in im­
plementing politically costly reforms. Three factors have been decisive in pushing for­
ward reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria: first, the divided and polarised party 
system that put pressure on the first Dzurinda government to stay in office and to guar­
antee the country’s re-orientation towards the West; a re-orientation which can only be 
understood within the context of Slovakia’s foreign policy failure under the Meciar gov­
ernment (see chapter 5). Second, the ideologically coherent second Dzurinda govern­
ment of centre-right parties that shared a common view on economic policy. And third, 
a favourable constellation of party fragmentation in the parliament and the support of 
LS-HZDS for key government bills in order to end its ‘long-standing pariah status’. 
These three factors contributed to a fast-track approach to adopting the euro and help 
to understand why Slovakia has been much more successful in pushing forward re­
forms in line with the Maastricht requirements than the other Visegrad countries.
Central Bank Independence
Like the CNB, the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) did not alter its central bank leg­
islation toward compliance with the acquis until the end of the accession negotiations 
in 2002. Scholars agree that the NBS was relatively dependent during the 1990s
18 Certainly, it can be argued that it is precisely this shift of Meciar’s party away from populism that fuelled 
support for the populist SMER.
236
(Hochreiter and Kowalski 2000, Hallerberg et al. 2002a,b, Freytag 2003). Apart from 
the lower result in the Cukierman index, the political debates on the amendment to 
the central bank law, initiated by the last Meciar government, reflected the impres­
sion of the relatively lower independence of the central bank compared with the other 
Visegrad countries (Dvorsky 2000: 20). Especially during 1996 and 1997, the Meciar 
government criticised the NBS’ restrictive monetary policy and put pressure on the 
NBS governor Vladimir Masar to reduce interest rates. There were “unmistakable 
signs that the government [was] attempting to circumscribe the NBS’s independ­
ence” (EIU 1997: 15), as highlighted in the Finance Minister’s attendance to the NBS 
board meetings “in a non-voting ‘advisory’ capacity” (EIU 1997: 8) and the govern­
ment’s appointment of three compliant NBS board members (e.g. the former finance 
ministry state secretary Jozef Magula). However, in contrast to the Czech Republic, 
no amendments to the central bank laws were implemented and “the draft was with­
drawn from the parliament's agenda a few months before the elections” (Dvorsky 
2000: 20), while the proposal to curb CBI was not taken up by the subsequent 
Dzurinda government elected in 1998. Indeed, the Dzurinda government was keen 
to strengthen the NBS’ “reputation as a pillar of macroeconomic stability” (EIU 2000: 
32) which was seen as most crucial in gaining domestic and international confidence 
in the economy.
Yet, compared to the other Visegrad countries, Slovakia scored worst on the 
Cukierman index prior to the amendments in 2002 (see Table 17, p. 224). This was 
because there were no severe restrictions on lending facilities to the government 
(Freytag 2003). Until recently Slovakia allowed a central bank credit to the govern­
ment of 5 percent of the previous year’s budget revenues. Since the last amend­
ments in 2002, direct financing has been prohibited. In addition, before the amend­
ment in 2002, the NBS’s primary objective was to guarantee currency stability, rather 
than price stability. As for the status of the NBS’s board, the top managers of the 
central bank have a 5-year term, which is longer than the electoral cycle. Members 
of the central bank council other than the governor and the deputy governors are
237
appointed for four years, thus for a shorter term than in the Czech Republic. Trans­
parency and accountability are to be achieved through the submission of regular 
reports to inform the Parliament about their monetary policies at least twice a year. In 
addition, the NBS has to publish a quarterly report to inform the public about mone­
tary developments. While on the Cukierman index, Slovakia still scores worst among 
the Visegrad countries, its overall degree of central bank independence is relatively 
high after 2002 (see Table 17, p. 224).
The inflation rate dropped from over 12 percent in 2000 to a record low of 3.5 
percent in 2002 (see chapter 3). In 2003 and 2004 inflation again increased to 
around 8 percent due to strong growth rates and because the second Dzurinda gov­
ernment further liberalised prices that were kept artificially low under the previous 
Meciar governments (the so-called inherited ‘inflation debt’). Since core inflation re­
mains low it is expected that the rate of inflation will decrease sharply in the coming 
years (see chapter 3). However, again, this shows that transition specific events, 
rather than the direct control of the central bank, influence inflation developments. 
Still, it should be noted that Slovakia’s high degree of CBI contributes significantly to 
lower inflation expectations, an aspect which cannot be underestimated for a transi­
tion economy. As seen in the Polish case, the lowering of inflation expectations is an 
important element for a successful disinflation process. In addition, unlike in the 
Czech Republic, the NBS’s restrictive monetary policy is supported by the govern­
ment’s ambitious budget plans designed to meet the Maastricht criteria. Moreover, 
and again in contrast to the Czech Republic, the former Governor of the NBS, 
Marian Jusko, supports “the earliest possible approach towards the Euro-adoption 
and EMU membership” (Jusko 2003). The NBS’ positive view of the euro matches 
the government’s euro-adoption strategy to join the euro-zone as quickly as possible. 
The government’s approach to adopting the euro is thus supported by a central bank 
that enjoys a high degree of independence and a reputation as a pillar of monetary 
policy stability.
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Industrial Relations
After the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia adopted Czech tripartism and 
established the Slovak Council for Economic and Social Concertation (RHSD) in a 
practically unchanged form (Cziria 2003). Throughout the 1990s, tripartite meetings 
were “complicated by the state’s ‘dual role’ as government and principal employer” 
(Heinisch 1999: 71). Heinisch (1999) therefore speaks of a “bipartism” in the Slovak 
case. Indeed, although the Dzurinda governments have pushed forward the privatisa­
tion process and redefined the state’s role in the economy, the state is still a significant 
employer especially in the public service sector (see Cziria 2003). Apart from setting 
the minimum wage which serves as the basis for wage levels in sectoral and company- 
level bargaining (Toth and Neumann 2004b: 12), the council has only a consultative 
role and can only make non-binding decisions for the government (Heinisch 1999). 
General agreements were signed between 1993 and 1996, with the last one in 2000. 
Due to the government’s failure to meet the objectives of the general agreement, the 
social partners broke-off the negotiations at the RHSD in 1997 and the council re­
sumed its work in 1999 only. The social dialogue is further weakened by a lack of con­
sensus between employers’ and employees’ associations. As a result of the discord 
between the social partners, the government amended the labour code and is now 
authorised to unilaterally set the minimum wage if no consensus can be reached in the 
tripartite meeting. However, unlike in Poland and Hungary, strike actions have been an 
exception; in fact the first strike in the independent Slovak Republic took place in 2003 
when railway workers went on strike for four days (Cziria and Kosta 2003: 236).
The specification of the strategy for adopting the euro (National Bank of Slovakia
2004), approved by the parliament in September 2004, mentions the important role of a 
social pact for the compliance with the Maastricht criteria. Yet, according to a survey 
conducted by Ludovit Cziria for the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions in June 2004, “the wage strategy in view of joining EMU was 
[...] not included in the agenda of tripartite RHSD yet” (Cziria 2004: 6). In fact, accord­
ing to the survey, EMU was not treated as a separate issue in the RHSD. This is quite
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surprising given that the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic (KOZ 
SR)19 strongly oppose the centre-right government’s economic policy reforms that also 
aim to fulfil the EMU accession requirements. As a reaction to these reforms -  and 
especially to those in the social insurance and tax system -  the KOZ SR organised 
several protests in late 2003 and together with the SMER conducted a referendum in 
March 2004 calling for an early general election (see p. 236). However, the protest ac­
tions had no effect at all and were not a success for the trade unions (Munkova 2003). 
In the course of the conflict, the RHSD was suspended twice and no new general 
agreement, let alone a social pact on EMU, was signed (Cziria 2004: 5). The tripartite 
institution in Slovakia is therefore more formal than consensual in nature (Cziria 2004: 
6, see also Toth and Neumann 2004b: 12). In short, the social partners were not able 
to influence the content of the government’s euro-adoption strategy.
Slovakia is the only country among the Visegrad countries where most of the 
wage bargaining takes place at the sectoral level (see appendix 2). Slovakia also has 
the highest collective bargaining coverage (48 percent) and union density (40 percent) 
among the Visegrad countries which is a consequence of the high importance of sec­
toral wage bargaining (see Table 18, p. 229). But it should be kept in mind that these 
figures still represent a fairly decentralised system if compared to the current countries 
of the euro area (see Table 18). The average collectively agreed pay increases in 2003 
and 2004 were 7.5 percent and 7 percent respectively, almost twice as much as in the 
neighbouring Czech Republic but still below the Hungarian pay increases (see Carley
2005). It should be noted that while in Hungary the wage increase is a consequence of 
the populist macroeconomic policies as pursued by the governing parties, in Slovakia 
wages have increased because of the strong growth rates in GDP in recent years and 
a considerably lower average wage per head. In fact, in view of high unemployment 
rates (see chapter), trade unions -  like in Poland -  are preoccupied with questions of 
job creation and maintenance and have adopted a rather moderate stance on wage
19 After the break-up of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), the Czech and Slovak Confedera­
tion of Trade Unions (CSKOS) was split into the Czech and Moravian Trade Union Chamber (CMKOS) 
and the Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic (KOZ-SR) in 1993 (see appendix 3).
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increase demands (see Toth and Neumann 2004b: 7). Thus, while the social partners 
are not able to influence the content of the euro-adoption strategy, it can be argued that 
they indirectly influenced its pace given that the trade unions’ moderate stance on 
wage developments have fostered the country’s path to a fast adoption of the euro.
Hungary 
Electoral system
Whereas in former Czechoslovakia the communist party did not play any role during 
the constitutional bargaining process, the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
was directly involved in negotiations with the newly-founded opposition parties.20 The 
new mixed electoral system was negotiated in the National Roundtable Talks held from 
June to September 1989.21 The outcome of the Roundtable negotiations reflects a 
broad compromise that contains provisions for every participant. It also reflects the 
parties’ attempts to maximise their seat shares and to allocate these seats to top party 
elites (Geddes 1996, Birch 2000; Schiemann 2001). The small and poorly organised 
historical parties that existed before communist rule, like the agrarian Independent 
Smallholders’ Party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party, the Hungarian People’s 
Party, and the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, favoured a PR system with a low 
threshold that would guarantee them political survival. In contrast, new opposition par­
ties like the Hungarian Democratic Forum pushed for a two-round majority system in a 
Single Member District (SMD) system that would “permit them to capitalise on their 
dissident status” (Schiemann 2001: 254). Initially, the ruling Socialist party favoured a 
majority system as well, because it was convinced that it would best benefit from it, 
since it was the largest party. However, when private opinion polls published in August 
1990 predicted a dramatic loss of votes for the Socialist Party, the Socialists immedi­
20 This is why Stark and Bruszt point out, “whereas in Czechoslovakia the communist authorities capitu­
lated, communism did not collapse in Hungary and Poland; its demise was negotiated in both countries” 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998:101).
21 For a detailed description of the Roundtable and Opposition Roundtable talks, see Bozoki (1993).
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ately changed their position and eventually agreed on a complicated mixed system 
(Benoit and Schiemann 2001:164).22
It is not an understatement to describe the Hungarian electoral system as one of 
the most complex parliamentary voting systems in the world. In mixed electoral sys­
tems, voters elect candidates through various voting mechanisms. The electoral sys­
tem is a combination of individual districts and party lists. The electoral law consists of 
three distinct systems: 1) voting for a single candidate from a single member district 
(SMD) in a majoritarian voting system; 2) list voting for territorial districts by a propor­
tional voting system; and 3) compensation seats from a national compensation list by a 
proportional system. The first two levels each require a separate ballot and the national 
compensation list takes “surplus” votes that are not used on the first or second level.
The mixed electoral system favours large parties. Despite its complexity, it enjoys 
the greatest stability among the Visegrad countries (see Benoit 2001). The electoral 
system was changed only once, in 1992, by raising the threshold by 1 percent, but “the 
complex round-table law remained in all its glorious complexity” (Birch et al. 2002: 
175).23
22 For a full account of the 1989 bargaining on the electoral system, see Schiemann and Benoit (1997). For 
a literature review on electoral research in Hungary, see Tokar (2000).
23 As Birch et al. (2002: 175) explain: “One reason [for the stability of the electoral law] stemmed from the 
need to mobilise a two-thirds parliamentary majority for electoral reform, thus preventing even the strong­
est single party from imposing change.”
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Table 21 Main Features of Hungary’s Electoral System
Single-Member-Districts (SMDs)
• 176 seats from single member districts
• Formula: two-round majority-plurality system. Top 3 and all candidates with at 
least 15 percent of the first-round votes advance to runoff
Territorial PR Lists
• maximum of 152 seats directly elected from the 19 counties and Budapest.
• Threshold: 4 percent of the nationwide vote
• Formula: Largest-Remainder/Hagenbach-Bischoff. Remainder seats are 
limited to parties with at least two-thirds of the quota; unawarded seats are 
added to the national allocation lists
National Compensatory PR List
• minimum of 58 seats from the compensation list, not directly elected and 
awarded from national party lists
• 5 percent threshold for list seats
• Formula: d’Hondt, based on surplus votes from SMD and territorial list_______
Source: Benoit and Schiemann (2001:165)
The three distinct systems to elect the parliament led to specific consequences for 
parties, candidates, and voters, because each voting mechanism establishes a different 
incentive structure. For example, parties have to place their most popular candidates for 
elections in a SMD and less popular candidates on the territorial or national list, be­
cause the SMD system encourages candidates with strong local support and popularity 
to run for election, reducing party affiliation to secondary status. On the other hand, 
party list voting emphasises parties as the main actor in elections. Therefore, two differ­
ent types of electoral campaigns are run in Hungary. One is highly personalised (SMD) 
and the other is based on party manifestos.24 Candidates can also run simultaneously 
on a SMD, on a district list, and on a national compensation list to enhance their 
chances of being elected.
24 Voters have a large scope for tactical voting because the Hungarian electoral system consists of two 
ballot sheets. Duverger (1954) refers to this as the “psychological effects” of an electoral system as op­
posed to the “mechanical effects”, by which he means the translation of votes into seats under various 
conversion formulae. Hungarians can, for instance, split their votes between two different parties (also 
referred as to a “split-ticket”. For the reasons for split voting in Hungary, see Benoit (2001:479).
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Table 22 Governments in Hungary
M?n™er
Party Legislative period
government
Josef Antall MDF 05/90- 12/93 Coalition MDF, 
KDNP, FKGP3
Peter Boross0 MDF 12/93- 07/94 Coalition MDF, 
KDNP, FKGP
Gyula Horn MSZP 07/94- 07/98 Coalition MSZP, 
SZDSZ
Viktor Orban FIDESZ 07/98- 05/02 Coalition FIDESZ, 
FKGP, MDF
Peter
Medgyessy
Inde­
pendent
05/02- 09/04 Coalition MSZP, 
SZDSZ
Ferenc
Gyurcsany
MSZP 09/04 - Coalition MSZP, 
SZDSZ
aThe FKGP resigned from the coalition government in 1992, but the majority of 
FKGP members continued to support the Antall government. Supporters of the 
Antall government were afterward excluded from the party. 
b After the death of Josef Antall on 12 December 1993, Peter Boross headed 
the government until the official elections in July 1994.
Source: Korosenyi (2002: 322)
As Table 22 shows, so far under the mixed-member electoral system, Hungary 
has experienced only coalition governments. However, in contrast to Poland, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic, coalition governments in Hungary have proved to be stable. 
All governments retained a working majority and survived the full legislative period. 
However, although the mixed-member system provided much stability, none of the 
Hungarian coalition governments were able to get immediately re-elected; a phenome­
non (the so-called ‘iron law’ of CEECs politics; see footnote 9, p. 221) which is common 
to most other CEECs. In addition, while Hungary’s coalition governments enjoyed a lot 
of stability, they had the greatest difficulties achieving fiscal convergence among the 
Visegrad countries. Only after delegating power to the Finance Minister on the trouble- 
causing extra-budget funds in 1994 and the implementation of the austerity measures 
under the MSZP-led government (1994-1998), was Hungary able to reduce its budget 
deficit (Dimitrov 2003, see also chapter 3). However, with the election of a new 
FIDESZ-led government in 1998, the deficit has risen again since 2001, reaching a 
record high of 9.2 percent of GDP in the election year of 2002 (see chapter 3).
As argued in chapters 4 and 5, opportunistic political business cycles prior to 
the elections contributed significantly to the budget deficit. The Orban government 
(1998-2002) failed to pursue structural reforms that were started with the austerity
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plan under the Horn government (1994-1998). Indeed, while Orban followed the rheto­
ric of a liberal economic policy, he pursued a policy of state intervention, including 
price controls, while making little progress in the privatisation process (see chapter 3, 
see also FT, 09/04/2002). Yet, “FIDESZ’s pre-election spending spree was only the 
beginning” (EIU 2005f: 32) given that the Medgyessy government continued the ex­
penditure-oriented fiscal policy of the Orban-government and “launched a fiscally gen­
erous 100 days programme” that included increases in social benefits and public sec­
tor wages as well as tax cuts (EIU 2005f: 32, see chapters 3 and 4). As discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5 this has to be seen in the context of the tight electoral contest with 
FIDESZ and the need to fulfil election promises. Thus, the MSZP-led government did 
not use its ‘honeymoon’ period to implement fiscal consolidation programmes but in­
crease public expenditure instead. The lack of any significant structural reforms and 
the ballooning of the fiscal deficit dramatically affected Hungary’s reputation and peo­
ple and investors’ trust in economic policy-making (see chapters 4 and 5). Public dis­
satisfaction grew and the MSZP’s defeat in the European Parliament election in June 
2004 as well as a dispute with the SZDSZ over a dismissal of the liberal party’s minis­
ter led to a severe crisis in the coalition government and was only solved with the res­
ignation of Prime Minister Medgyessy who was replaced by Ferenc Gyurcsany in Sep­
tember 2004. Nevertheless, despite the crisis within the MSZP-led government, the 
coalition stayed in office and is likely to serve the full legislative period. Thus, in con­
trast to the Visegrad countries, Hungary did not experience a break-up of a coalition 
government or a minority government.
In short, the mixed electoral system has exclusively produced coalition gov­
ernments. Although the coalition governments proved to be stable (reinforced by the 
trend, as described in chapter 4, towards a bipolar party system), none of them was 
able to consolidate the budget over a longer period. It is therefore assumed that other 
factors apart from the electoral system itself, influence the country’s capacity to ad­
here to the Maastricht criteria, thus affecting Hungary’s euro-adoption strategy.
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Central Bank Independence
The ECSB statute served as the benchmark for the new Hungarian central bank legis­
lation that was adopted in 2001. Hungary amended its central bank laws to make price 
stability their primary objective and to prohibit direct fiscal financing from the central 
bank. Before the 2001 amendment, the primary objective was the less ambitiously for­
mulated “currency stability”, and a central bank credit to the government of 2 percent of 
budget revenues of the current year was allowed. The lack of credibility of the Hungar­
ian central bank before the 2001 amendment contributed considerably to the high infla­
tionary pressures which led to a situation where the large degree of inflation inertia 
itself affected inflationary expectations and prevented the inflation rate from declining 
(Moghadam 1998: 61, see also chapter 3). Also, politicians frequently engaged in dis­
cussions with the Central Bank on the level of interest rates. In particular the relation­
ship between the Orban government and the then President of the NBH, Gyorgy 
Suranyi, led to “several public clashes” (see EIU 2001: 18). In March 2001, Orban then 
nominated his former Finance Minister Zsigmond Jarai as the President of the Central 
Bank who, “as a former finance minister and a FIDESZ deputy, [...] has been instru­
mental in forming the government’s [FIDESZ’s] economic policy” (EIU 2001: 8), an 
economic policy that put emphasis on ‘"faster growth at the expense of lower inflation” 
(EIU 2001: 18, see also chapter 3). By placing a loyal politician at the head of the Cen­
tral Bank, Orban hoped to end the disputes between the government and the NBH on 
the conduct of monetary policy. Certainly, it was also a step taken by Orban to under­
mine central bank independence. However, despite these interventions, the 2001 
amendment to the central bank law was not as contested as in the Czech Republic. 
Given that Hungary experienced persistent moderate inflation throughout the 1990s the 
amendment in 2001 was primarily implemented to strengthen the credibility of Hun­
gary’s monetary policy. It also “supports Cukierman’s (1992) idea that the relation be­
tween central bank independence and inflation performance reflects a society’s rising 
aversion to inflation” (Maliszewski 2003: 229). This in mind, the NBH’s position on EMU 
has been largely instrumental. Although the NBH was very sceptical about the feasibil­
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ity of a quick adoption of the euro, it strongly supported an early target date given that 
the central bank justified its restrictive monetary policy with reference to the inflation 
criterion of the Maastricht Treaty (see chapter 5).
As for the status of the central bank’s board, the top managers of the central 
bank have a 6-year term, which is longer than the electoral cycle. Members of the cen­
tral bank council other than the governor and the deputy governors are appointed for 
three years which is less than in the other Visegrad countries and lower than the elec­
toral cycle. The NBH is obliged to inform the Parliament about its monetary policies 
once a year. As Table 17 (p. 224) shows, the overall degree of central bank independ­
ence is relatively high in Hungary. Indeed, among the Visegrad countries, Hungary 
comes second, after Poland. The difference in ratings can be explained by the fact that 
in contrast to Poland where the central bank is not allowed to purchase public bonds, 
the Hungarian central bank is allowed to purchase public bonds on the primary market 
(Freytag 2003).
The central bank has been successful in lowering the inflation rate since 2002 
which might be to due to an increase in CBI since the implementation of the new cen­
tral bank act. However, as compared to the other Visegrad countries, Hungary still has 
to cope with relatively high inflation rates. In fact, while Hungary scores well in the Cuk­
ierman index, the NBH has lost credibility in recent years because of its inconsistent 
monetary policy and wrong inflation forecast (see chapter 3 and 6). In addition “it has 
weakened its standing by squabbling unsuccessfully and sometimes publicly with the 
government over economic policy” (The Economist 31/01/2004, see chapter 5). The 
lack of trust in the Hungarian economy caused by populist fiscal policies and the NBH’s 
poor credibility, explain why Hungary has had to readjust its initial euro-adoption strat­
egy and to postpone the target date to the next decade.
Industrial Relations
The conservative Antall government established the Interest Reconciliation Council 
(Erdekegyezteto Tanacs, ET) to act as a tripartite institution for social dialogue in 1990
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(Kurtan 1993, Korosenyi 1999).25 However, the ET was a non-autonomous and state- 
led tripartite institution, in that the government had the right of initiative (Heinisch 
1999). The ET had a merely consultative role in economic and social policy and a right 
of co-decision in certain matters of labour rights legislation and wage policy. In addi­
tion to the ET, ‘social security functional self-governments’ with broad powers to im­
plement social security policy were set up in 1993, with representatives from employ­
ers’ and employees’ associations. Nevertheless, the social partners’ and in particular 
the ET’s influence on policy-making was rather limited. In fact, the government domi­
nated the ET mainly because the social partners experienced internal problems like 
fragmentation, conflicts, declining membership, and the inability of small and medium­
sized enterprises to articulate their interests (Toth 1999, Cox and Masson 2000a,b, 
Keune 2002). As Keune (2002: 9) puts it: “They [social partners] needed the IRC [In­
terest Reconciliation Council] to gain legitimacy, instead of having conquered their 
place on the Council because of their strength.” In 1995, the ET was temporarily sus­
pended when the Horn government implemented the austerity plan which involved a 
decline in real wages (see chapters 3 and 4 and Toth and Neumann 2004b: 5). The 
Orban government (1998-2002) weakened the trade unions further by disbanding the 
so-called social security functional self-governments, re-establishing government con­
trol, abolishing the right of trade unions to conclude collective agreements, and dis­
solving the ET in 1999. In July 2002, the current government, headed by the Hungar­
ian Socialist Party, established a reformed tripartite National Interest Reconciliation 
Council (OET) that replaced the ET and a separate national-level interest reconcilia­
tion forum for the public sector (the Public Service Interest Reconciliation Council -  
KET), certainly also in response to demands from the better organised public sector 
union and the need to respond to partisan pressures. This 2002 “‘reverse reform’ [...] 
was perceived as a new start for meaningful social dialogue” (Toth and Neumann 
2004b: 5). The ‘new start’ was at first promising and indeed, Hungary has distin­
guished itself significantly from the other Visegrad countries, as EMU membership has
25 The ET was the successor institution to the National Reconciliation Council, which was founded in 1988.
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been high on the agenda of national-level tripartite meetings. As early as 2002 the 
social partners issued an official statement about the prospect of joining EMU. There 
was a consensus about the benefits of a fast-track approach to EMU accession. In­
deed, the outline of the national development plan from the social partners in prepara­
tion for the EMU states that the adoption of the euro could happen around 2006/07 
(Foti 2003: 62). The outline (Foti 2003: 62) continues:
[t]he social partners agree that the main general objective is to achieve real 
economic and social convergence. For this, sustainable economic growth is 
needed. This could only be maintained with financial balance, which means 
that budget deficit, inflation, and state debt should be kept at such a level, 
which makes it possible to fulfil the Maastricht criteria in due course (italics 
in original).
But while the social partners agreed on the objective of EMU membership, they dis­
agreed on how reforms to meet the Maastricht criteria should be carried out. This dis­
agreement between the social partners can only be understood by pointing to the gov­
ernment’s wage policy since the late 1990s.
Already in the late 1990s, the prospect of joining the euro-zone was used by the 
governments and employers’ associations to justify wage restraints (Toth and Neu­
mann 2004a: 3, see also chapter 3). But between 2000 and 2002, also in an effort to 
get re-elected and to stimulate the economy, a centre-right government under Prime 
Minister Orban ironically tried to push the wage level upwards and embarked on a 
“Keynesian style spending policy” (Toth and Neumann 2004a: 2). For example, in 2001 
the minimum wage was raised by 25 percent to 57 percent of the average national 
wage and wages increased for certain groups of civil servants and public sector em­
ployees (Toth and Neumann 2003). It should be noted that none of the other Visegrad 
countries raised the minimum wage so drastically, even “outbidding the most radical 
unions’ demands” (Toth and Neumann 2004b: 7). The Hungarian Socialist Party, 
elected in 2002, ran its electoral campaign under the slogan “Transformation to Welfare 
Society” and continued the expenditure-oriented policies of the Orban government. In 
2002 the government presented its 100 days programme and initiated a 50 percent 
wage increase for public sector employees (see chapter 3). Especially the wage in­
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crease is a reaction to considerably low wages in the public sector. But the rapid in­
crease in public sector wages to an unprecedented level contributed to an increase in 
the public deficit, reaching a record high of 9.2 percent of GDP in 2002 (see chapter 3). 
In addition, the increase in wage-levels beyond the level of productivity growth and 
further macroeconomic imbalances (e.g. the crisis of the forint, see chapter 3) added to 
a loss in competitiveness. It has also to be seen in this context that Hungary lost a 
number of landmark investments, especially to Slovakia.26 To address the fiscal deficit 
and high inflationary pressure, the government changed its economic policy in 2003. 
The economic policy shift to redress macroeconomic imbalances by cutting the state 
budget and guaranteeing wage restraints was justified with reference to the obligation 
to meet the Maastricht criteria (Toth and Neumann 2004a: 3). However, unlike in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, the Hungarian government was keen to include 
the social partners while preparing the reform plan.
In March 2003, the government officially established a joint meeting of the Eco­
nomic Cabinet of the Government and two representatives of the employers’ and em­
ployees’ associations to draft a proposal for a medium term social pact for preparing 
the economy to meet the Maastricht criteria. By including the social partners the gov­
ernment hoped to ensure wage restraint and to gain support for restrictive fiscal poli­
cies. But the social partners remained split over the government’s reform programme 
and were not able to come to a consensus. Employers’ associations demanded a cut in 
corporate tax from 18 percent to 12 percent, rejected any increases in the minimum 
wage and called for cuts in the public sector. Employees’ associations demanded an 
increase in the minimum wage up to 60 percent of the average wage27 and called for 
an annual real wage increase above the GDP growth level arguing that the gap be­
tween the average EU wage level and the Hungarian wage level has to be closed (see 
Toth and Neumann 2004a: 5). Trade Unions further argued that Hungarian competi­
26 Analysts blame the inconsistent economic policies for the loss of some major investment deals in the 
region. For example, in 2004 and 2003 Slovakia won the bid for the $870 million Hyundai/Kia and the $800 
million PSA Peugeot-Citroen car plant, respectively.
27 As in Slovakia, Hungarian trade unions’ stance on the minimum wage has to be seen in the context of 
the European Social Charter demand of 60 percent.
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tiveness should not be based on low wages but wages should be set in accordance to
the economic development. As Toth and Neumann (2004a: 6) argue
after years of politicians regularly offering more in wage hikes than what 
was demanded, unions did not want to lower their demands on the first call 
of the Finance Minister.
The negotiations to conclude a medium-term social pact over economic policy aimed to 
fulfil the Maastricht criteria and facilitate Hungary joining the euro-zone as soon as 
possible then collapsed in July 2003 and the government had to act unilaterally to pro­
pose the reform package. Trade unions were mostly blamed for the break down of the 
talks because they firmly rejected any wage restraints. Despite the fact that there is no 
political division between the Hungarian trade unions and the MSZP-led government, 
Hungarian trade unions stuck to their strategy of
rapid wage approximation to the EU level, which seems to be at odds with 
the requirements of the Maastricht criteria as far as low inflation and a bal­
anced budget are concerned (Toth and Neumann 2004b: 15).
The proposal of the government strategy for the adoption of the euro was then pre­
sented in August 2003 (cf National Bank of Hungary 2003 for the draft strategy). De­
spite the critics and the fact that no medium-term social pact to meet the Maastricht 
criteria was concluded, the social partners agreed on the government’s euro-adoption 
strategy. As Toth and Neumann (2004a: 6) explain:
social partners seem still not to be aware of the importance of the mid-term 
economic strategy plan to be submitted to the Commission. This must be 
the only reason that despite the failure of negotiations on a social pact, [...] 
social partners gave their blessing to a mid-term economic programme, 
which targeted the radical reduction of the state budget deficit and inflation 
(see also Toth and Neumann 2004b).
While the medium-term economic programme was designed to meet the Maas­
tricht criteria by 2006 and to join the euro-zone in 2008, the government had to readjust 
its strategy in 2004 and postponed the adoption of the euro to 2010. Thus, despite the 
fact that the social partners agreed on the economic programme, the macroeconomic 
imbalances -  caused to a large extent by the populist economic policies of the FIDESZ 
and MSZP-led governments -  affected the Hungarian EMU accession strategy, and 
help to understand why the government postponed the adoption of the euro to 2010.
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Indeed, it is argued that the social partners have not been able to accommodate 
inflationary pressures; pressures that were reinforced by real wage increases initiated 
by the Orban and Medgyessy governments. For example, at 9.1 percent pay increases 
-  which are the highest among the Visegrad countries -  exceeded the recommended 
7-8 percent wage increase for 2004 by the OET (see Carley 2005: 35 and 39). Given 
the decentralised nature of the Hungarian wage bargaining system (see appendix 2), 
the very low union density (only 20 percent, Figure 19, p. 230) and the low collective 
bargaining coverage (see Table 18, p. 229), it can be assumed that the increase in real 
wages as experienced in recent years is not driven by trade unions’ strength to press 
for wage hikes but first and foremost by the opportunistic interests of the mainstream 
parties to get re-elected and to fulfil election promises. In short, although EMU was 
explicitly on the agenda of the tripartite meetings, trade unions and employers' associa­
tions have only limited scope to influence the pace and content of the country’s euro- 
adoption strategy.
Poland
Electoral System
To prevent Soviet intervention in Poland, Solidarity accepted the dominance of the 
Communist Party in the roundtable talks in Spring 1989, during which the new electoral 
law for the semi-open election to be held in June 1989 was negotiated. It was agreed 
that a two-chamber parliament consisting of a lower and upper (Senate) house would 
be introduced. However, for the lower house, only a third of the seats were to be dis­
tributed by single member constituencies. The Senate was freely elected with a double 
member district system. The June 1989 election ended in disaster for the ruling Com­
munist Party, which lost all the seats that were voted on in the open election. The par­
liament negotiated and approved the electoral law for the first free parliamentary elec­
tions in 1991. Because of high fragmentation within the party system, parliamentarians
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agreed on a system of list proportional representation and the Hare-Niemeyer formula 
of extreme and fully proportional representation that favours small parties.28
The first electoral law produced an extremely fragmented parliament. After the 
1991 parliamentary elections, no fewer than 29 parties received a place in the Sejm, 
with no one party winning more than 13 percent of the seats.29 Many legal changes to 
the electoral law followed and led to the widespread impression among political scien­
tists that Poland’s political system was anarchic, chaotic, and unstable. Out of the four 
parliamentary elections, three were held under changed electoral rules. Markowski, on 
the other hand, points to the positive effects of the frequent changes in the electoral 
law design;
it is true that such changes have their acute difficulties, but at the same 
time one cannot ignore the educational effects of trial-and-error reforms, or 
neglect the merits of adaptability and flexibility (Markowski 2000: 106).
The 1993 parliamentary election in particular had a strong instructive effect on parties 
and voters. To limit the number of parties likely to gain access to the Sejm, a 5 percent 
threshold for individual parties and an 8 percent threshold for coalitions were intro­
duced in 1993 (Table 23). “Ironically, in the 1993 parliamentary election, this law elimi­
nated several post-Solidarity parties from legislative representation that had strongly 
supported it” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 106). This is because, instead of cooperating with 
each other, many religious-conservative-nationalist parties ran in the 1993 Sejm elec­
tion on their own and failed to meet the threshold. More than 35 percent of votes were 
“wasted” because of the thresholds. However, the 50 centre-right parties learned their 
lesson from the 1993 debacle and did not repeat their mistake in 1997. Most of the 
rightist parties took part in the elections in 1997 as members of the alliance, the Soli­
darity Election Action (AWS). At the same time, voters adjusted their electoral choice to 
these institutional changes quickly by increasing their tactical voting (Markowski 2001).
28 In the Hare-Niemeyer formula, seats are allocated in accordance with the number of votes a party ob­
tained, multiplied by the number of seats distributed and then divided by the number of valid votes. The 
formula favours small parties.
29 In contrast to the view that the “extreme multipartism” in the Sejm in 1991 was caused by the extreme 
proportional representation formula of Hare-Niemayer, Gebethner (1996) states that the diversity of politi­
cal opinions is the main reason for party diversification in Poland.
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In 1993, the electoral system changed from the extreme form of Hare-Niemeyer 
to the more moderate system of d’Hondt proportional representation. In 2001, the for­
mula was again replaced by the Ste Lague system.30 The d’Hondt formula systemati­
cally favours the larger parties, whereas the Sainte Lague formula favours small and 
medium-sized parties. The alteration from the d’Hondt to the Ste. Lague system was 
prepared by the AWS-led government in 2001 (see Table 23). It was predicted that the 
SLD would win overwhelmingly, and the AWS deputies hoped to reduce the electoral 
success of the SLD by changing from the d’Hondt to the Ste. Lague formula. As Millard 
(2002: 18) puts it:
[w]hen the presidential elections [in 2000] augured badly for its future sup­
port, AWS deputies sought refuge in electoral manipulation, seeking an 
electoral system that would not penalise its waning attractions and would 
simultaneously curb its arch-enemy the SLD.
Indeed, Millard (2002:16) continues,
we can clearly see the impact of the new modified Ste. Lague formula.
Miller and his colleagues would have achieved a comfortable absolute ma­
jority of seats, and except for the PO, all other parties would have seen 
their number reduced.
Instead of gaining from the Ste Lague formula, neither the party of former Prime Minis­
ter Jerzy Buzek (AWS) nor his coalition partner the Freedom Union (UW) could pass 
the electoral threshold; instead, they disintegrated and were eliminated from the Sejm 
in 2001.
30 The Ste. Lague formula uses the divisor series 1, 3, 5, 7, etc. and favours small and large parties 
evenly. The formula is used only in a modified form with the first divisor starting at 1.4, with the effect that it 
is harder for small parties to get their first seats. For detailed descriptions and examples, see Lijphart 
(1994:153-159).
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Table 23 Main changes in the law on elections to the Polish Sejm
1989 Semi-competitive ^ g  majoritarian Two-round N/A
1991
1993
1997
2001
Two-tier PR 
(nl=69)
Two-tier PR 
(nl=69)
Two-tier PR 
(nl=69)
35 (7-17)
52 (3-17)
52 (3-17)
Single-tier PR 41(4-19)
Hare-
Niemeyer (nl)°
D’Hondt
D’Hondt
Ste-LaguS
5 percent for nl
5 percent for 1 
party, 8 percent 
for a coalition, 7 
percent nl
5 percent for 1 
party, 8 percent 
for a coalition, 7 
percent nl
5 percent for 1 
party, 8 percent 
for a coalition
c = constituency; nl = national list 
Source: Birch et al. (2002: 27)
Table 24 Governments in Poland
mnTslrI ^ Legislative Type of government period _____________________________
Tadeusz Ma- 
zowicki
Solidarity 09/89-12/90 Coalition Solidarity, ZSL, SD
Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki
KLD 1/91-12/91 Minority government Coalition KLD, PC, ZChN, 
UD, SD, S
Jan Olszewski PC 12/91-6/92 Coalition ZChN, PSL, PC, PL, PSL
Waldemar
Pawlak
PSL 6/92-7/92 No cabinet
Hanna
Suchocka
UD 7/92-10/93 Minority Coalition government UD, ZChN, KLD, 
SChL, PPG, PChD
Waldemar
Pawlak
PSL 10/93-2/95 Coalition SLD, PSL
Josef Olesksy SLD 3/95-2/96 Coalition SLD, PSL
Wlodzimierz
Cimoszewicz
SLD 2/96-9/97 SLD, PSL
Jerzy Buzek AWS 10/97-6/00 AWS, UW
Jerzy Buzek AWS 6/00-10/01 Minority AWS-government
Leszek Miller SLD 10/01-02/03 Coalition SLD, UP, PSL
Leszek Miller SLD 02/03-05/04 Minority coalition government SLD/UP
Marek Belka Independent 05/04-09/05 Minority coalition government SLD/UP
As discussed in chapter 2, Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Grilli et al. 1991 
found empirical evidence that deficits tend to be larger in those countries that have a 
“short average tenure of government and [...] many political parties in a ruling coalition” 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989: 903). Poland has experienced both: short time horizons for
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governments and broad coalitions. Indeed, Poland has the most fragmented party sys­
tem and one of the highest volatility levels among the Visegrad countries. None of the 
governments were able to get re-elected and the elections gave a majority, alternately, 
to Solidarity/post-Solidarity parties or post-communist/peasant parties. The alternation 
between post-communist and Solidarity-affiliated parties also illustrates the polarisation 
of the party system between heirs of communism and heirs of Solidarity (see Millard 
2002: 2).31 As Table 24 shows, Poland experienced several minority and multi-party 
coalition governments.32 The success of the initial fiscal consolidation programme in­
troduced by Balcerowicz in 1990 and 1991 with low budget deficit of 3.6 percent of 
GDP in 1991
was due to the extraordinary politics of these years, in which Solidarity en­
joyed the unqualified support of the population. [...] Balcerowicz’s success 
could not be sustained following the start of “normal” democratic politics 
with the 1991 elections (Dimitrov 2003:16, see also Johnson and Kowalska 
1994).
In fact, the post 1991 coalition government was highly unstable and experienced diffi­
culties in pushing forward reforms on fiscal consolidation. Instead, given that the multi­
party coalitions in 1991-1992 were not expected to run together in further elections, the 
parties in office engaged in excessive public spending in an attempt to enhance their 
chances of getting re-elected (Dimitrov 2003). After the 1993 elections the Social De­
mocrats went on to form a coalition with the peasant party. However, this coalition gov­
ernment proved to be highly unstable as well and the Social democrat-peasant coali­
tion of 1993-7 was reconstituted three times (see Table 24). Nevertheless, the fiscal 
deficit remained low (even below the Maastricht deficit criterion) because of factors of 
rapid economic recovery, exceptionally high growth rates in 1995 and 1996 and the 
fact that the SLD-led government strengthened the Finance Minister’s position by dele­
gating the power to set spending caps for the ministries (Dimitrov 2003: 24). Fiscal re­
31 However, as the defeat of Lech Walesa in the 1995 presidential election showed “espousing traditional 
“anti-communist” values [is] not necessarily enough to win elections” (EIU 2005d: 5) which might indicate 
that the “Solidarity versus post-communism” cleavage is slowly losing its potency.
32 It should be kept in mind that the Buzek government (1997-2001) was led by the AWS; an electoral 
action that reunited more than 30 (centre-) right wing parties “and other groupings spearheaded by the 
Solidarity trade union” (Szczerbiak 2004: 62, see also chapter 4).
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forms then came to a halt during the last years of the Buzek government when the 
pace of reform slowed down remarkably. Poland was severely hit by the Russian cur­
rency crisis in 1998 (see chapter 3) and the European-wide recession in 2000. Since 
2001 high budget deficits have been a continuous and serious problem. The new SLD- 
led government elected in 2001 was faced with worrisome economic conditions (see 
chapter 3) and struggled with implementing fiscal reforms. Because of the high budget 
deficit, Finance Minister Marek Belka was forced to implement emergency spending 
controls in 2001 given that the budget exceeded the debt limit as imposed by the Con­
stitution.33 The targets for 2001 and 2002 were eventually met, but the pro-reform ori­
ented Finance Minister Marek Belka left the cabinet after a dispute over the pace of 
reforms with Prime Minister Miller in July 2002 (see chapter 5) and was replaced by 
Grzegorz Kolodko who was already Finance Minister between 1994 and 1997 and well 
known for populist economic and monetary policy measures. At the same time the SLD 
became involved in one of the biggest scandals, the so-called Rywin affair which de­
stabilised the coalition and damaged the credibility of the SLD (see chapter 4).34 As 
public and political pressures from the junior coalition partner grew, Kolodko revised 
Belka’s fiscal policy plans and postponed public finance reform until 2004 (see EIU 
2005d: 30). However, the coalition with the farmer party continued to be very fragile 
and eventually collapsed in February 2003 over a reform plan that aimed to show fi­
nancial fitness for EU and EMU accession (see chapter 4). The subsequent minority 
government (see chapter 4) proved to be too weak to push forward drastic reforms and 
the budget deficit reached a record high of 5.5 percent in 2003 (see chapter 3). Having 
lost the majority in the Sejm, the government had to modify and water down the so- 
called Hausner plan that initially foresaw severe cuts in public spending (see chapter 3 
and 5). While it can be argued that exogenous developments (the Russian crisis and
33 The Polish constitution sets a maximum public debt level of 60 percent of GDP debts. If public debt 
exceeds 60 percent of GDP then the government has to implement an immediate emergency programme 
and cannot extent its loan guarantees.
34 Other high-profile scandals involved the Orlen (allegations that Prime Minister Miller used the Polish 
security service to arrest the President of energy company PKN Orlen) and the PZU scandals (allegations 
of corruptions in the privatisation process of Poland’s largest insurance company, the PZU).
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European-wide economic recession) contributed to the increase in the budget deficit, 
the frequent crises and break-ups of the multi-party coalition governments in recent 
years have certainly hindered rather than supported fiscal policy reforms in Poland. In 
this regard, the Polish case provides supportive evidence for Roubini and Sachs’ ar­
gument that multi-coalition governments -  and the thesis includes minority govern­
ments as well -  are likely to postpone politically costly reforms. In addition to electoral 
concerns of the governing party (see chapter 4), the difficulties in achieving a sustained 
budget deficit helps to explain why the SLD-led government -  while aiming for a quick 
entry into the euro-zone -  did not announce an official target date. In fact it shows that 
a fast-track approach to adopting the euro was unlikely, especially given that the high 
unemployment rate made and makes it difficult for every government to reduce spend­
ing.
Central Bank Independence
Remarkably, while Poland has experienced poor fiscal performance in recent years, it 
has been able to achieve low inflation rates (see chapter 3). Among the Visegrad cen­
tral banks, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) scores best on the Cukierman index. 
Price stability was already the primary objective in 1998, much earlier than in Hungary, 
Slovakia, or the Czech Republic. This is why Poland scored much better than the other 
Visegrad countries in the previous ratings (see Table 17, p. 224). In 1998, Poland in­
troduced legislation prohibiting direct fiscal financing, also much earlier than in the 
other Visegrad countries. Given that Poland experienced exceptionally high levels of 
inflation throughout the 1990s (see and chapter 3) it is not surprising that policy-makers 
started to develop an anti-inflationary consensus and that they “institutionalised [this] 
consensus and delegated authority to the independent central bank to protect the con­
sensus” (Maliszewski 2003: 234). Since 1998, monetary policy is the responsibility of 
the monetary policy council (MPC) whose nine external members (plus the President of 
the NBP) are appointed for six years by the Sejm, the Senate and the President choos­
ing three members each. The MPC meets once per months and sets the monetary
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policy targets.35 Transparency and accountability are obtained by publishing quarterly 
reports on the balance of payments and annual balances of central government’s as­
sets and liabilities. In addition, the governor of the NBP must publish “draft monetary 
guidelines, opinions on the draft budget, balance-of-payments projections and the 
Council’s resolutions” (Art. 23.1).
Poland was remarkably successful in reducing the inflation rate. Some econo­
mists attribute the success in the disinflation process to an “inflation-averse” central 
bank or, to put it differently, to the so-called ‘Balcerowicz-effect’ (The Economist 
31/01/2004, see Berger 2004: 26). Balcerowicz has committed the NBP to price stabil­
ity and preparation for euro-zone entry (see chapter 5, Balcerowicz 2001a: 2, 2002). 
However, the need to stimulate the economy during the 2000 economic recession led 
to an increasing divergence of views between the monetary authorities and the gov­
ernment (Zombrit 2003: 73, see also Epstein 2005) ending in a conflict about the ap­
propriate level interest rates in 2001-2002 (see chapter 4 and 5). Indeed, in 2002 inter­
est rates in Poland were the highest among European states and many politicians 
blamed the restrictive monetary policy for Poland's economic downturn. Backed by the 
EU and IMF, Balcerowicz defended the interest rate by referring to the European Un­
ion’s mandatory inflation target and to the uncertainty about the government’s ability to 
reduce public expenditure (see chapter 5). To force the NBP to cut interest rates, politi­
cians in the parliament proposed to expand the 10-member board by five seats and to 
add the objectives of employment and growth to that of attaining low inflation (see 
chapter 3). In addition, in summer 2002 Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko proposed 
to introduce a currency board and to peg the zloty unilaterally to the euro. Certainly, 
Kolodko’s intention can be interpreted as an effort to undermine Balcerowicz’s power 
given that the debate over the currency board system was not only over the most ap­
propriate exchange rate system for Poland or a strategy for a fast-track approach to 
EMU accession but reflected very much the power struggle between the government
35 The first MPC completed its term in January 2004. In the new MPC Balcerowicz lost some of his influ­
ence given that the new MPC is “dominated by members with less hawkish views” (EIU 2005d: 26).
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and the central bank. A currency board, as suggested by Kolodko, would have been an 
elegant way to transfer the central bank’s power to the central bank of the anchor cur­
rency: the European Central Bank. Interest rates would have been at the low level of 
the ECB and at the same time the zloty would have been depreciated before the intro­
duction of the currency board (see FTD, 01/08/2002).
It should be noted, however, that Balcerowicz’s hawkish monetary policy during 
the economic recession may have been in part influenced by his flawed relationship to 
a post-communist government. This is because -  arguing from an economic point of 
view -  the high interest rates policy of the central bank was not necessarily justified 
given that Polish economic growth had reached a level of zero percent in 2002 and 
unemployment rose to a new record high of 19.9 percent (see chapter 3). At the same 
time, inflation was below 2 percent which was clearly below the central bank target of 5 
percent. Interest rates, however, were kept at a high level of 8.5 percent. Indeed, be­
tween 2001-2003 end-year inflation was below the targets set by the MPC (see EIU 
2005d: 26) fuelling criticism that the NBP was pursuing an overly restrictive monetary 
policy. Pressure to cut interest rates came not only from the government, but also from 
trade unions. The OPZZ (All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions), for instance, organised 
a demonstration in front of Poland’s central bank. Demonstrators threw firecrackers, 
demanded a cut in interest rates in order to stimulate the economy, and chanted: “Bal­
cerowicz must go” (Wall Street Journal Europe, 26/06/2002). Certainly, it is no coinci­
dence that it was the SLD-affiliated OPZZ and not the trade union NSZZ SolidarnoSc 
(see below) that organised the demonstration, underlining once again, that the dispute 
over the appropriate path of monetary policy is not only a power struggle between the 
government and an independent central bank, but also reflects a row between a post­
communist government and Balcerowicz, the former Finance Minister in the first Soli­
darity-led government. In this sense, the struggle reflects the cleavage between ‘heirs 
of communism and heirs of Solidarity’ (cf Millard 2002: 2) and can therefore only be 
understood with reference to the communist past.
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Given the high degree of independence of the hawkish NBP and the need to 
counterbalance the economic recession, the government turned to fiscal policies to 
reflate the economy which contributed to an increase in the budget deficit to 5.4 per­
cent in 2004. Although the government did not announce an official target date, the 
high fiscal deficit has constrained a fast-track approach to adopting the euro (see also 
chapters 4 and 5). This is not to argue that the high independence of the NBP is re­
sponsible for the fiscal deficit that has constrained a fast-track approach in Poland. But 
it is argued that in the light of the NBP’s successful restrictive monetary policy, the Pol­
ish government faced a dilemma during the economic recession that started in 2000. It 
was a dilemma generated by the two following options: to use fiscal cycles to reflate 
the economy or to accept a high level of unemployment (see also Hallerberg et al. 
2002a,b).
Industrial Relations
As a result of growing labour unrest, especially in the public sector, the Tripartite 
Commission for Social and Economic Issues (Komisja Trojstronna) was established 
under the “State Enterprise Pact” in 1994, thus much later than in the other Visegrad 
countries. This has to be seen in the context of Solidarity’s political role in the govern­
ment and the weak representation of business interests by employers’ associations 
(see below). The Commission was a consultative body and its decisions were to be 
non-binding guidelines only. As in the other Visegrad countries, the tripartite body sets 
the minimum wage, with other agreements on annual wage increases serving only as a 
recommendation for ceiling raises (Toth and Neumann 2004b: 13). Acting as a forum 
for social dialogue, the tripartite Commission faced several difficulties arising from the 
weakness of the employers’ associations, the political role of Solidarity, and the dis­
putes between the two major trade unions, Solidarity and OPZZ. By the end of the 
1990s, the Commission had become more and more marginalised. Especially in Po­
land, where the private sector consists mainly of small dealerships and service compa­
nies, business interests are hardly organised in employer associations. Thus, much of
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the Commission’s success depends on the ability of the rival trade unions to formulate 
a common position, and on the organisation of employers in small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Gardawski 2002).
NSZZ Solidarnosc (the Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity) 
and the OPZZ (All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions) are the main trade union confed­
erations. Solidarity is not a typical trade union following Western patterns of interest 
mediation, but was above all an anticommunist organisation and was a mass political 
movement against communist rule. In contrast, the OPZZ is the successor of the for­
mer trade union under the communist regime. As Sanford (2002: 198) puts it: “Solidar­
ity rivalry with the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Partyj-sponsored OPZZ and reform 
communist movement left a powerful legacy of personal hatred and animosity between 
activists.” The two trade unions are thus greatly polarised and are a unique case in 
Central Europe.
Both trade unions had representatives in the Sejm until the parliamentary elec­
tion of 2001.36 Before that, numerous trade unionists from NSZZ Solidarnosd and 
OPZZ were either members of the parliament, or the trade union itself headed the coa­
lition governments. NSZZ Solidarnosd formed part of the government in 1989-1993 and 
1997-2001, while OPZZ was part of the government between 1993 and 1997. Since 
the OPZZ and Solidarity trade unionists were members of the parliament until the 2001 
general elections, trade unions could use the “state-capture” strategy to influence eco­
nomic policy outcomes instead of promoting their interests through tripartite bodies. 
However, direct involvement in the policy-making process did not prevent either trade 
union from losing great numbers of members; nor were these unions able to improve 
the working conditions of employees (Gardawski 2002). In addition, for Solidarity, the 
state-capture strategy ended in a dispute between liberal reformers in the government 
and trade union activists at the base. Being a trade union, it has sought to support 
workers’ interests on the micro-level, whereas in its political role it has supported re­
36 In the Miller government, 19 trade unionists from OPZZ were elected in the Sejm, but they did not repre­
sent the trade union, nor did they act as a separate group (Gardawski 2002).
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strictive macroeconomic policies (Thirkwell et al. 1994: 86, Rainnie and Hardy 1995). 
The resulting tensions between the leadership and the rank-and-file members were 
mainly responsible for the sharp decline in membership in recent years.37 The multifac­
eted and contradictory role of Solidarity led to tensions and a rupture within Solidarity. 
As a result, Solidarity partially left the executive and altered its state-capture strategy to 
a confrontational strategy, with mass strikes as the core instrument to influence policy 
outcomes. But although Poland has a distinctive strike culture, “the [...] [high] number 
of strikes does not reflect the atmosphere in employee environments: strikes are simply 
perceived as a tool that is ineffective in achieving one’s own rights” (Kozek 2003: 81).
The legacy of Solidarity as a social movement that fought against the communist 
regime determines the constraints within the Tripartite Commission. Indeed, the divi­
sion within the society in terms of attitudes toward the former communist regime (see 
chapter 2, p. 65) is probably best illustrated by the infighting between NSZZ Solidar- 
nosc and the SLD-affiliated OPZZ. The strong polarisation of the trade unions makes 
the representation of genuine workers’ interests at times secondary given that the in­
fighting dominates the agenda. The mistrust between the negotiating parties is also the 
major obstacle for the conclusion of a social pact over the compliance with the Maas­
tricht criteria. In fact, EMU membership as a separate issue was not on the agenda of 
the Trilateral Commission and the government does not refer to the EMU accession 
requirements to underpin its income policy within the Trilateral Commission either. 
Gardwaski (2004: 8) concludes: “the Trilateral Commission has discussed membership 
in EMU cursorily at best”. The wage strategy in view of joining EMU was thus not in­
cluded. However, it should be noted that trade unions’ demand for wage increases has 
been moderate and, as in Slovakia, was related to labour market policy targets (see 
Toth and Neumann 2004b: 7). In fact, Poland’s social partners have “adopted a re­
sponsible approach” (Gardawski 2004: 6) to tax reduction and minimum remuneration. 
As Gardawski (2004: 6) concludes
37 As in the other Visegrad countries, trade unions in Poland have lost many members. In 2002, only 15 
percent of the labour force was organised in trade unions (see Figure 19, p. 230). Membership in Solidarity 
declined from 10 million between 1982 and the mid-1990s to 800,000 in 2003 (RFE/RL, Poland Report, 
30/09/2003).
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the most pressing problems in the Polish economy comprise of job reten­
tion and the provision of some manner of safety net for those who drop out 
of the job market.
Centralised and sectoral wage bargaining is underdeveloped and most of the 
bargaining takes place at the company level (see appendix 2). In addition, as Figure 19 
(p. 230) shows, trade union density is at 15 percent lowest in Poland because in private 
and small-scale enterprises, union membership is either very low or does not exist at 
all. Employers’ associations are also very weak, and it is questionable whether agree­
ments made on the national level in tripartite meetings can be implemented on the mi­
cro-level. Collective bargaining coverage has declined to 40 percent (see Table 18, p. 
229), mainly as a result of the prominence of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) that are not unionised and are therefore not bound by collective bargaining. In 
large enterprises, most of the wage bargaining is transferred to the divisional level, 
limiting the scope of agreements and creating a weak regulatory framework for trade 
unions. As in the Czech Republic, Poland provides supportive evidence for the U- 
shape curve of wage determination where the negative wage-push inflation is mitigated 
by the absence of strong trade unions. But it should be recalled that trade unions took 
a moderate stance on wage demands anyway, given that in view of high unemploy­
ment rates, trade union demands were related to job retention and creation. Thus, 
while the social partners do not have the power to influence the content of the country’s 
euro-adoption strategy, they do not negatively affect the escalation of wage develop­
ments either.
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the implications of domestic institutions for reforms aimed at 
fulfilling the Maastricht criteria and therefore for the Visegrad countries’ approach to 
adopting the euro. Starting from the assumption that electoral systems, central bank 
independence and industrial relations play a key role in shaping fiscal and monetary 
policy reforms, the chapter has examined whether stable and coherent coalition gov­
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ernments succeed better in implementing policy reforms, whether CBI supports the 
disinflation process while constraining governments’ economic policy choices to stimu­
late the economy, and whether the influence of social partners and the level of wage 
bargaining explain inflation developments.
As for electoral systems, there is little supportive evidence that coherent coali­
tion governments are more stable and succeed better in implementing policy reforms in 
the Czech Republic. The second Klaus government, a coalition government of coher­
ent centre-right parties, collapsed in 1997 and the economic recession revealed many 
of the flaws in the reform programme of the government. The succeeding minority and 
coalition governments under Zeman and Spidla proved to be weak and unable to sup­
port fiscal consolidation either. The opposition agreement under the Zeman minority 
government led to political gridlock and to a postponement of policy reforms. The sub­
sequent coalition government consisting of left, conservative and liberal parties was not 
ambitious to pursue fiscal consolidation as the leading coalition partner, the CSSD, 
needed to address growing partisan pressure; a pressure which was reinforced by high 
unemployment rates in the aftermath of the currency crisis and a trend towards class- 
based voting behaviour (see chapter 4). In addition, the CSSD-led coalition govern­
ment experienced a series of major political crises which contributed to difficulties in 
implementing policy reforms and which underpinned the postponement of the target 
date for the adoption of the euro into the next decade. The postponement falls on fertile 
ground given that the public, opposition parties and the central bank itself are rather 
sceptical towards EMU (see chapters 4 and 5). Indeed, while -  despite frequent attacks 
from Czech politicians -  the central bank successfully followed a restrictive monetary 
policy in line with the Maastricht criteria, its central bank board members are split over 
the costs and benefits of joining the euro-zone; a reluctant attitude also to be seen in 
light of the Czech experience of monetary policy failure of a fixed exchange rate under 
a large amount of capital flight (chapter 5). Certainly with the nomination of new central 
bank board members who share an affinity to Klaus’ view on the adoption of the euro, 
the CNB’s attitude towards the euro has become even more reluctant.
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So far, the lack of a legal binding framework and -  as in the other Visegrad 
countries -  political consensus between the social partners has hindered the adoption 
of a national accord over economic policy reforms in the Czech Republic. In fact, this 
has led to a situation in which the social dialogue is subject to political decisions de­
pending on the will of the government to initiate or to suspend tripartite meetings 
whenever it suits the political climate. EMU was not on the agenda in tripartite meetings 
either. However, the absence of an effective tripartite institution and the lack of social 
pacts over EMU do not necessarily mean that the social partners are not able to influ­
ence the pace of the adjustment process. For example, the confrontational attitude of 
the trade unions towards the government or compliance with market mechanisms 
might affect the countries’ euro-adoption strategy positively or negatively. Indeed, while 
Czech trade unions are too weak to support an escalation of wages that would jeopard­
ise compliance with the Maastricht criteria, the confrontational attitude of the trade un­
ions towards the Spidla government contributed to the political crisis that underpinned 
the furthest target date for the adoption of the euro. But because the social partners’ 
influence on economic policies depends on specific conditions (such as general public 
dissatisfaction) rather than on agreements, tripartite institutions as an independent 
variable here has to be -  as is the case in the other Visegrad countries -  limited to the 
decentralised structure of industrial relations that positively affect wage moderation. 
Indeed, trade unions and employers’ associations, in general, have relatively little 
power in the political process. As Heinisch (1999: 50) puts it: “the initial rush to estab­
lish tripartism did not result in the development of politically effective social partner­
ships”. In fact, it is a state of “tripartism without corporatism” (Reutter 1996). Since tri­
partite institutions are not able to act in an influential and powerful manner, “the convic­
tion of the possible benefits of tripartism is not high” (Brokl and Mansfeldova 1996: 154). 
Indeed, unlike in the old member states,, special social pacts to meet the requirements 
of the Maastricht criteria have not been concluded in the Visegrad countries (see foot­
note 4, p. 218).
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In contrast to the Czech Republic, the Slovak case provides supportive evi­
dence for the argument that coherent coalition governments succeed better in imple­
menting fiscal policy reforms. The recent success in implementing policy reforms has 
been supported by a government of coherent centre-right parties that share a common 
view on economic policy. The ambitious reforms of the second Dzurinda government 
are in line with the country’s intention to join the euro-zone as soon as possible. The 
reform efforts are further supported by a favourable constellation of party fragmentation 
and the LS-HSDZ’s wish to increase its coalition potential by voting for key government 
bills in the parliament. Thus, in the Slovak case, the institutional opportunities and con­
straints arising from the electoral system help to explain Slovakia’s path to adopting the 
euro.
In addition, the central bank’s’ ‘reputation as a pillar of macroeconomic stability’ 
supports the disinflation process in line with the government’s euro-adoption strategy. 
In fact, while political attempts to undermine CBI were frequent in Slovakia under Me- 
ciar, the Dzurinda governments were keen to support CBI because it was seen as cru­
cial in maintaining domestic and international confidence in the economy. Indeed, while 
most of the inflationary pressures since 1998 have been generated by an inherited in­
flation debt, Slovakia’s high degree of CBI contributes significantly to lower inflation 
expectation. In addition, unlike in the Czech Republic, the NBS’ restrictive monetary 
policy is supported by the government’s ambitious budget plans designed to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Moreover, and again in contrast to the Czech Republic, the former 
Governor of the NBS, Marian Jusko, shares with the government the wish to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible and in any case no later than the other Visegrad 
countries. As argued in chapter 5, both the NBS and the government point to the period 
of political isolation in order to explain their intention to join the euro-zone as soon as 
possible and in any case no later than the other Visegrad countries. Thus, while the 
institutional framework of CBI, a cohesive coalition government and a favourable party 
fragmentation support reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria, the fast-track ap­
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proach to adopting the euro can only be understood with reference to the shared prin­
cipled belief that Slovakia’s future depends on its commitment to Western integration.
The disinflation process is further supported by a moderate stance on wage 
demands on behalf of the Slovak trade unions. In view of high unemployment rates 
Slovak trade unions -  as in Poland -  were preoccupied with questions of job retention 
and creation. Yet, it should be noted that employees’ and employers’ associations’ in­
fluence on economic policies is rather limited anyway; Slovak tripartism is rather of a 
formal than consensual nature and until June 2004 EMU was not on the agenda of the 
meetings. Thus, it can be argued that while social partners were not able to influence 
the content of the country’s euro-adoption strategy they did not negatively affect wage 
developments and therefore the pace of the government’s strategy either.
In Hungary, the electoral system proves to be a weak variable for explaining dif­
ferences in the euro-adoption strategies. In fact, it is argued that the euro-adoption 
strategy of Hungary has to be understood with reference to other factors. This is be­
cause although the Hungarian coalition governments enjoy stability, none of them were 
able to consolidate the budget deficit over a longer period. Stable coalitions of relatively 
coherent parties did not prevent the Hungarian governments from running large budget 
deficits. Therefore it is assumed that other factors, not the electoral system itself, influ­
ence the government’s capacity to achieve fiscal consolidation. Indeed, it seems that 
the opportunistic interests of politicians in getting re-elected and to broaden out the 
party’s voter base play a predominant role in understanding why Hungary experienced 
a steady increase in the fiscal budget since 1998 and why Hungary had to postpone 
the target date for the adoption of the euro to 2010. In addition, inconsistent monetary 
policy and public clashes with the government severely weakened the position and 
credibility of the central bank. The loss of credibility in the Hungarian economy further 
contributed to macroeconomic imbalances and explains why Hungary had to readjust 
its initial euro-adoption strategy and to postpone the target date to the next decade.
While Hungary is the only country among the Visegrad countries where EMU 
was high on the agenda, the social partners have not been able to accommodate infla­
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tionary pressure. This pressure, which has been largely generated by real wage in­
creases, was caused by the Orban and Medgyessy governments’ populist economic 
policies. Thus, given the decentralised nature of the Hungarian wage bargaining sys­
tem and the atomised work force, it can be assumed that the increase in real wages 
experienced in recent years was not driven by trade unions’ strength to press for wage 
hikes but by the opportunistic interests of the government parties to get re-elected 
(FIDESZ) and to fulfil election promises (MSZP).
Poland’s coalition governments proved to be fairly unstable, especially the 
SLD/UP-PSL coalition government under Prime Minister Miller, which faced several 
difficulties of cohesion and eventually collapsed in 2003 after the PSL refused to sup­
port a reform plan aimed at consolidating public finances. The problems in attaining 
fiscal consolidation had consequences for the country’s initial intention to join the euro­
zone as quickly as possible. But it has also been argued in the previous chapter, that 
growing public and party-based Euroscepticism further constrained any fast-track ap­
proach to adopting the euro for a government that was too weak to push forward politi­
cally costly reforms. In addition, the high degree of independence of the hawkish NBP 
-  in fact Poland scores best in the Cukierman index -  also plays a role in explaining 
why governments have shifted from monetary to fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. 
This is not to argue that the high independence of the NBP is responsible for the fiscal 
deficit. But it is argued that in the light of the NBP’s successful restrictive monetary pol­
icy, the Polish government faced a dilemma during the economic recession that started 
in 2000: use expansionary fiscal policy to reflate the economy or to accept a high level 
of unemployment.
With the implementation of the new Central Bank Act in 1998, President Balce­
rowicz successfully pursued a restrictive monetary policy and inflation rates fell to his­
torically low levels. The disinflation process was further supported by a moderate 
stance on wage demands by heavily polarised but weak trade unions. Animosities 
rather than economic interests determine the position of the two key actors on the em­
ployee side: The deadlock between NSZZ Solidarity on the one hand and the post­
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communist government and SLD-affiliated OPZZ on the other hand hinders the conclu­
sion of a social pact over the compliance of the Maastricht criteria. In fact, the adoption 
of the euro was not on the agenda of the Trilateral Commission. However, facing re­
cord high unemployment rates, Polish trade unions are more concerned with labour 
market policy targets than with wage demands. A low wage-push pressure is further 
supported by a fairly decentralised wage bargaining structure.
This chapter has demonstrated that reforms aimed at fulfilling the euro-zone en­
try requirements may take place in similar domestic institutional settings, however, the 
implications for the euro-adoption strategy concerned vary across the Visegrad coun­
tries. This is because the implications cannot be solely explained on the basis of fixed 
assumptions, for example, that coherent coalition governments succeed better in im­
plementing policy reforms. The euro-adoption strategy depends on country-specific 
conditions and is equally affected by different constellations of interests and distinct 
ideas that are historically shaped. Consequently, an integrated analysis of interests, 
ideas and institutions must be applied to fully understand the euro-adoption strategies 
of the Visegrad countries. The following concluding chapter summarises the main find­
ings of this thesis, focusing on the underlying causes and conditions of policy variation 
responsible for the approach to adopting the euro in each country examined.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The legal obligation to join the euro-zone requires fiscal and monetary policy conver­
gence because the new member states can only adopt the euro once they fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria. This thesis has analysed why -  despite occupying similar systemic 
positions and being exposed to the same external constraints -  the Visegrad countries 
nonetheless have pursued different strategies for the adoption of the euro. The argu­
ment is that countries are not materially-driven generic units or unitary actors within the 
international system. While policy convergence acts through a mechanism that can be 
labelled as ‘EMU conditionality’, this thesis has demonstrated that policy divergence is 
equally subject to its own logic. This logic is evident in the different constellation of in­
terests, distinct ideas that are historically shaped and different institutional settings. 
These cross-national variations follow the logic of deeply-embedded domestic differ­
ences.
The starting point of this thesis was therefore to contextualise the euro-adoption 
strategies with the help of an integrated domestic-level analysis. Chapter 2 provided 
the framework applied in this thesis based on the argument that cross-national varia­
tions as such may be traced back to the underlying differences in interests, ideas and 
institutions and to the relationships that are said to exist between them. The latter point 
is particularly important for the ‘value-added’ contribution of an integrated approach 
given that simply stating that domestic factors matter is not very valuable for analytical 
research (cf Schonhardt-Bailey 2001). Interests, ideas and institutions are inextricably 
linked and therefore one factor alone is not sufficient to address questions of policy 
variation with regards to euro-zone entry. The aim of this thesis was to reflect system­
atically the complex nature of politico-economic processes and to demonstrate the un­
derlying causes and conditions (e.g. critical junctures/moments that lead to a change in 
interests, ideas and institutions) that are behind policy divergence. Specifically, it was
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to show why and how domestic factors intersect and/or come to prevail over others and 
under which conditions (thus when) they impede or generate policy changes that affect 
the euro-adoption strategies. In so doing, this thesis has contributed both to the litera­
ture on the relative importance of interests, ideas and institutions for policy variation 
and to a systematic study of the adoption of the euro in the new member states. This 
conclusion first summarises the implications of the elaborated domestic-level ap­
proaches for the euro-adoption strategies of each country examined. The underlying 
focus is on causes and conditions for policy variation. Subsequently, the conclusion 
points to challenges that an integrated analysis of policy variation with regards to inter­
national monetary integration has to face. Moreover, it addresses the question of the 
future path of European integration and makes recommendations for further research.
Understanding variations in the euro-adoption strategies of the 
Visegrad countries: Main findings and conclusions
Among the Visegrad countries, Slovakia has been the most successful in pushing for­
ward reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria and is the most determined to join the 
euro-zone as soon as possible. However, this was not always the case. Under the Me- 
ciar governments (1993-1998), EU membership, and particularly EMU accession, be­
came a distant prospect. This thesis argues that a consensus on a fast-track approach 
to adopting the euro developed for a number of reasons. Important here is the critical 
experience of policy failure that changed ideas about European integration. In fact, 
Slovakia’s fast-track approach to adopting the euro can only be understood in the con­
text of the foreign policy failure of the ‘illiberal’ (Vachudova 2005) Meciar governments 
that saw EU-membership as too costly. It was the period of political isolation and the 
experience of being treated as an outsider that made the idea of deeper European in­
tegration so persuasive to the public and politicians alike, reflected in the high and -  in 
contrast to the other Visegrad countries -  stable approval rates for EU and euro-zone 
membership in Slovakia. Principled and causal belief about European integration and 
macroeconomic policy provided the Slovak government with a road map for choosing
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among political strategies: the euro-adoption strategy of the Slovak Republic is guided 
by the determination to join the euro-zone as soon as possible and in any case no later 
than the other Visegrad countries (cf National Bank of Slovakia and Ministry of Finance 
of the Slovak Republic 2003: 17). The fact that the joint draft strategy of the govern­
ment and the National Bank adds 'in any case no later than the other Visegrad coun­
tries’ to the intention of joining the common currency 'as soon as possible’ demon­
strates the extent to which the period of being treated as an outsider affects the euro- 
adoption strategy of Slovakia.
Ideas come to exert a strong influence on a country’s euro-adoption strategies 
when existing ideas are discredited by events. Ideas about European integration be­
came persuasive because EU membership was seen as the remedy for the country’s 
economic and political problems. What prevailed was thus a constructivist understand­
ing of Slovakia’s future path in Europe. Given that ideas of European integration are 
profound and do not change frequently, changes in principled beliefs as opposed to 
causal beliefs have a much stronger impact on domestic policy adaptation to foreign 
input (chapter 2, cf Risse-Kappen 1994). But ideas are not intrinsically powerful. As 
argued in chapter 2, the impact of ideas is neither random nor independent or auto­
matic, that is policy failure does not automatically result in a radical change of policies 
(see Garrett and Weingast 1993: 178, Risse-Kappen 1994: 191). What makes them so 
powerful is that they are able to create winning coalitions for particular policy goals (in 
this case a fast-track approach to adopting the euro). Ideas guide and help actors to 
achieve their goals under strong constraints and conditions of uncertainty. But these 
goals have to fit different interests: first, given a public feeling of political isolation, a 
successful foreign policy towards Western integration is “a source of legitimacy and 
proof of successful rule” (Kopecky and Ucen 2003: 172) for the governing parties. Le­
gitimacy -  a very hard currency in politics -  points to the value of the pro-European 
stance for the coalition’s own survival and has therefore also to be seen in the context 
of interests. Moreover, interest in ‘speeding up’ the country's modernisation process is 
formulated in relation to the transition process of Slovakia’s neighbours and finds its
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expression in the wish to join the euro-zone in no case later than the other Visegrad 
countries. Relative gains become all the more important for Slovakia, a country that 
suffered so much from the loss of FDI during the years of the Meciar governments. It 
can thus be argued that the fear of relative economic decline is an important aspect in 
understanding the Slovak drive for policy reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria. 
This zero-sum character of the Slovak euro-adoption strategy highlights well the weight 
of interests.
Yet, these interests (to catch up economically with its neighbours and to retain 
the political legitimacy of the governing parties) alone do not account for Slovakia’s 
success in pushing forward reforms in line with the Maastricht criteria. Nor can interest- 
based approaches support the argument that a fast-track approach to adopting the 
euro is inevitable. Put differently, it is difficult to attribute the enthusiasm for euro-zone 
entry solely to the interest of ‘speeding up the modernisation process’ because the lat­
ter depends not only on its objective merits but on its meaning and interpretation, thus 
on the political and ideological conditions that influenced the acceptance of the euro- 
adoption strategy. The case of Slovakia shows how ideas on European integration pro­
vide the basis for winning coalitions, that is local alliances, for policy reforms designed 
to join the euro-zone as soon as possible. Joining the euro-zone as soon as possible is 
in the government’s own interest but at the same time it is interwoven in the beliefs that 
EU membership and the adoption of the euro are fundamental principles for guiding 
Slovakia’s path in Europe and are the means to ‘speed up the country’s modernisation’. 
While this illustrates how ideas intersect with interests, the government’s ability and 
capacity to join the euro-zone as soon as possible is further supported by favourable 
institutional opportunities.
As demonstrated in chapter 6, the euro-adoption strategy of the second coali­
tion government under Prime Minister Dzurinda benefits from a favourable constella­
tion of party fragmentation in the parliament. Indeed, in the case of Slovakia, party sys­
tem fragmentation and polarisation strengthened the government’s ability to push for­
ward reforms given that the two deeply divided opposition parties, SMER and LS-
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HZDS, were not able to present a coherent alternative to the Dzurinda government’s 
reform plans. Party fragmentation and polarisation also explain why Meciar -  after re­
peatedly heading the strongest party in parliament without being able to find coalition 
partners -  has changed his position on European integration. Meciar’s U-tum from an 
advocate of inward-looking politics to a supporter of key government liberal reform bills 
in line with the Maastricht criteria is a logical consequence of his effort to increase his 
party’s coalition potential and to end its ‘long-standing pariah status’. In addition, 
Roubini and Sachs’ argument that multi-party coalition governments tend to hinder 
rather than stimulate policy reforms does not find supportive evidence in Slovakia. 
Other factors are crucial for understanding the capacity of coalition governments for 
policy reforms: the case of Slovakia points to the importance of a coalition of coherent 
parties. The second Dzurinda government is a 'closed coalition’ (Fitzmaurice 2004: 
166) of centre-right parties. While being divided along socio-cultural issues, the ideo­
logical cohesion on economic policy of the coalition parties helps to explain why the 
second Dzurinda government has been much more successful in pushing forward re­
forms.
Moreover, in contrast to the reluctant attitude of the Czech National Bank -  and 
given inconsistent monetary policy also the Hungarian National Bank -  Slovakia’s fast- 
track approach to adopting the euro is supported by the central bank. The National 
Bank of Slovakia enjoys a good reputation and has been successful in achieving lower 
inflation. Inflationary pressure is further reduced by a moderate stance on wage in­
creases on the part of the trade unions. Facing record high unemployment rates, trade 
unions’ demands -  as is the case in Poland -  are related to general labour market pol­
icy targets rather than wage increases. It should be noted, however, that while this 
moderate stance influences the pace of the government’s euro-adoption strategy, so­
cial partners were not able to influence its content. In fact, the tripartite institution in 
Slovakia is formal rather than consensual in nature and since 2000 no new general 
agreement (let alone a social pact regarding the compliance with the Maastricht crite­
ria) has been signed. Growing tensions between the government and the social part­
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ners led to temporary break-offs of the tripartite institution while the social dialogue has 
been further weakened by a lack of consensus between employers’ and employees’ 
associations. In fact, in all Visegrad countries, trade unions are either too weak to in­
fluence the wage level or are preoccupied with questions of general labour market pol­
icy targets rather than with wage demands. Expected adjustment costs are external­
ised to trade unions through a high degree of internal labour market flexibility. Ironi­
cally, trade unions which “served as a transmission belt for centralist and autocratic 
power” (Malova 1997: 97) under the communist regime, are once again ‘transmission 
belts’ but this time for government austerity measures (cf Thirkell et al. 1994, Ost 
2000).
In the case of the Czech Republic, the expenditure-oriented fiscal policy of the 
Social Democratic party accounts for why the Spidla government in 2002 had to post­
pone the adoption of the euro to 2010/2011. The underlying reasons for the shift of the 
CSSD -  which was the only party in the political spectrum to initially and uncondition­
ally support the Maastricht treaty and a quick euro-adoption strategy -  were based on 
two critical circumstances and conditions: the experience of monetary policy failure 
during the Czech currency crisis in 1997 and the trend towards class-based voting be­
haviour. The postponement of the target date was then underpinned by an unstable 
coalition government that faced growing public dissatisfaction and problems to imple­
ment reform plans in line with the Maastricht criteria. The reluctant public attitude to­
wards European integration and President Vaclav Klaus’ appointment of three mem­
bers who share a sceptical view on the euro to the central bank board further produced 
an unfavourable environment for any government that intends to join the euro-zone as 
soon as possible.
Ideas exert a distinct influence on the country’s euro-adoption strategy when pol­
icy failure triggers a cognitive change that fits with different interests. Ideas become 
causally consequential when they help to specify the origins of the crisis. In the same 
vein, the Czech Republic’s brutal experience of the failure of a fixed exchange rate 
subject to a large amount of capital flight helps to explain why policy-makers are rather
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reluctant to fix the koruna irrevocably to the euro. The currency crisis of 1997 and rising 
unemployment rates in the aftermath of the crisis contributed to a change of ideas on 
how to conduct macroeconomic policies. However, again, the causal belief in the suit­
ability of a flexible exchange rate for a transition economy corresponds well to existing 
interests. First, given that the Czech Republic already has a low debt level, low interest 
rates and low inflation, it would benefit least from an early adoption of the euro. Second, 
as the CSSD-led government is under high pressure to fulfil partisan expectations in 
light of growing unemployment rates and strong party competition with the communist 
party, a fast-track approach is not in the CSSD’s interests since the aspired counter­
cyclical fiscal policy contravenes the Maastricht criteria. Facing strong partisan inter­
ests, Spidla’s electoral campaign was based on economic policies to expand the wel­
fare state (see chapter 3).
In turn, the high partisan pressure has to be seen in the context of growing class- 
based voting behaviour in the Czech Republic mirroring the fact that it has a society 
with clear divisions on socio-economic issues. Electoral interests certainly nourished 
the expenditure-oriented fiscal policy of the CSSD given that the party lost much of its 
traditional core constituency of blue-collar workers and socially disadvantaged groups 
to the KSCM. Under these conditions of polarised class-based voting behaviour, inter­
ests exert a distinct impact on the euro-adoption strategies because left-wing parties in 
government find themselves trapped between commitments to fiscal consolidation pro­
grammes and low inflation rates and pre-election promises to reduce unemployment 
rates by expansionary fiscal policies. The trend towards class polarisation in the Czech 
Republic thus helps to explain why the government had to readjust its euro-adoption 
strategy.
However, in the Czech case, a fast-track approach to adopting the euro does not 
depend on a liberal party in office either. This is because the liberal opposition party, 
the ODS, is also rather reluctant about EMU accession. While the ODS advocates lib­
eral economic policies, it does not believe in the benefits of deepening European inte­
gration. In fact, European integration is seen as a threat to newly regained Czech sov-
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ereignty. Despite being a liberal party whose supporters are pro-EU and euro-zone 
membership as shown in chapter 4, the ODS has adopted a rather Eurosceptic dis­
course. It has been argued in chapter 5 that ideas on European integration help to ex­
plain why the preference of the party deviates from what an interest-based approach of 
party strategies would predict. High-ranked ODS politicians, among whom President 
Vaclav Klaus is the most prominent, harshly criticise EMU by referring to the Czech 
experience with foreign intervention. Indeed, with reference to the experience of the 
distant bureaucracy under Soviet rule, the ODS often cites Maastricht as a symbol of a 
‘socialist’ and anti-democratic threat to state sovereignty and the Czech nation. This is 
not to argue that the ODS or Klaus are not goal-oriented but that actors’ positions on 
the euro cannot entirely be reduced to their interests in gaining votes. By extension, the 
position on the euro cannot be explained by assumed stable preferences. This is illus­
trated in the ODS’ Eurosceptic position which runs counter to the preferences of its 
constituency on the euro-adoption.
It has been argued that Klaus' ideas on European integration and EMU in par­
ticular influence the Czech euro-adoption strategy because he is powerful enough to 
translate them into politics. First, President Vaclav Klaus, who dominates the discourse 
on euro-zone entry in the Czech Republic, is able to frame his opposition to EMU in the 
context of existing ideologies. Klaus uses symbols (for example EMU as the Trojan 
horse that aims to defeat Czech sovereignty or the image of the Czech “ideology of 
uniqueness and success” (Bugge 2000: 225), that may dissolve like a sugar cube in a 
cup of coffee) to appeal to common held beliefs (for example the bureaucratised Brus­
sels that opposes sovereignty and freedom and threatens unique existence and exclu­
sive national identity) in order to foster political opposition to EMU membership. While 
Klaus’ anti-EU rhetoric does not fit with the pro-EU attitude of the ODS' voter base, his 
ideas on EMU are sufficiently powerful to build a winning coalition because they reso­
nate with the relatively low level of public support for EU and euro-zone membership. 
Second, at a more concrete level, it can be argued that Klaus’ ideas on European inte­
gration and EMU have been realised and temporarily institutionalised in his appoint­
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ment of three central bank board members, all of whom are well known for their scepti­
cal positions on the euro. It should be recalled that the CNB’s position is of the utmost 
importance given its role in the formulation of the joint strategy for the adoption of the 
euro. But the positions of Klaus and his allies in the CNB also have consequences for 
the current discourse on the adoption of the euro in the new member states. Whereas 
the general discourse of the government elite justifies the postponement of the euro by 
pointing to the difficulties in meeting the Maastricht criteria, there might be a trend to­
wards justifying the postponement by referring to the difficulties in meeting the fiscal 
criterion by the current euro-zone member states. Such an argument has been repeat­
edly put forward by President Vaclav Klaus and the three new members of the central 
bank board. While this seems to be a subtle shift in the discourse, it challenges and 
questions EMU as a project. Although the new member states are under legal obliga­
tion to adopt the euro as soon as they meet the Maastricht criteria, this thesis argues 
that this discourse is likely to carry with it a risk of widening the ideological gap on 
European integration between the insiders and outsiders of the euro-zone, i.e. between 
those member states that are willing to accelerate the process of deeper integration 
and those staying outside of key European policy areas such as the euro. This result 
would have consequences within the current debate on a ‘multi-speed’ Europe and 
may therefore also affect the future path of European integration (see below).
As mentioned above, Vaclav Klaus’ decision to appoint new members to the 
central bank board who openly express their concerns towards the euro and favour a 
postponement of euro-zone membership fits well with the relatively low level of public 
support for euro-zone membership. While this shows an unwillingness to join the euro­
zone, problems with adhering to the Maastricht criteria underpinned the postponement 
of the target date into the next decade. The difficulties of the Spidla government to im­
plement reform plans in line with the Maastricht criteria were essentially reinforced by 
an unstable coalition government and growing public dissatisfaction with the govern­
ment’s policies. The CSSD-led government, in office since 2002, has faced the strong­
est difficulties of cohesion and encountered several crises provoked, among other
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things, by its junior coalition partner, the liberal US-DEU. Certainly, the political crises 
weakened the government’s ability and willingness to push forward fiscal consolidation 
programmes, while supporting its reluctant attitude towards euro-zone membership 
given that the adoption of the euro entails politically costly and painful reforms with 
which an unstable government can hardly cope.
In addition, while the national-level tripartite institution in the Czech Republic 
remains weak and not integrated as an important instrument in the Czech labour mar­
ket, the confrontational attitude of trade unions towards the government contributed to 
the political crisis and therefore indirectly added force to the postponement of the tar­
get date for euro-zone entry. This is not to argue that the Czech trade unions are able 
to influence the content of the government’s euro-adoption strategy but rather that the 
confrontational attitude of the trade unions fell on fertile ground given the public’s dis­
satisfaction with the Spidla government’s reform plans for the adoption of the euro by 
2010. But because the social partners’ influence on economic policies depends on 
specific conditions (such as general public dissatisfaction) rather than on agreements, 
tripartite institutions as an independent variable here has to be -  as is the case in the 
other Visegrad countries -  limited to the decentralised structure of industrial relations 
that positively influence wage moderation.
In the case of Hungary, the underlying reasons for the postponement of the tar­
get date for the adoption of the euro were based on opportunistic interests of politicians 
to preserve their power in office and to gain votes. The opportunistic interests of the 
Orban and Medgyessy governments resulted in a proliferation of populist economic 
policies. It has been argued that the increase in public spending (and therefore the 
postponement of the target date) is related to the cleavage structure that divides soci­
ety along the nationalist-traditionalist and left-liberal lines. The distinct feature of this 
cleavage heavily dominates Hungarian politics and has generated/reinforced the exist­
ing trend towards a bipolar party system. Under this rigid framework fiscal policy is the 
only ‘neutral’ policy that can be used to attract voters given that all other policies are 
too attached to one party. In an attempt to broaden out its electoral base and to attract
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voters from the far right, the civic party FIDESZ advocates interventionist and populist 
macroeconomic policies. While the MSZP as a ‘pragmatic party’ is more likely to act on 
fiscal policy reforms, it faces strong electoral competition and vested interests of the old 
nomenclature that still play a dominant role within the party.
By extension, the case of Hungary has also highlighted the crucial factor of the 
strategic environment of party competition to explain the level of success in fiscal con­
solidation. For example, while the Hungarian coalition governments -  in contrast to the 
other Visegrad countries -  proved to be fairly stable and have arguably consisted of 
relatively coherent parties, the strategic environment of party competition determines 
whether governmental parties in Hungary are able and willing to implement policy re­
forms in line with the Maastricht criteria. Under the above outlined conditions of a rigid 
framework for party competition, electoral interests exert a distinct influence on the 
euro-adoption strategy and the pressure for policy convergence, as expressed in the 
obligation to meet the Maastricht criteria, significantly loses its leverage.
Indeed, as elaborated below, the postponement of the target date is primarily 
related to the expenditure-oriented fiscal policy at odds with the Maastricht criteria 
rather than party-based or public Euroscepticism. In fact, in contrast to the Czech Re­
public and Poland, mainstream parties in Hungary strongly support euro-zone member­
ship, seeing the euro, as FIDESZ states, as the ‘greatest advantage offered by the EU’ 
(FIDESZ 2004). Yet, as elaborated below, the inconsistency between the Orban and 
Medgyessy government announcements that Hungary would join the euro-zone as 
soon as possible and the actual policy developed shows that opportunistic interests 
rather than genuine beliefs in deeper European integration drive Hungary's trouble­
some road to euro-zone accession.
In addition, the postponement of the target date for the adoption of the euro has 
been supported by the inconsistent monetary policy and relatively low credibility of the 
national bank that nourished further inflation expectations. Of the Visegrad countries, 
Hungary experiences the highest inflation rates. In fact, in contrast to the Czech Re­
public, Slovakia and lately also to Poland, Hungary has suffered from sticky inflation
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expectations and moderate inflation throughout the transition process, which was sup­
ported by a high foreign debt level inherited from the ‘goulash reforms’ of the commu­
nist regime. Indeed, Hungary’s high level of foreign debt was unusual among post­
communist countries and still constrains the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies. In 
addition, inflation in recent years was further caused by the populist economic policy of 
the Orban and Medgyessy government that resulted in real wage increases between 
2001 and 2003 beyond the level of productivity growth. This was reinforced by a lack of 
power and consensus on behalf of the social partners. For example, although Hungary 
-  like Slovakia -  mentions the role of the social partners and a medium-term social 
pact to facilitate adherence to the Maastricht criteria, the social partners could not 
reach an agreement. Certainly, while wage increases are driven by governments’ op­
portunistic interests, the lack of functioning tripartite institutions does not help to miti­
gate problems in achieving wage moderation and low inflation rates either.
Sticky inflation expectations and populist fiscal policies reduced the level of 
credibility and trust in Hungary’s economic policy and resulted in a loss of competitive­
ness. The lack of credibility, however, explains why Hungary was initially so keen to 
join the euro-zone as soon as possible given that the euro is seen as a much needed 
‘credibility anchor’. In addition, because Hungary still has relatively high interest rates, 
a quick adoption of the euro would bring interest rates down to the euro-zone level. 
Moreover, the high foreign debt burden, inherited from the communist regime, explains 
why an early entry into the euro-zone is in the interest of the government given that 
through irrevocably fixing the forint to the euro, Hungary’s debt service would no longer 
depend on currency fluctuations.
High inflation expectations and the experience of inflation inertia also explains 
why the public -  unlike in Poland and the Czech Republic -  believes that the introduc­
tion of the euro will bring price stability. The rising aversion to inflation contributes to 
low public concerns about the introduction of the euro. Moreover, the low level of cur­
rency stability reflects the fact that Hungarians do not believe that their national sover­
eignty depends on the country’s forint. Thus, the experience of moderate inflation is a
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distinct feature of Hungary’s post-communist transition process that helps to under­
stand why the national currency is not a strong 'symbolic marker’ (Risse 2003). This is 
an important aspect to keep in mind when discussing the ‘ideological’ value of a cur­
rency or currency union. Yet, the interests in gaining a much needed credibility anchor 
cannot be articulated without ideas -  after all the wish to join the euro-zone falls on 
fertile ground given that both party-based and public support for the euro are high in 
Hungary. While this demonstrates how ideas intersect with interests, it also shows how 
opportunistic interests have come to dominate Hungary’s road to euro-zone member­
ship. Indeed, the postponement of the euro-adoption to the next decade is neither a 
consequence of lacking domestic support nor a consequence of changing ideas on 
European integration. Instead, it must be seen in light of the government’s need to fulfil 
election promises and its interests in re-election that resulted in populist economic pol­
icy conflicting with the Maastricht criteria, while the initial ambitious plans to join the 
euro-zone as quickly as possible have to be seen in light of the government’s efforts to 
re-establish credibility and trust in the Hungarian economy. Thus, although Hungary 
shares with the Czech Republic the intention to adopt the euro around 2010, the rea­
sons for this decision differ.
Of the Visegrad countries, Poland was the only country not to announce a strat­
egy for joining the euro-zone in the course of 2004. This thesis argues that growing 
public and party-based Euroscepticism in the lead up to the 2005 elections influenced 
the ruling SLD party in its decision not to set an official target date for the adoption of 
the euro. While the SLD was keen to join the euro-zone as soon as possible, the obli­
gation to conduct restrictive monetary policy and fiscal policy in line with the EMU has 
led to societal tensions over the ways in which the reforms should be carried out. This 
has opened the door to populism, making life difficult for a government committed to 
adhering to the Maastricht criteria. Two crucial conditions influenced Poland’s path to 
euro-zone accession: first, institutional constraints generated by a highly fragmented 
party system and the minority government’s weakness in pushing forward politically- 
costly reforms; second, volatile public opinion on EU and euro-zone membership, mir­
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rored by the recent success of parties whose emergence is closely associated with 
their anti-EU rhetoric.
Indeed, coalition and minority governments as a variable for explaining prob­
lems in implementing policy reforms hold resonance in the Polish context. Having lost 
the majority in the Sejm, the Polish minority government had to repeatedly modify and 
water down the so-called Hausner plan that initially foresaw severe cuts in public 
spending. Yet while the government’s approach to EMU faced severe constraints, gen­
erated by a lack of support for its reform programme and growing party-based Euro­
scepticism, the SLD did not officially abandon its wish to join the euro-zone as quickly 
as possible, an intention which was driven as much by the party’s need to distance 
itself from its communist legacy as by its interest in belonging to the world’s largest 
economic area using a single currency in which Poland would have a strong say. While 
this shows how interests drove the SLD’s pro-EMU stance, institutional constraints and 
growing party-based and public Euroscepticism reinforced the difficulties of the SLD 
government to adhere to the Maastricht criteria.
Further institutional constraints for the conduct of economic policy, generated 
by the high degree of CBI and the hawkish President of the NBP, Balcerowicz, play a 
role in explaining why governments have shifted from monetary to fiscal policy to stimu­
late the economy. Indeed, among the Visegrad countries, the NBP enjoys the highest 
degree of independence. With the implementation of the new Central Bank Act in 1998, 
President Balcerowicz successfully pursued a restrictive monetary policy and inflation 
rates decreased to historically low levels (also referred to as the ‘Balcerowicz-effect’). 
As for the other Visegrad countries, the increase in CBI helps to explain shifting bal­
ances of power among different interests: the Central Bank gained twice; once from the 
central bank act and once from the Maastricht criteria providing the bank with additional 
tools to pressure the government and to gain leverage over politicians. The legal obli­
gation to join the euro-zone empowers central banks as it enables them to defend their 
restrictive monetary policy to attain the primary objective of price stability. Central 
banks in Poland and Hungary in particular have used the Maastricht criteria extensively
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to legitimise the costs imposed by a restrictive monetary policy. For example, the need 
to stimulate the economy during the economic recession that started in 2000 led to an 
increasing divergence of views between the monetary authorities and the government. 
While Balcerowicz’s hawkish monetary policy may have been in part influenced by his 
flawed relationship to a post-communist government, he defended the high interest rate 
policy during the economic recession in 2001 by referring to the European Union’s 
mandatory inflation target and to the uncertainty about the government’s ability to re­
duce public expenditure.
Ironically, although the government blamed the NBP in part for the malaise of 
the Polish economy and its failure to adhere to the Maastricht criteria, a fast-track ap­
proach to adopting the euro was supported by experts in the central bank holding an 
authoritative claim to EMU-relevant knowledge in Poland. Indeed, it has been argued 
that Poland provides supportive evidence for an epistemic community that consisted of 
professionals who share common goals and views. The epistemic community, whose 
most prominent member is the President of the National Bank, Leszek Balcerowicz, 
shared the belief that a rapid transformation of the economy must be achieved first if 
further progress is to be attained. It is no coincidence that the debate about unilateral 
euroisation was mainly conducted by Polish academics and politicians. As Balcerowicz 
argues: “EMU prospective acts as a powerful device to launch reforms” (Balcerowicz 
2001a: 2). A fast-track approach to EMU accession therefore stands in the tradition of 
the Balcerowicz-Plan of economic transition. In fact, as mentioned above and elabo­
rated in chapter 5, Balcerowicz has extensively used the Maastricht criteria to pressure 
the government into implementing necessary policy reforms.
However, while this epistemic community, whose members have held important 
and influential positions in the policy-making process, is keen to join the euro-zone as 
soon as possible, it is less successful in explaining or transmitting its ideas to the public. 
In fact, given that its most prominent member, Balcerowicz, is associated with painful 
reforms, it faces resistance to its view on European integration and EMU. However, 
because policy reforms can only be sustained if reforms are supported by a broader
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segment of society, the epistemic community’s ability to transmit its ideas to the public 
is an important aspect to bear in mind. The capacity to implement policy reforms and 
let changes persist depends on the ability to build internal consensus and local coali­
tions supported by the public. It is not enough to be a professional and to belong to an 
epistemic community.
Indeed, Poland’s lack of internal consensus on EU issues and public support for 
EU membership has been relatively volatile, mirroring the recent success of populist 
and nationalist parties like Samoobrona and LPR. As argued in chapter 4, the success 
of Samoobrona and the LPR in attracting voters is closely linked to their anti-EU rheto­
ric. The analysis of public opinion further substantiated this relationship between the 
parties’ anti-EU positions and their Eurosceptic voter base: chapter 4 shows that most 
of the dynamics for the opposition to the euro indeed emerge from supporters of na­
tionalist-catholic and farmer parties. In contrast to the Czech Republic, it is thus not a 
trend towards class-based voting behaviour, stemming from a more manifested Left- 
Right cleavage but rather a nationalist/religious-rural and liberal-urban cleavage that 
helps to explain opposition to the euro. Indeed, the role of the Catholic Church and the 
agricultural sector is a distinctive feature and dominates Polish politics and public de­
bates. The Polish case -  like the Hungarian one -  illustrates that individual preferences 
on policies related to EMU accession cannot solely be reduced to different economic 
interests (for example does EMU increase individual income?) but the analysis has to 
include different historical and cultural identities (for example authoritarian religious 
views or attitudes towards the communist past). By extension, the case of Poland 
shows that support for the euro cannot be achieved or maintained through addressing 
distributive issues with regards to euro-zone membership but it also depends upon 
cultural idiosyncrasies and ideational justification.
In the same vein, attitudes toward the communist past help to explain why ani­
mosities rather than economic interests determine the work of the tripartite institution 
and the position of the two key actors on the employee side: The deadlock between 
NSZZ Solidarnosc on the one hand and the post-communist government and SLD-
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affiliated OPZZ on the other hand hinders the conclusion of a social pact over the com­
pliance with the Maastricht criteria. In fact, the Trilateral Commission discussed the 
adoption of the euro ‘cursorily at best’ (Gardawski 2004). However, it should be noted 
that when confronted with the highest unemployment rates in the whole region, trade 
unions (like in Slovakia) are primarily concerned with creating and maintaining jobs 
while they have to compromise on other demands such as wage increases. A low 
wage-push pressure is further supported by a fairly decentralised wage bargaining 
structure. Employers’ and employees’ associations are almost completely absent on 
the micro-level, where collective bargaining agreements do not exist. On the macro­
level, employers’ associations still have substantial difficulties in articulating and press­
ing their position.
All of the preceding points demonstrate that the legal obligation to join the euro­
zone did not result in identical approaches to adopting the euro in the Visegrad coun­
tries. Incentives and constraints generated by this obligation, which can be labelled as 
‘EMU conditionality’, are mediated by distinctive domestic interests, ideas and institu­
tions which are at the heart of cross-national responses to euro-zone entry. These do­
mestic factors, however, are subject to country-specific conditions (such as the experi­
ence of dramatic policy failure that triggers a change in principled beliefs). This thesis 
demonstrates that the euro-adoption strategies depend on conditions and circum­
stances and follow the logic of deeply-embedded domestic differences.
Contribution of the thesis, the challenges of an integrated analysis and pros­
pects for further research
This thesis’ original contribution has been to explain the relationship between the 
Visegrad countries’ approaches to adopting the euro and their political economies by 
using an integrated analysis of interests, ideas and institutions. Previously, relative in­
sights from the existing interest-, idea- and institution-based scholarship on political 
economy have not been empirically tested in any systematic way in relation to the case 
of the euro-adoption strategies of the Visegrad Four. By using an integrated analysis of 
interests, ideas and institutions at the domestic level, this thesis has filled this research
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gap. It challenges existing concepts of systemic and economic scholarship, as well as 
the literature on domestic forces that usually starts with an analysis of power and inter­
ests and reverts in an ad hoc way only to other domestic factors to approach unex­
plained variances.
The focus of this thesis was on dynamic linkages, thus on a synthesis of causes 
for a fuller understanding of policy reforms that affect the euro-adoption strategies. As 
discussed, the Visegrad countries’ approaches to euro-zone membership are idiosyn­
cratic, that is, they vary both across country and time. It has been argued that the phe­
nomenological dynamics of the euro-adoption strategies depend on the meaning which 
actors attach to their action, that is, on how actors interpret conditions and circum­
stances. Actors do not have predictable preferences towards the euro because their 
attitudes are contingent upon context-specific institutions and ideas. The making of 
strategies is far more complex than any economic analysis of weighting the costs and 
benefits would suggest. In the same vein, political processes are far too complex to be 
explained by assuming stable preferences on the part of the actors involved. Unstable 
preferences argue against a systemic or a single dimensional (for example one that 
concentrates on interests only) approach. Certainly, in this respect, the main tension 
arises from the aspiration to simplification and the need to preserve contextual integrity 
(cf Schonhardt-Bailey 2001: 209). The “challenge is to capture some of the complexity 
of the political world without forsaking the parsimony on which good social science de­
pends” (Hall 1997: 189). However, for the purpose of this research, this approach ulti­
mately means that parsimony rests upon the inner logic of deeply embedded domestic 
differences that are at the heart of complex politico-economic dynamics of policy varia­
tion or convergence.
This thesis has opened up the path for further research that aims to contextual- 
ise and understand euro-adoption strategies in the new member states. But it has also 
pointed to the challenges an integrated analysis has to face in general theoretical and 
empirical terms when applied to post-communist countries. First, the research was 
challenged by the time period of observation given that euro-zone membership has
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only recently become part of the political agenda while the developments that eventu­
ally led to the euro-adoption strategies started well before EMU was discussed publicly. 
Unquestionably, given the relatively short period since the fall of the communist re­
gimes, Central and Eastern Europe presents a unique case and opportunity for the 
study of policy variation and monetary integration in transition countries. However, this 
also means that propositions about, for example, the role of institutions in achieving 
fiscal consolidation or low inflation are made on the basis of medium-term observation. 
In addition, because the Visegrad countries still experience special transition problems 
(especially in the realm of privatisation), fiscal or monetary policy may in fact reflect 
specific but temporary developments that are related to particular moments in the tran­
sition process. Related to this point is the fact that the new democracies are ‘still in a 
state of flux’. For example, this thesis has highlighted the frequent changes in the elec­
toral systems and the high volatility level of the post-communist party systems. While 
this makes it methodologically difficult to analyse how the electoral and party system 
structures and delivers policies this thesis has shown that the euro-adoption strategies 
of the Visegrad countries can only be understood within the context of these dynamic 
changes.
Second, at the analytical level the research had to deal with challenges related 
to the heterogeneous literature because an integrated analysis requires different meth­
odological approaches to ‘measure’ the domestic factors. For example, this thesis has 
used quantitative research methods to analyse economic self-interest at an individual 
level while a qualitative method was more suitable for identifying the ideas and motives 
of actors or to operationalise institutions as electoral systems, central banks and indus­
trial relations. But this ‘methodological divide’ (Hall 1997) between interest-based ap­
proaches on the one hand and institution- and idea-oriented approaches on the other 
hand also reflects the ‘ideological divide’ in social sciences. It is the divide between 
those who view political economy as a research field in which to apply economic meth­
ods (i.e. rational choice assumptions) to politics and those who resist the socio­
economic determinism on which most interest-oriented approaches are based. It is the
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divide between positive political economy and the primacy of politics, or, to put it differ­
ently, between explaining and understanding political economy.
In addition to these epistemological questions, the literature is heterogeneous 
because it deals with different levels of analysis, e.g. the individual level (public opinion 
and the analysis of actors’ ideas), institutional and organised level (central banks, elec­
toral system and industrial relations), sub-national (parties) or governmental level. The 
problem here is how to measure the interrelated causal effects of the different levels of 
analysis. While most of the work developed since Putnam’s seminal article on two-level 
games has attempted to bridge the international and the national level, there is limited 
research on the causal forces between and among the other above-mentioned levels. 
By carefully breaking down the units of analysis while establishing their interrelated and 
relative influence on the euro-adoption strategies, this thesis has sought to deal with 
these problems that were generated from the need to integrate different research meth­
ods and different levels of analysis.
This thesis also has raised a number of key issues in relation to the future path 
of European integration. The questions are related to the new member states’ capacity 
to adhere to the Maastricht criteria and their willingness to join the euro-zone as well as 
to the EU’s capacity to deal with many ‘member states with a derogation’ without creat­
ing a structural ‘core’ of member states. This is highlighted in the current debate about 
a multi-speed Europe, most prominently vocalised in major speeches by the former 
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2000), the former President of the Euro­
pean Commission Jacques Delors (2000) and the current Belgian Prime Minister Guy 
Verhofstadt (2005). The concept of a multi-speed Europe allows member states which 
are not able or willing to participate in a particular policy to stay outside and to join at a 
later stage.1 This thesis points to reasons why differentiated integration may be inevita­
ble. In fact, it is a logical consequence of the persistence of national diversity. Cross­
1 Differentiated or enhanced cooperation is not new to the EU. The Schengen area and EMU allowed for 
differentiated integration, while the concept of enhanced cooperation was introduced in 1997 by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. The Nice treaty reformed Article 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam and abolished the national 
veto for enhanced cooperation in all policy areas except for the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP). The rejected European Constitution would have further reduced the barriers for member states 
willing to establish enhanced cooperation (see European Constitution Article III 419 (1), 422 (1)).
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national variations vary across time and space, they depend on deeply embedded dif­
ferences, on conditions and circumstances and are therefore idiosyncratic in nature. 
Thus, differentiated integration and idiosyncrasy are two sides of the same coin. Cer­
tainly, differentiated integration may lead to disintegration because it bears the potential 
for undermining the unity of the EU. This is because enhanced cooperation or a multi­
speed Europe has implications for the European institutions, especially for the Euro­
pean Commission and the European Parliament (Donnelly and Dawes 2004). En­
hanced cooperation bears the risk of separating the Commissioners and MEPs into 
groups in accordance with their countries’ participation in central policy fields. For ex­
ample, when the new European Commission was appointed in 2004, several member 
states asked de facto for the informal selection criterion that the President of the Euro­
pean Commission has to come from a member state which participates in all policy 
areas (and in particular in the euro-zone). Certainly, this introduces a numerus clausus 
that carries the risk of undermining solidarity. Moreover, as stated in the first chapter, 
one of the driving forces behind European integration has been the mechanism of is­
sue linkage, or constraints created by institutional arrangements (Martin 2001). In a 
multi-speed Europe ‘linked issue’ bargaining as an engine for integration is weakened 
or non-existent because enhanced cooperation as such separates policy fields from 
each other. Without the clustering of issues, there are no side-payments to enhance 
the quids over the quos (cf Keohane 1984) and further European integration may come 
to a halt, or may even be reversed.
However, because -  for reasons discussed in this thesis -  differentiated integra­
tion is likely to persist, the focus should be on how to improve the institutional and legal 
framework for it. This is all the more important as most of the dynamics of European 
integration depends on whether enhanced cooperation is a transitional tool or a stan­
dard mode of operation. In this respect, this thesis has also contributed to the research 
on the dynamics of Europeanisation and the meaning of European integration. It there­
fore touches upon fundamental questions for the study of European integration. As 
Jones (2003: 141) puts it “if integration in Europe does not coincide with some form of
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necessary convergence between the member states, then what does ‘integration’ really 
mean?” European integration does not automatically lead to policy convergence be­
tween the member states of the EU. In fact, the new EU member states took divergent 
paths in designing their macroeconomic policies and strategies for the adoption of the 
euro. To this end, this thesis has analysed the confluence of factors and sought to 
establish the basic causal mechanism for policy variation among the Visegrad coun­
tries with regards to European monetary integration. It provides a domestic level analy­
sis that focuses on processes and uses qualitative case studies to explore them. It is 
hoped that this will stimulate further research on European models of capitalism and 
their related micro-institutions to explain different national response strategies to the 
adoption of the euro (Orfeo 2001). As Jones (2003: 141) points out “the juxtaposition of 
European integration and national distinctiveness underscores the relative importance 
of other causal factors affecting the varieties of capitalism in evidence”. In this regards, 
further emphasis should be given to the divergence of national models of capitalism 
that enable different strategies in corporate planning, wage-setting policy, training and 
education and impact on the formation of different coalitions across labour and busi­
ness (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, Coates 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001, Schmidt 2002, 
Menz 2005). Within this context, it would be beneficial to operationalise the models of 
capitalism in Central Europe. It would then be possible to compare these findings with 
the dualistic models of liberal and coordinated market economies in the literature of the 
varieties of capitalism and to relate the models to different responses to EMU.
By extension, it would be valuable to analyse the extent to which Europeanisa­
tion in the new member states contrasts or resembles the experience of old member 
states. For example, new member states may follow the example of Sweden and post­
pone euro-zone membership to the distant future. Also of significance is the nature of 
the relationship between insiders and outsiders of the euro-zone. First, the relationship 
may reflect different attitudes towards European integration per se. Second, with re­
gards to the research of this thesis, the insider-outsider question may raise tensions
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between the Visegrad countries and those new member states that are expected to join 
the euro-zone well before the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.2
By using a comparative politico-economic analysis of domestic-level approaches, 
this thesis has opened up the debate on the relative importance of interests, ideas and 
institutions in understanding cross-national policy variation but it hopes that it can pro­
vide a framework for discussing further case studies. Within this context it would be 
highly relevant to contrast the Visegrad countries with the new member states that 
joined the ERM II in June 2004 and agreed to adopt the euro by 2007 (Estonia, Lithua­
nia and Slovenia). Given that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are the only 
new member states that have not joined the ERM II yet, it would be equally relevant to 
apply the analytical framework to the new member states that entered the ERM II in the 
course of 2005. Empirical findings would contribute to the contextualisation of the euro- 
adoption strategies, the relative importance of interests, ideas and institutions and 
would help to identify sources for policy variation. In addition, given that this thesis’ 
period of reference is relatively short, further long-term observations will lead to a better 
understanding of the analytical assumptions in the literature of comparative politics 
applied to new democracies.
Because the study was on transition countries, the focus of further comparison 
should especially be on future enlargement which is an inevitable process given that 
there are already fixed accession dates for Bulgaria and Romania while EU member­
ship has been promised to other states (see e.g. the European perspective to the Bal­
kan states). In this regards, a comparison of Slovakia’s experience of illiberal democ­
racy with other illliberal pattern states like Bulgaria and Romania (cf Vachudova 2005) 
would be most valuable. In contrast, a comparison of the findings with those of the 
euro-entry strategies of current euro-zone members or other ‘outsiders’ like Sweden, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom may be valuable for drawing tentative conclusions 
only with the proviso that transition countries differ significantly from the consolidated
2 Apart from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland all new EU member states entered the ERM II ei­
ther in 2004 or in the course of 2005. Slovakia joined the ERM II on 28 November 2005.
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market economies and democracies of Western Europe. Taking these shortcomings 
into account, it might nevertheless be helpful to analyse the problems encountered 
during ERM II membership and to contrast these problems with the experience of the 
current euro-zone member states during their membership in the ERM of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) especially after the currency crisis in September 1992 and 
July 1993 when the fluctuation bands were broadened to the current ERM II bands of ± 
15 percent. Although the ERM now consists of wider fluctuation bands, members will 
not be safe from speculative attacks.3 In addition, it would be valuable for the analysis 
of cross-national approaches to EMU accession to explore the effects of these prob­
lems on the euro-adoption strategies of the new member states that have not joined 
the exchange rate mechanism yet.
Thus, the principal advantage of the integrated analysis as applied in this thesis 
is that it allows for a systematic study of the implications of interests, ideas and institu­
tions for the new member states’ approaches to adopting the euro. Yet, it is worth con­
sidering whether the approach applied in this thesis is also applicable to other EU issue 
areas such as social policy or areas where the EU may pursue differentiated integra­
tion in the future.
On a more theoretical level, it is hoped that further research is done on compara­
tive political economy approaches applied to transition economies. For example, a key 
area for future research is to revise the understanding of the process of political con­
flicts (thus the role of the endogeneity of causes and conditions) for the formation of 
specific interests, institutions and ideas. Although the literature suggests a number of 
factors based on empirical evidence from cross-national responses, there is still limited 
knowledge about the facilitating factors that may lead to cross-national policy variation. 
For example, this thesis highlights the conditions of policy failure and the environment 
for party competition to understand different preferences on fiscal policies and EMU. In 
this respect, it would be most valuable to further analyse structures of party competition
3 As the example of Greece has shown, participation in ERM II may potentially make a currency more 
exposed to speculative attacks.
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and to relate these facilitating factors and conditions to particular interests and prefer­
ences on fiscal policies. In the same vein, new ideas may have been adopted because 
of the experience of dramatic policy failure or/and the interpretation of new interests 
and existing ones which are mediated by institutions structuring political competition (cf 
Hall 1997: 198). Given that it is fruitless to specify these interests ex ante, this thesis 
has demonstrated that a key concern for future research should be to contextualise the 
influence of conditions on interests, ideas and institutions and how they impact on the 
new member states’ approaches to adopting the euro.
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Appendix 1: The Cukierman/Webb/Neyapti (LVAU) indicator for 
central bank independence
8k? £TTTrr| n  r» l
1) N a t io n a l  Ba n k  o f  T he  C z e c h  R e p u b l ic
=
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.20
a. Term of office
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years X
(6years)
0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of 
appointer
0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of Central Bank 1.00
A council of the central bank board, 
executive branch, and legislative 
branch
0.75
Legislature 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council of 
ministers)
0.25
One or two members of the executive 
branch- by the president of the 
Republic
X 0.00
c. Dismissal
No provision for dismissal 1.00
Only for reasons not related to policy X 0.83
At the discretion of central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
executive
0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in 
government?
No X 1.00
Only with permission of the executive 
branch
0.50
No rule against CEO holding another 
office
0.00
2 Policy formulation 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone X 1.00
Bank participates, but has little 
influence
0.67
Bank alone advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0.00
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b. Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict?
The bank, on issues clearly defiend in 
the law as its objectives
X 1.00
Government, on policy issues not 
clearly defined as the bank’s goal or in 
case of conflict within the bank
0.80
A council of the central bank, executive 
branch, and legislative branch
0.60
The legislature, on policy issues 0.40
The executive branch on policy issues, 
subject due to process and possible 
protest by bank
0.20
The executive branch has 
unconditional priority
0.00
c. Role of the government’s budgetary 
process
Central bank active 1.00
Central bank has no influence X 0.00
3 Objectives 0.15 0.15
Price stability is the major o f only 
objective in the charter, and the central 
bank has the final word in case of 
conflict with other governments 
objectives- and support general 
policies of government leading to 
sustainable economic growth. Act with 
principle of an open market economy
X
1.00
Price stability is the only objective 0.80
Price stability is one goal, with other 
compatible objectives, such as a stable 
banking system
0.60
Price stability is one goal, with 
potentially conflicting objectives, such 
as full employment
0.40
No objectives stated in the bank 
charter
0.20
Stated objectives do not include price 
stability
0.00
4 Limitations on lending to the government
a. Advances (limitation on nonsecuritized 
lending)
0.15
No advances permitted X 1.00
Advances permitted, but with strict 
limits (e.g., up to 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.67
Advances permitted, and the limits are 
loose (e.g., over 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
b. Securitized lending 0.10
Not permitted X 1.00
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Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up 
to 15 percent of government revenue)
0.67
Permitted, and the limits are loose 
(e.g., over 15 percent of government 
revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount)
0.10
Controlled by the bank X 1.00
Specified by bank charter 0.67
Agreed between the central bank and 
executive
0.33
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00
d. Potential borrowers 0.05 0
Only the central government 1.00
All levels of government (state as well 
as central)
0.67
Those mentioned above and public 
enterprises
0.33
Public and private sector X 0.00
e. Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.025
Currency amounts n.a. 1.00
Shares of central bank demand 
liabilities or capital
0.67
Shares of government revenue 0.33
Shares of government expenditures 0.00
f. Maturity of loans 0.025
Within 6 months n.a. 1.00
Within 1 year 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law 0.00
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025
Above minimum rates 1.00
At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.50
Interest rate is not mentioned X 0.25
No interest rate on government 
borrowing from the central bank
0.00
h. Central bank prohibited from buying or 
selling government securities in the 
primary market?
0.025
Yes 1.00
No X 0.00
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2) Na t io n a l  B a n k  o f  S l o v a k ia
numbir Description of variable Weight Numerical
1 Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.20
a. Term of office
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years 0.75
5 years X 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of 
appointer
0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of Central Bank 1.00
A council of the central bank board, 
executive branch, and legislative 
branch
0.75
Legislature 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council of 
ministers)
0.25
One or two members of the executive 
branch- President of Slovakia upon 
recommendation of the government 
and with approval of the national 
Council of the Slovak Republic
X 0.00
c. Dismissal
No provision for dismissal X 1.00
Only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
At the discretion of central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
executive
0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in 
government?
No X 1.00
Only with permission of the executive 
branch
0.50
No rule against CEO holding another 
office
0.00
2 Policy formulation 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone X 1.00
Bank participates, but has little 
influence
0.67
Bank alone advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0.00
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b. Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict?
The bank, on issues clearly defined in 
the law as its objectives
X 1.00
Government, on policy issues not 
clearly defined as the bank’s goal or in 
case of conflict within the bank
0.80
A council of the central bank, executive 
branch, and legislative branch
0.60
The legislature, on policy issues 0.40
The executive branch on policy issues, 
subject due to process and possible 
protest by bank
0.20
The executive branch has 
unconditional priority
0.00
c. Role of the government’s budgetary 
process
Central bank active 1.00
Central bank has no influence X 0.00
3 Objectives 0.15
Price stability is the major o^only 
objective in the charter, and the central 
bank has the final word in case of 
conflict with other governments 
objectives- and support general 
policies of government leading to 
sustainable economic growth. Act with 
principle of an open market economy
X
1.00
Price stability is the only objective 0.80
Price stability is one goal, with other 
compatible obejctives, such as a stable 
banking system
0.60
Price stability is one goal, with 
potentially conflicting objectives, such 
as full employment
0.40
No objectives stated in the bank 
charter
0.20
Stated objectives do not include price 
stability
0.00
4 Limitations on lending to the government
a. Advances (limitation on nonsecuritized 
lending)
0.15
No advances permitted X 1.00
Advances permitted, but with strict 
limits (e.g., up to 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.67
Advances permitted, and the limits are 
loose (e.g., over 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
b. Securitized lending 0.10
Not permitted 1.00
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Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up 
to 15 percent of government revenue)
X 0.67
Permitted, and the limits are loose 
(e.g., over 15 percent of government 
revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount)
0.10
Controlled by the bank X 1.00
Specified by bank charter 0.67
Agreed between the central bank and 
executive
0.33
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00
d. Potential borrowers 0.05
Only the central government n.a. 1.00
All levels of government (state as well 
as central)
0.67
Those mentioned above and public 
enterprises
0.33
Public and private sector 0.00
e. Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.025
Currency amounts X 1.00
Shares of central bank demand 
liabilities or capital
0.67
Shares of government revenue 0.33
Shares of government expenditures 0.00
f. Maturity of loans 0.025
Within 6 months X 1.00
Within 1 year 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law 0.00
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025
Above minimum rates X 1.00
At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.50
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.25
No interest rate on government 
borrowing from the central bank
0.00
h. Central bank prohibited from buying or 
selling government securities in the 
primary market?
0.025
Yes 1.00
No X 0.00
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3) Na t io n a l  B a n k  o f  H u n g a r y
1
Description of variable 
Chief executive officer (CEO) 0.20
a. Term of office
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years X
(6years)
0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of 
appointer
0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of Central Bank 1.00
A council of the central bank board, 
executive branch, and legislative 
branch
0.75
Legislature 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council of 
ministers)
0.25
One or two members of the executive 
branch- by the president of the 
Republic on proposal of the Prime 
Minister
X 0.00
c. Dismissal
No provision for dismissal 1.00
Only for reasons not related to policy X 0.83
At the discretion of central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
executive
0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in 
government?
No X 1.00
Only with permission of the executive 
branch
0.50
No rule against CEO holding another 
office
0.00
2 Policy formulation 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone X 1.00
Bank participates, but has little 
influence
0.67
Bank alone advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0.00
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b. Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict?
The bank, on issues clearly defined in 
the law as its objectives
X 1.00
Government, on policy issues not 
clearly defined as the bank’s goal or in 
case of conflict within the bank
0.80
A council of the central bank, executive 
branch, and legislative branch
0.60
The legislature, on policy issues 0.40
The executive branch on policy issues, 
subject due to process and possible 
protest by bank
0.20
The executive branch has 
unconditional priority
0.00
c. Role of the government’s budgetary 
process
Central bank active 1.00
Central bank has no influence X 0.00
3 Objectives 0.15
Price stability is the major o^only 
objective in the charter, and the central 
bank has the final word in case of 
conflict with other governments 
objectives- and support general 
policies of government leading to 
sustainable economic growth. Act with 
principle of an open market economy
X 1.00
Price stability is the only objective 0.80
Price stability is one goal, with other 
compatible obejctives, such as a stable 
banking system
0.60
Price stability is one goal, with 
potentially conflicting objectives, such 
as full employment
0.40
No objectives stated in the bank 
charter
0.20
Stated objectives do not include price 
stability
0.00
4 Limitations on lending to the government
a. Advances (limitation on nonsecuritized 
lending)
0.15
No advances permitted X 1.00
Advances permitted, but with strict 
limits (e.g., up to 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.67
Advances permitted, and the limits are 
loose (e.g., over 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
b. Securitized lending 0.10
Not permitted X 1.00
303
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., up 
to 15 percent of government revenue)
0.67
Permitted, and the limits are loose 
(e.g., over 15 percent of government 
revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount)
0.10
Controlled by the bank n.a. 1.00
Specified by bank charter 0.67
Agreed between the central bank and 
executive
0.33
Decided by the executive branch alone 0.00
d. Potential borrowers 0.05
Only the central government 1.00
All levels of government (state as well 
as central)
0.67
Those mentioned above and public 
enterprises
X 0.33
Public and private sector 0.00
e. Limits on central bank lending defined in 0.025
Currency amounts X 1.00
Shares of central bank demand 
liabilities or capital
0.67
Shares of government revenue 0.33
Shares of government expenditures 0.00
f. Maturity of loans 0.025
Within 6 months 1.00
Within 1 year 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law X 0.00
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025
Above minimum rates 1.00
At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.50
Interest rate is not mentioned X 0.25
No interest rate on government 
borrowing from the central bank
0.00
h. Central bank prohibited from buying or 
selling government securities in the 
primary market?
0.025
Yes X 1.00
No 0.00
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4) N a t io n a l  B a n k  o f  P o l a n d
1 Chief executive officer (CEO). 0.20
a. Term of office .
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years X
(6years)
0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years or at the discretion of 
appointer
0.00
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of Central Bank 1.00
A council of the central bank board, 
executive branch, and legislative 
branch
0.75
Legislature- at request of the 
President of the Polish Republic
X 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council 
of ministers)
0.25
One or two members of the 
executive branch
0.00
c. Dismissal
No provision for dismissal 1.00
Only for reasons not related to 
policy
X 0.83
At the discretion of central bank 
board
0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by 
executive
0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in 
government?
No X 1.00
Only with permission of the 
executive branch
0.50
No rule against CEO holding 
another office
0.00
2 Policy formulation 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone X 1.00
Bank participates, but has little 
influence
0.67
Bank alone advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0.00
b. Who has final word in resolution of 
conflict?
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The bank, on issues clearly defined 
in the law as its objectives
X 1.00
Government, on policy issues not 
clearly defined as the bank’s goal or 
in case of conflict within the bank
0.80
A council of the central bank, 
executive branch, and legislative 
branch
0.60
The legislature, on policy issues 0.40
The executive branch on policy 
issues, subject due to process and 
possible protest by bank
0.20
The executive branch has 
unconditional priority
0.00
c. Role of the government’s budgetary 
process
Central bank active X 1.00
Central bank has no influence 0.00
3 Objectives 0.15
Price stability is the major or only 
objective in the charter, and the 
central bank has the final word in 
case of conflict with other 
governments objectives- and 
support general policies of 
government leading to sustainable 
economic growth. Act with principle 
of an open market economy
1.00
Price stability is the only objective X 0.80
Price stability is one goal, with other 
compatible obejctives, such as a 
stable banking system
0.60
Price stability is one goal, with 
potentially conflicting objectives, 
such as full employment
0.40
No objectives stated in the bank 
charter
0.20
Stated objectives do not include 
price stability
0.00
4 Limitations on lending to the 
government
a. Advances (limitation on 
nonsecuritized lending)
0.15
No advances permitted X 1.00
Advances permitted, but with strict 
limits (e.g., up to 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.67
Advances permitted, and the limits 
are loose (e.g., over 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
b. Securitized lending 0.10
Not permitted X 1.00
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Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g., 
up to 15 percent of government 
revenue)
0.67
Permitted, and the limits are loose 
(e.g., over 15 percent of 
government revenue)
0.33
No legal limits on lending 0.00
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, 
amount)
0.10 n.a.
Controlled by the bank 1.00
Specified by bank charter 0.67
Agreed between the central bank 
and executive
0.33
Decided by the executive branch 
alone
0.00
d. Potential borrowers 0.05 n.a.
Only the central government 1.00
All levels of government (state as 
well as central)
0.67
Those mentioned above and public 
enterprises
0.33
Public and private sector 0.00
e. Limits on central bank lending 
defined in
0.025 n.a.
Currency amounts 1.00
Shares of central bank demand 
liabilities or capital
0.67
Shares of government revenue 0.33
Shares of government expenditures 0.00
f. Maturity of loans 0.025 n.a.
Within 6 months 1.00
Within 1 year 0.67
More than 1 year 0.33
No mention of maturity in the law 0.00
g. Interest rates on loans must be 0.025
Above minimum rates 1.00
At market rates 0.75
Below maximum rates 0.50
Interest rate is not mentioned 0.25
No interest rate on government 
borrowing from the central bank
0.00
h. Central bank prohibited from buying 
or selling government securities in the 
primary market?
0.025 0
Yes 1.00
No X 0.00
For the interpretation of the Polish central bank law and calculation see 
Dvorsky (2000:10)
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Appendix 2: Main levels of collective bargaining in the acceding countries
(wage negotiations)
Slovenia
Company Level
Sectoral Level Sectoral Level
Company Level
Cyprus
Slovakia
Trade Union 
Intersectoral Level
Employers 
Intersectoral Level
Government
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Poland
Source: Euro Found (2004: 9)
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Appendix 3: Main social partners
Main social partners in the Czech Republic
Association of Independent Trade Unions
Christian Trade Union Coalition (KOK)
Confederation of Art and Culture (KUK)
Czech-Moravian Confederation of Trade Unions (CMKOS)
Trade Union Association of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (OSCMS)
Confederation of employer and entrepreneur associations (KZPS) 
Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic (SP CR)_______
Main social partners in Slovakia
Confederation of Trade Unions of the Slovak Republic (KOZ SR)
Federation of Employers' Associations of the Slovak Republic (AZZZ SR) 
Union of Employers of the Slovak Republic (RUZ SR)________________
Main social partners in Hum
Autonomous Trade Union Confederation (ASZSZ)
Confederation of Professional Trade Unions (ESZT).
Democratic Ligue of Free Trade Unions (FSZDL)
Forum for the Cooperation of Trade Unions (SZEF)
National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions (MSZOSZ)
National Federation of Workers’ Councils (MOSZ)
Hungarian Industrial Association (OKISZ)
National Association of Employers (MaOSZ)
National Association of Entrepreneurs (VOSZ)
National Association of Hungarian Industrialists (MGYOSZ)________________
National Association of Industrial Corporations -  Chamber of Artisans (IPOSZ) 
National Association of Strategic and Public Utility Companies (STRATOSZ) 
National Federation Consumer Co-operatives (AFEOSZ)__________________
National Federation of Traders and Caterers (KISOSZ)
Union of Agrarian Employers (AMSZ)
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Main social partners in Poland
All-Poland Trade Union Agreement (OPZZ)
Solidarity trade union NSZZ
Trade Union Forum
Business Centre Club Employers Association
National Confederation of Polish Employers
Polish Confederation of Private Employers
Union of Polish Crafts
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